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II 
Earnings management and Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms prior to Leveraged Buyouts in the UK 
Abstract 
This research examines the use of accruals (AEM) and real earnings 
management (REM), and how they are affected by corporate governance 
mechanisms preceding leveraged buyouts in the UK. The sample includes all 
UK leveraged buyouts of listed firms between 1997 and 2011, which covers the 
second wave of leverage buyouts in the UK. The research considers 
management buyouts (MBOs) and institutional buyouts (IBOs) separately, 
because managerial incentives regarding earnings management are expected 
to differ in these two settings.  
 
The first empirical study investigates the existence of AEM, and how audit 
committee characteristics and external auditing quality affect AEM, prior to 
MBOs and IBOs. The findings suggest that managers engage in negative AEM 
prior to MBOs, possibly to reduce the perception of firm value, and thus depress 
the purchasing price of MBOs. The research finds no evidence that firms 
subsequently targeted in IBOs engage in AEM to a greater degree than non-
buyout firms. This finding might be related to the fact that managers are unable 
to predict IBOs. Moreover, the research suggests that quality of audit 
committees and external auditing has a greater impact on AEM in IBO than in 
MBO firms.  
 
The second empirical study explores the use of REM preceding MBOs and 
IBOs, and how block ownership and board characteristics affect it. Surprisingly, 
the findings suggest that managers pursue positive REM prior to both IBOs and 
MBOs. As firms targeted by IBOs tend to be undervalued compared to non-
III 
buyout firms, managers might engage in positive REM to improve the firm’s 
share price to reduce the risk of IBO bids. Positive REM prior to MBOs may 
serve to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value 
to secure financing for MBOs, even though it is likely to increase the purchasing 
price of MBOs. The research also indicates a positive relationship between 
insider and outsider block ownership and REM.  
 
While the findings for firms targeted by IBOs in first two empirical projects are 
consistent with the expectation that managers try to improve the perception of 
the performance and value of their firms, the findings for MBOs appear 
inconsistent and rather baffling. The third empirical study thus explores the 
puzzle of how decisions about AEM and REM are related in firms prior to IBOs 
and MBOs. The research reveals that, while AEM and REM have a 
complementary relationship preceding IBOs, prior to MBOs, AEM and REM 
have a substitutive relationship. 
 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of earnings management prior to 
IBOs and MBOs. Moreover, the findings highlight that the impact of firms’ 
corporate governance characteristics on earnings management differs 
depending on the setting. This might be related not only to different managerial 
incentives but also to a lack of context awareness by directors or auditors.  
 
Key Words: Accruals earnings management, Real earnings management, 
Corporate governance mechanisms, Management buyouts and Institutional 
buyouts 
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Chapter 1 
1 
1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research background and motivation 
Leveraged buyouts have become a distinct and increasingly important type of 
acquisition in global financial markets, which have also attracted increasing 
academic interest. A leveraged buyout is the purchase and delisting of a publicly 
listed corporation, in which the buyers are typically funded by substantial 
amounts of debt and backed by private equity firms (Weir and Wright, 2006). 
Within the UK market, since the 1990s, there has been a significant increase in 
the number and value of leveraged buyouts. The value of leveraged buyout 
deals has increased from £458.62 million in 1997 to £3802.91 million in 2010. 
In the peak year of 2006, there were 17 leveraged buyouts with the average 
value being £1267.12 million per deal (Thomson ONE database, Table 1.1 in 
the appendix). In leveraged buyouts, whether the company is purchased in a 
direct transaction by incumbent management or by outside institutional 
investors, the price paid for the firm directly affects the cash flow accruing to 
both sides of the transaction. In either case, purchasers always seek the lowest 
possible purchase price, and selling shareholders are concerned whether they 
get the highest possible sales price.  
 
However, information asymmetries generally exist between better-informed 
managers and less well informed outsiders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
leveraged buyout firms, the shareholders are principals, and managers act as 
agents. Information asymmetries arise when principals cannot reliably observe 
and interpret information about the competencies, intentions, expertise and 
actions of agents (Saam, 2007; Sepe, 2010). Information asymmetries might 
lead to moral hazard problems, which occur when an agent believes that their 
opportunistic behaviours will not be detected (Saam, 2007). In this case, a 
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divergence of interests between principals and agents might lead to the 
exploitation of principals.  
 
Information asymmetries create a demand for internally generated measures 
of a firm's performance to be reported on a periodic basis. Accounting earnings 
information thus plays a crucial role in reducing information asymmetry. For 
instance, prior to leveraged buyouts, potential bidders make extensive use of 
publicly available accounting information1 , such as earnings figures, to help 
them to model the valuation of firms. Earnings information therefore has great 
value relevance to investors and other financiers, and their demand for such 
information increases when they are making decisions (Aharony and Barniv, 
2004). A detailed analysis of earnings information can also help shareholders 
to assess whether they have been offered a fair price in leveraged buyouts (Bull, 
1989). For instance, DeAngelo (1990) found that investment bankers make 
extensive use of accounting earnings for firm valuation in leveraged buyouts. 
Perry and Williams (1994) also report that accounting earnings are used by the 
courts to assess the fairness of a buyout price when selling shareholders claim 
that their compensation is inadequate in management buyouts (MBOs). As 
financial statements should provide value-relevant information to the external 
stakeholders of a firm, the heavy reliance on accounting numbers creates 
powerful incentives for managers to manipulate earnings. Therefore, earnings 
management is a potential issue prior to leveraged buyouts.  
 
There are two types of earnings management, accruals-based earnings 
management (AEM) and real activities earnings management (REM). AEM 
occurs “when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
                                                             
1 Potential bidders might also need access to private information in confidentiality 
agreements.  
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contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999: 368). AEM involves changing discretionary accrual choices 
within the boundary of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), it 
therefore directly influences the amount of accounting accruals, and has no 
direct effect on cash flows (Kim and Sohn, 2013).  
 
In contrast, REM refers to “departures from normal operational practices, 
motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into 
believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course 
of operations” (Roychowdhury, 2006: 337). REM involves changing the normal 
operating decisions of the business. REM can have direct consequences on 
current and future cash flows as well as on accounting earnings (Kim and Sohn, 
2013). Although both types of earnings management aim to conceal the actual 
performance of the firm, AEM and REM have distinct characteristics and effects 
on firm performance. Hence both types of earnings management are significant 
concerns prior to leveraged buyouts.  
 
A relatively small number of empirical studies have previously investigated AEM 
prior to MBOs in the US market. MBOs are leveraged buyouts in which 
managers are involved as buyers. Although the evidence is somewhat mixed, 
most of these studies (e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994; DeAngelo, 1986; Wu, 
1997) suggest that managers engaged in negative AEM prior to MBOs, possibly 
in an attempt to depress valuation by concealing the real value of the firm so 
that shareholders might accept a lower buyout price. In contrast, Fischer and 
Louis (2008) report that managers engaged in positive AEM prior to MBOs, 
possibly to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s 
value in order to secure finance for buyouts. The contradictory results of prior 
studies encourage more research to be done in this field in an attempt to find 
further evidence. Moreover, prior studies have not investigated REM 
behaviours preceding leveraged buyouts when both AEM and REM are at the 
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managers’ discretion. By investigating both AEM and REM, this research might 
be able to explain further the reasons behind the contradictory results in 
previous studies.  
 
There are several types of REM behaviours, such as sales manipulation or 
overproduction, and managers might choose different strategies in their use of 
specific types of REM due to the potential long- or short-term effects. Aggregate 
REM is less likely to reveal specific strategies in REM. Hence investigating 
differentiated REM behaviours, rather than total REM behaviours, might provide 
a better understanding of managerial incentives and behaviours. In addition, 
given the portfolio of earnings management strategies, managers might use 
AEM and REM as complements or as substitutes for each other in order to 
increase the probability of beating earnings targets and to lower the risks of 
detection. Examining the relationships between AEM and REM might give a 
clearer understanding of the strategies that managers use in overall earnings 
management.  
 
In addition, prior studies have focused on AEM prior to MBOs, but the earnings 
management behaviours preceding another important type of leveraged buyout, 
institutional buyouts (IBOs), is under explored. IBOs are exclusively buyouts 
that are initiated and executed solely by outside institutional investors and 
private equity houses without including target firm's management in the 
transaction. This research has found that IBO firms have undervalued shares 
in the market, as measured by the industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio. Firm 
undervaluation attracts IBO buyers (Hafzalla, 2009), and IBOs threaten 
managers’ long-term job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). It appears that, as 
managers become aware that their firm has been undervalued, which might 
become a potential IBO target, they are more likely to engage in earnings 
management in an attempt to increase their firm's value. Hence managers 
might have different incentives in MBOs and IBOs, and their earnings 
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management behaviours might be different prior to buyouts. Investigating and 
comparing earnings management behaviours prior to these two types of 
buyouts might provide a better understanding of managerial incentives and 
earnings management behaviours in leveraged buyout settings.  
 
Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms play an important part in 
mitigating earnings management behaviours, but prior studies have not 
explored this issue in leveraged buyout settings. Specifically, different types of 
leveraged buyout might provide different incentives for different stakeholders, 
and the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management 
behaviours might be different in MBOs and IBOs. Hence it is worth investigating 
the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management 
preceding MBOs and IBOs. 
 
Most of what is currently known about leveraged buyouts comes from studies 
that analysed US samples from the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. DeAngelo, 1986; 
Perry and Williams, 1994). It is questionable whether the US evidence is 
generalisable to the UK, due to the distinct characteristics of the markets. In the 
UK, leveraged buyouts have relatively fewer hostile takeovers, lower debt levels, 
focus more on growth opportunities and are commonly financed by privately 
placed mezzanine funds rather than junk bonds (Toms and Wright, 2005). 
Moreover, the most recent wave of leveraged buyouts in the UK, starting from 
1997, is different from the first wave in the 1980s. In the latest wave, increasing 
numbers of private equity and debt financiers were willing to provide financial 
backup to support the buyout transactions. Furthermore, target shareholders 
were more likely to accept condition of irrevocable undertakings, a binding 
agreement on target shareholders to accept a buyout offer, which increases the 
chances of success in buyout transactions (Renneboog et al., 2007). Hence it 
is important to investigate earnings management behaviours prior to leveraged 
buyouts in the UK.  
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Leveraged buyouts are a distinct and significant type of acquisition in financial 
markets, and the self-interested behaviours of managers prior to buyouts may 
significantly affect buyout transactions. Prior literature (e.g. DeAngelo, 1986; 
Perry and Williams, 1994; Wu, 1997; Fischer and Louis, 2008) mainly focuses 
on AEM behaviours prior to MBOs, and the findings are inconclusive, 
suggesting either positive or negative AEM. Earnings management behaviours 
prior to IBOs are under explored. Hence there is a research gap relating to all 
types of earnings management behaviours prior to both MBOs and IBOs. This 
research investigates this research gap by taking account of managerial 
incentives in order to provide a better understanding of management 
behaviours preceding leveraged buyouts. There is also a call for future research 
to explore the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings 
management in special situations (e.g. Shan, 2015; Renneboog et al., 2007). 
This research therefore explores this research gap to investigate the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management 
practices prior to leveraged buyouts. The findings of this thesis may have 
implications for existing shareholders, potential investors and corporate boards. 
They might have a better understanding of managers' incentives and 
behaviours so that to be more active in protecting or maximising the long-term 
interests of shareholders. Moreover, the findings may have implications for 
governance regulators who seek to enhance the monitoring and control 
mechanisms for potential earnings management practices.  
1.2 Aims and objectives  
This study aims to carry out an investigation on the use of AEM and REM, and 
to determine how they are affected by corporate governance mechanisms 
preceding leveraged buyouts in the UK. This research differs from prior studies 
as it provides a new angle on the earnings management literature by examining 
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managerial AEM behaviours preceding leveraged buyouts in the UK. Weak 
corporate governance enables greater managerial discretions to manipulate 
earnings, but good corporate governance limits managers’ ability and thus 
potentially restricts earnings management behaviours. Hence, corporate 
governance is important for mitigating earnings management behaviours. This 
study provides a new angle on corporate governance literature by examining 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and AEM prior to 
leveraged buyouts in the UK. Specifically, AEM is achieved by changing the 
accounting methods or estimates used, which carries a high risk of drawing the 
scrutiny of auditors (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a). Hence this aspect of the 
research focuses on audit committee characteristics and the quality of external 
audits.  
 
Since REM is at managers’ discretion, this study extends the earnings 
management literature by examining managerial REM behaviours preceding 
leveraged buyouts in the UK. As managers might use different strategies in 
different types of REM, due to the potential long- or short-term effects of each 
type, this study investigates specific types of REM in addition to aggregate REM.  
 
This study also examines the relationships between corporate governance 
mechanisms and REM prior to leveraged buyouts in the UK. As REM uses 
managerial discretions over business operational decisions, it is more likely to 
be constrained by effective monitoring and control from significant shareholders 
and boards rather than from auditors. Thus the investigation focuses on the 
shareholding by outsiders and board characteristics instead of on auditors. 
Shareholders might have diverse concerns regarding the negative impact of 
different elements of REM, for instance, institutions with long-term investment 
horizons might greatly concern about research and development expense cuts. 
Accordingly, this research investigates disaggregated components of REM.  
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Furthermore, examining only one earnings management technique at a time 
may not explain the overall effect of earnings management activities if 
managers use AEM and REM as complements or as substitutes for each other 
(Fields et al., 2001). Hence this study provides a new angle on earnings 
management literature by investigating the relationship between AEM and REM 
preceding leveraged buyouts. This relationship might also be constrained by 
the relative costs of engaging in AEM and REM and by managers' abilities to 
use the two earnings management methods. For instance, if their ability to use 
REM is constrained or the costs attached are high, managers may have a 
tendency to use more AEM. Similarly, if their ability to use AEM are constrained 
or the costs attached are high, managers may have a tendency to use more 
REM. Thus controlling for a set of constraints of the two types of earnings 
management might contribute to the investigation of the relationship between 
AEM and REM.   
 
Prior literature usually assumes that AEM and REM might be related 
sequentially as REM needs to be engaged in reasonably far ahead of the 
publication of the financial reports, whereas AEM is likely to be more flexibly 
arranged in the short run after fiscal year end (e.g. Lara et al., 2012; Zang, 
2012). However, this sequential relationship that REM is engaged prior to AEM 
is merely based the expectations on theoretical and/or practical considerations. 
Moreover, if AEM and REM have a sequential relationship, which sequence the 
relationship is likely to be in. Prior studies do not actually test whether they get 
the sequence right.  
 
Hence, this raises the question that whether AEM and REM might really have 
a relationship given their distinct differences. Specifically, AEM changes 
discretionary accrual choices within the boundary of GAAP to distorting the 
impression of a firm’s financial position (Kim and Sohn, 2013). REM changes 
normal operations to influence both accounting accruals and cash flows in the 
Chapter 1 
9 
current period (Kim and Sohn, 2013). This suggests that AEM and REM might 
not actually be related, as they are very different types of activities.  
 
In contrast, this study suggests that managers might consider both AEM and 
REM jointly rather than consecutively. Managers might consider their ability and 
the most degree that could engage in each type of earnings management jointly, 
because the limited flexibility to exercise AEM constrains managers (Gunny, 
2010), and balance the use of AEM and REM could reduce associated risks 
and costs.  
 
Prior literature tends to simply use aggregate measure of REM in investigation 
might have increased the noise in the measure due to managerial different 
strategies in terms of the different types of REM, which might lead to spurious 
results (e.g. Lara et al., 2012; Zang, 2012). In contrast to argue the sequence 
of AEM and aggregated REM, this study examines whether AEM and REM 
might be related by disaggregating different types of REM, which might provide 
a relatively more reliable result. This is because managers might adopt different 
strategies in terms of the different types of REM, and the potential relationship 
between AEM and disaggregate types of REM might be different.  
 
However, a potential relationship between AEM and REM is not a foregone 
conclusion. As AEM and REM have distinct differences, investigating these two 
different types of earnings management separately is still valid. Moving from 
independent AEM and REM to interdependent AEM and REM, this chapter 
makes a further method based development to investigate the potential 
relationship between AEM and REM.   
 
Depending on whether they participate in leveraged buyouts or not, managers 
might have different incentives for engaging in earnings management, and their 
choice of earnings-management strategies might be different. Thus I subdivide 
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leveraged buyouts into MBOs and IBOs2 for the purposes of this investigation.  
 
In MBOs, managers are buyers and are part of the team instigating the takeover 
and they therefore remain with the firm. They usually have high levels of 
personal investment in a firm after the buyout. In the context of MBOs, 
managers' direct involvement in the transaction generates conflicts of interests. 
Managers wish to pay the lowest possible purchase price, whereas their 
shareholders wish to sell their shares for the highest possible price. The 
managers’ personal economic stake may motivate them to depress pre-buyout 
accounting earnings in order to portray the firm as underperforming, increasing 
the possibility that shareholders will accept a lower buyout price (Perry and 
Williams, 1994). Hence managers might have strong incentives to engage in 
negative earnings management in an attempt to depress the buyout price in 
MBOs.  
 
Furthermore, in most cases, internal financing by managers is insufficient to 
raise the cash required to implement a buyout. Management need to seek 
additional finance from external sources by leveraging their company’s assets 
through secured bank loans. Further external debt financing may also be 
obtained through private placements of subordinated claims from institutional 
investors. Managers therefore tend to depend on external funds to execute their 
buyouts, and they will be concerned about their ability to obtain finance from 
external sources. This might motivate them to manipulate earnings upward in 
order to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value 
and thereby secure external financing. Hence managers who rely on external 
sources of finance might engage in positive earnings management prior to 
MBOs (Fischer and Louis, 2008). Therefore, earnings management prior to 
                                                             
2 Throughout the paper, I use the term ‘MBOs’ to refer to leveraged buyouts where 
management is involved, and ‘IBOs’ to refer exclusively to leveraged buyouts where 
management is not involved.  
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MBOs could be either negative, in an attempt to depress the buyout price, or 
positive, to secure external financing. ‘’ 
 
By contrast, IBO targets usually have undervalued shares in the market relative 
to firms that remain public (Weir and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986). Firm 
undervaluation is likely to attract IBO buyers, and third-party buyers wish to take 
control and engage in active monitoring or make changes to a firm’s existing 
management team after a buyout (Hafzalla, 2009). Even if managers are not 
dismissed initially, the uncertainty regarding whether the business will be re-
sold again within several years threatens managers’ job security (Denis and 
Denis, 1995). As firm undervaluation attracts IBO buyers, a reduction in firm 
undervaluation is likely to reduce the possibility of becoming an IBO target. 
Therefore, prior to IBOs, managers might engage in positive earnings 
management to reduce firm undervaluation and/or increase the potential 
buyout costs in an attempt to impede any potential IBO bidding.  
 
Before comparing the MBO and IBO samples, it is worth first considering 
whether the investigation of earnings management behaviours prior to MBOs 
and IBOs is appropriate. In the run up to buyouts, managers’ incentives may 
change if they participate in an MBO. Before choosing to participate in an MBO, 
earnings management behaviours are driven by incentives that are unrelated 
to the buyout. However, once managers decide to take part in an MBO, the 
buyout-related incentives might become more important, driving earnings 
management behaviour from then on. In contrast, there is less likely to have 
such a change in incentives if managers encounter an IBO, as they are not part 
of the buying group. Hence earnings management behaviours in IBO firms are 
expected to be different from those in MBO firms once managers decide to take 
part in an MBO.  
 
Moreover, this research uses earnings management of non-leveraged buyout 
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industrial peers as benchmark to calculate the abnormal AEM and REM of 
buyout firms. Any abnormal AEM or REM detected in this process is taken to 
be earnings management relating to leveraged buyouts. Due to this control, 
exploring earnings management behaviours prior to MBOs and IBOs is 
appropriate.  
1.3 Theoretical background  
Agency theory defines a contractual relationship in public corporations under 
which one or more persons, referred to as the principal(s), engage another 
person, serving as the agent, to perform some service on their behalf (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In this relationship, the principal delegates some decision 
making authority to the agent, but the agents do not bear the full wealth effects 
of their decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This formal structure is 
applicable to an even wider context where no formal delegation relationship is 
explicitly involved (Rees, 1985; Saam, 2007). Therefore, agency theory 
proposes a consensual relationship between two parties, where one participant 
(the agent) agrees to act on the behalf of the other (the principal) (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Schroeder et al., 2010). In modern companies, the shareholders or 
owners of the firm, who do not directly manage the firm themselves, are referred 
as the principals, whereas the managers or employees, who are entrusted to 
act in the interest of shareholders, are serving as the agents (Solomon, 2010; 
Berle and Means, 1932). The separation of ownership and control between 
principal and agent in modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932) is 
associated with some inherent problems.  
 
There are two major problems in an agency relationship, which are interests 
conflict and information asymmetry. First, interests conflict between the 
shareholders and the managers is the primary assumption of agency theory. 
Shareholders usually desire to maximise their long-term wealth, whereas 
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managers might prefer to pursue the short-term objectives to maximise their 
own utilities, such as higher salaries, bonuses and as many perquisites as 
possible (Solomon, 2010; Schroeder et al., 2010). As agency theory suggested, 
if both parties to the relationship are self-utility maximisers, there is a good 
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, managers may not always 
act in the best interests of shareholders. Apparently, they will pursue self-
interests by maximising short-term investments and extract private benefits 
rather than long-term shareholder wealth maximisation, which might lead to a 
reduction of shareholder wealth in the long-term (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Saam, 2007).  
 
Moreover, the risk preferences between shareholders and managers is another 
reason for aberrant activities of the agent (Saam, 2007). Generally, the principal 
and the agent vary widely in their risk attitudes, which are related to different 
compensation schemes. Besides, the principal can diversify their risks through 
investments diversification, while the agent cannot. It is reasonable to assume 
that the manager is more risk averse, whereas the shareholder is risk neutral. 
Therefore, the inherent preference of risk or expectation divergence may lead 
to shareholders and managers favouring different action plans (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Saam, 2007; Roche, 2009).  
 
The interest and risk diverges between shareholder and manager may cause 
managerial abnormal behaviours (Dalton et al., 2007). The feasible solution to 
this agency problem is to develop incentive plans thus aligning the interests of 
owner and agent through offering equity ownership to agents (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such incentive alignment 
generally involves financial alignment, whereby the manager’s economic 
rewards co-vary with those of shareholders through offering equity ownership 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, such financial alignment may 
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additional affect agents’ risk preferences, causing them to take either riskier or 
less risky decisions than optimal from the shareholders’ perspective (Nyberg et 
al., 2010). Excessive incentive can also divert managers’ attention away from 
performing a task instead of focusing on how to get the incentives (Sprinkle, 
2000).  
 
Second, informational asymmetry between the shareholder and the manager is 
another major problem in an agency relationship, which is reflected in agency 
theoretical considerations. It is rational for both principal and agent to enter an 
agency relationship, either a potential agent has competences to fulfil a task 
which the principal does not have, or both of them have the competences, but 
the potential agent can fulfil the task at lower cost (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985; 
Saam, 2007). Informational asymmetries arise because the competences, 
intentions, knowledge, and actions of the agent cannot be monitor or can only 
be monitor at high costs, however the principal needs this information to 
compensate the agent depending on his effort. Therefore, asymmetrical 
information in favour of the agent is assumed in agency theory (Saam, 2007; 
Sepe, 2010).  
 
Informational asymmetry can result in moral hazard problems. Moral hazard 
problems are associated with hidden actions when agents have the incentive 
to pursue self-interested behaviour. After contracting the manager can perform 
aberrant activities, or work less but pretend to work hard, which cannot easily 
be evaluated by the principal (Saam, 2007; Voigt, 2011; Fama and Jensen, 
1983b). Further, manager may has private knowledge on facts which are 
relevant to evaluate his work’s effort, and such knowledge is part of his 
expertise which he may use opportunistically (Arrow, 1985). Shareholders may 
pay a high price to obtain the same information as managers, or it may be 
impossible for them to eliminate informational asymmetry. Hence, information 
asymmetry put the principal in a disadvantageous position (Voigt, 2011; 
Chapter 1 
15 
Schillhofer, 2003).  
 
While corporate reporting is in general supposed to be a corporate governance 
mechanism to alleviate information asymmetry, unless properly supervised, 
managers might use corporate reporting to increase information asymmetry, by 
issuing information to distort investors' and other stakeholders' perception of 
the firm.  
 
Earnings management is a moral hazard problem, and managers could use it 
to manipulate the degree of information asymmetry hence to affect 
shareholders’ perceptions of a firm’s value. Agency theory assumes that 
managers are self-motivated, thus they are likely to use earnings management 
to enlarge information asymmetry hence manipulating others' perceptions to 
meet their own objectives. This implies that managers seek to mislead investors 
to pursue the managerial private interests (Beneish, 2001). The empirical 
literature initiated by Healy (1985) found that managers use AEM to strategically 
manipulate bonus income hence to increase their compensation. Later 
researches by Sloan (1996) and Collins and Hribar (2000) provides evidence 
that managers may be able to use AEM to affect the markets’ valuation of their 
firms. These authors found an apparent accruals anomaly in financial markets, 
and the market appears to consistently overestimate the persistence of the 
accruals components of earnings, hence to overprice them (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). This means that investors are overoptimistic, and they are 
unlikely to spot on accruals earnings manipulation. Moreover, Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong (1998a; 1998b) suggest that investors naively extrapolating pre-issue 
earnings without fully adjusting for the potential manipulation of reported 
earnings. Their research reveals that firms appear to have engaged in AEM to 
report higher net income prior to the initial and the seasoned equity public 
offering have lower post-issue long-run abnormal share returns and net income. 
Therefore, managers may potentially be able to use AEM to affect shareholders’ 
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perceptions of a firm’s value.  
 
In the leveraged buyouts context, managers are also likely to use earnings 
management to affect shareholders’ perceptions of their firm’s value. DeAngelo 
(1986) suggests that managers could effectively manage shareholders’ 
perception of a firm’s value by engaging in negative AEM prior to MBOs. The 
empirical research by Perry and Williams (1994) found that managers engaged 
in negative AEM prior to MBOs in an attempt to depress valuation by concealing 
the real value of the firm. Further, Fischer and Louis (2008) report that 
managers engaged in positive AEM prior to MBOs in an attempt to enhance 
prospective external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s.  
 
Earnings management is an opportunistic behaviour from agency theory 
perceptive, which managers used to enlarge information asymmetry. However, 
signalling theory might view earnings management behaviour as a way that 
managers used to reduce information asymmetry between them and outside 
shareholders and potential investors. 
 
Signalling theory describes the behaviour of two parties (individuals or 
organizations) when they have access to different information. This theory 
indicates that, typically, the sender party choose whether and how to 
communicate (or signal) the information, and the other party, the receiver, 
choose how to interpret the signal (Connelly et al., 2011). Signalling theory is 
fundamentally concerned with the reduction of information asymmetry between 
two parties (Spence, 2002). Spence (1973) formulates this theory in labour 
markets by demonstrating how a job applicant might engage in behaviours to 
reduce information asymmetry that interferes the selection ability of prospective 
employers. Spence (1973) illustrates that the potential high-quality employees 
distinguish themselves from low-quality prospects via the costly signal of 
rigorous higher education.  
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Financial economists extended signalling theory to illustrate that firm debt 
(Ross, 1973; Levine (1996) cited in Arya et al., 1998) and dividends 
(Bhattacharya, 1979) could represent signals of firm quality. These researches 
suggest that only high-quality firms have the ability to make interest and 
dividend payments over the long term, while low quality firms will not be able to 
sustain such payments. Hence such signals influence outside lenders’ or 
investors’ perspective of a firm’s quality (Riley, 2001). With regards to earnings 
management, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) enunciated that informative 
earnings management could be a useful signal, under which managerial 
discretion was a means to reveal managerial private expectations for investors 
about the firm’s future cash flows (Beneish, 2001).  
 
Signalling theory is a potential alternative theory that could adopt in this 
research. However, as it suggests that earnings management is a way to 
reduce information asymmetry, which is not support the hypotheses in this 
research that managers use earnings management to pursue their private 
interests.  
 
Stewardship theory is an alternative to agency theory and offers opposing 
prediction that managers are stewards rather than the entirely self-interested 
rational economic (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Stewardship theory suggests 
that managers have a range of non-financial motives for their behaviours, such 
as the need for achievement and recognition, the intrinsic satisfaction of 
successful business, respect for authority and the work ethic (Argyris, 1964; 
Herzberg, 1968; McClelland, 1961). Stewardship theory views managers as 
essentially good stewards and are loyal to the company. When confronted with 
a course of action seen as personally unrewarding, managers may act based 
on a sense of duty and identification with the organisation (Etzioni, 1974). They 
act to achieve high performance and capable of using a high level of discretion 
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to act for the benefit of shareholders (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Stewardship 
theory provides a theoretical basis in this research to assume that managers 
are essential to the success of the business and corporate governance 
functions, as they are good stewards and loyal to the company rather than 
entirely self-interested.  
 
Resource dependence theory is one additional theory used in corporate 
governance research (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In contrast to agency theory 
emphasising board independence, resource dependence theory suggests that 
board provides various resources that is vital for the survival of a firm (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Boards are important boundary 
spanners that can be used as a mechanism to link the external environment 
with a firm. The inter-organisational linkages, such as the appointment of 
outside directors and board interlocks, is important because they can be used 
to manage environmental contingencies. For instance, prestigious directors, in 
their professions and communities, can be a source to access timely 
information for executives. These directors become involved in helping the 
organisation by influencing their other constituencies on behalf of this one 
(Price, 1963; Zald, 1967). Hence, adding more directors to serve the board may 
ensure a minimum required knowledge base (Vafeas, 2005), and the ability of 
the board to monitor may increase (Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009). Resource 
dependence theory is a theoretical base of this research to assume that boards 
or board sub-committees are essential functions of corporate governance 
mechanisms, which is helpful to mitigate earnings management behaviours.  
 
This study takes positivist approach to conduct an accounting research. 
Positivism refers to “an epistemological position that advocates the application 
of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond” 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011:16). The positivistic approach seeks the facts or causes 
of social phenomena that is independent to the subjective state of the individual. 
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Thus logical reasoning is applied to the research, which implies precision, 
objectivity and rigour on research investigation. Positivism takes the basic 
assumption that social reality is independent of us and exists regardless of 
whether we are aware of it, when studying human behaviour. Hence, the act of 
reality investigating has no effect on the reality. This might indicate the 
ontological position of positivism (Collis and Hussey, 2013). Positivist 
researchers are likely to use a highly structured methodology in order to 
facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 2002). They also emphasise on 
quantifiable observations and the use of statistical analysis, although they might 
also use qualitative methods (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
Positivism is generally taken to entail five principles: (1) only observable 
phenomena can genuinely lead to the production of credible data; (2) existing 
theory is used to generate hypotheses that can be tested and thereby lead to 
the further development of theory, which then may be tested by further research; 
(3) the hypotheses development lead to the gathering of facts that is the basis 
for subsequent hypothesis testing; (4) research is undertaken in a way that is 
value free; (5) scientific statements, rather than normative statements, are the 
true domain of the scientist, because the truth of scientific statements can be 
confirmed by the senses (Saunders et al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
 
Positive accounting research start flourishing since the introduction of empirical 
finance methods to financial accounting research (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; 
Beaver, 1968). The paper by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) helped advocate 
the positive accounting research, and introduced a brand of positive accounting 
theory that especially well grounded in economic theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1990; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Watts and Zimmerman (1990) indicate 
that the term ‘positive’ is used to distinguish their and other people's positive 
research from traditional normative theories by emphasising the importance of 
prediction and explanation.  
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This stream of positive accounting researches aims to predict and explain 
managerial accounting choice and the preference for accounting policies (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990). Positive studies of market reaction to earnings (e.g. 
Ball and Brown, 1968) revealed that the numbers were important to markets 
(positive share price changes associated with positive unexpected earnings) 
but could neither explain or predict the accounting choices been made (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990). By introducing information perspective (accounting 
data providing information) and/or transactions costs (e.g. agency costs), 
positive accounting researches could test hypothesis for the relationship 
between accounting choices and other motivations, such as political cost, 
bonus plan, debt/equity (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  
 
This study takes positivist accounting approach to investigate earnings 
management behaviours and the effects of corporate governance mechanisms 
on them prior to leveraged buyouts in the UK. In this study, agency theory is 
mainly used to develop hypotheses. As this study focuses on the UK market, 
the sampling frame is all UK firms involved in leveraged buyouts. This ensures 
the implications for the UK generalisability. In order to collect data to test 
hypotheses, this study choose to use secondary data from multiple sources, as 
no one database could provide all the data required in this study. Secondary 
data saves enormous resources for research, such as time and efforts to collect 
data, and could regarded as high quality data (Saunders et al., 2009). However, 
secondary data might be collected for a different purpose which is not match 
the specific research needs, hence the data downloaded from database needs 
refining before applying. Secondary data might also include mistakes so that 
the data sources must be evaluated carefully (Saunders et al., 2009). This study 
could also use interview or survey as additional data collection methods. 
Nevertheless, these two methods are time consuming and the author might 
have difficulty to access interviewees (Saunders et al., 2009). Following 
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positivist approach, the refined data is put into empirical models of this study to 
test for hypotheses, and thereby the results aim to lead to the further 
development of theory.  
1.4 Research questions 
In order to achieve the aims of this study, the following research questions are 
addressed:  
 
(1) Is there evidence of managers practising AEM preceding MBOs and IBOs 
in the UK? 
 
(2) What are the effects of the corporate governance mechanisms of audit 
committee characteristics and external audit quality on AEM behaviours 
preceding MBOs and IBOs in the UK? 
 
(3) Is there evidence of managers engaging in REM behaviour preceding MBOs 
and IBOs in the UK? 
 
(4) What are the effects of the corporate governance mechanisms of 
shareholding by outsiders and board characteristics on REM activities 
preceding MBOs and IBOs in the UK? 
 
(5) Is there any relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs and IBOs? 
 
(6) Do the constraints of earnings management methods have asymmetric 
effects on the relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs and IBOs?  
1.5 Methodology 
This study investigates all UK leveraged buyout cases in the London Stock 
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Exchange between 1997 and 2011. It adopts abnormal discretionary accruals 
from the cross-sectional model of Kothari et al. (2005) to proxy for AEM. The 
Dechow et al.’s (1995) cross-sectional model or Jones’s (1991) cross-sectional 
model is also used to provide alternative measures of AEM. Moreover, this 
study uses cross-sectional models developed by Roychowdhury (2006) to 
detect REM proxies in signed values. Specifically, abnormal cash flow from 
operations (CFO) proxies for sales manipulations, abnormal production costs 
proxies for overproduction and abnormal discretionary expenses proxies for 
manipulations of discretionary expenses. Furthermore, alternative REM proxies 
in signed values generated by the models of Gunny (2010) and Lara et al. (2012) 
are used to increase robustness of this study. The adoption of alternative 
measures of AEM and REM aims to provide consistent results and confirm that 
my findings are not sensitive to the particular measures used for AEM or REM.   
 
Univariate tests adopt two-sided T-tests to examine whether earnings 
management behaviours (both AEM and REM) exist prior to MBOs and IBOs. 
Further, multivariate tests adopt ordinary least square (OLS) models to 
investigate the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings 
management behaviours (both AEM and REM) preceding both MBOs and IBOs.  
 
Finally, in the third empirical chapter, this study constructs a simultaneous 
equations system to capture the relationship between AEM and REM. The AEM 
and REM variables are subject to a potential endogeneity bias, as the levels of 
AEM and REM might be determined simultaneously. Similar to prior studies (e.g. 
Beatty et al., 1995; Barton, 2001; Pincus and Shivaram, 2002; Badertscher, 
2011), this research uses the simultaneous equations system to address the 
potential simultaneity. This study uses both three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) to explore the impact of simultaneous 
equations system to address the sequence of earnings management decisions. 
The findings support the suggestion of prior literature (e.g. Greene, 2011; 
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Hussain, 2000) that 3SLS, by estimating the whole system of structural 
equations jointly, better address the simultaneous relationships.   
1.6 Contributions 
This thesis represents a comprehensive study on earnings management (AEM 
and REM) and the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings 
management in the UK leveraged-buyout market. The first empirical study 
(Chapter 2) explores the existence of AEM and the effects of audit committee 
characteristics and external audit quality on AEM prior to MBOs and IBOs. The 
second empirical study (Chapter 3) investigates the existence of REM, and the 
effects of the shareholding by outsiders and board characteristics on REM 
activities preceding MBOs and IBOs. Based on the results of these two studies, 
the third empirical study (Chapter 4) examines the potential relationships 
between AEM and REM preceding MBOs and IBOs by controlling for a set of 
factors that may constrain the ability and degree to which managers can 
engage in earnings management.  
 
This thesis contributes to the earnings management and corporate governance 
researches, and the main contributions are set out in line:  
 
First, the first empirical chapter of this thesis investigates AEM behaviours in 
leveraged buyout settings, which extends earnings management research to 
both MBOs and IBOs fields. Managers might have different incentives when 
they engage in earnings management prior to MBOs and IBOs. Depending on 
whether they participate in leveraged buyouts or not, their choice of earnings-
management strategies might be different. Hence this study subdivides the 
sample into MBOs and IBOs for investigation. It sheds light on the importance 
of earnings management prior to IBOs. The findings suggest that managers 
have different earnings management patterns prior to MBOs and IBOs. 
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Second, this study investigates REM behaviours in leveraged buyout settings. 
As AEM and REM have distinct characteristics and effects on firm performance, 
managers might have different AEM and REM behaviours preceding leveraged 
buyouts. Several prior studies have examined AEM behaviours prior to MBOs 
(e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994; DeAngelo, 1986; Wu, 1997; Fischer and Louis, 
2008). However, little attention has been paid to REM behaviours prior to 
leveraged buyouts. Hence the second empirical chapter explores REM 
behaviours in leveraged buyout settings. This research sheds light on the 
importance of REM in fields of research that cover leveraged buyouts. It seeks 
to improve the understanding of the effect of managerial incentives on all 
earnings management behaviours prior to leveraged buyouts. The findings 
reveal that managers engage in negative AEM and positive REM preceding 
MBOs. This study also finds that managers engage in positive REM but there 
is no evidence of systematic AEM compared to non-buyout firms preceding 
IBOs. These findings suggest that managers have different AEM and REM 
behaviours preceding leveraged buyouts. Thus it is worth investigating REM 
behaviours in addition to AEM behaviours in leveraged buyout settings.  
 
Third, this study extends corporate governance research in the leveraged 
buyout fields by investigating the effects of corporate governance mechanisms 
on earnings management prior to MBOs and IBOs. MBOs and IBOs are 
different buyout types with distinct features. Managers and investors might have 
similar or different incentives, such as interest alignments or interest conflicts, 
depending on the type of buyout, and the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms in MBOs and IBOs might also differ. This study seeks to improve 
the understanding of how corporate governance mechanisms affect managerial 
behaviours prior to different types of leveraged buyout. The findings suggest 
that corporate governance mechanisms have different effects on earnings 
management (both AEM and REM) prior to MBOs and IBOs. This might be 
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because different buyout settings provide managers and shareholders with 
different incentives to engage in governance mechanisms.   
 
Fourth, this study investigates the relationship between AEM and REM in both 
MBO and IBO settings. Given the portfolio of earnings management strategies, 
examining only one earnings management tool may not explain the overall 
effect of earnings management activities (Fields et al., 2001). While managers 
intend to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value 
to secure financing for MBOs, managers in firms targeted by IBOs tend to 
improve their firm’s share price in order to reduce the risk of IBOs. Hence 
management decisions on earnings-management strategies prior to MBOs and 
IBOs might lead to a different relationship between AEM and REM.  
 
This study seeks to improve our understanding of managerial earnings-
management strategies prior to different types of leveraged buyouts, that 
managers might use AEM and REM as complements or as substitutes for each 
other. The findings suggest that REM and AEM have a negative impact on each 
other prior to MBOs, but they have a positive impact on each other preceding 
IBOs. The findings reveal that managers adopt different strategies on the 
relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs and IBOs.  
 
Fifth, this research uses simultaneous equation systems to explore the 
interdependencies of AEM and REM. Prior literature (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Zang, 2012) has made a primary assumption about 
the sequence of decision making without testing it. Unlike them, this research 
adopts a simultaneous equations system to examine the relationship between 
AEM and REM, thus to mitigate the potential endogeneity bias. This study 
draws on 3SLS, 2SLS and OLS methods to explore the impact of simultaneous 
equations system on the findings, as suggested by prior literature (e.g. Greene, 
2011; Hussain, 2000). The findings reveal that AEM and REM sequentially 
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effect each other. Moreover, the findings support the suggestion of prior 
literature (e.g. Greene, 2011; Hussain, 2000), that 3SLS better address the 
simultaneous relationships by estimating the whole system of structural 
equations jointly.  
 
Moreover, this study adopts a new approach to interpret the multivariate 
regression test results. Unlike much of the prior literature (e.g. Klein, 2002; 
Peasnell et al., 2005), this research has considered the sign of the dependent 
variables in the regressions. The signed value of some dependent variables 
(AEM and REM proxies) has been indicated as significantly negative in the 
univariate tests. If the dependent variable of an earnings management proxy in 
univariate tests is significantly negative, a positive relationship between the 
earnings management proxy and corporate governance mechanisms means 
the governance mechanisms mitigate earnings management, and a negative 
relationship between them means the governance mechanisms facilitate 
earnings management. For robustness purpose, this study transforms all 
dependent variables into absolute values and re-runs all multivariate tests as a 
sensitivity analysis. The results of the sensitivity analysis largely support the 
new approach of findings interpretation.  
 
Finally, this study extends the research of pre-buyout earnings management 
and corporate governance into the UK context. Leveraged buyouts are a 
distinct and increasingly important type of acquisition in the UK financial market. 
Previous studies that addressed pre-buyout earnings management issues have 
been conducted in the US market (e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994; DeAngelo, 
1986; Wu, 1997; Fischer and Louis, 2008). It is questionable whether the US 
evidences is generalisable to the UK, because the UK market has distinct 
characteristics. Consequently, further work is required to introduce evidence 
from the UK regarding pre-buyout earnings management and corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
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1.7 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured into five chapters. This chapter has discussed the 
background and motivations for this study, outlined the objectives, specified the 
research question and overviewed the research methodology. The 
contributions made by this thesis have also been highlighted. The remainder of 
this thesis is organised as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 examines AEM practices preceding leveraged buyouts in the UK. It 
investigates the existence of AEM, and whether managers have different AEM 
behaviours preceding MBOs and IBOs. It also examines the effects of the 
corporate governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and 
external audit quality on AEM behaviours prior to MBOs and IBOs.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates REM behaviours prior to leveraged buyouts in the UK. 
It starts with an investigation on the existence of REM, and how do managers 
behave differently on REM preceding MBOs and IBOs. Then, it examines 
whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially outsiders’ shareholding 
and board characteristics, can mitigate REM activities preceding MBOs and 
IBOs.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between AEM and REM preceding 
MBOs and IBOs in the UK. This chapter first compares these two types of 
earnings management tools, and then discusses how managerial incentives 
might affect their decisions on the relationship between AEM and REM. The 
investigation includes a set of factors that may constrain the ability and degree 
to engage in earnings management.  
 
Chapter 5 presents a summary of this thesis and draws conclusions and 
implications. This chapter also discusses the potential limitations, and provides 
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suggestions for future research.  
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2. Chapter 2: Earnings Management, Audit Committee 
Characteristics and External Audit Quality prior to Leveraged 
Buyout in the UK 
2.1 Introduction 
Agency theory provides a framework for linking earnings management 
behaviour to corporate governance by considering both as mechanisms that 
are used to protect investors and help them to reduce agency conflicts (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). However, the few articles that address these issues (e.g. 
Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003) focus more on the magnitude than on the direction 
of AEM. This study builds on the current literature by examining a specific 
setting: leveraged buyouts. This setting provides a clear incentive for managers 
to engage in a specific form of discretionary AEM, which is different from much 
of the previous literature. While managers are expected to lower the market 
value of a firm prior to MBOs, they are expected to increase its value prior to 
IBOs. This makes leveraged buyouts an ideal setting in which to examine the 
effects of corporate governance on specific forms of AEM practices. Therefore, 
this study investigates how the corporate governance mechanisms of audit 
committee characteristics and external audit quality affect AEM behaviour 
preceding MBOs and IBOs in the UK.  
 
AEM involves changing discretionary accrual choices within the boundary of 
GAAP to “either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend 
on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 368). AEM directly 
influences the amount of accounting accruals and has no direct effect on cash 
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flows. AEM is managerial discretion which focuses on distorting the impression 
of a firm’s financial position (Kim and Sohn, 2013).  
 
In addition, prior literature (e.g. Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999) suggests that managerial incentives are a key determinant of earnings 
management behaviours. Because managers have a variety of incentives, the 
earnings management literature often focuses on specific settings where the 
incentives are clear, such as meeting dividend thresholds (Atieh and Hussain, 
2012), meeting capital market expectations (Teoh et al., 1998b), pursuing 
managerial compensation contracts (Healy, 1985) and reducing the possibility 
of an unfavourable ruling from antitrust regulations (Cahan, 1992). Although the 
leveraged buyouts setting provides clear incentives for managers to engage in 
specific forms of AEM, prior literature only examines AEM preceding MBOs (e.g. 
DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams, 1994). Hence this study will investigate 
whether managers have different AEM practices preceding MBOs and IBOs in 
the UK.  
 
In MBOs, managers’ direct involvement in the transaction generates an agency 
conflict of interest. A firm’s managers wish to pay the lowest possible purchase 
price, whereas their shareholders wish to sell their shares for the highest 
possible price. This creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings 
figures to reduce the perceived value of their firm (Perry and Williams, 1994). 
In IBOs, the bidding group consists solely of outside institutional investors and 
private equity houses. The non-participation of management in the transaction 
generates another conflict of interest: a firm’s managers wish to protect their 
jobs and/or personal wealth in any circumstance, whereas the third-party 
buyers often wish to make changes to a firm’s existing management team after 
the buyout (Hafzalla, 2009). This creates an incentive for managers to 
manipulate earnings figures to increase the perceived value of their firm and, 
thereby, prevent the buyout.  
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In this study, we perform empirical tests using abnormal AEM estimated by the 
cross-sectional version of Kothari et al.’s (2005) model, for all UK listed firms 
that made leveraged buyouts announcements between 1997 and 2011 and 
were subsequently delisted from the London Stock Exchange. We also perform 
robustness tests using abnormal AEM estimated by the cross-sectional version 
of Dechow et al.’s (1995) model.  
 
I find that discretionary AEM behaviours are significantly negative in the year 
preceding MBOs, whereas there is no evidence of systematic AEM preceding 
IBOs compared to non-buyout firms. In other words, this means that managers 
manipulate earnings downward prior to MBOs, and there is no evidence of 
systematic AEM compared to non-buyout firms preceding IBOs. This research 
differs from those carried out in prior research, as it extends AEM research in 
the context both of MBOs and of IBOs. My study also contributes to empirical 
accounting research by taking account of managerial incentives when exploring 
the choices of managers to engage in AEM.  
 
Moreover, my findings contribute to the institutional debate on the quality of 
financial reporting, in relation to the characteristics of audit committees and the 
quality of audits in the UK. First, audit committees control the quality of financial 
reporting, and thus they are expected to constrain the aggressive forms of AEM. 
I find that the financial expertise of the audit committee has no impact on 
negative AEM prior to MBOs. Prior to IBOs, the financial expertise of the audit 
committee is found to be negatively associated with AEM, which is consistent 
with the findings of Xie et al. (2003), Bédard et al. (2004), and Abbott et al. 
(2004). However, contrary to the findings of Klein (2002) and Bédard et al. 
(2004), from the US, the independence of audit committees is not an effective 
corporate governance mechanism in mitigating AEM prior to either MBOs or 
IBOs. This could be because outside directors perform little or no real 
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monitoring role as they lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, and 
information to challenge management activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 
1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). Furthermore, I find that equity ownership 
by members of audit committee and the presence of non-executive 
blockholders on audit committee have no impact on negative AEM prior to 
MBOs. Prior to IBOs, equity ownership by members of audit committee and the 
presence of non-executive blockholders on audit committee are positively 
correlated with AEM. High share ownership might jeopardise the independence 
of audit committee members, thus leading to more AEM prior to IBOs. Hence 
audit committee characteristics have a greater impact on AEM prior to IBOs 
than they have prior to MBOs. Preceding MBOs, audit committees might be 
ineffective because they do not take sufficient care of the MBO context, and 
focus on traditional positive AEM.  
 
Second, as auditors attest to financial reports, they are the most important 
controller of pernicious AEM practices. I find that Big 5 auditors have no impact 
on negative AEM prior to MBOs. In terms of IBOs, Big 5 auditors are negatively 
associated with abnormal AEM. This is consistent with the findings of prior 
studies (e.g. Palmrose, 1986a), which found that larger auditor firms provide 
higher quality auditing. Moreover, I find that audit fees are positively associated 
with AEM prior to MBOs and IBOs. This might be because, prior to MBOs and 
IBOs, economic rents associated with audit fees create an economic bond 
between auditors and their clients, which may affect auditors’ independence, 
leading them to permit AEM (Frankel et al., 2002). In addition, the level of non-
audit fees is negatively associated with negative AEM prior to MBOs. It might 
be related to the greater knowledge of client business. By undertaking auditing 
as well as providing consulting services, auditors learn more about a client's 
business, which may improve the quality of all their services (Wallman, 1996). 
Prior to IBOs, the level of non-audit fees has no impact on AEM. Overall, this 
study contributes to the corporate governance literature by providing empirical 
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evidence that audit committee characteristics and external audit quality have 
dissimilar effects on AEM preceding MBOs and IBOs.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses AEM 
prior to MBOs and IBOs. Section 3 reviews the literature on the relationships 
between corporate governance mechanisms and AEM, and then specifies the 
hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the design of the proposed research. Section 5 
reports the empirical results and findings. Section 6 provides a conclusion.  
2.2 Accruals Earnings Management prior to Leveraged Buyouts 
2.2.1 The role of accounting earnings in leveraged buyouts 
Leveraged buyouts are a very specific form of takeover, in which listed firms 
become private and the deal is funded with high amounts of debt. Over the 
years, leveraged buyouts have become increasingly popular in the UK as 
measured by the number and size of the transactions (Renneboog et al., 2007). 
Whether a company is purchased in a direct transaction by the incumbent 
management or by outsiders, the price paid for the firm directly affects the cash 
flow accruing to both sides of the transaction. In either case, purchasers always 
seek the lowest possible purchase price, while selling shareholders seek the 
highest possible selling price.  
 
Agency theory suggests that information asymmetries generally exist between 
managers, who are better informed, and outsiders, who are less well informed. 
Information asymmetries create a demand for internally generated measures 
of firm performance to be reported on a periodic basis. Accounting information 
thus plays a crucial role in overcoming problems that arise when markets do 
not perfectly aggregate individually held information (Fields et al., 2001). During 
periods surrounding leveraged buyouts, new potential financiers, such as the 
new investors and acquiring firms, scrutinise publicly available accounting 
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information extensively in order to prepare their bidding. Accounting information 
therefore provides great value relevance for investors and other financiers of 
the firm, who increase their demand for such information when making 
decisions (Aharony and Barniv, 2004). A detailed analysis of accounting 
earnings can help shareholders to assess whether they have been offered a 
fair price in leveraged buyouts (Bull, 1989). DeAngelo (1990) found that 
investment bankers make extensive use of accounting earnings to value firms 
in leveraged buyouts. Additionally, Perry and Williams (1994) report that 
accounting earnings were used by the courts to assess the fairness of buyout 
prices when selling shareholders claimed that their compensation was 
inadequate in MBOs.  
 
AEM occurs “when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 368). Managers possess private information about 
their firms and have a great deal of discretion over accounting earnings. 
Information asymmetry could have an impact on the outsiders’ perceptions of a 
firm’s prospects and on the value placed on its stock price (Lehn and Poulsen, 
1989). The manipulation of accounting accruals helps managers to keep their 
informational advantage over their shareholders and any competing bidders 
from outside of the firm. Accruals manipulation is not a costly tool, because it 
only involves exercising accounting choices to alter accounting earnings and 
has no actual effects on a firm’s real operations. Therefore, since managers 
could use AEM to cheat shareholders or external financiers, it might be a 
potential issue prior to leveraged buyouts.  
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2.2.2 Hypotheses for AEM preceding MBOs and IBOs 
An MBO consists of the purchase and privatisation of a public company by 
incumbent managers who seek institutional support from private equity firms, 
typically relying on a preponderance of debt. In MBOs, managers purchase 
their own firm and are likely to remain with the firm. Their direct involvement in 
the transaction generates a conflict of interest. They wish to pay the lowest 
possible purchase price, whereas their shareholders wish to sell their shares 
for the highest possible price. This creates an incentive for managers to 
manipulate earnings figures before MBOs (DeAngelo, 1986). 
 
Previous literature (e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994; DeAngelo, 1986; Wu, 1997) 
reports that managers systematically manipulate reported earnings downwards 
prior to MBOs. Perry and Williams (1994) indicate that, in their fiduciary role 
representing shareholders, managers have a legal duty to seek the highest 
possible price when trading a firm. However, agency theory suggests that 
incumbent managers’ personal economic stake in buyouts may motivate them 
to act in their own interests and seek the lowest possible buyout price for 
themselves. By deliberately depressing earnings, not meeting the expectations 
of security analysts, reporting decreases in earnings, or even losses, managers 
can take advantage of the undervaluation of share prices in MBOs. Moreover, 
managers are likely to engage independent investment bankers and the courts 
to evaluate the terms of an MBO offer. Because the independent third parties 
employ earnings-based valuation methods to assess the fair value of a firm, 
managers have incentives to understate reported earnings in order to reduce 
the MBO transaction price (DeAngelo, 1986). Perry and Williams (1994) and 
Wu (1997) report that unexpected accruals were negative in the year prior to 
MBO transactions for the US firms they studied, indicating managers engaged 
in negative AEM. Wu (1997) further suggests that a downward movement of 
pre-MBO share prices is systematically associated with changes to pre-MBO 
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earnings, based on the observation that the change in earnings of sampled 
MBO firms was significantly lower than the industry median. Nevertheless, 
DeAngelo (1988) found that competitive bidding also motivates managers to 
manipulate earnings upwards in order to avoid the risk of being replaced after 
MBOs. Fischer and Louis (2008) report that the need for external financing 
causes managers to adopt income-increasing earnings management practices 
in order to secure their external funding. Despite this, I expect the earlier 
discussion to be more relevant in the investigation of this study. Accordingly, I 
hypothesise as follows: 
 
H1-1a: Managers engage in negative AEM prior to MBOs 
 
In IBOs, the buyouts are initiated and executed solely by outside institutional 
investors and private equity houses, which purchase the firms without including 
its management in the transaction. Managers can be excluded from a 
transaction when outside buyers either do not wish to relinquish their control 
power to a firm’s existing management team, or wish to make changes to the 
team after a buyout (Hafzalla, 2009). Even if managers are not dismissed 
initially, the uncertainty associated with that the firm will be re-sold again within 
several years threatens managers’ job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). Hence, 
managers and third-party buyers have a conflict of interests in IBOs. Managers 
are likely to lose their jobs after the transaction, and this creates an incentive 
for them to manipulate earnings figures upwards in order to prevent a buyout. 
 
IBO targets are characterised by having undervalued shares in the market, 
relative to firms that remain public (Weir and Wright, 2006). Undervaluation may 
reflect a perceived undervaluation by management, or it may be objective. 
Managers have some private information that can lead them to value a firm 
differently from the shareholders in the market. If the shareholders do not 
appreciate this information, incumbent managers may have a perception of 
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share undervaluation. However, managers may also concentrate too closely on 
the performance of share prices as a measure of a firm's value, ignoring more 
objective measures, such as the price-earnings ratio. Objective measures 
provide a broader indication of firm growth perspectives in addition to market 
capitalisation (Weir et al., 2005b).  
 
IBO targets usually have low growth perspectives in the market (Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen, 1989), which reflects objective undervaluation. Some researchers 
have argued that objective undervaluation results from the poor decisions of 
prior managers, and a leveraged buyout is often used as a means to turn a 
failing company around (Renneboog et al., 2007). Jensen (1986; 1989) 
indicates that IBO targets have another key characteristic: substantial free cash 
flows. Incumbent managers hold the discretions of free cash flows, which gives 
them increased control and power. As the third-party buyers usually wish to 
make changes to incumbent management teams, managers are likely to lose 
control and power over their firms after IBOs, which also endangers their 
perquisites, remuneration and/or share-related personal wealth (Baron, 1983; 
Weir et al., 2005a; Weir et al., 2005b). Moreover, when the hostile bidders take 
control in IBOs, managers usually face a high risk of losing their jobs 
(Renneboog et al., 2007). Even if managers are not dismissed initially, the 
uncertainty associated with the business will be re-sold again within several 
years threatens managers’ long-term job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). 
Therefore, in the periods preceding IBOs, managers are expected to act in such 
a way as to prevent any potential IBOs.  
 
It is argued that managers are likely to manipulate accounting earnings 
upwards preceding IBOs. As they have private information, they become aware 
of their firm’s undervaluation before any one else in the market does (Weir and 
Wright, 2006). Undervaluation attracts IBO specialists, who expect to create 
additional shareholder value once a firm has been privatised (Renneboog et al., 
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2007). In order to protect their jobs and personal interests, managers are likely 
to use discretionary tools to get their firms overvalued and thereby prevent any 
potential IBOs. Accounting earnings contains information about a firm’s growth 
potential (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983), and thus earnings management is 
an ideal tool for managers who wish to alter the perceived value of their firms. 
Accordingly, if an undervaluation is realised, managers who expect an increase 
in the share price of their firm are likely to engage in income-increasing AEM. 
Once the increased accounting earnings are announced, the market will adjust 
this information in the firm’s share price (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; 
Chambers and Penman, 1984). Consequently, IBO specialists are less likely to 
be aware of the undervaluation, or may find the adjusted share price less 
attractive. Therefore, I predict that managers will manipulate accounting 
earnings upwards in order to protect their jobs and/or their personal interests 
prior to IBOs. Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows: 
 
H1-1b: Managers engage in positive AEM prior to IBOs 
2.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.3.1 The role of the audit committee 
Audit committees play a key role in providing active scrutiny of financial 
reporting processes and in monitoring the relationship between a firm’s 
management and its external auditor. An effective audit committee adds to the 
quality of the corporate reporting process on two levels: First, the audit 
committee should supervise major accounting choices in order to mitigate 
earnings management practices. Second, the committee should coordinate 
internal and external audits and protect external auditors’ independence in 
order to increase the likelihood that any irregularities they discover will be 
reported at a sufficiently high level (Piot and Janin, 2007). Prior studies highlight 
that certain audit committee characteristics are likely to affect an audit 
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committee’s ability to perform its role, namely independence, financial 
experience, equity ownership by committee members and size.  
2.3.2 Audit committee independence 
Agency theory suggests that non-executive directors are more independent 
than executive directors are, and thus they can monitor more effectively (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983a; Elshandidy and Hassanein, 2014). Independent audit 
committee members, as non-executive directors, may view their service as 
directors as a means of enhancing their reputations as experts in decision 
control (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Serving on an audit committee may improve 
a director's reputation, but it may also carry the potential for their reputation to 
be damaged if a financial misstatement occurs (Abbott et al., 2000). 
Consequently, the preservation of reputational capital serves as a motivation 
for outside directors to monitor managers more closely.  
 
Furthermore, apart from being directors of a firm, non-executive directors have 
no economic or psychological affiliation that may interfere with their ability to 
question management (Fama, 1980). In contrast, as part of the management 
team, executive directors often have incentives to underperform their 
monitoring role (Vafeas, 2005). In line with this, prior evidence suggests that 
the presence of executive directors on an audit committee is likely lead to 
poorer financial reporting choices (Bédard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002). Therefore, 
non-executive directors on audit committees are more likely to provide 
unbiased assessments and judgements hence being able to monitor 
management effectively.  
 
However, non-executive directors are also criticised for performing little or no 
real monitoring role, as they lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, 
and information to challenge management activities effectively (Patton and 
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Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). The inclusion of insiders on an audit 
committee is also advantageous. They facilitate the communication of relevant 
information to outside directors during committee meetings and provide a forum 
for evaluating the performance and senior management potential of junior 
executives. In addition, executive directors provide expertise that a firms' 
decision makers may draw on when formulating and implementing high-level 
strategies (Baysinger and Butler, 1985).  
 
Prior studies tend to establish a negative relationship between the 
independence of an audit committee and the magnitude of abnormal accruals, 
although there is a lack of consensus due to the diversity of the approaches 
used in the studies. Bédard et al. (2004), Xie et al. (2003), and Davidson et al. 
(2005) found that more independent audit committees are associated with lower 
earnings management. Klein (2002) reports that it is the presence of a majority 
of outside directors on an audit committee, rather than 100 percent of the 
members being outsiders, that seems to have a significant effect on the level 
of abnormal accruals. Therefore, these expectations lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1-2a: There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence 
and AEM preceding both MBOs and IBOs 
2.3.3 Financial expertise of the audit committee  
Directors of audit committees are often from a range of different backgrounds 
and some may not have acquired enough experience or technical knowledge 
to enable effective accounting and auditing oversight. An audit committee's 
monitoring role may be perceived as ineffective by an external auditor if the 
auditor believes it does not possess the necessary financial knowledge to 
understand technical auditing and accounting reporting matters (Abbott et al., 
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2004). An external auditor’s consideration of corporate governance factors 
along with its knowledge of the client's overall business risk could affect the 
levels of inherent and control risks that are assessed, thereby affecting the 
nature, timing, and extent of audit work (Cohen et al., 2002).  
 
In contrast, where there is financial expertise within audit committees, it makes 
their internal control judgments more like those of experts, effectively facilitating 
the reporting process (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Audit committees that have 
financial expertise are better equipped to understand auditing issues and risks, 
as well as any procedures that are proposed to address and/or detect them 
(DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). In addition, knowledgeable audit committees are 
more likely to understand the internal audit programs and their results, and, in 
turn, they ensure that internal controls are more effective for preventing or 
detecting earnings management (Abbott et al., 2004). Therefore, the financial 
expertise of the audit committee may be associated with greater monitoring 
effectiveness.  
 
Empirical evidence from Xie et al. (2003), Bédard et al. (2004), and Abbott et 
al. (2004) is consistent with the notion that the presence of at least one member 
with financial expertise on an audit committee is negatively related to the level 
of AEM. Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows: 
 
H1-2b: There is a negative relationship between the presence of members with 
financial expertise on audit committee and AEM preceding both MBOs and 
IBOs 
2.3.4 Equity ownership by members of the audit committee  
According to agency theory, directors who own more equity in the firm are 
expected to protect shareholder interests more effectively. As equity ownership 
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aligns the interests of directors with those of external shareholders, more equity 
ownership by the directors creates a personal incentive to actively monitor 
managers (Bhagat et al., 1999). Accordingly, when audit committee members 
hold high levels of equity, this is likely to mitigate the risk of these directors 
colluding with management to manipulate earnings. Such collusion would 
ultimately harm their own interests (Vafeas, 2005). As discussed previously, 
prior to MBOs, managers are likely to adopt income-decreasing AEM in order 
to depress offering prices. As lower MBO offer prices generate lower premiums 
for selling shareholders, this harms their interests. Thus members of an audit 
committee who have higher levels of equity ownership are inclined to monitor 
more actively, resulting in less AEM.  
 
Prior to IBOs, high levels of equity might impair the independence of members 
in an audit committee and leads to a lower level of monitoring. Hence members 
of audit committees with high levels of equity ownership might compromise to 
upwards AEM prior to IBOs. The findings of existing literature are inconclusive 
on the relationship between audit committee members’ equity ownership and 
AEM (Klein, 2002; Lin et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2003). Accordingly, I hypothesise 
as follows:  
 
H1-2c: There is a negative relationship between audit committee members’ 
equity ownership and AEM preceding MBOs  
 
H1-2d: There is a positive relationship between audit committee members’ equity 
ownership and AEM preceding IBOs 
 
Large shareholders have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, 
discipline, and influence managers (Cornett et al., 2008). Non-executive 
directors, as large shareholders, have a powerful personal incentive to exercise 
effective monitoring, because their high equity ownership makes them an 
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effective agency of external shareholders. Substantial equity ownership by 
outside directors reunites ownership and control, and leads to better monitoring 
of management (Bhagat et al., 1999). Hence outside directors with substantial 
shareholdings and a position on the audit committee can force managers to 
focus more on maximising the wealth of shareholders rather than on 
opportunistic or self-serving earnings management. In the UK, The Corporate 
Governance Code suggests that directors who have 3% or more shareholdings 
of a firm are classified as ‘substantial shareholders’ (FRC, 2010). As previously 
discussed, members of an audit committee who have higher levels of equity 
ownership are inclined to monitor management actively prior to MBOs and to 
monitor inactively prior to IBOs. Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows:  
 
H1-2e: There is a negative relationship between AEM and the incidence of at 
least one outside blockholder (with at least 3% shareholdings) sitting on a 
board’s audit committee preceding MBOs 
 
H1-2f: There is a positive relationship between AEM and the incidence of at least 
one outside blockholder (with at least 3% shareholdings) sitting on a board’s 
audit committee preceding IBOs 
2.3.5 Audit committee size 
Resource dependence theory suggests that a firm’s board provides various 
resources, and more directors will expand the available resources of the board 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Initially, adding more directors to serve the audit 
committee may ensure that it has a minimum required knowledge base (Vafeas, 
2005). In addition, the effectiveness of an audit committee is significantly 
related to the power of this committee (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Larger audit 
committees are beneficial because they have an elevated status in an 
organisation, and are thus more likely to be acknowledged as an authoritative 
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body by external and internal audit functions (Louis Braiotta et al., 2010). The 
increased organisational status and power of a large audit committee may 
enhance its performance of internal audit functions, and subsequently prevent 
or detect earnings manipulations (Abbott et al., 2004; Vafeas, 2005).  
 
However, large size of an audit committee might be detrimental to its 
effectiveness and cohesiveness, and resulting in it having a weak monitoring 
role. Problems with coordination and communication may arise in larger 
committees as it is more difficult for them to arrange meetings and reach a 
consensus, and thus leading to slower and less-efficient decision-making, and 
directors becoming less likely to criticise the behaviour of top managers 
(Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Moreover, directors’ free-riding problem may 
increase as committee grow, because monitoring cost to any individual director 
falls in proportion to committee size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
 
The results of prior studies on the relationship between audit committee size 
and AEM are mixed (Lin et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2003; Vafeas, 2005; Bédard et 
al., 2004). In consideration of the arguments presented in this section, I 
hypothesise as follows: 
 
H1g: There is a negative relationship between audit committee size and AEM 
preceding both MBOs and IBOs 
2.3.6 Audit Quality  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) define external audit quality as the ability of an 
external auditor to detect accounting misstatements and then to express them 
in appropriate audit opinions. In other words, audit quality is determined by an 
auditor’s independence, competence and the effort it devotes to detect errors 
and misstatements during an audit (Ronen and Yaari, 2007). Previous literature 
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suggests that larger audit firms tend to deliver a higher audit quality than smaller, 
less well-known firms do, because they are less willing to accept questionable 
accounting methods and are more likely to detect and report errors and 
irregularities (e.g. Becker et al., 1998). The relevant studies have investigated 
the notion of ‘Big 5’ auditors and ‘non-Big 5’ auditors and they quality of their 
audit work. DeAngelo (1981) suggests that larger audit firms have more 
resources to invest in improving the quality of their work. Hence larger audit 
firms have greater incentives to detect and reveal management misstatements 
resulting in a difference between the audit quality of larger and smaller firms.  
 
Since Big 5 audit firms are larger than their peers, it follows from DeAngelo's 
analysis that their audits are of higher quality (Becker et al., 1998). Moreover, 
Palmrose (1986a) and Palmrose (1988) report that Big 5 audit firms have lower 
litigation rate and charge higher fees or monopoly price for the higher quality 
audits they provide. The empirical studies of Craswell et al. (1995), Palmrose 
(1986a), and Simunic (1980) also suggest that Big 5 auditors are associated 
with higher audit quality. Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows:  
 
H3a: The presence of ‘Big 5’ auditors is negatively associated with AEM 
preceding both MBOs and IBOs 
 
Another measure of the quality of external audits could be audit fees in relation 
to the size of a firm. Several studies suggest that higher audit fees are likely to 
reflect a higher quality of external audit, as they compensate for the increased 
audit effort and the high-price of reputation capital (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; 
Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Palmrose, 1986a; Simunic, 1980). Increased audit 
effort is more likely to detect and report irregularities and errors in the estimation 
of accruals (Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). Due to the risk of litigation, auditors are 
less willing to accept questionable accounting reports. Auditors will require 
management to correct errors and modify accounting methods to improve 
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financial reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2006). Hence higher audit fees reflect 
a higher audit quality, which, in turn reduces AEM practices.  
 
Nevertheless, economic rents associated with audit fees create an economic 
bond between auditors and their clients, which may affect auditors’ 
independence and lead them to permit AEM (Frankel et al., 2002). In addition, 
higher AEM is likely to be associated with higher inherent risk, as assessed by 
auditors. The higher the level of inherent risk, the more audit effort will be 
required to reduce the risk of detection in order to achieve an accepted level of 
audit risk (Gul et al., 2003). Hence higher audit fees could also have a positive 
relationship with AEM. Empirical findings on the relationship between audit fees 
and AEM are mixed (e.g. Frankel et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003; Abbott et al., 
2006). According to the arguments and counter arguments, I hypothesise the 
following: 
 
H1-3b: The level of audit fees is negatively associated with AEM preceding both 
MBOs and IBOs 
2.3.7 Rent seeking by auditors 
The effectiveness of external monitoring also largely depends on an auditor's 
willingness to challenge its client’s management when errors or opportunistic 
accounting practices are encountered. The joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services may compromise the independence of auditors, which in turn affects 
their willingness to express an audit opinion appropriately (Frankel et al., 2002; 
Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988). Large fees paid to auditors, particularly those 
related to non-audit services, make them more economically dependent on their 
clients. This causes auditors to become reluctant about making appropriate 
inquiries during audits for fear of losing highly profitable clients (Hoitash et al., 
2007). Furthermore, when auditors are no longer perceived to be independent, 
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managers are unlikely to be deterred from opportunistic behaviours (Srinidhi 
and Gul, 2007). Consequently, even if auditors are competent in detecting 
errors, an economic bond with a client reduces their independence, in turn 
reducing audit quality. The provision of non-audit services causes auditors to 
lose objectivity, and thus affects their role in preventing earnings management. 
In addition, the joint provision of audit and non-audit services may mean that 
an auditor ends up auditing its own work (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, by undertaking audits in addition to providing consultancy 
services, auditors learn more about a client's business, which may improve the 
quality of their services (Wallman, 1996). Empirical evidence regarding the 
relationship between non-audit fees and AEM is inconclusive (Frankel et al., 
2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). In line with the argument that non-audit fees 
reduce audit quality, I hypothesise as follows:  
 
H1-3c: Non-audit fees are positively associated with AEM preceding both MBOs 
and IBOs 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Sample 
This study investigates all UK listed firms that made leveraged buyouts 
announcements during the period from 1997 to 2011 and were finally delisted 
from the London Stock Exchange. The setting of the study has significant 
advantages as follows: First, most of the research on leveraged buyouts is 
based on the analysis of US samples from the 1980s and1990s (e.g. DeAngelo, 
1986; Perry and Williams, 1994). Yet, it is questionable whether evidence from 
the US can be generalised to the UK. In the UK, leveraged buyouts are more 
rarely related to hostile takeovers than they are in the US. They also have lower 
debt levels, focus more on growth opportunities and are commonly financed by 
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privately placed mezzanine funds rather than by junk bonds (Toms and Wright, 
2005).  
 
Second, the period studied covers the second wave of leveraged buyouts in the 
UK, which is different from the first wave in the 1980s. In the second wave, 
private equity and debt providers had increased confidence regarding important 
issues, such as access to key information, the support of target shareholders, 
and the expectation of acquiring all shares through squeeze-out provisions 
(Renneboog et al., 2007). Moreover, the increased use of innovative techniques, 
such as inducement fees and strict exclusivity agreements, facilitated the 
reduction of risks in leveraged buyouts (Davis and Day, 1998).  
 
The data for leveraged buyout samples are collected from Thomson ONE 
Banker. 39 firms from the financial industry (Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB) code between 8000 and 8999) are excluded because they are subject to 
the external scrutiny of bodies like the Financial Services Authority (Weir et al., 
2005a), which may affect their corporate governance. Datastream provides the 
earnings, total assets, and other financial data required to calculate abnormal 
AEM. 17 of the firms are eliminated due to there being insufficient financial data 
available from Datastream. This study uses the cross-sectional regression 
models developed by Kothari et al. (2005) and Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate 
the unadjusted abnormal accruals for each sample firm. The model parameters 
are estimated by industry and I require each firm-year to have at least six 
observations with the same ICB code. The industry-matched firms are collected 
from a sample of firms that were not involved in leveraged buyouts. Four-digit 
ICB codes are used for matching to the extent possible, and if no appropriate 
match is found, three-digit or two-digit codes are chosen. This approach is 
similar to the research design of Perry and Williams (1994). Data about audit 
committee characteristics and audit quality are hand collected from annual 
reports. I exclude 4 observations due to missing information about their audit 
Chapter 2 
49 
committees. In total, these requirements yield 192 observations for leveraged 
buyouts3, including 113 MBOs and 79 IBOs. The sampling process is listed in 
Table 2.1 
 
Table 2.1  Sample 
 MBOs IBOs 
Initial sample 149 102 
Deleting 
Financial firms 
25 14 
Non-financial firms 124 88 
Deleting 
Observations with missing financial data 
9 8 
Firms with Complete financial data 115 80 
Deleting 
Observations with missing corporate governance data 
2 1 
Final sample 113 79 
 
2.4.2 Measuring AEM 
This study adopts discretionary accruals from the cross-sectional model of 
Kothari, et al. (2005) to proxy for AEM4. Dechow et al. (1995), Guay et al. (1996) 
and Kasznik (1999) show that any proxy for abnormal accruals yields biased 
metrics if measurement error in the proxy is correlated with omitted variables. 
Significantly, well-specified tests must include an adjustment for any omitted 
variables if the omitted variables are associated with an independent variable 
or within a non-random sample (Klein, 2002). Following Kothari et al. (2005), 
this paper uses a matched-firm or portfolio technique to adjust the abnormal 
                                                             
3 For studies on Leveraged buyouts in the UK, this sample size is large enough in comparison 
to Weir, et al. (2005a), who examined 96 Leveraged buyouts, and Renneboog, et al., (2007), 
who investigated 177 leveraged buyouts.  
4  This research adopts the same approach of prior studies on detecting earnings 
management by breaking the total accruals into two components: the discretionary accruals 
(abnormal accrual) and nondiscretionary accruals (normal accruals) (e.g. Healy, 1985; Jones, 
1991; Dechow, et al., 1995; Subramanyam, 1996; Sok-Hyon & Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). 
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accruals. Furthermore, in an attempt to capture revenue manipulation, change 
in revenue is subtracted by changes in receivables. In addition, return on assets 
is added to the model in order to control for extreme operating performance, 
which can also bias the estimation of discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 
2005).   
 
Normal accruals are estimated using the following model:  
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1𝑖 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2𝑖 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3𝑖(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                       (1) 
Where: 
TAit: is the current total accruals, calculated as the change in non-cash current 
assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the current portion of 
long-term debt, minus depreciation and amortization 
Ait-1: is the lagged total assets 
∆REVit: is the sales growth 
∆ARit: is the change in receivables 
PPEit: is the property, plant, and equipment 
ROA it-1: is the lagged return on assets 
 
Total accruals are first regressed on equation (1) using data of peer firms in 
year t to estimate the parameters that are used to calculate the expected normal 
accruals for each leveraged buyout firm in year t. The parameter estimates a0, 
ai, b1i, b2i, and b3i of 𝛼0, 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽1𝑖, 𝛽2𝑖, and 𝛽3𝑖 from the previous step are then 
combined with data on each leveraged buyout firm in event year t to generate 
estimated discretionary accruals (AccruKoit), as follows:  
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𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝐾𝑜𝑖𝑡
=
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
− [𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1𝑖 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2𝑖 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
)
+ 𝛽3𝑖(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡)]                                                                       (2) 
 
Where: 
 AccruKoit: is abnormal accrual or discretionary accruals 
 
The estimated discretionary accruals (AccruKo) represent the magnitude of 
AEM, which is the difference between current accruals and expected normal 
accruals. Specifically, zero discretionary accruals indicate that a firm’s current 
accruals are the same as expected, which means that AEM is not detected. 
Positive discretionary accruals indicate income-increasing AEM, while negative 
discretionary accruals indicate the opposite.  
 
Moreover, in order to increase the robustness of the results, this study also used 
a cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model, as developed 
by Dechow et al. (1995), as an alternative to measure discretionary accruals 
(AccruDe), as follows:   
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼𝑖 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1𝑖 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2𝑖 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        (3) 
 
Kothari, et al.’s (2005) model and Dechow et al.’s (1995) are developed by the 
US scholar to detect AEM behaviours in US firms. The differences of accounting 
systems between the US and other countries might reduce the effectiveness of 
the models. For instance, Yoon and Miller (2002) and Yoon et al. (2006) report 
that the modified Jones model does not fit for Korean firms. Hence, this study 
uses the models developed by Kothari, et al. (2005) and Dechow et al. (1995) 
to increase the robustness of my results. 
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2.4.3 Governance variables 
Audit committee independence is measured by the percentage of non-
executive directors on the audit committee (Ned%AudCom), and I expect a 
negative coefficient of this variable.  
 
The financial expertise of audit committees is measured using a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if at least one audit committee member has accounting 
or financial expertise, and 0 otherwise (FinancialExp).  
 
Equity ownership by members of the audit committee is identified as the 
percentage of common share cumulatively owned by audit committee members 
(AudShare). In addition, this study identifies the presence of large shareholders 
on audit committees by a dummy variable with a value of 1 if at least one of the 
non-executive directors on audit committee has at least a 3% shareholding, and 
0 otherwise (3%holdAudCom).  
 
Audit committee size is measured by the number of audit committee members 
(AudComSz). Moreover, Defond et al. (2005) suggests that audit committee size 
also represents the amount of board resources devotes to the audit committee’s 
function. Accordingly, this study uses another size proxy: the size of the audit 
committee divided by the size of the full board (AuditSz2BoardSz).  
 
Audit quality has two proxies in this study: Big 5 auditors and audit fees. Big 5 
auditors is coded 1 if a firm is audited by Big 5 auditors (Big5). Moreover, the 
measurement of audit fees is identified by a natural logarithm of audit fees 
(LNAudFees). Furthermore, size deflation ensures that the findings are not 
driven by size. Simunic (1980) and Kinney et al. (2004) suggest that the square 
root function best captures the relationship between audit fees and assets. On 
examining various scatter plots of residuals, the residual variance was found to 
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be homogeneous when a square-root transformation was used. To control the 
size effect of the fees, audit fees is scaled by the square root of the ‘total assets 
value’ of each firm (AudFees/AssetsSqrt).  
 
Rent seeking by auditors is identified by the natural logarithm of non-audit fees 
(LNNonAudFees). In addition, to control the size effect of the non-audit fees, this 
paper also scales non-audit fees by the square root of the total assets value of 
each firm (NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt). This study also captures rent seeking by 
auditors by the fee ratio of non-audit fees to total auditor fees 
(NonAudFees/TotalFees).  
 
In Table 2.2 at section 2.4.6, Panels A and B show the summary statistics of all 
the variables for MBOs and IBOs respectively. For MBOs, on average, 85% of 
the audit committee members and 45% of the board members are outsiders. 
Audit fees and non-audit fees are, on average, 37.2% and 43.5% of the square 
root of total assets respectively. 28.3% of the firms include a financial expert in 
their audit committees, and 69.9% of the firms are audited by Big 5 auditors. 
For IBOs, on average, 95.7% of the audit committee members and 52.5% of 
the board members are outsiders. Audit fees and non-audit fees are 59.7% and 
63.8% of the square root of total assets respectively. 63.3% of the firms include 
a financial expert in their audit committee, and 86.1% of the firms are audited 
by Big 5 auditors. Hence audit committees and boards in IBOs are more 
independent than they are in MBOs. IBO firms incur more audit fees and non-
audit fees than are incurred in MBOs. More IBO firms include financial experts 
in their audit committees and choose Big 5 auditors to do their external auditing.  
2.4.4 Control variables 
This study controls for three other governance mechanisms, namely, board 
independence, board size, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality.  
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As discussed before, outside directors are expected to have greater incentives 
to monitor management behaviour than inside directors have, and thus greater 
board independence is expected to lead to less discretionary accruals. Prior 
studies found that the proportion of non-executive directors on a board is 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; 
Davidson et al., 2005). In UK studies, Peasnell et al. (2000a) and Peasnell et 
al. (2005) report that a higher proportion of non-executive directors is more 
likely to constrain income-increasing accruals than income-decreasing accruals. 
However, Rahman and Ali (2006) and Siregar and Utama (2008) found an 
insignificant relationship between board independence and earnings 
management. Similar to prior studies, this study identifies board independence 
by the percentage of non-executive directors on a board (NED%). 
 
This study controls for board size. As discussed above, larger boards are 
associated with more resources and greater ability in respect to monitor 
management. Thus larger boards are expected to be associated with less 
discretionary accruals. Xie et al. (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2005) found a 
negative association between board size and AEM, whereas Rahman and Ali 
(2006) reported a positive association between them. This study measures 
board size by the number of board members (BoardSz).  
 
This study controls for CEO duality. Duality occurs when the same individual 
holds the posts of CEO and chairman. CEO duality enables a CEO to effectively 
control the information that is available to other board members and thus it may 
impair effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, CEO duality 
concentrates power in the CEO’s position without effective controls and 
balances. When CEO duality does impede effective monitoring, it might also be 
associated with greater use of discretionary accruals (Cornett et al., 2008). 
Therefore, CEO duality is likely to be positively associated with discretionary 
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accruals. Klein (2002) reports that the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
is positively related to a powerful CEO who holds a position on a board’s 
nominating and compensation committee. As in prior studies, in this study, CEO 
duality is identified by a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a board has CEO 
duality, and 0 otherwise (Duality).  
 
The inclusion of firm size as a control variable is motivated by the size 
hypothesis. Larger firms are more likely to draw the attention of antitrust 
legislation due to their high reported profits or monopoly rents. Antitrust 
legislation has the power to redistribute wealth from these large firms. In order 
to reduce this political attention, managers of large firms are inclined to manage 
accounting discretion in order to reduce earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978). However, larger firms are also likely to be under closer scrutiny by 
outsiders, such as financial/investment analysts, than small firms are (Hussain, 
2000; Hussain, 1996). This can potentially reduce managers’ opportunities to 
exercise earnings management (Koh, 2003). Furthermore, information 
asymmetry is often smaller in large firms because they produce more public 
information, which in turn reduces the needs for earnings management 
practices (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Peasnell et al. (2000a), Xie et al. (2003) 
and Klein (2002) found that firm size is negatively associated with abnormal 
accruals. In line with previous research, this study uses the natural logarithm of 
a firm’s market value to proxy for its size (LNMarketVal).  
 
This study uses institutional ownership as a control variable because 
institutional investors are expected to act as an alternative governance 
mechanism. Initially, agency theory suggests that large shareholdings may act 
as a disciplining mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since institutional 
investors have large shareholdings, they are induced to undertake monitoring 
activities, as their voting power allows them to significantly influence 
management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Moreover, the presence of large 
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institutional owners facilitates the exercise of shareholder’s rights (Cremers and 
Nair, 2005), enabling the shareholders to remove top executives in firms that 
are performing poorly (Denis et al., 1997). Chtourou et al. (2001) indicate that 
firms which have a larger percentage of institutional ownership usually have a 
lower level of abnormal accruals. However, institutions with high levels of 
ownership may also influence managers and secure private benefits at the 
expense of other shareholders (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). In line with prior 
literature, the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors is used to 
measure institutional ownership (InsShare).  
 
More profitable firms are likely to have fewer agency conflicts, as managers are 
inclined to protect shareholder wealth rather than extract private interests. Thus 
pernicious earnings management is exercised less in these firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, managers are less likely to engage in income-
increasing earnings management, in order to produce better accounting results, 
if their firm already performs well (Becker et al., 1998; Bédard et al., 2004). 
Bédard et al. (2004) report that firm performance, measured as the lagged 
return on assets, is negatively associated with earnings management. 
Accordingly, firm performance is measured by the previous year's return on 
assets (LagROA). 
 
Sales growth is likely to affect earnings management, as growth in sales will 
affect accruals, such as inventory and receivables. Furthermore, large growth 
in sales often inflates the market’s expectations of future cash flows, which can 
affect earnings management (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). In times of rapid 
growth, a company may also be under pressure to maintain or exceed 
anticipated growth rates, driving managers to engage in earnings management 
to achieve a targeted growth rate, or to mask downturns (Carcello and Nagy, 
2004). As in prior studies, sales growth is measured by the annual percentage 
growth in total sales (SalesGrow).  
Chapter 2 
57 
 
Leverage picks up debt contracting motivations for earnings management. 
Higher leverage is associated with a higher risk of a firm violating its debt 
covenants (Press and Weintrop, 1990), and the violation of debt covenants is 
related to the decision to use discretionary accruals to manage earnings 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Managers of highly leveraged firms have 
incentives to exercise income-increasing discretionary accruals to avoid 
violating debt covenants. Moreover, higher leverage ratio is associated with 
higher cost of debt financing (Piot and Janin, 2007). As debt increases, 
companies may use income-increasing earnings management practices in 
order to present a more favourable financial position when negotiating with 
lenders. Thus, leverage ratio is likely to have a positive relationship with 
abnormal accruals (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Similar to prior studies, 
leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage).  
 
Jensen (1986) suggests that the leveraged buyout targets generally have large 
free cash flows, which are more likely to raise agency conflicts. However, 
steady free cash flow could be used to pay off the debt raised in leveraged 
buyout transactions, and thus attract potential buyers (Jensen, 1986). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that managers always act in their best interests. 
Therefore, free cash flow is likely to motivate managers to adopt income-
decreasing earnings management in order to depress shareholder premiums 
prior to MBOs, and income-increasing earnings management to secure their 
jobs and interests prior to IBOs. Free cash flow is measured by deducting 
capital expenditure and cash dividend from funds from operations, and then 
scaling it by a firm’s total assets (FreeCashFlow).  
2.4.5 Model 
This study uses OLS models to investigate how the corporate governance 
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mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and external audit quality 
affects AEM. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, audit committee 
variables and main board variables are separated into different models. Model 
1 investigates the effects of audit committee variables on AEM, and Model 2 
investigates the effects of board characteristics on AEM.  
 
Audit Committee Characteristics Model:  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝐾𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Ned%AudCom + 𝛽2 FinancialExp + 𝛽3AudShare
+ 𝛽43%holdAudCom + 𝛽5AudComSz + 𝛽6AuditSz2BoardSz
+ 𝛽7LNMarketVal + 𝛽8InsShare + 𝛽9LagROA + 𝛽10SalesGrow
+ 𝛽11Leverage + 𝛽12FreeCashFlow + 𝜀                     (1) 
 
 
Audit Quality Model: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝐾𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Big5 + 𝛽2 LNAudFees + 𝛽3AudFees/AssetsSqrt
+ 𝛽4LNNonAudFees + 𝛽5NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt
+ 𝛽6NonAudFees/TotalFees + 𝛽7NED% + 𝛽8BoardSz + 𝛽9Duality
+ 𝛽10LNMarketVal + 𝛽11InsShare + 𝛽12LagROA + 𝛽13SalesGrow
+ 𝛽14Leverage + 𝛽15Free Cash Flow
+ 𝜀                          (2) 
 
Where: 
AccruKo: is abnormal accruals, detected using the cross-sectional model of Kothari et 
al. (2005)   
Ned%AudCom: is the percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
AudComSz: is the number of members on the audit committee size 
AuditSz2BoardSz: is the ratio of audit committee size to board size 
FinancialExp: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the audit committee has financial 
expertise; 
AudShare: is the percentage of common stock cumulatively owned by audit committee 
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members 
3%holdAudCom: is a dummy variable coded 1 if at least one non-executive director 
on the audit committee has at least a 3% shareholding 
Big5: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm uses a Big 5 Auditor 
LNAudFees: is the natural logarithm of audit fees 
AudFees/AssetsSqrt: is the fee ratio of audit fees to the square root of total assets 
LNNonAudFees: is the natural logarithm of non-audit fees 
NonAudit Fees/Assets SQroot: is the fee ratio of non-audit fees to the square root of 
total assets 
NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt: is the fee ratio of non-audit fees to the total auditor fees 
NED%: is the percentage of non-executive directors on the main board 
BoardSz: is the number of directors on the board 
Duality: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the board has CEO duality 
LNMarketVal: is the natural logarithm of the market value 
InsShare: is the percentage of cumulative institutional Shareholding 
LagROA: is the lagged return on assets 
Leverage: is the ratio of total debt to total assets 
SalesGrow: is the percentage of sales growth 
FreeCashFlow: is defined as funds from operations - capital expenditure - cash 
dividend, scaled by total assets. 
 
If the errors in OLS models are heteroscedastic, OLS estimators are still 
unbiased coefficient estimates, but they are no longer best linear unbiased 
estimators. This is because they no longer have the minimum variance among 
the class of unbiased estimators (Brooks, 2014). White (1980) general test is 
used in this research to detect any potential heteroscedasticity. The results of 
this diagnostic tests suggest that there is no heteroscedastic problem in the 
OLS model.  
 
Moreover, multicollinearity, omission of an important variable and inclusion of 
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an irrelevant variable might also result in OLS model to generate biased results 
(Brooks, 2014). The board characteristics data and audit committee 
characteristics data have a relatively high correlation, which might cause 
multicollinearity. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, these variables are 
separated into different models. However, due to data limitation, the selection 
of variable in my model is constrained. Hence, the OLS model applied in this 
study might omit another corporate governance variable that is relevant to this 
study. Moreover, the OLS model might include irrelevant control variable, and 
thus the estimation might be less efficient. Therefore, I’ve replaced the 
dependent variable in robustness test section to check whether my results are 
consistent and not sensitive to the selection of variables.  
 
Furthermore, corporate governance variables might suffer from endogeneity 
problem (Coles et al., 2008). If there is no endogeneity in a model, the 
coefficient estimates will be consistent for both OLS and 2SLS, but OLS is more 
efficient. However, if there is an endogeneity problem, only 2SLS estimator is 
consistent (Brooks, 2014). In order to ensure my model do not suffer from 
endogeneity problem, I use Hausman tests to detect the potential endogeneity. 
The Hausman test results suggest that there is no endogeneity in my models, 
which will be explained in section 2.5.4.   
2.4.6 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of all variables. Panel A shows the 
summary statistics for MBOs. Panel B shows the summary statistics of IBOs. 
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Table 2.2 Panel A  Summary Statistics for MBOs 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for MBOs 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std.Dev. p25 p75 Min Max 
AccruKo 113 -0.010 -0.002 0.068 -0.039 0.013 -0.208 0.194 
AccruDe 113 -0.013 -0.010 0.091 -0.052 0.008 -0.316 0.431 
Ned%AudCom 113 0.850 1.000 0.246 0.667 1.000 0.000 1.000 
FinancialExp 113 0.283 0.000 0.453 0.000 1.000 0 1 
AudShare 113 0.073 0.005 0.148 0.001 0.067 0.000 0.771 
3%holdAudCom 113 0.168 0.000 0.376 0.000 0.000 0 1 
AudComSz 113 3.053 3.000 1.209 2.000 4.000 1 8 
AuditSz2BoardSz 113 0.521 0.500 0.219 0.400 0.571 0.125 1.000 
Big5 113 0.699 1.000 0.461 0.000 1.000 0 1 
LNAudFees 113 4.343 4.357 0.835 3.807 4.890 2.303 6.551 
AudFees/AssetsSqrt 113 0.372 0.327 0.197 0.243 0.476 0.019 1.133 
LNNonAudFees 113 3.860 4.094 1.629 3.047 5.037 0.000 7.187 
NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt 113 0.435 0.266 0.581 0.105 0.553 0.000 4.242 
NonAudFees/TotalFees 113 0.429 0.421 0.234 0.275 0.588 0.000 0.912 
NED% 113 0.450 0.429 0.132 0.400 0.500 0.143 0.750 
BoardSz 113 6.062 6.000 1.571 5.000 7.000 3 11 
Duality 113 0.283 0.000 0.453 0.000 1.000 0 1 
LNMarketVal 113 10.321 10.205 1.476 9.325 11.108 5.635 15.067 
InsShare 113 0.357 0.321 0.218 0.197 0.502 0.000 0.890 
LagROA 113 -0.017 0.102 1.132 0.051 0.149 -11.864 0.429 
SalesGrow 113 0.358 0.036 2.212 -0.060 0.136 -0.554 21.687 
Leverage 113 0.168 0.144 0.150 0.032 0.256 0.000 0.740 
FreeCashFlow 113 -0.008 0.015 0.140 -0.046 0.046 -0.980 0.369 
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Table 2.2 Panel B  Summary Statistics for IBOs 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for IBOs 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std.Dev. p25 p75 Min Max 
AccruKo 79 -0.002 0.002 0.080 -0.020 0.041 -0.457 0.159 
AccruDe 79 -0.001 -0.003 0.083 -0.037 0.044 -0.449 0.245 
Ned%AudCom 79 0.957 1.000 0.115 1.000 1.000 0.500 1.000 
FinancialExp 79 0.633 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 0 1 
AudShare 79 0.030 0.001 0.075 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.393 
3%holdAudCom 79 0.152 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.000 0 1 
AudComSz 79 3.076 3.000 0.931 3.000 3.000 1 8 
AuditSz2BoardSz 79 0.473 0.500 0.138 0.375 0.556 0.222 1.000 
Big5 79 0.861 1.000 0.348 1.000 1.000 0 1 
LNAudFees 79 4.982 4.875 1.147 4.205 5.704 2.890 8.038 
AudFees/AssetsSqrt 79 0.597 0.400 0.735 0.234 0.659 0.081 5.683 
LNNonAudFees 79 4.659 4.605 1.607 3.829 5.704 0.000 8.366 
NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt 79 0.638 0.375 0.926 0.178 0.693 0.000 5.683 
NonAudFees/TotalFees 79 0.450 0.444 0.222 0.300 0.578 0.000 0.880 
NED% 79 0.525 0.500 0.129 0.429 0.625 0.125 0.750 
BoardSz 79 6.772 7.000 1.633 5.000 8.000 4 10 
Duality 79 0.114 0.000 0.320 0.000 0.000 0 1 
LNMarketVal 79 11.424 11.480 1.767 9.983 12.764 8.111 15.653 
InsShare 79 0.379 0.377 0.186 0.288 0.504 0.000 0.905 
LagROA 79 0.073 0.074 0.140 0.044 0.129 -0.429 0.604 
SalesGrow 79 0.187 0.075 0.668 -0.010 0.189 -0.895 5.169 
Leverage 79 0.253 0.230 0.211 0.092 0.366 0.000 1.130 
FreeCashFlow 79 -0.270 0.009 2.313 -0.047 0.050 -20.550 0.201 
 
In Table 2.3, Panels A and B show the results of the Pearson correlation matrix 
for MBOs and IBOs respectively. Multicollinearity in regression analysis is 
regarded as harmful only when correlations exceed 0.7. When the highly 
correlated variables are separated into different models, all independent 
variables included in each regression analysis in this research are below 0.65. 
The variance inflation factors (VIFs) are also computed and examined in order 
to examine whether multicollinearity is a problem. The VIFs of all regression 
models are below 3, which is far lower than the critical value of 10 (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2012). Therefore, multicollinearity is not a problem in this study.  
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Table 2.3 Panel A  Pearson Pairwise Correlation Matrix for MBOs 
Panel A: Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for MBOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Ned%AudCom (1) 1                     
FinancialExp (2) -0.17 1                    
AudShare (3) -0.453 0.289 1                   
3%holdAudCom (4) 0.072 0.085 0.416 1                  
AudComSz (5) -0.362 0.103 0.368 0.138 1                 
AuditSz2BoardSz (6) -0.594 0.021 0.5 0.138 0.717 1                
Big5 (7) 0.269 -0.016 -0.164 -0.118 -0.083 -0.162 1               
LNAudFees (8) 0.369 -0.196 -0.288 -0.182 0.04 -0.275 0.314 1              
AudFees/AssetsSqrt (9) 0.2 -0.222 -0.197 -0.196 -0.043 -0.079 0.123 0.57 1             
LNNonAudFees (10) 0.311 -0.21 -0.132 -0.02 0.106 -0.134 0.311 0.474 0.198 1            
NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt (11) 0.223 -0.121 -0.135 0.003 -0.05 -0.095 0.199 0.137 0.176 0.633 1           
NonAudFees/TotalFees (12) 0.194 -0.079 -0.027 0.05 0.072 -0.084 0.207 0.04 -0.126 0.831 0.703 1          
NED% (13) 0.365 -0.066 -0.058 0.183 0.258 0.232 0.015 0.201 0.08 0.058 0.046 -0.022 1         
BoardSz (14) 0.303 0.05 -0.166 0.012 0.332 -0.362 0.137 0.382 -0.009 0.322 0.037 0.215 0.026 1        
Duality (15) -0.269 -0.09 -0.024 0.085 -0.093 0.123 -0.016 -0.302 -0.23 -0.106 -0.137 -0.019 -0.27 -0.288 1       
LNMarketVal (16) 0.223 -0.124 -0.163 0.021 0.11 -0.179 0.254 0.59 -0.053 0.507 0.071 0.222 0.049 0.366 -0.087 1      
InsShare (17) 0.26 -0.117 -0.362 -0.266 0.025 -0.023 -0.017 0.258 0.294 0.186 0.163 0.046 0.236 0.034 -0.188 0.059 1     
LagROA (18) 0.034 0.06 0.049 0.05 -0.068 -0.208 0.154 0.163 -0.085 0.199 0.07 0.145 -0.222 0.134 -0.138 0.346 -0.183 1    
SalesGrow (19) 0.014 -0.073 -0.06 -0.049 0.008 -0.081 -0.012 0.012 -0.006 0.12 0.096 0.149 0.016 0.13 0.176 -0.01 -0.066 0.008 1   
Leverage (20) 0.105 0.159 -0.177 -0.127 0.004 -0.133 0.006 0.204 0.098 -0.078 0 -0.138 0.175 0.129 -0.311 -0.041 0.193 0.085 -0.068 1  
FreeCashFlow (21) -0.039 0.055 0.147 0.132 -0.067 -0.071 -0.005 -0.063 -0.197 -0.029 -0.194 -0.024 -0.175 -0.04 -0.023 0.184 -0.201 0.647 -0.074 -0.126 1 
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Table 2.3 Panel B  Pearson Pairwise Correlation Matrix for IBOs 
Panel B: Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for IBOs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Ned%AudCom (1) 1                     
FinancialExp (2) 0.069 1                    
AudShare (3) -0.26 0.066 1                   
3%holdAudCom (4) -0.022 0.176 0.654 1                  
AudComSz (5) -0.313 -0.108 0 0.042 1                 
AuditSz2BoardSz (6) -0.498 -0.186 0.262 0.165 0.609 1                
Big5 (7) 0.142 0.149 -0.085 0.068 0.152 0.069 1               
LNAudFees (8) 0.325 -0.041 -0.219 -0.157 0.222 -0.145 0.362 1              
AudFees/AssetsSqrt (9) 0.094 0.021 -0.074 -0.071 -0.118 -0.058 -0.143 0.29 1             
LNNonAudFees (10) 0.174 -0.045 -0.003 0.004 -0.048 -0.136 0.113 0.437 0.289 1            
NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt (11) 0.068 0.058 -0.007 -0.061 -0.2 -0.128 -0.12 0.08 0.638 0.558 1           
NonAudFees/TotalFees (12) -0.075 0.014 0.208 0.141 -0.142 -0.04 -0.047 -0.245 -0.257 0.62 0.387 1          
NED% (13) 0.219 0.039 -0.021 0.09 0.317 0.315 0.189 0.156 -0.233 0.014 -0.226 0.013 1         
BoardSz (14) 0.143 0.103 -0.265 -0.136 0.349 -0.462 0.056 0.421 0.128 0.168 0.085 -0.125 -0.102 1        
Duality (15) 0.018 -0.058 0.123 -0.041 -0.116 -0.093 -0.086 -0.146 -0.129 0.033 -0.021 0.186 -0.022 -0.048 1       
LNMarketVal (16) 0.329 0.104 -0.285 -0.255 0.15 -0.247 0.263 0.686 0.189 0.246 0.045 -0.27 0.007 0.522 -0.093 1      
InsShare (17) -0.141 -0.169 -0.206 -0.27 0.079 0.183 -0.033 -0.099 0.136 0.052 0.138 0.047 0.011 -0.129 0.053 -0.103 1     
LagROA (18) 0.108 0.119 0.089 0.012 -0.114 -0.263 -0.001 0.039 -0.057 -0.091 -0.09 -0.12 -0.288 0.123 -0.041 0.203 -0.168 1    
SalesGrow (19) 0.006 -0.087 0.023 -0.021 -0.06 0.022 0.032 0.017 0.046 0.145 0.069 0.109 0.015 -0.086 -0.053 0.06 0.019 0.014 1   
Leverage (20) 0.283 0.04 -0.216 -0.089 -0.173 -0.248 0.095 0.162 0.174 0.222 0.185 0.017 0.249 0.116 0.134 0.24 0.254 -0.033 0.083 1  
FreeCashFlow (21) -0.043 -0.087 0.053 0.044 0.246 0.119 0.283 0.159 -0.788 -0.115 -0.623 0.126 0.345 -0.1 0.043 -0.132 -0.158 0.04 -0.071 -0.227 1 
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2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Univariate tests 
In Table 2.4, Panels A and B shows the results of univariate tests on abnormal 
accruals after the sample was partitioned into MBOs and IBOs. In Panel A, the 
means of the detected abnormal accruals (AccruKo) are negative for MBOs, 
based on the model from Kothari et al. (2005). The results are statistically 
significant (at the 10% level of confidence) in the one-sided t-test. Panel B 
shows the average direction of abnormal accruals prior to MBOs, as measured 
by the model from Kothari, et al. (2005). It can be seen that the minority of MBO 
firms have engaged in positive AEM practices (39.8%). In addition, the test for 
robustness, using abnormal accruals as measured by the model from Dechow 
et al. (1995) reports the same results for MBOs. These results indicate that 
managers engage in income-decreasing AEM behaviour preceding MBOs in 
the UK. The finding is consistent with those of DeAngelo (1986), Perry and 
Williams (1994), and Wu (1997): managers engage in negative AEM practices 
prior to MBOs, possibly in attempt to depress the premium for selling 
shareholders. This is consistent with hypothesis H1-1a.  
 
In Panel C of Table 2.4, the means of the detected abnormal accruals are shown 
to be negative for IBOs, but this figure is very small and has no significant 
difference from 0 in the t-test. In order to further investigate AEM behaviour 
preceding IBOs, this study summarises the direction of AEM practices in Panel 
D. It can be seen that, 53.2% of the detected abnormal accruals are positive, 
according to the model from Kothari et al. (2005). This indicates that the majority 
of managers exercised income-increasing AEM prior to IBOs in the UK. 
Nevertheless, the results from the Dechow et al. (1995) model shows that 48.1% 
of the detected abnormal accruals have a positive sign. These findings are 
inconclusive; hence we cannot determine the direction of AEM practices 
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preceding IBOs. This is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-1b. 
 
In summary, the results show that abnormal accruals is significantly negative in 
the year preceding MBOs, which suggests that managers engage in negative 
AEM. In contrast, the results show that managers engage in no greater AEM 
behaviour compared to non-buyout firms preceding IBOs. Managers’ ability to 
predict IBOs is much less accurate than it is with MBOs, as they are not part of 
the bidding group. Hence their behaviour is likely to be driven by the perception 
of undervaluation. Managers do not usually have a long time to prepare before 
IBO biddings. Since AEM can only be used in the end of the accounting period, 
when managers perceive their firm to be undervalued, they might have no time 
to engage in AEM before the bid are announced. Therefore, managers are less 
likely to have systematic AEM prior to IBOs.  
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Table 2.4  Univariate Tests Results 
Note1:The null hypothesis is “AccruKo=0”, H1 is alternative hypothesis 
Variable Definition: AccruKo: detected abnormal accruals using Kothari, et al. (2005) model; AccruDe: 
detected abnormal accruals using Dechow et al. (1995) model. 
 
2.5.2 Multivariate tests 
Table 2.5 shows the results from the OLS regressions. Panel A shows multiple 
regression results for the audit committee variables. Panel B shows multiple 
regression results for the audit quality variables. In this section, the dependent 
variable is AEM, which is proxied by the detected abnormal accruals (AccruKo) 
from the model of Kothari et al. (2005).  
 
In this section, the interpretation of regression results will be different from that 
found in prior literature, as this study includes a dependent variable, AEM, that 
Panel A. T-test for Abnormal Accruals in Signed Value (MBOs) 
Group Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. H1Note1 t-Stat p-Value 
MBO AccruKo 113 -0.011  0.072  AccruKo<0 -1.626  0.053  
MBO AccruKo 113 -0.011  0.072  AccruKo>0 -1.626  0.947  
MBO AccruDe 113 -0.013  0.091  AccruDe<0 -1.568  0.060  
MBO AccruDe 113 -0.013  0.091  AccruDe>0 -1.568  0.940  
        
Panel B. The direction of Abnormal Accruals (1=positive, 0= negative) (MBOs) 
Group Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev.    
MBO AbnAcc 113 0.398  0.492     
MBO AccruDe 113 0.363  0.483     
        
Panel C. T-test for Abnormal Accruals in Signed Value (IBOs) 
Group Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. H1 t-Stat p-Value 
IBO AccruKo 79 -0.006  0.073  AccruKo<0 -0.701  0.243  
IBO AccruKo 79 -0.006  0.073  AccruKo>0 -0.701  0.757  
IBO AccruDe 79 -0.001  0.083  AccruDe<0 -0.127  0.450  
IBO AccruDe 79 -0.001  0.083  AccruDe>0 -0.127  0.550  
        
Panel D. The direction of Abnormal Accruals (1=positive, 0= negative) (IBOs) 
Group Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev.    
IBO AccruKo 79 0.532  0.502     
IBO AccruDe 79 0.481  0.503     
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has been shown to have a significantly negative value in univariate tests. If the 
AEM proxy in univariate tests is significantly negative, a positive correlation 
between the AEM proxy and corporate governance mechanisms indicates that 
the governance mechanisms mitigate AEM, and a negative correlation between 
the AEM proxy and corporate governance mechanisms indicates that the 
governance mechanisms facilitate AEM.  
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Table 2.5 Panel A  Multivariate Test Results 
Panel A. Audit Committee Characteristics Model 
 MBO 1 MBO 2 MBO 3 MBO 4 IBO 1 IBO 2 IBO 3 IBO 4 
VARIABLES AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo 
Ned%AudCom 0.017 0.001 0.006 -0.009 0.083 0.026 0.062 0.016 
 (0.414) (0.037) (0.130) (-0.220) (1.250) (0.318) (0.929) (0.199) 
FinancialExp -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.024* -0.028* -0.025* -0.029* 
 (-0.749) (-0.428) (-0.704) (-0.246) (-1.853) (-1.783) (-1.907) (-1.800) 
AudShare 0.080  0.103  0.309**  0.321**  
 (1.111)  (1.278)  (2.285)  (2.309)  
3%holdAudCom  0.015  0.019  0.054*  0.056* 
  (1.064)  (1.300)  (1.799)  (1.793) 
AudComSz 0.008 0.010   0.003 -0.001   
 (1.092) (1.139)   (0.310) (-0.114)   
AuditSz2BoardSz   0.001 0.020   -0.029 -0.027 
   (0.017) (0.463)   (-0.441) (-0.369) 
LNMarketVal 0.010** 0.009** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 
 (2.120) (2.005) (2.276) (2.215) (2.171) (2.054) (2.590) (2.396) 
InsShare -0.024 -0.029 -0.016 -0.024 0.084 0.088 0.090 0.091 
 (-0.857) (-0.986) (-0.584) (-0.796) (0.966) (0.953) (1.005) (0.973) 
LagROA -0.011 -0.010 -0.012* -0.010 -0.073** -0.058 -0.082** -0.062 
 (-1.581) (-1.474) (-1.732) (-1.558) (-2.097) (-1.412) (-2.184) (-1.434) 
SalesGrow 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (3.884) (3.742) (3.293) (3.253) (-0.197) (-0.103) (-0.205) (-0.077) 
Leverage 0.043 0.035 0.048 0.041 -0.097 -0.108* -0.101 -0.110* 
 (0.804) (0.699) (0.865) (0.761) (-1.614) (-1.730) (-1.629) (-1.713) 
FreeCashFlow 0.060 0.062 0.055 0.056 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.856) (0.866) (0.837) (0.832) (-2.282) (-2.115) (-2.884) (-3.194) 
Constant -0.152* -0.128* -0.142 -0.126 -0.227** -0.167 -0.194* -0.148 
 (-1.862) (-1.823) (-1.538) (-1.443) (-2.311) (-1.496) (-1.855) (-1.270) 
Observations 113 113 113 113 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.131 0.120 0.119 0.102 0.213 0.189 0.214 0.190 
F-test 2.337 2.285 1.663 1.652 7.103 5.670 7.092 5.685 
Prob > F 0.016 0.018 0.0997 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5 Panel B  Multivariate Test Results 
Panel B. Audit Quality Model 
 MBO 1 MBO 2 MBO 3 IBO 1 IBO 2 IBO 3 
VARIABLES AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo 
Big5 -0.019 -0.023 -0.020 -0.043** -0.040* -0.034* 
 (-1.165) (-1.409) (-1.254) (-2.147) (-1.877) (-1.758) 
LNAudFees -0.001   0.026***   
 (-0.065)   (2.822)   
AudFees/AssetsSqrt   -0.065*   0.010 
   (-1.966)   (0.915) 
LNNonAudFees  0.009*   0.008  
  (1.856)   (1.430)  
NonAudFees/AssetsSqr
t 
  0.024**   0.004 
   (2.419)   (0.568) 
NonAudFees/TotalFees 0.071**   0.046   
 (2.336)   (1.084)   
NED% 0.101 0.087 0.086 0.020 0.021 0.033 
 (1.396) (1.248) (1.183) (0.266) (0.261) (0.454) 
BoardSz 0.008 0.005 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (1.589) (1.272) (1.362) (-0.341) (-0.193) (-0.094) 
Duality 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.008 0.003 0.008 
 (1.155) (1.093) (0.808) (0.400) (0.128) (0.342) 
LNMarketVal  0.004 0.007  0.010* 0.011* 
  (0.867) (1.543)  (1.859) (1.937) 
InsShare -0.039 -0.051 -0.036 0.065 0.065 0.062 
 (-1.257) (-1.658) (-1.092) (0.840) (0.817) (0.782) 
LagROA -0.007 -0.010 -0.004 -0.027 -0.049 -0.053 
 (-1.216) (-1.532) (-1.131) (-0.605) (-1.097) (-1.155) 
SalesGrow 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (2.115) (2.022) (2.403) (-0.013) (-0.102) (0.096) 
Leverage 0.031 0.035 0.015 -0.109** -0.109** -0.108* 
 (0.581) (0.644) (0.287) (-2.058) (-2.042) (-1.848) 
FreeCashFlow 0.079 0.080  -0.005*** -0.001  
 (1.211) (1.175)  (-2.750) (-0.380)  
Constant -0.114** -0.139** -0.128** -0.119* -0.127* -0.119* 
 (-2.085) (-2.195) (-2.004) (-1.845) (-1.935) (-1.838) 
Observations 113 113 113 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.156 0.157 0.176 0.200 0.166 0.152 
F-test 2.536 1.812 3.732 8.669 6.771 1.397 
Prob > F 0.007 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.195 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5.2.1 Results for management buyouts 
In Panel A of Table 2.5 in the Appendix, Models MBO 1 to MBO 4 report the 
results of the OLS regressions on audit committee characteristics for MBOs. 
This study does not include all the audit committee variables in the same 
regressions, in order to avoid high correlation between them.  
 
The percentage of non-executive directors on an audit committee 
The percentage of non-executive directors on an audit committee 
(Ned%AudCom) has no significant relationship with AEM (AccruKo). The sign 
direction of AEM is significantly negative in univariate tests, which indicates 
negative AEM. This suggests that the percentage of non-executive directors on 
an audit committee has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H1-2a.  
 
Non-executive directors might perform little or no real monitoring role as they 
lack the independence, time, expertise and information they would need in 
order to challenge management activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; 
Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). Hence a high percentage of non-executive 
directors on the audit committee might have no impact on AEM.  
 
Financial expertise on audit committee 
The financial expertise of audit committees (FinancialExp) has no significant 
relationship with AEM. The sign direction of AEM is significantly negative in 
univariate tests, which indicates negative AEM. This suggests that the financial 
expertise of audit committees has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H1-2b.  
 
Equity ownership by members of audit committees 
Audit committee members’ equity ownership (AudShare) has no significant 
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relationship with AEM. The sign direction of AEM is significantly negative in 
univariate tests, which indicates negative AEM. This suggests that equity 
ownership by audit committee members has no impact on AEM, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2c.  
 
Moreover, as an alternative measure of equity ownership, the presence in an 
audit committee of an outside blockholder with more than a 3% shareholding 
(3%holdAudCom) has no significant relationship with AEM. The sign direction of 
AEM is significantly negative in univariate tests, which indicates negative AEM. 
This suggests that having a blockholder with a 3% shareholding on the audit 
committee has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2e. 
 
Audit committee size 
Audit committee size (AudComSz and AuditSz2BoardSz) has on significant 
relationship with AEM. The sign direction of AEM is significantly negative in 
univariate tests, indicating negative AEM. This suggests that audit committee 
size has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2g.  
 
Audit committees might not take sufficient care that an MBO is about to happen, 
and thus they might focus on mitigating traditional positive AEM, in which 
managers boost earnings, rather than noticing negative AEM. Hence, audit 
committee members are unable to spot negative AEM behaviours prior to 
MBOs. 
 
In Panel B of Table 2.5 in the Appendix, Models MBO 1 to MBO 3 report the 
results of the OLS regressions on audit quality for MBOs. 
 
Big 5 auditors 
The presence of a Big 5 auditor (Big5) has an insignificant relationship with 
AEM. The sign direction of AEM is significantly negative in univariate tests, 
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which indicates negative AEM. This suggests that the presence of a Big 5 
auditor has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3a.  
 
External auditors might have no awareness that an MBO is about to happen, 
and thus they might focus on limiting traditional positive AEM, in order to 
mitigate managers’ attempts to boost earnings, rather than on spotting negative 
AEM. 
 
Audit fees 
Audit fees (AudFees/AssetsSqrt) have a significant negative relationship with 
AEM. The sign direction of AEM is significantly negative in univariate tests, 
which indicates negative AEM. This suggests that higher audit fees are 
associated with more AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3b.  
 
Economic rents associated with audit fees create an economic bond between 
auditors and their clients, which may affect auditors’ independence and lead 
them to permit AEM (Frankel et al., 2002). In addition, higher levels of AEM are 
likely to be associated with higher inherent risks, as assessed by auditors. The 
higher the level of inherent risk, the more audit effort will be required to reduce 
the risk of detection in order to achieve a given level of audit risk (Gul et al., 
2003). Hence higher audit fees might be associated with higher levels of AEM. 
 
Non-audit fees 
Non-audit fees (LNNonAudFees, NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt and 
NonAudFees/TotalFees) have a significant positive relationship with AEM. The 
sign direction of AEM is significantly negative in univariate tests, indicating 
negative AEM. This suggests that higher non-audit fees are associated with 
less AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3c.  
 
By undertaking audits and providing consultancy services, auditors learn more 
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about a client's business, which may improve the quality of all their services 
(Wallman, 1996). Hence higher non-audit fees might lead to less AEM.  
 
Summary of findings for management buyouts 
In summary, audit committee characteristics have no impact on AEM, which is 
inconsistent with hypotheses H1-2a, H1-2b, H1-2c, H1-2e and H1-2g. With regards to 
the quality of external audits, the presence of a Big 5 auditor has no impact on 
AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3a. Higher audit fees are 
associated with more AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3b. Higher 
non-audit fees are associated with less AEM, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H1-3c.  
2.5.2.3 Results for institutional buyouts 
In Panel A of Table 2.5 in the Appendix, Models IBO 1 to IBO 4 reports the 
results of the OLS regressions on audit committee characteristics for IBOs. This 
study does not include all audit committee variables in the same regressions in 
order to avoid high correlation between them. 
 
The percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
The percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
(Ned%AudCom) has no significant relationship with AEM. The sign direction of 
AEM is insignificant in univariate tests, which indicates no systematic AEM 
behaviour. This suggests that the percentage of non-executive directors on the 
audit committee has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H1-2a.  
 
Non-executive directors might perform little or no real monitoring role as they 
lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, and information in order to 
challenge management activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson 
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and Kraakman, 1991). Hence a high percentage of non-executive directors on 
an audit committee might have no impact on AEM.  
 
Financial expertise on audit committees 
The financial expertise of audit committees (FinancialExp) has a significant 
negative relationship with AEM. The sign direction of AEM is insignificant in 
univariate tests, which indicates no systematic AEM behaviour. This suggests 
that financial expertise in an audit committees is associated with less AEM, 
which is consistent with hypothesis H1-2b.  
 
The financial expertise of an audit committee makes internal control 
judgements more like those of experts, effectively facilitating the reporting 
process (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Audit committees that have financial 
expertise are better equipped to understand auditing issues and risks, as well 
as any procedures that are proposed to address and/or detect them (DeZoort 
and Salterio, 2001). In addition, knowledgeable audit committees are more 
likely to understand internal audit programs and their results, which, in turn, 
they ensure internal controls are more effective for preventing or detecting AEM 
(Abbott et al., 2004).  
 
Equity ownership by members of audit committees 
Audit committee members’ equity ownership (AudShare) has a significant 
positive relationship with AEM. The sign direction of AEM is insignificant in 
univariate tests, which indicates no systematic AEM behaviour. This suggests 
that higher levels of equity ownership by members of an audit committee is 
associated with more AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis H1-2d.  
 
Moreover, as an alternative measure of equity ownership, the presence in an 
audit committee of an outside blockholder with more than a 3% shareholding 
(3%holdAudCom) has a significant positive relationship with AEM. The sign 
Chapter 2 
76 
direction of AEM is insignificantly in univariate tests, which means no systematic 
AEM behaviour. This suggests that having a blockholder with a 3% 
shareholding on the audit committee is associated with more AEM, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H1-2f.  
 
The share ownership might impair the independence of audit committee 
members. Members of audit committees with high equity ownership might 
therefore underperforming their monitoring role. Hence members of audit 
committees who have higher equity ownership might compromise to income-
increasing AEM, leading to higher levels of AEM preceding IBOs. 
 
Audit committee size 
Audit committee size (AudComSz and AuditSz2BoardSz) has an insignificant 
relationship with AEM. The sign direction of AEM is insignificant in univariate 
tests, which indicates no systematic AEM behaviour. This suggests that the size 
of an audit committee has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H1-2g.  
 
As the responsibility of audit committee might be appropriately assigned, the 
size of an audit committee might have no impact on its function in detecting 
AEM. 
 
In Panel B of Table 2.5 in the Appendix, Models IBO 1 to IBO 3 report the results 
of the OLS regressions on audit quality for IBOs.  
 
Big 5 auditors 
The presence of a Big 5 auditor (Big5) has a significant negative relationship 
with AEM. The sign direction of AEM is insignificant in univariate tests, which 
indicates no systematic AEM behaviour. This suggests that the presence of a 
Big 5 auditor is associated with less AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis 
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H1-3a.  
 
Larger audit firms tend to deliver high quality audits, because they are less 
willing to accept questionable accounting methods and are more likely to detect 
and report errors and irregularities (e.g. Becker et al., 1998). These firms also 
have more resources to invest in improving the quality of their work (DeAngelo, 
1981). Hence larger audit firms have greater incentives to detect and reveal 
misstatement, and this makes a difference to the quality of their audits. 
Moreover, Big 5 auditors have lower litigation rates than their peers have 
(Palmrose, 1986a; Palmrose, 1988), which suggests that they provide higher 
quality audits.  
 
Audit fees 
Audit fees (LNAudFees) has a significant positive relationship with AEM. The 
sign direction of AEM is insignificant in univariate tests, which indicates no 
systematic AEM behaviour. This suggests that higher audit fees are associated 
with more AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3b. 
 
The economic rents associated with audit fees create an economic bond 
between auditors and their clients, which may affect auditors’ independence, 
leading them to permit AEM (Frankel et al., 2002). In addition, higher AEM is 
likely to be associated with a higher inherent risk, as assessed by auditors. The 
higher the level of inherent risk, the more audit effort will be required to reduce 
the risk of detection in order to achieve an acceptable level of audit risk (Gul et 
al., 2003). For these reasons, higher audit fees might be associated with higher 
AEM. 
 
Non-audit fees 
Non-audit fees (LNNonAudFees, NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt and 
NonAudFees/TotalFees) have an insignificant relationship with AEM. The sign 
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direction of AEM is insignificant in univariate tests, which indicates no 
systematic AEM behaviour. This suggests that non-audit fees have no impact 
on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3c. This might be because the 
variable of non-audit fees picks up different things in different circumstances.  
 
Summary of findings for institutional buyouts 
In summary, the percentage of non-executive directors on an audit committee 
has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2a. The financial 
expertise of audit committees is associated with less AEM, which is consistent 
with hypothesis H1-2b. Higher levels of equity ownership by audit committee 
members are associated with more AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis 
H1-2d. Furthermore, having on an audit committee a blockholder with at least of 
a 3% shareholding is associated with more AEM, which is consistent with 
hypothesis H1-2f. Audit committee size has no impact on AEM, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2g.  
 
With regards to the quality of external audits, the presence of a Big 5 auditor is 
associated with less AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis H1-3a. Higher 
audit fees are associated with more AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H1-3b. Non-audit fees have no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H1-3c.  
2.5.2.3 Comparison of results between the two types of buyout 
Audit committee characteristics have different impacts on AEM prior to MBOs 
when compared with IBOs.  
 
The percentage of non-executive directors on an audit committee 
(Ned%AudCom) has no impact on AEM prior to either MBOs or IBOs, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2a. This might be because these directors 
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perform little or no real monitoring role as they lack the independence, time, 
expertise, and information they would need in order to challenge management 
activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991).  
 
Prior to MBOs, the financial expertise of an audit committee (FinancialExp) has 
no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2b. This might be 
because even financially literate directors are usually particularly focused on 
avoiding positive AEM. They may perceive negative AEM as accounting 
conservatism, which is good news even in the case of an MBO, and therefore 
they do not intervene. Prior to IBOs, the financial expertise of an audit 
committee is associated with less AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis H1-
2b. Financial expertise makes an audit committee’s internal control judgements 
more like those of experts, effectively facilitating the reporting process (DeZoort 
and Salterio, 2001). Audit committees with financial expertise are better 
equipped to understand auditing issues and risks, as well as the procedures 
that are proposed to address and/or detect them (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). 
In addition, knowledgeable audit committees are more likely to comprehend an 
internal audit program and its results, which in turn, increase the effectiveness 
of internal controls in preventing or detecting AEM (Abbott et al., 2004). 
 
Prior to MBOs, equity ownership by audit committee members (AudShare) has 
no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2c. Furthermore, the 
presence, on an audit committee, of an outside blockholder with over 3% 
shareholding (3%holdAudCom) has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent 
with hypothesis H1-2e. Audit committees might not take sufficient care of the 
incoming MBO context, and thus they might focus on traditional positive AEM, 
in order to mitigate managers’ attempts to boost earnings, rather than on 
spotting negative AEM. Hence, audit committee members may be unable to 
spot AEM behaviours prior to MBOs.  
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Prior to IBOs, higher levels of equity ownership by audit committee members 
are associated with more AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis H1-2d. The 
results also suggest that the presence, on an audit committee, of an outside 
blockholder with over 3% shareholding is associated with more AEM, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H1-2f. The independence of audit committee 
members might be impaired by high share ownership. Members of audit 
committees with higher equity ownership might be less likely to perform active 
monitoring. Hence audit committee members with higher equity ownership 
might compromise to upwards AEM, leading to higher levels of AEM preceding 
IBOs. 
 
Prior to MBOs, audit committee size (AudComSz and AuditSz2BoardSz) has no 
impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2g. Prior to IBOs, audit 
committee size has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H1-2g. As the responsibility of audit committee might be appropriate assigned, 
the size of audit committee might have no impact on functions of AEM detection.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that audit committees perform little or no real 
monitoring roles prior to MBOs. This might be because that audit committees 
are not aware of the incoming MBO context, and they traditionally focus on 
limiting positive AEM to mitigate managers’ attempts to boost earnings. Prior to 
IBOs, the financial expertise of an audit committee and equity ownership by 
audit committee members is positively correlated with earnings management. 
These results suggest that audit committees do perform their intended role in 
governance prior to IBOs. Therefore, including a director with financial expertise 
in a firm’s audit committee and reducing the level of equity ownership by audit 
committee members can lead to a lower level of AEM prior to IBOs.  
 
Audit quality has different impacts on AEM prior to MBOs and IBOs. Prior to 
MBOs, the presence of a Big 5 auditor (Big5) has no impact on AEM, which is 
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inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3a. External auditors might not take sufficient 
care that an MBO is about to happen, and thus they might focus on limiting 
traditional positive AEM in order to mitigate managers’ attempts to boost 
earnings, rather than to spot negative AEM. Prior to IBOs, the presence of a 
Big 5 auditor is associated with less AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis 
H1-3a. Larger audit firms tend to deliver higher quality audits, because they are 
less willing to accept questionable accounting methods and are more likely to 
detect and report errors and irregularities (e.g. Becker et al., 1998). Larger audit 
firms have more resources to invest in improving the quality of their work 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Hence larger audit firms have greater incentives to detect 
and reveal management misstatement, leading to audit quality differentiation. 
Moreover, Big 5 audit firms have lower litigation rates than their peers have 
(Palmrose, 1986a; Palmrose, 1988), which suggests that they provide audits of 
a higher quality.  
 
Higher audit fees (LNAudFees and AudFees/AssetsSqrt) are associated with more 
AEM prior to both MBOs and IBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3b. 
The economic rents associated with audit fees create an economic bond 
between auditors and their clients, which may affect the independence of 
auditors, and lead them to permit AEM (Frankel et al., 2002). In addition, higher 
level of AEM is likely to be associated with a higher inherent risk, as assessed 
by auditors. The higher level of inherent risk requires the more audit effort to 
reduce detection risk in order to achieve an given level of audit risk (Gul et al., 
2003).  
 
Prior to MBOs, higher non-audit fees (LNNonAudFees, NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt 
and NonAudFees/TotalFees) are associated with less AEM, which is inconsistent 
with hypothesis H1-3c. By undertaking audits and providing consultancy services, 
auditors learn more about a client's business, which may improve the quality of 
all their services (Wallman, 1996). Hence higher non-audit fees might lead to 
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less AEM. Prior to IBOs, non-audit fees has no impact on AEM, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3c. This might be because the variable of non-
audit fees picks up different things in different circumstances. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that the presence of Big 5 auditors mitigates AEM 
prior to IBOs. Higher audit fees charged by auditors will lead to more AEM prior 
to MBOs and IBOs. The economic rents associated with audit fees create an 
economic bond between auditors and their clients, which may affect auditors’ 
independence and lead them to permit AEM (Frankel et al., 2002). High non-
audit fees mitigates AEM prior to MBOs. This might be because auditors learn 
more about a client's business by providing both auditing and consultancy 
services, which may improve the quality of all their services (Wallman, 1996).  
2.5.3 Robustness tests 
This study adopts discretionary accruals (AccruDe) from Dechow et al.’s (1995) 
cross-sectional model as an alternative to proxy for AEM in order to investigate 
whether the results of multivariate tests are sensitive to a particular measure of 
AEM. Table 2.6 reports the regression results of the robustness tests in the 
multivariate models. Panels A and B of Table 2.6 present multiple regression 
results for the audit committee variables and audit quality variables respectively. 
In Panel A, the relationships between the financial expertise of an audit 
committee, equity ownership by audit committee members and AEM prior to 
IBOs are consistent with those found in the main tests. They therefore support 
my findings. Although the presence on audit committee of an outside 
blockholder with over 3% shareholding has no significant relationship with AEM, 
the direction of the coefficients in these relationships are still the same as in the 
main test. In Panel B, although the impact of Big 5 auditors and non-audit fees 
on AEM are less significant respectively, the directions of these relationships 
are the same as in the main test. Thus, the findings of this research are largely 
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robust for the UK context.  
 
Table 2.6 Panel A  Robustness Test Results (Dependent variable: AccruDe -
discretionary accruals estimated by Dechow et al. (1995) model) 
Panel A. Audit Committee Characteristics Model 
 MBO 1 MBO 2 MBO 3 MBO 4 IBO 1 IBO 2 IBO 3 IBO 4 
VARIABLES AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe 
Ned%AudCom 0.017 -0.002 -0.001 -0.020 0.030 -0.016 -0.004 -0.044 
 (0.363) (-0.044) (-0.020) (-0.396) (0.498) (-0.221) (-0.064) (-0.603) 
FinancialExp -0.008 -0.004 -0.010 -0.003 -0.039** -0.041** -0.042** -0.044** 
 (-0.533) (-0.223) (-0.603) (-0.140) (-2.484) (-2.347) (-2.592) (-2.385) 
AudShare 0.094  0.124  0.267**  0.319***  
 (1.238)  (1.506)  (2.377)  (2.708)  
3%holdAudCom  0.019  0.025  0.037  0.042 
  (0.886)  (1.189)  (1.164)  (1.286) 
AudComSz 0.005 0.008   -0.010 -0.012   
 (0.680) (0.802)   (-1.052) (-1.164)   
AuditSz2BoardSz   -0.023 -0.000   -0.142* -0.130 
   (-0.499) (-0.007)   (-1.934) (-1.627) 
LNMarketVal 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 
 (1.136) (0.991) (1.274) (1.157) (0.729) (0.631) (0.582) (0.420) 
InsShare -0.032 -0.037 -0.022 -0.031 0.095 0.093 0.108 0.102 
 (-1.038) (-1.111) (-0.708) (-0.897) (1.000) (0.901) (1.118) (0.979) 
LagROA -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.037 -0.023 -0.058 -0.036 
 (-0.701) (-0.589) (-0.923) (-0.720) (-0.620) (-0.361) (-0.905) (-0.546) 
SalesGrow 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 0.014*** 
 (5.796) (5.713) (5.076) (5.043) (2.007) (2.262) (2.520) (2.816) 
Leverage 0.026 0.017 0.029 0.020 0.024 0.015 0.017 0.009 
 (0.391) (0.274) (0.426) (0.309) (0.274) (0.168) (0.199) (0.106) 
FreeCashFlow -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 -0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.244) (-0.202) (-0.307) (-0.282) (0.141) (0.186) (0.010) (-0.197) 
Constant -0.113 -0.085 -0.088 -0.068 -0.084 -0.026 -0.000 0.049 
 (-1.141) (-0.975) (-0.790) (-0.623) (-0.785) (-0.219) (-0.004) (0.387) 
Observations 113 113 113 113 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.228 0.220 0.226 0.212 0.158 0.132 0.184 0.147 
F-test 4.347 4.253 3.285 3.225 5.356 4.741 6.207 4.950 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6 Panel B  Robustness Test Results (Dependent variable: AccruDe -
discretionary accruals estimated by Dechow et al. (1995) model) 
Panel B. Audit Quality Model 
 MBO 1 MBO 2 MBO 3 IBO 1 IBO 2 IBO 3 
VARIABLES AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe AccruDe 
Big5 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.021 -0.020 -0.016 
 (-0.177) (-0.345) (-0.156) (-0.932) (-0.885) (-0.763) 
LNAudFees -0.007   0.007   
 (-0.728)   (0.669)   
AudFees/AssetsSqrt   -0.063*   -0.004 
   (-1.678)   (-0.372) 
LNNonAudFees  0.004   0.005  
  (0.780)   (0.765)  
NonAudFees/AssetsSqr
t 
  0.014   0.003 
   (1.467)   (0.426) 
NonAudFees/TotalFees 0.049   0.051   
 (1.446)   (1.051)   
NED% 0.068 0.058 0.054 -0.046 -0.049 -0.038 
 (0.843) (0.740) (0.674) (-0.580) (-0.599) (-0.545) 
BoardSz 0.009 0.007 0.008 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.563) (1.443) (1.505) (-0.031) (0.008) (0.064) 
Duality 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.031 0.033 0.035 
 (0.664) (0.716) (0.443) (1.004) (1.018) (1.024) 
LNMarketVal  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.002 
  (0.176) (0.399)  (0.155) (0.228) 
InsShare -0.044 -0.053 -0.038 0.078 0.078 0.077 
 (-1.302) (-1.536) (-1.089) (0.934) (0.914) (0.904) 
LagROA -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.022 -0.030 -0.032 
 (-0.554) (-0.657) (-1.130) (-0.323) (-0.423) (-0.473) 
SalesGrow 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015** 0.016** 0.017** 
 (5.453) (5.129) (5.517) (2.009) (2.212) (2.383) 
Leverage 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.022 0.023 0.021 
 (0.238) (0.146) (0.097) (0.269) (0.275) (0.255) 
FreeCashFlow 0.006 0.007  -0.000 0.002  
 (0.095) (0.101)  (-0.003) (0.658)  
Constant -0.082 -0.100 -0.083 -0.058 -0.033 -0.030 
 (-1.369) (-1.329) (-1.152) (-0.845) (-0.488) (-0.461) 
Observations 113 113 113 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.236 0.224 0.241 0.111 0.101 0.093 
F-test 5.317 4.499 5.500 3.784 4.053 1.182 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.316 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5.4 Endogeneity Test 
Corporate governance is determined exogenously by environmental factors 
such as legal efficiency and regulations relating to the market for corporate 
control (Himmelberg, 2002 cited in McKnight and Weir, 2009). In the UK, the 
essential exogenous environmental factor is the Corporate Governance Code. 
Hence Coles et al. (2008) suggest that firm-level governance might be treated 
as endogenous, otherwise, the tested models are problematic.  
 
Most studies of earnings management have used OLS regression models, but 
a few recent studies suggest that a simultaneous equations approach might be 
more appropriate, as models that include corporate governance variables suffer 
from endogeneity (e.g. Coles et al., 2008; McKnight and Weir, 2009; Piot and 
Janin, 2007; Linck et al., 2008).  
 
I control for the potential endogeneity using a two-stage least squares 
regression (2SLS) method that follows the approach of Coles et al. (2008) and 
McKnight and Weir (2009) using the lagged values of the endogenous variables 
as instruments. In the analysis, all audit committee characteristics, external 
audit quality and board structure variables are treated as endogenous.  
 
Before testing endogenous bias, this study adopts a two-stage process to 
investigate whether lagged regressors of corporate governance variables are 
valid instruments of themselves. First, for a 2SLS estimation to be reliable, there 
is a rule of thumb that the t-statistic of instruments in first-stage regressions 
must be greater than about 3.3. In this study, the t-statistic of instruments are 
greater than 3.3 for both MBOs and IBOs, which passes the rule of thumb. 
Second, this study checks the F statistic for joint significance of the instruments 
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in first-stage regression. The results show that the F statistic for joint 
significance of the instrument has greater than 10 for both MBOs and IBOs, 
indicating strong instruments. The minimum eigenvalue of the F statistic is also 
greater than critical value tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005) for both MBOs 
and IBOs, which reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. 
Therefore, lagged regressors of corporate governance variables is a valid 
instrument for both MBOs and IBOs in this study.  
 
Hausman test is used to investigate whether there is any endogeneity bias for 
the independent variables. The results of Hausman tests are insignificant at a 
5% level of significance, which indicates that my models have no endogeneity 
bias.  
 
The 2SLS regression results are shown in Table 2.7 in the Appendix. Although 
some variables have either higher or lower levels of significance, the directions 
of their correlations remain the same. Thus, regarding AEM in signed value, the 
2SLS analyses provide regression coefficients that are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained in the robustness tests, shown in Table 2.5.  
2.6. Conclusion 
This research investigates the effect of audit committee characteristics and 
external audit quality on AEM behaviour preceding MBOs and IBOs in the UK. 
It extends the corporate governance literature to examine, in particular, the 
setting of leveraged buyouts. It therefore differs from prior literature in at least 
three ways: (1) it demonstrates that the leveraged buyouts setting provides 
clear incentives for managers to engage in specific forms of AEM; (2) leveraged 
buyouts are subdivided into MBOs and IBOs for investigation and (3) it focuses 
more on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the direction rather 
than the magnitude of AEM.  
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I hypothesise that managers may engage in negative AEM preceding MBOs in 
an attempt to pay a lower buyout price to selling shareholders. In MBOs, 
managers are buyers and are likely to remain with a firm. They usually have 
high levels of personal investment in a firm after a buyout. In the context of 
MBOs, managers’ direct involvement in the transaction generates conflicts of 
interest: they wish to pay the lowest possible purchase price, whereas their 
shareholders wish to sell their shares for the highest possible price. Managers’ 
personal economic stake may motivate them to depress pre-buyout accounting 
earnings to portray an underperformed picture of the firm, and thereby increase 
the possibility that shareholders will accept a lower buyout price (Perry and 
Williams, 1994). Accordingly, I expect that abnormal discretionary accruals will 
be negative prior to MBOs.  
 
Moreover, I hypothesise that managers will engage in positive AEM preceding 
IBOs, in order to reduce firm undervaluation and/or to increase the potential 
costs of a buyout, and thus impede any potential IBO bidding. IBO targets 
usually have undervalued shares in the market relative to firms that remain 
public (Weir and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986). Managers are concerned about 
undervaluation as it may result in an IBO. IBO buyers might argue that the 
undervaluation of shares results from poor decisions of prior managers, and 
they see a leveraged buyout as a means of turning a failing company around 
(Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2005b). Although 
managers wish to retain managerial discretions in their firms, third-party buyers 
often wish to take control and engage in active monitoring or make changes to 
a firm’s existing management team after a buyout (Hafzalla, 2009). Furthermore, 
the uncertainty associated with that the business will be re-sold again within 
several years threatens managers’ job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). 
Therefore, managers may be motivated to engage in positive REM to reduce 
firm undervaluation and/or increase the potential buyout costs in an attempt to 
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impede any potential IBO bidding. Accordingly, I expect that abnormal 
discretionary accruals will positive prior to IBOs.  
 
In addition, I examine that how audit committee characteristics and external 
auditing quality affect AEM. I hypothesise that the independence of an audit 
committee, its financial expertise and equity ownership by committee members 
mitigates AEM; and that Big 5 auditors and higher audit fees curb AEM, as a 
whole, but non-audit fees impair the quality of external audits.  
 
Empirical tests in this study address all UK leveraged buyouts between 1997 
and 2011 using discretionary accruals derived from the cross-sectional model 
of Kothari et al. (2005) to proxy for AEM. This study also adopts a cross-
sectional model from Dechow et al. (1995) to give an alternative measure of 
AEM.  
 
The results show that abnormal AEM is significantly negative in the year 
preceding MBOs, which suggests that managers engage in negative AEM 
during this period. This is consistent with my prediction that managers engage 
in negative AEM preceding MBOs in an attempt to pay a lower buyout price to 
selling shareholders. Preceding IBOs, the results show that there is no 
evidence of greater AEM behaviour compared to that in non-buyout firms. 
Managers’ ability to predict IBOs is much less accurate than their ability to 
predict MBOs, as they are not part of the bidding group. Hence they do not 
usually have long time to prepare before IBO biddings. AEM can only be 
engaged at the end of the accounting period. Thus when managers perceive 
their firm to be undervalued, they might not have time to engage in AEM before 
the bids are announced.  
 
Having a high percentage of non-executive directors on an audit committee 
appears to have no impact on AEM, as these directors perform little or no real 
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monitoring role. They lack the independence, time, expertise, and information 
they would need in order to challenge management activities effectively (Patton 
and Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). Moreover, the inclusion of 
insiders on an audit committee is also beneficial, as they facilitate the 
communication of relevant information to outsiders during committee meetings, 
and they provide a forum for evaluating the performance and senior 
management potential of junior executives. This might explain why having a 
high percentage of non-executive directors on an audit committee appears to 
have no impact on AEM. The results suggest that the percentage of non-
executive directors on an audit committee has no impact on AEM prior to MBOs 
and IBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2a. 
 
The financial expertise of audit committees helps them to make internal control 
judgements that are more like those of experts, facilitating the reporting process 
(DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). Audit committees with financial expertise are 
better equipped to understand auditing issues and risks, as well as the 
proposed procedures to address and/or detect them (DeZoort and Salterio, 
2001). In addition, knowledgeable audit committees are more likely to 
comprehend an internal audit program and its results, and this increases the 
effectiveness of internal controls in preventing or detecting AEM (Abbott et al., 
2004). The results suggest that, prior to MBOs, the financial expertise of audit 
committees has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2b. 
This might be because even financially literate directors usually focus on 
avoiding positive AEM. They may perceive negative AEM as accounting 
conservatism, which is good news even in the case of an MBO, and thus they 
do not intervene. However, prior to IBOs, the results suggest that the financial 
expertise of audit committees is associated with less AEM, which is consistent 
with hypothesis H1-2b.  
 
High levels of equity ownership by audit committee members are expected to 
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protect shareholder interests more effectively. Since equity ownership aligns 
the interests of directors with those of external shareholders, more equity 
ownership by the directors creates a personal incentive to actively monitor 
managers (Bhagat et al., 1999). Accordingly, higher equity ownership by audit 
committee members is likely to mitigate the risk of these directors colluding with 
management to manipulate earnings, because such collusion would also 
ultimately harm their own interests (Vafeas, 2005).  
 
Prior to MBOs, the results suggest that equity ownership by audit committee 
members has no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2c. 
The results also suggest that the presence of a blockholder with 3% or more 
shareholding on the audit committee has no impact on AEM, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2e. Members of the audit committee might not 
take sufficient care that an MBO is about to happen, and thus they might focus 
on traditional positive AEM, in order to mitigate managers’ attempts to boost 
earnings, rather than on mitigating negative AEM. However, prior to IBOs, the 
results suggest that higher levels of equity ownership by audit committee 
members are associated with more AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis 
H1-2d. The results also suggest that the presence on an audit committee of a 
blockholder with a holding of 3% or more shares is associated with more AEM, 
which is consistent with hypothesis H1-2f. The share ownership might jeopardise 
the independence of audit committee members, leading to a lower level of 
monitoring. Hence higher equity ownership by audit committee members might 
compromise to income-increasing AEM, leading to higher levels of AEM 
preceding IBOs.  
 
Having a large audit committee may ensure that a firm has a minimum required 
knowledge base (Vafeas, 2005). In addition, the effectiveness of an audit 
committee is significantly related to its power (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). 
Larger audit committees are beneficial because they have an elevated status 
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in an organisation and are thus more likely to be acknowledged as an 
authoritative body by the external and internal audit functions (Louis Braiotta et 
al., 2010). The increased organisational status and power of a larger audit 
committee may enhance its performance of internal audit functions and 
subsequently prevent or detect earnings manipulations (Abbott et al., 2004; 
Vafeas, 2005). The results suggest that audit committee size has no impact on 
AEM prior to either MBOs or IBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-2g. 
As the responsibility of audit committees might be appropriate assigned, the 
size of an audit committee might have no impact on its function in detecting 
AEM. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that audit committees perform little or no real 
monitoring prior to MBOs. This might be because they do not take sufficient 
care that an MBO is about to happen, and they traditionally focus on limiting 
positive AEM.  
 
Big 5 audit firms tend to deliver high quality audits, because larger audit firms 
are less willing to accept questionable accounting methods and are more likely 
to detect and report errors and irregularities (e.g. Becker et al., 1998). Larger 
audit firms have more resources to invest in improving the quality of their work 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Hence, larger audit firms have greater incentives to detect 
and reveal management misstatement, resulting in differentiation in the quality 
of auditing between larger and smaller firms. Moreover, Big 5 audit firms have 
lower litigation rates than their peers do (Palmrose, 1986a; Palmrose, 1988), 
which suggests that they provide higher quality audits. The results suggest that, 
prior to MBOs, Big 5 auditors have no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent 
with hypothesis H1-3a. External auditors might not be aware of the MBO context, 
and thus they might traditionally focus on limiting positive AEM, in order to 
mitigate managers' attempts to boost earnings, rather than on spotting negative 
AEM. The results suggest that, prior to IBOs, the presence of a Big 5 auditor is 
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associated with less AEM, which is consistent with hypothesis H1-3a.  
 
Higher audit fees are more likely to reflect higher quality of external auditing as 
they compensate for an increased audit effort and the high price of reputation 
capital (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Palmrose, 
1986a; Simunic, 1980). Increased audit efforts make auditors more likely to 
detect and report accrual estimation errors and irregularities (Srinidhi and Gul, 
2007). Due to potential risks of litigation, auditors are less willing to accept 
questionable accounting reports. Auditors will require management to correct 
the errors and modify their accounting methods to improve the quality of 
financial reports (Abbott et al., 2006). The results suggest that higher audit fees 
are associated with more AEM prior to both MBOs and IBOs, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3b. This might be because the economic rents 
associated with audit fees create an economic bond between auditors and their 
clients, which may affect auditors’ independence, leading them to permit AEM 
(Frankel et al., 2002). In addition, higher AEM is likely to be associated with 
higher inherent risk, as assessed by auditors. The higher the level of inherent 
risk, the more audit effort will be required to reduce detection risk to achieve an 
acceptable level of audit risk (Gul et al., 2003).  
 
Non-audit fees may compromise an auditor's independence, which in turn 
affects the auditor's willingness to express an audit opinion appropriately 
(Frankel et al., 2002; Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988). Large fees paid to 
auditors, particularly those related to non-audit services, make auditors more 
economically dependent on their clients. This may cause the auditor to become 
reluctant to make appropriate inquiries during an audit for fear of losing a highly 
profitable client (Hoitash et al., 2007). Furthermore, when auditors are no longer 
perceived to be independent, managers are unlikely to be deterred from 
opportunistic behaviours (Srinidhi and Gul, 2007).  
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The results suggest that, prior to MBOs, higher non-audit fees are associated 
with less AEM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H1-3c. By providing both 
auditing and consulting services, auditors learn more about a client's business, 
which may improve the quality of all their services (Wallman, 1996). Hence 
higher non-audit fees may lead to less AEM. Prior to IBOs, the results suggest 
that non-audit fees have no impact on AEM, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H1-3c. This might be because the variable of non-audit fees picks up 
different things in different circumstances.  
 
To conclude, the results suggest that audit committees perform little or no real 
monitoring prior to MBOs. They perhaps do not take sufficient care that an MBO 
is about to happen. They might traditionally focus on limiting positive AEM 
behaviours, which managers might use to pursue a bonus plan, and hence be 
unable to spot negative AEM behaviours prior to MBOs. Prior to IBOs, the 
financial expertise of an audit committee mitigates AEM. This suggests that 
audit committees should include financial experts. Moreover, equity ownership 
by audit committee members is positively correlated with AEM. This suggests 
that directors who have higher equity ownership should not be included in an 
audit committee in order to preventing high levels of AEM.  
 
Moreover, the results suggest that the presence of Big 5 auditors mitigates AEM 
prior to IBOs. This indicates that hiring a Big 5 auditor has advantageous. In 
addition, the higher audit fees charged by these auditors might lead to more 
AEM prior to MBOs and IBOs. This reveals that shareholders should be 
cautions if their firm has a very high level of audit fees, as this might reflect a 
decrease of auditor’s independence due to economic bond between auditors 
and their clients. Furthermore, high non-audit fees mitigate AEM prior to MBOs. 
This suggests that incurring non-audit fees could lead auditors to learn more 
about a client's business hence may improve the quality of all services.  
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This study focuses on managerial AEM behaviours preceding leveraged 
buyouts. It hypothesises that managers use positive AEM to reduce firm 
undervaluation and increase potential buyout costs in an attempt to impede any 
potential IBO bidding. In other words, the IBO sample in this study consists of 
the firms that have attempted to increase their firm value by engaging in positive 
earnings management but failed to conceal their underperformance and 
ultimately became IBO targets. Ideally, a control group would include firms that 
could be predicted to engage in positive AEM in an attempt to increase their 
firm value and could be expected to be successful in impeding IBO bidding. 
Due to the limitations of the data available, however, this study does not have 
such a control group. In other words, this study is based on events that have 
occurred rather than those that are predicted. Future research may overcome 
this issue by using a control group that includes firms that have not been subject 
to IBO bids but do have a high likelihood of being taken over. Drawing on prior 
literature, future research could construct a model to identify firms with a high 
likelihood of being targeted by takeovers in the market. By adding IBO firm 
characteristics into the model, it might be able to distinguish firms at high risk 
of IBOs from firms at risk from other types of takeover.  
 
In addition, this study hypothesises that managers might engage in positive 
AEM to reduce firm undervaluation preceding IBOs, thereby reducing the risk 
of becoming an IBO target. However, the findings are inconsistent with this 
hypothesis. This might be because managers uses other earnings 
management tools at the same time (REM for example), and this issue will be 
explored in Chapter 3. 
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3. Chapter 3: Real Earnings Management, Block Ownership and 
Board Characteristics prior to Leveraged Buyouts in the UK 
3.1 Introduction 
There has been a significant increase in the number and value of leveraged 
buyouts in the UK since the beginning of the 1990s. For instance, the value of 
deals increased from £458.62 million in 1997 to £3802.91 million in 2010. In the 
peak year of 2006, there were 17 leveraged buyouts with the average value 
being £1267.12 million per deal (data from Thomson ONE database, Table 1.1 
in the Appendix). A leveraged buyout is the purchase and delisting of a publicly 
listed corporation, and buyers are typically funded by substantial amounts of 
debt and backed by private equity firms (Weir and Wright, 2006). As leveraged 
buyouts are a distinct and increasingly important type of acquisition in the 
financial market, managerial self-interested behaviours prior to the buyouts 
may significantly affect the buyout transactions.  
 
Therefore, this study provides a new angle on the real earnings management 
(REM) literature by examining managerial REM behaviours preceding 
leveraged buyouts. REM refers to departures from normal operational practices, 
motivated by managers’ desire to manipulate current-period earnings, using 
methods such as cutting discretionary expenditures to boost earnings 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). REM uses managerial discretions over operational 
business decisions, hence it is less likely to be scrutinised by auditors and 
regulators and potentially has a smaller probability of being detected (Graham 
et al., 2005).  
 
REM is made during a financial year to distort the current period's normal 
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operations, hence have direct consequences on current and future cash flows 
as well as accounting accruals (Kim and Sohn, 2013). REM aims to influence 
short-term reported earnings at the expense of distorting normal operations in 
the current period, and this impact is less likely to reverse in future (Kim and 
Sohn, 2013). 
 
As REM changes the normal operations of a firm, and some REM practices 
may have a long-term impact on its value (Kim and Sohn, 2013), managers 
might have different incentives to engage in REM, depending on whether they 
participate in leveraged buyouts or not. Thus, I subdivide leveraged buyouts 
into MBOs and IBOs. In MBOs, managers are buyers and are likely to remain 
with and have high levels of personal investment in a firm after the buyouts. In 
the context of MBOs, management’s direct involvement in the transaction 
generates conflicts of interest. Managers wish to pay the lowest possible 
purchase price, whereas their shareholders wish to sell their shares for the 
highest possible price. Managers’ personal economic stake may motivate them 
to depress pre-buyout accounting earnings in order to portray their firm as 
underperforming, thereby increasing the possibility that shareholders accept a 
lower buyout price (Perry and Williams, 1994). Therefore, managers have 
strong incentives to engage in negative REM in an attempt to offer a lower 
buyout price in MBOs.  
 
However, managers might also engage in positive REM prior to MBOs, with the 
intention to secure external funding. In MBOs, managers are part of the buying 
group and, in most cases, the internal financing by managers is insufficient to 
meet the cash required to implement a buyout. As managers tend to depend on 
external funding to execute a buyout, they will consider their ability to obtain the 
external financing, especially when they have fewer fixed assets available to 
secure loans. Hence managers might engage in positive REM to enhance 
prospective external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value in order to secure 
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finance (Fischer and Louis, 2008). 
 
In contrast, IBO targets usually have undervalued shares in the market relative 
to firms that remain public (Weir and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986). Managers 
worry about undervaluation as its potential consequence is IBO. IBO buyers 
argue that the undervaluation of shares results from poor decisions made by 
incumbent managers, and a leveraged buyout could be a means of turning a 
failing company around (Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir et al., 
2005b). Thus, undervaluation attracts potential IBO buyers as it signals that 
there is scope for improvements.  
 
However, in an IBO, managers wish to retain their managerial discretions, while 
third-party buyers wish to take control and engage in active monitoring or make 
changes to a firm’s existing management team after a buyout (Hafzalla, 2009). 
Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with that the business will be re-sold 
again within several years threatens managers’ job security (Denis and Denis, 
1995). Thus, incumbent managers have strong incentive to prevent their firm 
becoming a potential target for an IBO in order to retain their discretions and 
protect their long-term job security. Managers’ ability to predict IBOs is much 
less accurate, as they are not part of the bidding group. However, as firm 
undervaluation attracts IBO buyers, reducing undervaluation is likely to reduce 
the possibility of a firm becoming an IBO target. If their firm is perceived to be 
undervalued, managers may engage in positive REM in order to reduce the 
undervaluation and/or increase the potential buyout costs in an attempt to 
impede any potential IBO bidding. Hence, it is argued that managers might 
have different incentives to engage in REM, lowering its market value prior to 
MBOs and increasing it prior to IBOs.  
 
As research on real activity-based earnings management has been limited to 
just a few studies (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Kim and Sohn, 2013), this 
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study provides additional insight into this field, and investigates whether 
managers have different REM behaviours preceding MBOs and IBOs in the UK.  
 
In addition to considering, whether managers engage in REM prior to MBOs 
and IBOs, it is also of interest to explore when this behaviour starts. Prior 
literature suggests that managers often plan MBOs for as many as two or three 
years prior to the date of a public offering (e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994). This 
indicates that, in most cases, managers issue at least one annual report, in 
which earnings could be manipulated, prior to MBOs (DeAngelo, 1986). 
Research by Perry and Williams (1994) indicates that, although some firms may 
manage accounting accruals for several years prior to an MBO offer, the year 
prior to the MBO offer announcement is the most likely period to be subject to 
the systematic manipulation of AEM.  
 
In contrast, as previously mentioned, managers’ ability to predict IBOs is much 
less accurate than their ability to predict MBOs. They might suspect that their 
firm will become subject to an IBO if it is perceived to be undervalued, but they 
are much more uncertain about the actual event happening. This might indicate 
that both the degree and timing of REM differs between MBOs and IBOs. This 
study therefore examines REM behaviours in the 2-year period prior to MBOs 
and IBOs in order to detect any potential changes in REM activity. 
 
Before comparing the MBO and IBO samples, it is worth first considering 
whether the investigation of earnings management behaviours prior to MBOs 
and IBOs is appropriate. Before choosing to participate in an MBO, managers’ 
REM behaviours are driven by incentives that are unrelated to the buyouts. 
However, once managers decide to take part in an MBO, this choice is 
endogenous to certain characteristics of the firm and its environment. Such 
characteristics may include the percentage of pre-buyout ownership that 
managers hold in a firm, their ability to procure funding and their level of risk 
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aversion (Hafzalla, 2009). This choice also provides managers of MBO firms 
with new incentives, as stated before. As long as these endogenous 
characteristics are unrelated to the REM already being made, a comparison of 
MBO and IBO samples is appropriate for this study and makes it an ideal setting 
for my investigation. Moreover, this research uses the earnings management 
of non-leveraged buyout industrial peers as benchmark to calculate the 
abnormal AEM and REM of buyout firms. Any abnormal AEM and REM 
detected in this process are earnings management relating to leveraged 
buyouts. Due to this control, exploring earnings management behaviours prior 
to MBOs and IBOs is appropriate.  
 
As REM uses managerial discretions over operational business decisions, 
weak corporate governance enables greater managerial discretions to 
manipulate earnings, but good corporate governance limits managers’ ability 
and potentially restricts REM behaviours. Hence corporate governance is 
important for mitigating REM behaviours, and this study provides a new angle 
on REM by examining the relationship between corporate governance and 
REM. Boards have an essential function in monitoring management behaviours 
to ensure that a company operates in the long-term interests of the 
shareholders (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Furthermore, outside shareholders, 
especially institutional investors, have strong incentives to monitor managers in 
order to remove their incentives for myopic behaviours (Bushee, 1998). Close 
monitoring by a board and outside shareholders may reduce self-interested 
managerial discretions, and thus may mitigate REM behaviours. Therefore, this 
study investigates whether corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate 
REM activities, especially outside shareholders and board characteristics.  
 
Since no prior research appears to have analysed REM in the UK or in the 
context of takeovers, this study investigates the REM activities of all UK firms 
that have made leveraged buyout announcements during the period from 1997 
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to 2011 and which are subsequently delisted from the London Stock Exchange. 
This setting has significant advantages: First, most previous studies of 
leveraged buyouts have examined US samples from the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. 
DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams, 1994), but it is questionable whether the 
US evidence can be generalised to the UK. In the UK, leveraged buyouts are 
more rarely related to hostile takeovers, have lower debt levels, focus more on 
growth opportunities and are commonly financed by privately placed 
mezzanine funds rather than by junk bonds (Toms and Wright, 2005). Second, 
the sample period covers the second wave of leveraged buyouts in the UK, 
which differs from the first wave of buyouts in the 1980s. In the second wave, 
private equity and debt providers have increased confidence on important 
issues, such as the support of target shareholders5 and an expectation of 
acquiring all the shares through squeeze-out provisions, which facilitates the 
success in buyout transactions (Renneboog et al., 2007).  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
literature on REM studies, Section 3 discusses managerial incentives to engage 
in REM prior to MBOs and IBOs and presents the hypotheses, and Section 4 
discusses the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on REM. Section 5 
then outlines the proposed research design, while Section 6 reports the 
empirical results and findings, and Section 7 provides a sensitivity analysis. 
Finally, Section 8 presents conclusions.  
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Theoretical background 
The separation of ownership and control in listed public corporations can cause 
principal–agent problems, as the owners of these firms often lack incentives 
                                                             
5 Target shareholders were more likely to accept irrevocable undertakings, which a binding 
agreement on target shareholders to accept a buyout offer. 
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and the ability to monitor and incentivise managers to manage the daily 
operations of a firm effectively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When principals 
and agents have divergent economic interests, higher degrees of information 
asymmetry between them will lead to greater risks that the agents will engage 
in self-serving behaviour. Information asymmetries arise because principals 
cannot reliably observe and interpret information about the competence, 
intentions, expertise and actions of the agent (Saam, 2007; Sepe, 2010). 
Information asymmetries can result in moral hazard problems. Moral hazard 
problems arise when agents act in opportunistic behaviours, as they believe the 
principal is unlikely to detect their behaviour (Saam, 2007).  
 
Information asymmetries in firms with better-informed managers and less-well-
informed outsiders create a demand for internally generated measures of firm 
performance to be reported on a periodic basis. Accounting earnings 
information thus plays a crucial role in reducing information asymmetry. For 
instance, prior to leveraged buyouts, potential bidders make extensive use of 
publicly available accounting information, such as earnings figures, when 
preparing their bids6. Earnings information therefore has great value relevance 
to investors and other financiers, and their demand for such information 
increases when they are making decisions (Aharony and Barniv, 2004). 
Moreover, a detailed analysis of earnings information can help shareholders to 
assess whether they have been offered a fair price in leveraged buyouts or not 
(Bull, 1989). For instance, DeAngelo (1990) found that investment bankers 
made extensive use of accounting earnings for firm valuation in leveraged 
buyouts; Perry and Williams (1994) also report that accounting earnings were 
used by courts to assess the fairness of buyout prices when selling 
shareholders claimed that their compensation was inadequate in MBOs. As 
financial statements provide value-relevant information to a firm's external 
                                                             
6 Potential bidders might also need access to private information in confidentiality 
agreements. 
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stakeholders, the heavy reliance on accounting numbers creates powerful 
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings. Therefore, REM is a potential 
issue prior to MBOs and IBOs.  
3.2.2 Prior empirical literature on real earnings management studies 
Real earnings management refers to the purposeful actions of management 
that deviate from normal business operational practices with the primary 
objective of manipulating current period earnings. REM can have direct 
consequences both for accounting accruals and for cash flows in current and 
future periods. REM changes the reported earnings by distorting real activities, 
such as altering the timing and scale of production, sales, investment, and 
financing activities throughout the accounting period. For instance, reported 
earnings can be temporarily boosted by cutting discretionary expenditures or 
by accelerating the timing of production and sales (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
 
REM is subject to managerial discretion on certain operational business 
decisions, such as whether assets are sold or bought before or after the end of 
a reporting period (Bartov, 1993). Hence REM activities are more difficult for 
monitors, such as audit committees, auditors or regulators, to detect and to 
scrutinise.  
 
The prevalence of real activities manipulation as an earnings management tool 
was not well understood until Graham et al. (2005) surveyed more than 400 
executives and documented the widespread use of real activities manipulation. 
Their survey suggested that managers attach higher importance to accounting 
earnings benchmarks (such as targets of zero earnings, previous period 
earnings and analyst forecasts) than to cash flows. In order to meet these 
targets, some executives admitted to decreasing expenditure on research and 
development (R&D), advertising and maintenance, or postponing new projects, 
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even if this delay caused a small loss in firm value. 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) developed empirical models to separate normal from 
abnormal levels of real operational activities as reflected in CFO, production 
costs and discretionary expenditures. Consistent with the survey undertaken by 
Graham, et al.’s (2005), Roychowdhury (2006) found that managers avoid 
reporting annual losses by manipulating sales upward, reducing discretionary 
expenditures and overproducing inventory to decrease the cost of goods sold, 
all of which are deviations from optimal operational decisions.  
 
Recent research examines the consequences of real activities manipulation. 
Kim and Sohn (2013) suggested that, if REM is used to improve a firm’s short-
term reported earnings at the expense of distorting current period real 
operations, it is generally value destroying, particularly in the long term. The 
same applied to the reduction of R&D expenses to increase current period 
earnings, or offer increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms to 
generate additional unsustainable sales. Cohen and Zarowin (2010a) found 
that firms that engage in REM prior to seasoned equity offerings experience a 
subsequent decline in performance, as measured by the return on assets. 
Furthermore, Bhojraj et al. (2009) reported that firms that beat analyst forecasts 
by using REM and accruals-based earnings management had worse operating 
performance and stock market performance in subsequent years than firms that 
missed analyst forecasts without earnings management had.  
 
Nevertheless, research by Gunny (2010) found that REM was positively 
associated with future-period earnings and cash-flow performance for the firms 
that just met or beat their earnings benchmarks. She explained that REM 
attains benefits that allow a firm to perform better in the future. For instance, 
managers may use REM to meet benchmarks in an effort to enhance a firm’s 
credibility and reputation with stakeholders, and thus benefit from better 
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relationships with its customers, suppliers and/or creditors. Alternatively, 
managers could engage in REM to just meet earnings benchmarks as a way to 
signal superior future earnings (Gunny, 2010).  
3.3 Hypothesis Development for Real Earnings Management  
3.3.1 Managerial incentives prior to management buyouts and 
institutional buyouts 
An MBO is the purchase and delisting of a listed company by incumbent 
managers who seek financial support from private equity firms, typically using 
a preponderance of debt. Where managers are buyers, they are likely to remain 
with the firm and to have significant ownership stakes in the buyout. As a result, 
management’s direct involvement in the transaction generates conflict of 
interests. Managers will wish to pay the lowest possible purchase price, while 
their shareholders will wish to sell their shares for the highest possible price 
(Hafzalla, 2009). Managers therefore have a strong incentive to depress pre-
buyout accounting earnings to portray a less favourable picture of the firm, and 
thus increase the possibility that shareholders will accept a lower buyout price. 
DeAngelo (1986) argued that managers could effectively manage shareholders’ 
perception of a firm’s value by engaging in negative earnings management prior 
to a purchase offer.  
 
Furthermore, negative earnings management facilitates the overall execution 
of MBOs. First, if earnings management reduces the perceived value of a firm, 
shareholders may accept a lower buyout price. Second, lower reported 
earnings in the periods preceding the MBOs can be used to support the fairness 
of the buyout price if there is a legal challenge to the role of managers in the 
transaction (Perry and Williams, 1994). Therefore, managers might engage in 
negative earnings management prior to MBOs in an attempt to depress pre-
buyout accounting earnings hence increasing the possibility that shareholders 
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will accept a lower buyout price.  
 
However, managers might also engage in positive earnings management prior 
to MBOs, possibly to secure external funding and to lower the cost of finance. 
In MBOs, managers are part of the investment group buying a firm. In most 
cases, the internal financing by managers is insufficient to meet the cash 
required to implement a buyout. Additional financing is sought from external 
sources by leveraging a company’s assets through secured bank loans. 
Moreover, further external debt financing may be obtained through private 
placements of subordinated claims from institutional investors. As managers 
depend on external funding to execute a buyout, they will be concerned about 
their ability to obtain the funding and motivated by their desire to obtain it at a 
low cost, especially when they have fewer fixed assets available to secure loans. 
Managers may therefore be likely to manipulate earnings upward to enhance 
prospective external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value in order to secure 
finance (Fischer and Louis, 2008).  
 
An IBO is initiated and executed solely by third parties, such as outside 
institutional investors and private equity houses, who purchase and delist the 
firm without involving management in the transaction. Prior research suggests 
that a key characteristic of IBO targets is that their shares are undervalued in 
the market relative to firms that remain public, as measured by the price-
earnings ratio (Weir and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986). IBO buyers argue that 
the undervaluation of shares results from the poor decisions of prior 
management, and a leveraged buyout could be a means of turning a failing 
company around by imposing a more efficient system of corporate governance 
or hiring a different management team (Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; 
Weir et al., 2005b). Thus undervaluation attracts potential IBO buyers as it 
signals that there is scope for improvement. Moreover, undervalued companies 
allow investors to acquire assets comparatively cheaply.  
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Incumbent managers want to prevent their firm from becoming a potential IBO 
target, as third-party buyers wish take control and engage in active monitoring 
or make changes to a firm’s existing management team after the buyout. This 
incentive is particularly strong in the UK, due to the comparatively limited 
options managers have to defend successfully against takeover offers, once 
they have been made (Hafzalla, 2009). Many takeover defence strategies that 
are prevalent in the USA, such as 'poison pills', are illegal under UK company 
Law and regulations included in The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (The 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 2013). Moreover, given that a very high 
takeover premium is often offered and an adequate time is required to obtain 
funding, incumbent managers are usually unable to make a rival bid and take 
the firm over themselves (Hafzalla, 2009).  
 
As firm undervaluation attracts IBO specialists, a reduction in undervaluation is 
likely to decrease the probability of any potential IBOs. Moreover, an increase 
of share prices by positive earnings manipulation also increases the costs of 
IBO transactions (Hafzalla, 2009). This may further impede the initiation of IBO 
offers, as potential bidders will find it more difficult to raise sufficient funds and 
generate adequate returns to cover the cost of their finance. While managers 
cannot precisely anticipate IBO offers, they can use industrial adjusted price-
earnings ratio as a measure of undervaluation to trigger REM behaviour in an 
attempt to reduce the risk of becoming a target. Therefore, managers might 
engage in positive earnings management to increase the perceived value of 
their firm once they realise their firm is undervalued.  
3.3.2 Real earnings management prior to institutional buyouts 
As discussed before, managers have clear incentives to manipulate current 
period earnings upwards. As managers cannot precisely anticipate IBO offers, 
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they use industrial adjusted price-earnings ratio as a measure of undervaluation 
benchmark to trigger their REM behaviour. By engaging in positive REM, 
managers can increase profits, profit margins, profitability or sales at their 
discretion. Prior literature (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010) suggests 
that managers typically engage in five types of REM activities to increase 
earnings: sales manipulation, overproduction, decreasing discretionary selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expenses, decreasing discretionary R&D 
expenses and timing the sale of fixed assets. All of these REM practices are 
value decreasing in the long term, as they interfere with the normal operations 
of firms by boosting current period profits at the expense of future profits. Hence 
this study follows the approach of prior literature and focuses on the above five 
types of REM prior to IBOs.  
 
3.3.2.1 Sales manipulation  
Sales manipulation refers to managers' attempts to increase sales during the 
current year in an effort to increase reported profits. By cutting prices or offering 
more lenient credit terms toward the end of the year in an effort to accelerate 
sales from the next fiscal year into the current year, managers can book 
additional sales to this period. The additional sales will boost profits in the 
current year, assuming there are positive profit margins in doing so. The 
potential costs of sales manipulation include losses in future sales and profits 
once a firm reverts to its old prices (Gunny, 2010).  
 
Both price cuts and more lenient credit terms will result in lower cash flows in 
the current year, as cash inflow per sale decreases and cash outflow (of total 
costs) per sales increases. Cash inflow per sale from additional sales is lower 
as profit margins decline. As long as a firm's suppliers do not offer matching 
discounts on firm inputs, sales manipulation will lead to lower cash flow over 
the life of the sales (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
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3.3.2.2 Overproduction  
Overproduction refers to the managers' manipulation of the costs of goods sold 
(COGS) in an effort to increase reported profits. By producing more units than 
necessary, the fixed overhead costs can be spread over a larger number of 
units, thus lowering the fixed costs per unit. As long as the reduction in per-unit 
cost is not offset by inventory holding costs or any increase in marginal costs in 
the current period, total costs per unit will decline. As a result, reported COGS 
will decrease, and the firm can report higher profits in the current year. The 
incremental costs incurred in producing and holding the additional inventories 
will nevertheless result in higher annual production costs (Roychowdhury, 
2006).  
 
Research by Thomas and Zhang (2002) reported that managers do 
overproduce in order to decrease reported COGS. Roychowdhury (2006) found 
that managers use overproduction in an attempt to avoid reporting losses.  
 
3.3.2.3 Decreasing discretionary selling, general and administrative 
expenses  
Discretionary SG&A expenditures are generally expensed in the same period 
in which they are incurred, such as employee training, maintenance and travel. 
Some portions of SG&A expenses are subject to managerial discretion. Hence 
managers can reduce discretionary SG&A expenses in an effort to increase 
profits in the current year, especially when such expenditures do not generate 
immediate revenues and income. If discretionary SG&A expenses are reduced 
to meet earnings targets, a firm should exhibit unusually low discretionary 
expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
 
If outlays on discretionary expenses are paid in cash, reducing such expenses 
leads to higher current-period cash flows, possibly at the risk of lower future 
cash flows (Roychowdhury, 2006). This type of manipulation has drawbacks. If 
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employee-training programs, which are intended to increase human capital and 
the commitment of employees, are cut back, the economic consequences may 
not materialise in the short term but in the long term (Gunny, 2010).  
 
3.3.2.4 Hypotheses based on the discussion in Sections 3.3.2.1 to 3.3.2.3 
As in Roychowdhury (2006), the discussions in Sections 3.3.2.1 to 3.3.2.3 lead 
to the following two arguments and hypotheses:  
 
(1) Discretionary expenditure cuts lead to abnormally low discretionary 
expenses relative to sales. Price discounts and overproduction have a negative 
effect on abnormal CFO in the current period, while the reduction of 
discretionary expenditures has a positive effect on it. Thus the net effect on 
abnormal CFO is ambiguous, leading to the hypotheses below. 
 
After controlling for sales levels, IBO firms exhibit at least one of the following:  
 
H2-1a: The abnormal current-period cash flow from operations is negative prior 
to IBOs 
or  
 
H2-1b: The abnormal selling, general and administrative expenses are negative 
prior to IBOs  
 
(2) Excessive price reductions and overproduction lead to abnormally high 
production costs relative to sales. Accordingly, it is hypothesised as follows:  
 
H2-1c: After controlling for sales levels, abnormal annual production costs7 are 
                                                             
7 Following the approach of prior research (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006), I analyse production 
costs instead of COGS expenses to mitigate the confounding influence of accruals 
management. For example, if a manager postpones the write-down of obsolete inventory in 
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positive prior to IBOs.  
 
3.3.2.5 Decreasing discretionary research and development expenses  
Under the current accounting rules of ‘Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice’ (SSAP) 13, R&D expenditures must be charged to expenses as 
incurred8, because of the uncertainty of future benefits associated with such 
investments (ASB, 2013). Hence managers who attempt to boost current-
period profits could choose to cut investment in R&D, particularly if the 
realisation of the benefit associated with the abandoned R&D project impacts 
the firm in a future period rather than in the current period (Gunny, 2010).  
 
Several studies provide evidence that managers cut discretionary R&D 
spending to achieve earnings targets. For instance, Baber et al. (1991) reported 
that R&D spending is significantly less when such spending risks the ability to 
report positive or increasing income in the current period. In addition, Dechow 
and Sloan (1991) indicated that CEOs cut down R&D expenses in their final 
years in office. Bens et al. (2002) found that managers cut R&D and capital 
expenditure when faced with earnings per share dilution due to share option 
exercises. Gunny (2010) reported that managers cut R&D to meet earnings 
benchmarks. The evidence suggests that managers myopically cut investment 
in R&D in order to achieve various income objectives. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised as follows: 
 
H1d: Abnormal research and development expenses are negative prior to IBOs. 
 
                                                             
an effort to decrease reported COGS, this action would result in abnormally low COGS 
expenses. Using COGS as a proxy for REM would misclassify accruals management as REM. 
However, if production costs (COGS + inventories changes) are examined, the accruals 
management action will not affect production costs because the change in inventories would 
be correspondingly higher to offset lower COGS (Gunny, 2010).  
8 Unless it is expenditure on fixed assets (Accounting Standards Board, 2013) 
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3.3.2.6 Timing the sale of fixed assets 
Managers have discretions on the timing of assets sales. The gains from the 
sale of fixed assets are the difference between net book value and current 
market value. Since gains are reported on the income statement as current-
period profits at the time of the sale, the timing of asset sales could be used as 
a way to increase reported profits (Gunny, 2010). Research by Bartov (1993) 
reported that managers sell fixed assets to avoid decreases in earnings and 
debt covenant violations. Accordingly, it is argued that there are abnormally high 
gains from fixed asset sales prior to IBOs. Although the gains from asset sales 
can be used to manipulate earnings, it is transparent in the annual report. As 
REM behaviours are less transparent, and it is difficult to model gains from fixed 
asset sales, this hypothesis will not be tested.  
3.3.3 Real earnings management prior to management buyouts 
3.3.3.1 Hypotheses for negative earnings management incentives 
As discussed before, prior to MBOs, the conflict of interests between managers 
and selling shareholders motivates managers manipulate current period 
earnings downwards in an effort to reduce the perceived value of their firms. By 
engaging in negative REM, managers can decrease the profits, profit margins, 
profitability or sales of their firm at their discretion. I expect to find that managers 
use REM to decrease earnings prior to MBOs, which is a reverse process in 
comparison to IBOs. Following the approach of prior literature, this study 
focuses on five types of REM prior to MBOs as discussed in the previous 
section. Sales manipulation and underproduction may be detrimental to firm 
value as they interfere in the normal operations of firms. Increasing 
discretionary SG&A expenses, increasing discretionary R&D expenses, and 
timing the sale of fixed assets may have positive impact on the firm in the long 
term. As shown below, the realisation of the benefits associated with these REM 
practices impacts the firm in a future period rather than in the current period  
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3.3.3.1.1 Sales manipulation  
Managers attempt to decrease sales during the current year in an effort to 
decrease reported profits. By increasing prices or offering less lenient credit 
terms toward the end of the year, managers can defer additional sales to the 
next period at the expense of current profits. The reduction in sales will erode 
profits in the current year. The sales manipulation will increase future sales and 
profits once a firm re-establishes its original prices.  
 
Both price increase and less lenient credit terms will result in higher cash flows 
in the current year. Cash inflows per sale are higher as profit margins increase. 
As long as suppliers to a firm do not make a matching price adjustment, sales 
manipulation will lead to higher cash inflows over the life of the sales. 
 
3.3.3.1.2 Underproduction  
Managers could manipulate COGS in an effort to decrease reported profits. By 
producing fewer units, the fixed overhead costs become spread over a smaller 
number of units, thus increasing the fixed costs per unit. As long as the rise in 
per-unit cost is not offset by reduced inventory holding costs or any decline in 
marginal costs in the current period, total costs per unit will increase. This 
implies that, as reported COGS increases, the firm can report lower profits in 
the current year. The decline in costs incurred in producing and holding the 
lower levels of inventory result in lower annual production costs.   
 
3.3.3.1.3 Increasing discretionary selling, general and administrative 
expenses  
As previously discussed, discretionary SG&A expenditures are generally 
expensed in the same period in which they are incurred. Portions of SG&A 
expenses are subject to managerial discretion, and managers can therefore 
increase discretionary SG&A expenses in an effort to decrease profits in the 
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current year, especially when such expenses do not generate immediate 
revenues and income. If discretionary SG&A expenses are increased to reduce 
profits, the firm can be expected to exhibit unusually high discretionary 
expenses.  
 
If outlays on discretionary expenses are paid in cash, increasing them leads to 
lower cash flows in the current period. This type of manipulation may have 
benefits. If employee-training programs, which are intended to increase human 
capital and the commitment of employees, are increased, the economic 
consequences may materialise in the long term.  
 
3.3.3.1.4 Hypotheses based on the discussion in Sections 3.3.3.1.1 to 
3.3.3.1.3 
As in Roychowdhury (2006), the discussion in Sections 3.3.3.1.1 to 3.3.3.1.3 
leads to the first set of two arguments and hypotheses as follows:  
 
(1) Increases in discretionary expenditures lead to abnormally high 
discretionary expenses relative to sales. Price increases and underproduction 
have a positive effect on the abnormal CFO in the current period, while 
increases in discretionary expenditures have a negative effect on it. Thus the 
net effect on abnormal CFO is ambiguous, leading to the hypotheses below. 
After controlling for sales levels, MBO firms exhibit at least one of the following:  
 
H2-2a: Abnormal current-period cash flow from operations is positive prior to 
MBOs 
or  
 
H2-2b: Abnormal selling, general and administrative expenses are positive prior 
to MBOs.  
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(2) Excessive price increases and underproduction lead to abnormally low 
production costs relative to sales. Accordingly, it is hypothesised as follows: 
 
H2-2c: After controlling for sales levels, abnormal annual production costs are 
negative prior to MBOs.  
 
3.3.3.1.5 Increasing discretionary research and development expenses  
Under current accounting rules of SSAP 13, R&D expenditures must be 
charged to expenses as incurred9 because of the uncertainty of future benefits 
associated with such investments (ASB, 2013). Hence managers attempting to 
reduce current-period profits could choose to increase investment in R&D. If 
the realisation of the benefits associated with the incremental investment in 
R&D project impacts the firm in a future period rather than the current period, 
this type of manipulation will give managers more benefits in the post-MBO 
period. Accordingly, it is hypothesised as follows: 
 
H2-2d: Abnormal research and development expenses are positive prior to 
MBOs. 
 
3.3.3.1.6 Timing the sale of fixed assets 
Managers have discretions on the timing of asset sales, and gains are reported 
on the income statement as current-period profits at the time of the sale. The 
gains from fixed asset sales are the difference between net book value and 
current market value. Hence, as long as the gains from asset sales are not 
offset by the costs associated with holding and maintaining fixed assets, the 
timing of asset sales could be used as a way to decrease reported profits. 
Moreover, delaying the timing of asset sales may secure additional debt finance 
to execute MBOs. Accordingly, it is argued that there are abnormally low gains 
                                                             
9 Unless it is expenditure on fixed assets (Accounting Standards Board, 2013) 
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from fixed asset sales prior to IBOs. Although the gains from asset sales can 
be used to manipulate earnings, they are transparent in the annual report. As 
REM behaviours are less transparent, and it is difficult to model gains from fixed 
asset sales, this hypothesis will not be tested. 
3.3.3.2 Hypotheses for positive earnings management incentives 
As discussed before, prior to MBOs, managers might also have incentives to 
engage in positive REM to manipulate earnings upwards if there is a need for 
securing external financing. This positive REM practice is similar to that in IBOs. 
Managers may engage in four types of REM activities to increase earnings: 
sales manipulation through excessive price discounts or credit sales, 
overproduction, decreasing discretionary SG&A expenses and decreasing 
discretionary R&D expenses. Hence this study proposes a second set of 
hypotheses for MBOs as follows:  
 
(1) Discretionary expenditure cuts lead to abnormally low discretionary 
expenses relative to sales. Price discounts and overproduction have a negative 
effect on abnormal CFO in the current period, while the reduction of 
discretionary expenditures has a positive effect on it. Thus the net effect on 
abnormal CFO is ambiguous, leading to the hypotheses below. 
 
After controlling for sales levels, MBO firms exhibit at least one of the following:  
 
H2-2ai: Abnormal current-period cash flows from operations (CFO) are negative 
prior to MBOs 
or 
 
H2-2bi: Abnormal selling, general and administrative expenses are negative prior 
to MBOs.  
Chapter 3 
116 
 
(2) Excessive price reductions and overproduction lead to abnormally high 
production costs relative to sales. Accordingly, it is hypothesised as follows: 
 
H2-2ci: After controlling for sales levels, abnormal annual production costs are 
positive prior to MBOs. 
 
(3) Discretionary R&D expenditure cuts lead to abnormally low discretionary 
expenses relative to sales. Accordingly, it is hypothesised as follows: 
 
H2-2di: Abnormal research and development expenses are negative prior to 
MBOs.  
3.4 Impact of Corporate Governance on Real Earnings Management 
REM are purposeful actions, undertaken by managers, which deviate from 
normal business operational practices with the primary objective of 
manipulating earnings in the current period (Roychowdhury, 2006). Hence REM 
is an agency problem that is more likely to arise in firms with poor corporate 
governance, characterised by the absence of effective monitoring and control 
mechanisms. Prior literature has shown that firms can reduce the agency 
problem by adopting appropriate external and internal governance practices 
that limit the potential for suboptimal managerial behaviours (e.g. Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2009). This paper therefore investigates the corporate governance 
mechanisms of equity ownership and board characteristics.  
3.4.1 Equity ownership 
3.4.1.1 Aggregate outside ownership concentration 
Previous research suggested that large, undiversified outside shareholders in 
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a firm could play a critical role in monitoring (Maug, 1998), as they have the 
opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence 
managers (Cornett et al., 2008). Substantial equity ownership by outsiders 
generates greater incentives and capabilities when it comes to monitoring 
managers. Furthermore, as large equity ownership makes them as effective 
agents of external shareholders, large outside shareholders have a strong 
incentive to exercise effective monitoring and to restrict managerial discretion 
(Bhagat et al., 1999). Hence outside shareholders with substantial 
shareholdings are expected to force managers to focus more on shareholder 
wealth maximisation rather than on opportunistic or self-serving REM 
behaviours.  
 
In the UK, the existing takeover code and the corporate law favours minority 
shareholders and limits the incentives for investors, especially non-institutional 
investors, to hold very large percentages of shares (The Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers, 2013). Moreover, the UK Corporate Governance Code suggests 
that shareholders who have 3% or more shares in a firm are classified as 
substantial shareholders (FRC, 2010). Following the approach taken by Singh 
and Davidson (2003), in this study, aggregate outside ownership concentration 
is defined as the aggregate percentage of shareholding by all outsiders (other 
than board members) with an equity level greater than 3% (Concentr3%). 
Moreover, although 3% is the majority declaration point, it is still unclear 
whether outside shareholders with 3% equity ownership have real ability and 
incentives to monitor and influence the behaviour of managers. As I do not know 
the level of ownership that could have a real influence on management 
behaviours, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Florackis and Ozkan, 2009), I 
also use a 5% ownership threshold (Concentr5%) to capture the effects of 
concentrated outside ownership.  
 
As discussed before, negative earnings management is harmful to the interests 
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of selling shareholders in MBOs, and positive earnings management works 
against the wealth maximisation of shareholders in the long term in IBOs. 
According to the above arguments and counter arguments, it is hypothesised 
as follows:   
 
H2-3a: Higher concentrations of outside ownership are associated with less REM 
preceding both MBOs and IBOs  
3.4.1.2 Institutional shareholding 
Managers find it difficult to manipulate REM when their operations are being 
monitored closely by institutional investors (Bushee, 1998). Institutional 
investors provide a high degree of monitoring, removing incentives for 
managerial myopic behaviour. This monitoring can occur either explicitly, 
through governance practices, or implicitly, through information gathering and 
correctly pricing the impact of managerial decisions. Institutions that intend to 
hold substantial equity ownership in the long term have strong incentives to 
incur the cost of explicitly monitoring and ensuring that managers do not use 
REM to meet short-term earnings goals. Moreover, institutional investors can 
monitor managerial behaviour by gathering information on the quality of 
operating decisions, thereby reducing the opportunities for REM manipulation 
(Bushee, 1998).  
 
Institutional investors are also more sophisticated and informed than other 
investors are. As REM has real economic consequences for the long-term value 
of a firm, institutional investors are likely to have a better understanding of the 
long-term impact of a firm’s operating decisions, leading them to put more effort 
into monitoring and controlling REM activities. Prior studies suggest that 
institutional investors play a monitoring role in reducing REM practice. 10 
                                                             
10 However, there is also evidence that ‘‘transient’’ institutions, or those with high portfolio 
turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings, increase managerial myopic behaviour (e.g. 
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Bushee (1998) reports that firms with high levels of institutional ownership are 
less likely to cut R&D expenditure to avoid a decline in earnings. Roychowdhury 
(2006) found a negative relationship between institutional ownership and REM 
to avoid reporting negative earnings. Similar to prior literature (e.g. Bushee, 
1998), this study measures institutional ownership as the total percentages of 
shares that are held by institutions (InsShare). Accordingly, it is hypothesised as 
follows: 
 
H2-3b: Higher levels of institutional ownership are associated with less REM 
preceding both MBOs and IBOs. 
3.4.1.3 Non-managerial large blockholders 
The existence of large blockholders may affect REM practices. Large 
blockholders are shareholders who have the capacity to determine the outcome 
of particular corporate policy decisions. Among major shareholders, large 
blockholders are those with the strongest incentives to be active owners, and 
they may have a significant impact on the levels of managerial discretions 
(Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Hence the presence of large blockholders may 
decrease the extent of managerial discretions and mitigate REM behaviours.  
 
In contrast, some researchers argued that highly concentrated shareholding 
might create incentives for blockholders to support management rather than 
monitoring them (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Hijazi and 
Conover, 2011). Instead of imposing efficient monitoring and control on 
management, large outside shareholders may produce their own agency costs 
of equity (Roe, 1990). In particular, lack of diversification means that a firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk adversely affects large outside shareholders. As this risk 
                                                             
Bushee 1998; Bushee 2001). In this study, I focus on the average effect of institutional 
ownership on firms’ earnings management activities without looking into the investment 
horizon of different institutions.  
Chapter 3 
120 
decreases the subjective value of the investment, large outside shareholders 
may use opportunities to collude with managers and shift wealth from minority 
shareholders to themselves (Maug, 1998). Moreover, blockholders are likely to 
side with managers for strategic alignment in proxy contests, or they can be 
influenced by existing business relationships with managers, and thus act to 
protect their own interests (Pound, 1988). Furthermore, blockholders are 
generally passive and are likely to support managers in their quest for growth 
rather than residual value maximisation, as the role of such shareholders is 
ambiguous and varies across firms (Gibbs, 1993). Thus the presence of large 
blockholders may not decrease the extent of managerial discretions and 
mitigate REM behaviours.  
 
The majority of previous literature classifies large blockholders as those 
investors whose equity ownership exceeds 20% (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999). 
Following this approach, I define the presence of large blockholders by a 
threshold of equity ownership at 20% (Block20%). Moreover, other research 
shows that investors whose equity ownership exceeds 10% can actually put 
real pressure on management (e.g. Gugler et al., 2008). Since I do not know 
the level of ownership that determines a genuinely influential blockholder, a 10% 
threshold (Block10%) is also used in this study for robustness. 
 
Since, as outlined above, negative earnings management harms the interests 
of selling shareholders in MBOs, and positive earnings management is 
detrimental to the long-term wealth maximisation of shareholders in IBOs, I 
expect that when large blockholders are present, they are inclined to monitor 
actively, resulting in less REM preceding MBOs and IBOs. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised as follows:  
 
H2-3c: The presence of large blockholders is associated with less REM 
preceding both MBOs and IBOs 
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3.4.1.4 Management shareholding 
The ultimate effect of management ownership on agency problems, such as 
REM, is determined by a trade-off between the effects of alignment and of 
entrenchment (Short and Keasey, 1999). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggested that shareholding by managers helps to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers. As the equity ownership makes managers co-
owners of a firm, they are less inclined to divert resources away from the goal 
of value maximisation for shareholders. Management ownership works as an 
incentive mechanism to prevent managers from expropriating wealth from 
shareholders. Hence higher levels of management ownership may align the 
interests of managers and shareholders, and lead to lower levels of self-
motivated REM behaviour by managers.  
 
However, at certain levels of executive equity ownership, managers’ 
consumption of perquisites may outweigh the loss that they suffer from a 
reduction of firm value (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Morck et al. (1988) 
suggested that high levels of managerial ownership could lead to entrenchment 
effects, as it is difficult for external shareholders to control the actions of 
entrenched managers. At certain levels of ownership, managers find that they 
have sufficient control to follow their own objectives without fear of discipline 
from other ownership interests (Short and Keasey, 1999). Hence high executive 
ownership may also entrench managers and lead to higher levels of self-
motivated REM discretions.  
 
In line with other literature (e.g. Walters et al., 2008; Klein, 2002), as the chief 
executive officer (CEO) has the most power in the daily operations of a firm, the 
effect of management ownership is captured in this study by the percentage of 
equity ownership held by the CEO (CeoHd). Furthermore, similar to the 
approach used in prior studies (e.g. Short and Keasey, 1999), this study also 
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tests for a non-linear effect, and CEO ownership is measured as the squared 
transformation of the percentage of equity ownership held by CEO (CeoHdSq).  
 
The combination of alignment and entrenchment effects suggests that the 
effects of managerial ownership on agency problems are unclear. According to 
the above arguments and counter arguments, it is hypothesised as follows:  
 
H2-3d: Higher levels of management ownership are associated with more REM 
preceding both MBOs and IBOs 
3.4.2 The role of board of directors 
The board of directors is the most important governance body in a firm, and it 
has a fiduciary duty to ensure that a company operates in the long-term 
interests of its shareholders. Boards has two essential functions, which are 
monitoring management and providing useful connections as well as expert 
advice. The first role implies that they play a key part in corporate governance, 
and the second role implies that they bring various skills and expertise in 
supporting and reviewing the performance of a firm (Ronen and Yaari, 2007). 
These functions are associated with a board's responsibility to mitigate REM 
behaviours, because REM could be managerial discretions on making business 
operational decisions. Prior studies highlight that certain characteristics are 
likely to affect a board’s ability to fulfil its role, namely, equity ownership by non-
executive board members, the percentage of non-executive directors on a 
board, CEO duality, and board size.  
3.4.2.1 Equity ownership by non-executive board members 
Agency theory suggests that directors who own more equity in a firm are 
expected to protect shareholders’ interests more effectively. As equity 
ownership aligns the interests of directors with those of external shareholders, 
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more equity ownership by directors creates a personal incentive for them to 
actively monitor managers (Bhagat et al., 1999). Moreover, higher equity 
ownership by non-executive board members is likely to mitigate the risk of these 
directors colluding with managers to manipulate earnings, because this would 
ultimately harm their own interests (Vafeas, 2005).  
 
As discussed before, prior to MBOs, managers are likely to manipulate earnings 
downwards in order to depress the offering price. As lower MBO offering prices 
generate lower premiums for selling shareholders, this conflicts with the best 
interests of selling shareholders. Thus non-executive board members with 
higher equity ownership may be inclined to monitor managers more actively, 
leading to less negative REM preceding MBOs. In contrast, prior to IBOs, earlier 
discussion suggests that managers are likely to manipulate earnings upwards, 
to increase a firm's value. However, while upward REM increases the short-
term value of a firm, it decreases the value in the long term, which is contrary 
to the principle of shareholder wealth maximisation. Non-executive board 
members with higher equity ownership are therefore inclined to monitor 
managers actively, leading to less positive REM practices prior to IBOs. Similar 
to prior studies (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2005), the percentage of equity ownership 
held by non-executive directors is used to proxy for non-executive shareholding 
(NonExecHd). Accordingly, it is hypothesised as follows:  
 
H2-3e: Higher equity ownership by non-executive board members is associated 
with less REM preceding both MBOs and IBOs 
3.4.2.2 The percentage of non-executive directors on board 
Resource dependence theory suggests that boards provide various resources, 
and that having more non-executive directors will expand the available 
resources of the board (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). While executive directors 
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have better knowledge about a company and its industry, non-executive 
directors are boundary spanners who provide various knowledge and 
resources. Non-executive directors are better advisers, as they provide or 
facilitate access to external resources that are critical to a firm’s success (Daily 
et al., 2003). The ability of a board to monitor can increase as more directors 
are added, and increasing the number of non-executives in particular is 
expected to have a more positive impact than increasing executive directors 
would have (Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009).  
 
Moreover, agency theory suggests that non-executive directors are more 
independent than executive directors are, and thus they are expected to have 
greater monitoring incentives (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Elshandidy and 
Hassanein, 2014). Furthermore, apart from being directors, non-executive 
directors have no economic or psychological affiliation with a firm's managers 
that may interfere with their ability to question management (Fama, 1980). In 
contrast, being part of the management team, executive directors often have 
incentives to underperform their monitoring role (Vafeas, 2005). As non-
executive directors can monitor managers more effectively, adding more of 
them to a board is expected to lead to less REM. Research by Osma (2008) 
found that the presence of more non-executive directors on a board constrained 
the manipulation of R&D expenditures in the UK.   
 
However, non-executive directors are also criticised for performing little or no 
real monitoring role as they lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, 
and information to challenge management activities effectively (Patton and 
Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). Moreover, the inclusion of executive 
directors on a board is also preferable because they facilitate the 
communication of relevant information to non-executive directors during board 
meetings and provide a forum for evaluating the performance of managers and 
the senior management potential of junior executives. In addition, executive 
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directors provide a source of expertise that a firms' decision makers may draw 
on in formulating and implementing high-level strategies (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985).  
 
Similar to prior studies (e.g. Klein, 2002), this governance mechanism is proxied 
by the percentage of non-executive directors on a firm's main board (Ned%). In 
light of the discussion above, this research hypothesises as follows:  
 
H2-3f: Higher percentages of non-executive directors on boards are associated 
with less REM preceding both MBOs and IBOs 
3.4.2.3 Chief executive officer duality 
Duality occurs when the positions of CEO and board chairperson are held 
simultaneously by one person. CEO duality enables the CEO to effectively 
control the information that is available to other board members, and thus it may 
impair effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, it concentrates power 
in the CEO’s position without effective controls and balances on his or her 
activities. If CEO duality does impede the effective monitoring of managers, it 
might be associated with more REM (Cornett et al., 2008). Similar to prior 
studies (e.g. Cornett et al., 2008), CEO duality is proxied by a dummy variable 
coded 1 if a board has CEO duality (Duality). Since CEO duality is likely to be 
positively associated with REM, it is hypothesised as follows:  
 
H2-3g: CEO duality is associated with more REM preceding both MBOs and 
IBOs 
3.4.2.4 Board size 
Resource dependence theory suggests that boards provide various resources, 
and having more directors will expand the available resources of a board 
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(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Initially, adding more directors to serve the board 
may ensure a minimum required knowledge base (Vafeas, 2005), and the ability 
of the board to monitor may increase as more directors are added, especially 
increasing the number of non-executives (Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009).  
 
However, enlarging boards might be detrimental to their effectiveness and 
cohesiveness, weakening their monitoring role. Problems with coordination and 
communication may arise in larger boards as it becomes difficult to arrange 
meetings and reach a consensus, leading to slower and less-efficient decision-
making and directors becoming less likely to criticise the behaviour of top 
managers (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Moreover, the director free-riding 
problem may also increase on larger boards, as the monitoring cost to any 
individual director falls in proportion to board size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
Hence the size of a board might relate to its effectiveness and thus affect 
managers' ability to engage in REM. Similar to prior studies (e.g. Peasnell et 
al., 2005), board size is measured by the number of directors on a board 
(BoardSz). In line with previous research, this study uses the number of board 
members as a proxy for board size.  
 
In line with argument that larger boards can monitor more effectively, it is 
hypothesised as follows: 
 
H2-3h: Larger board sizes are associated with less REM preceding both MBOs 
and IBOs 
3.5 Methodology  
3.5.1 Data and sample 
This study investigates all UK firms who made leveraged buyout 
announcements during the period from 1997 to 2011 and subsequently delisted 
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from the London Stock Exchange. The data for the leveraged buyouts samples 
is collected from Thomson ONE Banker. I exclude 39 firms from the financial 
industry (ICB codes between 8000 and 8999) because they are subject to the 
external scrutiny of bodies like the Financial Services Authority (Weir et al., 
2005a), which may affect their corporate governance. Datastream provides the 
earnings, total assets and other financial data needed to detect abnormal REM 
in the sample. This study uses cross-sectional regression models developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate the unadjusted abnormal CFO, production 
costs and discretionary expenses for each sample firm. Moreover, this study 
uses alternative measurements of REM from the regression models developed 
by Gunny (2010) and Lara et al. (2012). The parameters of the models are 
estimated by industry and I require each firm year to have at least 6 
observations with the same two-digit ICB code11. The industry-matched firms 
are collected from firms that are not involved in a leveraged buyout. Following 
a similar approach to that of Roychowdhury (2006) two-digit ICB codes are 
used to match the sampled firms wherever possible.  
 
As previously discussed, both the degree and timing of REM can be expected 
to differ in MBOs and IBOs. This study therefore examines REM behaviours in 
the period up to 2 years prior to buyouts in order to examine potential changes 
and mean reversal in REM activity. Hence, I define the year of a leveraged 
buyout as Year T, the first year preceding a leveraged buyout as Year T-1, and 
the second year preceding a leveraged buyout as Year T-2. Data about 
corporate governance is hand-collected from annual reports. The number of 
initial and final regression samples is listed on table 3.1.212.  
                                                             
11 As suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), a minimum of 6 firms are needed in each 
firm-year portfolio to give the minimum degrees of freedom needed to perform statistical 
tests. 
12 For studies on leveraged buyouts in the UK, this sample size is large enough in comparison 
to Weir, et al. (2005a), who examined 96 leveraged buyouts and Renneboog, et al., (2007), 
who investigated 177 leveraged buyouts.  
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Table 3.1.2  Sample 
 Year T-1 Year T-2 
MBOs IBOs MBOs IBOs 
Initial sample 149 102 149 102 
Deleting Financial firms 
Non-financial firms 124 88 124 88 
Deleting observations with missing financial data 
REM sample 118 87 116 82 
Deleting observations with missing corporate governance data 
Regression sample 115 85 115 78 
 
3.5.2 Real earnings management measures – Roychowdhury (2006) 
models 
This study draws on prior studies to develop proxies for REM. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), this study considers three measures to detect the level 
of REM: abnormal levels of CFO, production costs and discretionary expenses. 
Subsequent studies using the same metrics, such as Zang (2012), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010a), and Kim and Sohn (2013) provide evidence that these 
measures can effectively capture REM behaviours. For instance, the research 
by Cohen and Zarowin (2010a) found significant positive abnormal production 
costs, negative abnormal discretionary expenses and negative abnormal CFO 
in the year of seasoned equity offering, which indicates that managers engaged 
in REM. Nevertheless, the effect of suggested REM methods on CFO is 
ambiguous (Roychowdhury, 2006). Specifically, price discounts, channel 
stuffing and overproduction all decrease CFO, whereas cutting discretionary 
expenditures increases CFO. For instance, given a particular sales level, both 
sales manipulation and overproduction lead to abnormally low current-period 
CFO, whereas reducing discretionary expenditures leads to abnormally high 
current-period CFO (Zhao et al., 2012).  
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Following the method employed in other studies, I decompose the actual CFO, 
production costs and discretionary expenses into the normal (expected) portion 
and the abnormal (unexpected) portion by estimating the equations shown 
below for each industry and year. The abnormal levels of CFO, production costs 
and discretionary expenses, which indicate REM practices, are the difference 
between their actual level and their normal level respectively. The models are 
shown as follows:  
 
The normal level of CFO is assumed to be a linear function of sales and 
changes in sales:  
 
𝑅𝑜𝑤𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
The normal level of production costs is estimated from:  
 
𝑅𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
The normal level of discretionary expenses is estimated from:  
 
𝑅𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
RowCFOt: is cash flow from operations, as per Roychowdhury’s (2006) model 
RowProdCost: is production costs, as per Roychowdhury's (2006) model, 
calculated as the sum of the costs of goods sold and changes to the inventory 
RowDiscExpt: is discretionary expenses, as per Roychowdhury's (2006) model, 
calculated as the sum of advertising expenses, research and development 
(R&D) expenses, and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses. 
(Advertising expenses data is not available for the UK firms, as it is included in 
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SG&A expenses)  
Salest: is the sales during period t, and (Δ)Salest=Salet-Salest-1 
At: is the total assets at the end of period t 
 
In this study, I examine REM practices up to 2 years preceding buyouts in order 
to investigate whether managers changed their REM behaviours in the run-up 
to the buyout. This study examines aggregate as well as individual signed levels 
of REM, as detected using the models described above.  
 
More negative values of CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses are 
associated with more income-increasing REM. More positive values of 
abnormal production costs are also associated with more income-increasing 
REM.  
 
Consistent with Zang (2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010a), this study 
combines the three individual measures to generate two comprehensive 
metrics of REM activities to capture the total effects of REM. For the first 
aggregate measure (RowProd+Disc), I first multiply abnormal discretionary 
expenses by minus one (so that a higher value means the firm is more likely to 
cut discretionary expenses) and add it to abnormal production costs13 . The 
higher amount of the first aggregate measure, the more likely a firm is to be 
engaged in REM activities. For the second aggregate measure (RowCFO+Disc), 
I first multiply abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses by minus 
one separately, and then aggregate them into one measure. Multiplying by 
minus one gives a result in which the higher amount of the second aggregate 
measure indicate a greater likelihood that a firm engages in sales manipulations 
                                                             
13 Abnormal production costs does not multiply by negative one because higher production 
costs is indicative of overproduction to reduce COGS. I do not combine abnormal production 
costs and abnormal CFO. Roychowdhury (2006) suggests that the same activities that lead to 
abnormally high production costs also lead to abnormally low CFO, thus adding these two 
amounts leads to double counting (Cohen and Zarowin,2010).  
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and cutting discretionary expenditure in order to manage reported earnings 
upwards.  
 
The three individual REM proxies may have different implications for earnings 
that may dilute any results obtained using two aggregated measures (Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010a). Thus, both aggregate and individual signed levels of REM 
are investigated in this study.  
 
The existing REM detecting models are developed by the US scholar to detect 
REM behaviours in the US firms (e.g. Gunny, 2010; Lara et al., 2012; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). The differences of financial market and accounting 
systems between the US and other countries might reduce the effectiveness of 
the REM detecting models, thus might compromise the reliability of the models 
to apply in the UK market. Hence, this study adopts alternative REM detection 
models, as shown in section 3.5.3 and section 3.5.4, to increase the robustness 
and reliability of results in this study. If the results are consistent by using 
different REM detecting models, this might indicate that the country difference 
is insignificant and my results are reliable. 
 
Moreover, the use of abnormal CFO to detect sales manipulation might include 
the effects of overproduction and discretionary expenditures cut in addition to 
sales manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006). Although sales manipulation is the 
dominate reason which affects cash flow, the CFO model is not a perfect 
approach to detect sales manipulation behaviour. For instance, price discounts, 
channel stuffing and overproduction will reduce CFO, while discretionary 
expenditures cut increases CFO. Given a particular sales level, both sales 
manipulation and overproduction results in abnormally low current-period CFO, 
whereas cutting discretionary expenditures leads to abnormally high current-
period CFO (Zhao et al., 2012). Hence, this study adopts more than one REM 
detection models thus to investigate different types of REM behaviours, which 
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potentially increases the robustness of this study. 
3.5.3 Alternative measures – Gunny’s (2010) models 
Alternative measures of REM are also used in this study for robustness purpose. 
Gunny’s (2010) models have been used to capture the REM activities from 
abnormal R&D expense, SG&A expenditure, production costs and income from 
asset sales. Gunny’s (2010) models include the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity, Tobin’s Q, and internal funds to control for additional factors in 
a firm. The natural logarithm of the market value of equity controls for the size 
effect. Tobin’s Q proxies the marginal benefit to marginal cost of installing an 
additional unit of a new investment. Internal funds serves as a proxy for reduced 
funds available for investment.  
 
The prior year’s R&D expense is a proxy for a firm’s R&D opportunity set for 
the current year. Normal level of R&D expense is estimated using the following 
model:  
 
𝐺𝑢𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑠&𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1𝑀𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽3
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4
𝑅𝐷𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
GuyRes&Devt: is R&D expenses, as per Gunny’s (2010) model 
MVt: is the natural logarithm of market value 
Qt: is Tobin’s Q ratio (=(the market value of equity + the book value of liabilities) 
/ book values of total assets) 
INTt: is internal funds (=Income before Extraordinary Items + Depreciation and 
Amortization + Research and Development Expense)  
 
The SG&A estimation model includes a proxy for 'sticky' cost behaviour. Costs 
are sticky if the magnitude of a cost increase is greater than the magnitude of 
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a cost decrease when associated with an equal level of change in sales. Hence 
managers trade off the expected costs of maintaining unused resources in 
weak sales periods with the expected costs of replacing these resources if 
demand is restored (Anderson et al., 2003). As a result, only negative change 
in sales between t-1 and t is included in the model to capture the “sticky” cost 
behaviour. In other words, change in sales multiplies by a dummy variable equal 
to one when sales revenue decreases between t-1 and t is used in the model 
to capture the “sticky” cost behaviour. Not including this indicator in the SG&A 
expectations model may lead to underestimating (overestimating) the response 
of costs to increases (decreases) in sales (Gunny, 2010). The normal level of 
SG&A is estimated using the following model:  
 
𝐺𝑢𝑦𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑉𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑄𝑡  +  𝛽3
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
 +  𝛽4
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝐷 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
GuySGAt: is selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses, as per 
Gunny's (2010) model  
DD: is a dummy variable that is equal to one when total sales decrease between 
t-1 and t, zero otherwise. 
 
The model for estimating production costs includes sales, changes in sales and 
lagged changes in sales, which are expected to control for any changes in the 
demand of a product that might directly influence the level of production. 
Abnormally high production costs for a given sales level are indicative of either 
sales boosting or the manipulation of COGS expenses by overproduction 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). The inclusion of the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity and Tobin’s Q in the following model is expected to generate a 
more precise estimation. The normal level of production costs is therefore 
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estimated using the following model:  
 
𝐺𝑢𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1𝑀𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽3
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
GuyProdCost: is production costs, as per Gunny's (2010) model, calculated as 
the sum of the cost of goods sold plus changes in the inventory 
 
Funds available for investment and the marginal benefit to marginal cost of 
installing an additional unit of a new investment may influence the decision to 
sell fixed assets (Gunny, 2010). These are included in the model used to 
estimate income from asset sales (Gunny, 2010). Further, separating long-lived 
asset sales from long-lived investment sales is expected to generate a better 
estimation of the normal level of income from asset sales. The normal level of 
income from asset sales is therefore estimated using the following model:  
 
𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1𝑀𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽3
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4
𝐴𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5
𝐼𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
GainAt: is the income from asset sales (=(-1) * Sale of Property, Plant and 
Equipment and Investments/Gain (Loss))  
Intt: Internal funds (=Income before Extraordinary Items + Research and 
Development Expenses + Depreciation and Amortization) 
ASalest: is long-lived asset sales 
ISalest: is long-lived investment sales 
 
Due to limits on the data available, it is impossible to conduct the estimation of 
income from asset sales.  
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3.5.4 Alternative measures – Lara, et al.’s (2012) models 
The models developed by Lara et al. (2012) are used to capture the REM 
activities from abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
This model controls for the influence of firm performance and growth on the 
level of production costs and discretionary expenses, following the 
recommendations of Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) and of Collins, 
Pungaliya and Vijh (2012) (cited in Lara et al., 2012). It includes additional 
regressors of the lagged return on assets (ROA) (defined as net income scaled 
by total assets) and current sales growth.  
 
More positive values of abnormal production costs are associated with more 
income-increasing REM. More negative values of abnormal discretionary 
expenses are associated with more income-increasing REM. This study reports 
both aggregate (by adding LaraProdCost and -1*LaraDiscExpt) and individual 
signed levels of REM estimated from the models described in this section. 
Higher values of aggregate REM are interpreted as evidence of more income-
increasing REM.  
 
The normal level of production costs is estimated using the following model: 
 
LaraProdCos𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼5𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
LaraProdCost: is production costs, as per the model of Lara, et al. (2012), 
calculated as the sum of the costs of goods sold and changes in the inventory 
LagROAt: is the lagged return on assets 
SalesGt: is the current sales growth 
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The normal level of discretionary expenses is estimated from the following 
model:  
 
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑎𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
LaraDiscExpt: is discretionary expenses, as per Lara, et al. (2012), calculated 
as the sum of advertising, research and development (R&D), and selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expenses. (Advertising data is not available 
for UK firms, as it is included in SG&A) 
3.5.5 Control variables 
The inclusion of firm size as a control variable is motivated by the size 
hypothesis. Large firms are more likely to be under close scrutiny by outsiders, 
such as financial/investment analysts, than small firms are (Hussain, 2000). 
Such scrutiny potentially reduces managers’ opportunities to manage earnings 
(Koh, 2003). Furthermore, large firms produce more information for public 
access. This suggests that they have alternative methods of influencing 
investors’ perceptions of their performance, which in turn reduces the need for 
earnings management practices (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Hence firm size 
may affect managers’ REM practices. In line with previous research, this study 
uses the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size (LN Total 
Assets).  
 
Actual sales growth is likely to affect REM, as growth in sales will affect accruals, 
such as inventory and receivables, and CFO, which in turn affects REM. 
Furthermore, high growth in sales often inflates the market's expectations of 
future cash flows, leading managers to manipulate sales downwards in order 
to avoid high expectations for future performance (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). 
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Moreover, in times of rapid growth, a company may experience pressure to 
maintain or exceed anticipated growth rates, resulting in the practices of REM 
to achieve a growth-rate benchmark, or alternatively to mask a downturn 
(Carcello and Nagy, 2004). Similar to prior studies, sales growth is measured 
by the annual percentage growth in total sales (Sales Growth). 
 
This study controls for the potential sales growth prospects of a firm, because 
firms with higher growth prospects are more likely to engage in REM. Collins 
and Kothari (1989) found that the market has a greater reaction to earnings 
announcements from firms with high-growth opportunities. Moreover, Skinner 
and Sloan (2002) report that the market response to positive vs. negative 
earnings surprises is asymmetric, and the absolute magnitude of the price 
response to negative surprises is significantly greater than the price response 
to positive surprises, particularly for high-growth firms. These findings imply that 
managers of high-growth firms have greater incentives to avoid negative 
earnings surprises, such as missing earnings expectations (Matsumoto, 2002). 
Thus, managers of high growth firms may have strong incentives to engage in 
REM to avoid negative earnings surprises. As in prior studies, growth prospects 
are measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
common equity (Market to Book).  
 
In more profitable firms, managers are less likely to engage in income-
increasing earnings management behaviours to produce better accounting 
results, as their firms already perform well (Becker et al., 1998; Bédard et al., 
2004). Consequently, pernicious earnings management is rarely exercised in 
the more profitable firms. Hence firm performance may have an impact on REM 
(e.g. Bédard et al., 2004), firm performance is measured by the current year's 
return on assets (ROA).  
 
Financial leverage captures debt-contracting motivations for REM. High 
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leverage is associated with the closeness of debt covenants violations (Press 
and Weintrop, 1990), and debt covenant violations are related to the choice of 
earnings management strategy (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Managers of 
highly leveraged firms have incentives to exercise income-increasing REM 
practices to prevent violation of their debt covenants. Moreover, higher leverage 
ratio is associated with higher costs of debt financing (Piot and Janin, 2007). As 
debt increases, companies may use income-increasing REM practices to 
present a more favourable financial position when negotiating with lenders. 
Thus leverage ratio is likely to have a relationship with REM practices. Similar 
to prior studies, leverage in this study is measured by the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets (Leverage).  
 
This study uses the asset turnover ratio as a proxy to account for the degree of 
potential agency problems. The asset turnover ratio is defined as the ratio of 
total sales to total assets (Assets Turnover Ratio). This ratio is an inverse proxy 
for agency costs and can be interpreted as asset utilisation ratio that measures 
how effectively managers deploys a firm’s assets (Ang et al., 2000). A low asset 
turnover ratio indicates poor corporate governance, such as managers’ inferior 
investment decisions, insufficient effort, and consumption of perquisites, 
suggesting that significant agency costs arise from the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). 
 
This study also controls for the potential financial constraint of acquirers. If a 
firm is financially constrained but has potential valuable projects to invest, then 
this firm can use earnings management to signal its positive prospects and 
raise its share price in the short term. Hence increased earnings may signal 
positive prospects to prospective external financiers, enabling a firm to raise 
capital to make the investments (Linck et al., 2013). Prior studies use the ability 
to obtain external finance as a proxy for financial constraints, such as financial 
leverage or free cash flows (e.g. Park and Shin, 2004). However, financial 
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information on acquirers was unavailable for this study. Instead, this study 
measures financial constrain of acquirers by relative deal values, which reflect 
how much money is required in a buyout. A deal value demonstrates the ability 
of an acquirer to obtain external financing, which is an appropriate proxy for 
financial constraints for the purposes of this study. Specifically, the deal value 
is the total cash paid to shareholders in buyout transactions. In IBOs, as the 
acquirer comes from outside the firm, financial constraint is measured by the 
total deal value. In MBOs, as managers are acquirers and they only need to 
purchase the shares held by other shareholders, financial constraint is 
measured by the deal value excluding the portion required to purchase the 
shares owned by managers. Accordingly, financial constraint of acquirers is 
measured by deal value (DealVal).  
3.5.6 Corporate governance regression model 
This study uses the multiple OLS regression model described below to 
investigate the relationship between REM and corporate governance 
mechanisms. REM is proxied by the signed value of CFO (RowCFOt), 
production costs (RowProdCost), discretionary expenses (RowDiscExpt) 
obtained from Roychowdhury’s (2006) models. The robustness tests use the 
REM proxies generated from the models of Gunny (2010) and Lara, et al. 
(2010).  
 
𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟3% + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟5% + 𝛽4𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘10%
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘20% + 𝛽6𝐶𝑒𝑜𝐻𝑑 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑒𝑜𝐻𝑑𝑆𝑞 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑒𝑑% + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑧 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘
+ 𝛽14𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽16𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽17𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙 + 𝜀 
 
Definition of variables:  
REMit: represents real earnings management proxies of the following variables, 
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which is dependent variable in the model:  
1. Main REM proxies from Roychowdhury’s (2006) model: 
RowCFO: is the abnormal CFO detected using Roychowdhury's (2006) model 
RowProdCos: is abnormal production costs 
RowDiscExp: is abnormal discretionary expenses 
 
2. Alternative REM proxies from Gunny’s (2010) Model: 
GuyRes&Dev: is the abnormal R&D expense detected using Gunny’s (2010) 
model 
GuySGA: is abnormal SG&A expenses 
GuyProdCos: is abnormal production costs 
 
3. Alternative REM proxies from Lara, et al. (2010)’s Model: 
LaraProdCos: is the abnormal production costs detected using Lara (2012) 
model 
LaraDiscExp: is abnormal discretionary expenses 
 
Independent variables: 
InsShare: is institutional shareholding (=the cumulative institutional 
shareholding); 
Concentr3% (5%): is ownership concentration (=the sum of the shares of firm’s 
outside shareholders with equity ownership greater than 3% (or 5%) ) 
Block10% (20%): is large blockholders, a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm has 
a non-managerial large shareholder who own at least 10% (or 20%) equity 
ownership  
CeoHd: is the CEO’s shareholding 
CeoHdSq: is the squared transformation of the CEO’s shareholding 
NonExecHd: is the non-executive shareholding (=the percentage of equity 
ownership held by non-executive directors) 
Ned%: is the percentage of non-executive directors on a firm's main board 
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Duality: means CEO duality, a dummy variable coded 1 if a board has CEO 
duality 
BoardSz: is the number of directors on a firm's board 
 
Control variables:  
LnAssets: is the natural logarithm of total assets 
SalesGrow: is the percentage of sales growth ratio 
Mark2Book: is the market-to-book ratio (= market capitalization divided by the 
book value of shareholders’ equity) 
ROA: is the return-on-assets ratio (=earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by total assets) 
Leverage: is the financial leverage ratio (= total liabilities divided by total assets) 
AssTurn: is the assets turnover ratio (= total sales to total assets) 
DealVal: is the total cash paid to shareholders in buyout transactions. For MBOs, 
it refers to the value of the deal excluding the portion required to purchase 
shares owned by managers (=Deal Value * (1- CEO’s shareholding); for IBOs, 
it is the total deal value (unit: £million) 
 
Multicollinearity, omission of an important variable or inclusion of an irrelevant 
variable, might compromise the reliability of OLS estimations (Brooks, 2014). 
High correlations between sales growth (Sales Growth) and return on assets 
(ROA) in year T-2 preceding MBOs cause multicollinearity problem in OLS 
model. In order to ensure the validity of the results of multivariate OLS model, 
this study re-runs the same OLS model by omitting each of these highly 
correlated variables in turn to control for multicollinearity in sensitivity analysis 
section (section 3.7). The results are consistent in the main test and in the 
sensitivity analysis, which suggests the results are reliable.  
 
Moreover, due to data limitation, the selection of variable in my model is 
constrained. For instance, this study controls for the potential financial 
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constraint of acquirers, and the acquirers’ financial leverage or free cash flows 
could be a good proxy (e.g. Park and Shin, 2004). However, it is unable to 
access the financial information of acquirers, and I have used an alternative 
measure, the deal value, as a proxy of this variable. Furthermore, I do not 
control for more factors that might affect the REM behaviours in the OLS model. 
For instance, this study does not control the motivation to just meet or beat zero 
earnings. As the sample size is relatively small, controlling for this factor might 
further reduce observations in this study. In addition, the OLS model might 
include irrelevant variable, and thus the estimation might be less efficient. In 
order to consider the robustness of the results, I used different proxies for the 
dependent variable to check whether my results are consistent and not 
sensitive to the selection of variables. Hence, this might imply that the results 
are strongly reliable. 
3.5.7 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 3.1.3 contains the summary statistics for the independent and control 
variables. Panel A shows summary statistics for MBOs in years T-1 and T-2. 
Panel B compares the summary statistics of MBOs and IBOs in year T-1. Panel 
C shows summary statistics for IBOs in years T-1 and T-2. Further details of the 
summary statistics are listed on Table 3.1.4.  
 
Panel A of Table 3.1.3 reports the results for ownership structure, board 
characteristics and firm characteristics for MBOs in years T-1 and T-2. It can be 
seen that there are no significant differences between years T-1 and T-2.  
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Table 3.1.3 Panel A  Summary Statistics for MBO  Year T-1 VS T-2 
 Year T-1 Year T-2 T-test: T-1 ≠ T-2 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. t-Stat1 p-Value 
InsShare            115 0.353 0.218 115 0.334 0.213 0.6501 0.2581 
Concentr3% 115 0.389 0.206 115 0.364 0.207 0.9078 0.1825 
Concentr5% 115 0.312 0.206 115 0.290 0.204 0.8112 0.2091 
Block10%2 115 0.748 0.436 115 0.678 0.469   
Block20%2 115 0.270 0.446 115 0.226 0.420   
CeoHd 115 0.075 0.131 115 0.076 0.132 -0.0229 0.4909 
NonExecHd 115 0.048 0.117 115 0.042 0.104 0.3913 0.3480 
Ned% 115 0.440 0.142 115 0.433 0.147 0.3835 0.3509 
Duality2 115 0.261 0.441 115 0.287 0.454   
BoardSz                115 6.052 1.555 115 6.148 1.613 -0.4579 0.3237 
TotalAssets 115 124,718.2 349,671.6 115 121,548.7 352,342 0.0685 0.4727 
SalesGrow 115 0.356 2.194 115 0.304 1.319 0.2154 0.4148 
Mark2Book 115 1.739 1.787 115 1.339 8.240 0.5092 0.3057 
ROA 115 0.062 0.184 115 -0.015 1.122 0.7285 0.2339 
Leverage 115 0.509 0.187 115 0.514 0.188 -0.2215 0.4125 
AssTurn 115 1.411 0.955 115 1.386 0.999 0.1920 0.4239 
PE Ratio 115 -3.834 16.863 115 -3.545 17.298 -0.1283 0.4490 
Note 1: T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 2: T-test is not used for dummy variables 
 
Panel B of Table 3.1.3 compares ownership structure, board characteristics and 
firm characteristics between MBOs and IBOs in year T-1. From this table it can 
be seen that CEOs of MBO firms have 7.5% equity ownership, which is nearly 
twice that of CEOs of IBO firms. The high rates of managerial shareholding may 
facilitate the planning and execution of MBOs. Moreover, more MBO firms have 
outside large blockholders with equity ownership exceeding the 20% threshold 
than IBO firms do. MBO firms also have more CEO duality than IBOs. In 
addition, MBO firms have higher asset turnover rates than IBO firms have. The 
higher asset utilisation ratio indicates that MBO firms have lower agency costs.  
 
In contrast, IBO firms include more non-executive directors on their boards, 
which may imply that there are greater monitoring incentives for directors. 
Moreover, IBO firms have larger boards than MBO firms. The firm size and the 
deal value of IBOs are also larger than that of MBOs. In addition, IBO firms 
Chapter 3 
144 
have greater financial leverage than MBO firms have. To conclude, smaller firm 
sizes and higher managerial shareholdings may indicate a higher possibility 
that managers can afford a MBO. A lower financial leverage rate may imply that 
managers are able to leverage a firm’s assets to a higher extent, in order to 
access external finance.  
 
Table 3.1.3 Panel B  Summary Statistics for Year T-1  MBO VS IBO 
 MBO IBO T-test: MBO ≠ IBO 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. t-Stat1 p-Value 
InsShare            115 0.353 0.218 85 0.373 0.187 -0.6948 0.2440 
Concentr3% 115 0.389 0.206 85 0.397 0.196 -0.2806 0.3897 
Concentr5% 115 0.312 0.206 85 0.295 0.187 0.5974 0.2755 
Block10%2 115 0.748 0.436 85 0.694 0.464   
Block20%2 115 0.270 0.446 85 0.153 0.362   
CeoHd 115 0.075 0.131 85 0.038 0.091 2.3872*** 0.0090 
NonExecHd 115 0.048 0.117 85 0.033 0.064 1.1719 0.1214 
Ned% 115 0.440 0.142 85 0.533 0.119 -5.0268*** 0.0000 
Duality2 115 0.261 0.441 85 0.106 0.310   
BoardSz                115 6.052 1.555 85 6.788 1.612 -3.2407*** 0.0007 
TotalAssets 115 124,718.2 349,671.6 85 552,946 1461269 -2.6464*** 0.0048 
SalesGrow 115 0.356 2.194 85 0.224 0.719 0.5996 0.2748 
Mark2Book 115 1.739 1.787 85 2.104 15.234 -0.2196 0.4133 
ROA 115 0.062 0.184 85 0.033 0.206 1.0433 0.1492 
Leverage 115 0.509 0.187 85 0.581 0.233 -2.3381** 0.0103 
AssTurn 115 1.411 0.955 85 1.168 0.868 1.8734** 0.0313 
DealVal 115 165.154 918.184 85 506.742 1,377.260 -1.9839** 0.0246 
PE Ratio 115 -3.834 16.863 85 -2.020 16.432 -0.7629 0.2233 
Note 1: T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 2: T-test is not used for dummy variables 
 
Panel C of Table 3.1.3 reports the results for ownership structure, board 
characteristics and firm characteristics for IBOs in years T-1 and T-2. There are 
no significant differences in firm characteristics between years T-1 and T-2 in 
the case of IBOs. However, the ROA ratio significantly decreases from 0.072 to 
0.033 between years T-2 and T-1, which may indicate a decline in firm 
performance. 
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Table 3.1.3 Panel C  Summary Statistics for IBO  Year T-1 VS T-2 
 Year T-1 Year T-2 T-test: T-1 ≠ T-2 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. t-Stat1 p-Value 
InsShare            85 0.373 0.187 78 0.342 0.192 1.0244 0.1536 
Concentr3% 85 0.397 0.196 78 0.369 0.201 0.8895 0.1875 
Concentr5% 85 0.295 0.187 78 0.279 0.193 0.5345 0.2969 
Block10%2 85 0.694 0.464 78 0.731 0.446   
Block20%2 85 0.153 0.362 78 0.128 0.336   
CeoHd 85 0.038 0.091 78 0.041 0.094 -0.2580 0.3984 
NonExecHd 85 0.033 0.064 78 0.037 0.073 -0.4089 0.3416 
Ned% 85 0.533 0.119 78 0.521 0.119 0.6547 0.2568 
Duality2 85 0.106 0.310 78 0.090 0.288   
BoardSz                85 6.788 1.612 78 6.949 1.772 -0.6031 0.2737 
TotalAssets 85 552,946 1461269 78 533,332.5 1383447 0.0880 0.4650 
SalesGrow 85 0.224 0.719 78 0.227 0.542 -0.0264 0.4895 
Mark2Book 85 2.104 15.234 78 2.554 2.504 -0.2683 0.3946 
ROA 85 0.033 0.206 78 0.072 0.140 -1.4397* 0.0760 
Leverage 85 0.581 0.233 78 0.564 0.217 0.4678 0.3203 
AssTurn 85 1.168 0.868 78 1.101 0.874 0.4878 0.3132 
PE Ratio 85 -2.020 16.432 78 -0.062 21.006 -0.6591 0.2554 
Note 1: T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 2: T-test is not used for dummy variables 
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Table 3.1.4 reports the detailed summary statistics of this study. 
 
Table 3.1.4 Panel A  Summary Statistics for MBO Year T-1 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
InsShare 115 0.353 0.218 0.000 0.196 0.321 0.502 0.890 
Concentr3% 115 0.389 0.206 0.000 0.240 0.396 0.527 0.890 
Concentr5% 115 0.312 0.206 0.000 0.152 0.294 0.456 0.875 
Block10% 115 0.748 0.436 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Block20% 115 0.270 0.446 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CeoHd 115 0.075 0.131 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.095 0.681 
CeoHdSq 115 0.023 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.463 
NonExecHd 115 0.048 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.030 0.664 
Ned% 115 0.440 0.142 0.000 0.375 0.429 0.500 0.750 
Duality 115 0.261 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BoardSz 115 6.052 1.555 3.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 11.000 
TotalAssets 115 124,718.2 349,671.6 1,370 21,736 53,357 101,019 3376400 
LnAssets 115 10.818 1.268 7.223 9.987 10.885 11.523 15.032 
SalesGrow 115 0.356 2.194 -0.554 -0.066 0.036 0.157 21.687 
Mark2Book 115 1.739 1.787 -1.676 0.798 1.225 2.116 10.741 
ROA 115 0.062 0.184 -1.054 0.024 0.090 0.140 0.521 
Leverage 115 0.509 0.187 0.095 0.387 0.492 0.639 1.122 
AssTurn 115 1.411 0.955 0.076 0.833 1.335 1.742 8.116 
DealVal 115 165.154 918.184 0.110 10.960 31.831 82.601 9,802.953 
PE Ratio 115 -3.834 16.863 -58.560 -12.180 -4.090 0.120 88.090 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
147 
Table 3.1.4 Panel B  Summary Statistics for MBO Year T-2 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
InsShare 115 0.334 0.213 0.000 0.160 0.328 0.495 0.895 
Concentr3% 115 0.364 0.207 0.000 0.212 0.350 0.506 0.895 
Concentr5% 115 0.290 0.204 0.000 0.125 0.274 0.459 0.860 
Block10% 115 0.678 0.469 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Block20% 115 0.226 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CeoHd 115 0.076 0.132 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.097 0.681 
CeoHdSq 115 0.023 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.463 
NonExecHd 115 0.042 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.033 0.630 
Ned% 115 0.433 0.147 0.000 0.333 0.429 0.500 0.750 
Duality 115 0.287 0.454 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BoardSz 115 6.148 1.613 3.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 12.000 
TotalAssets 115 121,548.7 352,342 1,925 22,241 49,990 107,682 3448900 
LnAssets 115 10.794 1.245 7.563 10.010 10.820 11.587 15.054 
SalesGrow 115 0.304 1.319 -0.583 -0.007 0.077 0.210 11.284 
Mark2Book 115 1.339 8.240 -67.773 0.888 1.354 2.880 17.164 
ROA 115 -0.015 1.122 -11.864 0.051 0.102 0.149 0.429 
Leverage 115 0.514 0.188 0.088 0.395 0.511 0.632 1.048 
AssTurn 115 1.386 0.999 0.003 0.823 1.298 1.740 8.866 
DealVal 115 164.992 918.215 0.110 11.309 32.662 82.556 9,802.953 
PE Ratio 115 -3.545 17.298 -78.570 -6.600 -3.000 1.010 93.710 
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Table 3.1.4 Panel C  Summary Statistics for IBO Year T-1 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
InsShare 85 0.373 0.187 0.000 0.288 0.374 0.500 0.905 
Concentr3% 85 0.397 0.196 0.000 0.296 0.377 0.533 0.905 
Concentr5% 85 0.295 0.187 0.000 0.149 0.288 0.422 0.862 
Block10% 85 0.694 0.464 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Block20% 85 0.153 0.362 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CeoHd 85 0.038 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.037 0.648 
CeoHdSq 85 0.010 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.419 
NonExecHd 85 0.033 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.019 0.362 
Ned% 85 0.533 0.119 0.222 0.444 0.556 0.625 0.750 
Duality 85 0.106 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BoardSz 85 6.788 1.612 4.000 5.000 7.000 8.000 10.000 
TotalAssets 85 552,946 1461269 3,447 41,021 112,328 533,565 11700000 
LnAssets 85 11.758 1.754 8.145 10.622 11.629 13.187 16.278 
SalesGrow 85 0.224 0.719 -0.895 0.010 0.083 0.215 5.169 
Mark2Book 85 2.104 15.234 -92.143 0.902 1.682 2.409 103.703 
ROA 85 0.033 0.206 -0.876 0.028 0.075 0.110 0.413 
Leverage 85 0.581 0.233 0.060 0.469 0.550 0.655 1.774 
AssTurn 85 1.168 0.868 0.002 0.517 0.978 1.545 5.083 
DealVal 85 506.742 1,377.260 1.010 26.030 114.280 508.490 11,730.530 
PE Ratio 85 -2.020 16.432 -52.470 -7.400 -3.170 3.550 74.700 
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Table 3.1.4 Panel D  Summary Statistics for IBO Year T-2 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
InsShare 78 0.342 0.192 0.000 0.202 0.329 0.475 0.905 
Concentr3% 78 0.369 0.201 0.000 0.222 0.345 0.497 0.905 
Concentr5% 78 0.279 0.193 0.000 0.109 0.253 0.419 0.862 
Block10% 78 0.731 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Block20% 78 0.128 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CeoHd 78 0.041 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.043 0.648 
CeoHdSq 78 0.010 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.419 
NonExecHd 78 0.037 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.032 0.377 
Ned% 78 0.521 0.119 0.200 0.429 0.500 0.600 0.833 
Duality 78 0.090 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BoardSz 78 6.949 1.772 4.000 6.000 7.000 8.000 12.000 
TotalAssets 78 533,332.5 1383447 5,615 41,200 93,064.5 506,123 10400000 
LnAssets 78 11.739 1.723 8.633 10.626 11.441 13.135 16.160 
SalesGrow 78 0.227 0.542 -0.702 0.010 0.095 0.286 3.082 
Mark2Book 78 2.554 2.504 -2.581 1.259 1.769 3.129 13.274 
ROA 78 0.072 0.140 -0.429 0.044 0.073 0.128 0.604 
Leverage 78 0.564 0.217 0.075 0.427 0.542 0.664 1.405 
AssTurn 78 1.101 0.874 0.012 0.410 0.918 1.456 5.643 
DealVal 78 516.082 1,430.584 1.010 26.030 111.470 508.490 11,730.530 
PE Ratio 78 -0.062 21.006 -92.810 -6.250 -1.065 7.040 72.750 
 
Table 3.1.5 reports the results of the Pearson correlation matrix. High 
correlations between right-hand-side variables may lead to the risk of 
multicollinearity in regression analysis. This study separates highly correlated 
independent variables into different regression models to mitigate 
multicollinearity in the multivariate tests section. Moreover, the VIFs are 
examined in order to ensure that multicollinearity is not problematic in the 
models. The VIFs are lower than the critical value of 10, indicating that there is 
no risk of multicollinearity (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2012). If high correlations 
between control variables in a model lead to multicollinearity problems in this 
study, then the same regression models are re-run by omitting one of these 
variables in turn in sensitivity analysis to check the validity of the models and 
results.  
 
In the multivariate tests section, the high correlation between sales growth 
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(SalesGrow) and return on assets (ROA) in year T-2 of MBOs leads to 
multicollinearity problem in regression models that the dependent variables are 
discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp), SGA expenses (GuySGA) and 
discretionary expenses (LaraDiscExp) respectively. The same regression 
models are therefore re-run by omitting these highly correlated variables one at 
a time in sensitive analysis. The results from the main tests are consistent with 
those from the sensitivity analysis, thus the results in this study are robust and 
multicollinearity is not problematic. 
 
Similar to prior studies on ownership (e.g. McKnight and Weir, 2009; Weir et al., 
2002; Weir and Laing, 2000), this study includes CEO’s shareholding and its 
squared transformation into one specified model to test the potential non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and REM. The high correlation and 
the VIFs value between these two variables may indicate a high risk of 
multicollinearity. However, the powers of a variable, such as X2 and X3, are all 
nonlinear functions of it, and thus including a variable and its powers in one 
regression model does not violate the assumption of no multicollinearity 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Moreover, the P-value for powers transformation is 
not affected by multicollinearity. The high correlations can be greatly reduced 
by 'centring' the variables (i.e. subtracting their means) before creating the 
powers. But the P-value for the powers will be exactly the same, regardless of 
whether or not centring the variable. All the results for the other variables 
(including the R2 but not the lower-order terms) will be the same in either case. 
Hence including a variable and its powers in one specified regression model 
has no adverse consequences, and multicollinearity is not problematic (Allison, 
2012).  
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Table 3.1.5 Panel A  Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for MBOs Year T-1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
InsShare (1) 1                   
Concentr3% (2) 0.946 1                  
Concentr5% (3) 0.891 0.952 1                 
Block10% (4) 0.345 0.387 0.438 1                
Block20% (5) 0.319 0.325 0.382 0.353 1               
CeoHd (6) -0.394 -0.404 -0.338 -0.254 -0.151 1              
CeoHdSq(7) -0.314 -0.349 -0.293 -0.292 -0.138 0.924 1             
NonExecHd (8) -0.181 -0.209 -0.138 0.151 0.377 -0.057 -0.063 1            
Ned% (9) 0.285 0.201 0.177 0.110 0.202 -0.280 -0.244 0.350 1           
Duality (10) -0.187 -0.206 -0.169 -0.065 0.085 0.340 0.277 -0.075 -0.193 1          
BoardSz (11) 0.042 -0.036 -0.056 -0.058 -0.084 -0.117 -0.103 0.028 -0.007 -0.225 1         
LnAssets (12) 0.169 0.072 0.017 -0.043 -0.072 -0.287 -0.213 0.027 0.214 -0.154 0.429 1        
SalesGrow (13) -0.059 -0.033 -0.006 0.058 0.026 0.147 0.081 -0.043 0.028 0.186 0.134 0.008 1       
Mark2Book (14) -0.039 -0.073 -0.138 -0.145 -0.137 0.114 0.166 0.028 -0.003 0.066 0.109 0.069 -0.054 1      
ROA (15) -0.215 -0.223 -0.247 -0.117 -0.041 0.171 0.215 0.119 -0.168 -0.006 0.102 0.299 -0.208 0.395 1     
Leverage (16) 0.199 0.161 0.113 -0.155 -0.139 -0.115 -0.064 -0.110 0.113 -0.206 0.175 0.135 -0.170 0.296 -0.042 1    
AssTurn (17) 0.077 0.071 0.062 -0.035 -0.203 -0.007 0.018 -0.103 -0.129 -0.029 0.109 0.052 -0.170 0.487 0.142 0.335 1   
DealVal(18) -0.052 -0.079 -0.100 -0.156 -0.064 -0.084 -0.054 -0.013 0.156 -0.053 0.158 0.404 -0.029 0.059 0.066 0.003 0.041 1  
PE Ratio (19) -0.186 -0.219 -0.243 -0.216 -0.156 0.168 0.116 -0.003 -0.092 0.029 -0.074 -0.001 -0.092 0.073 0.236 -0.158 0.008 0.017 1 
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Table 3.1.5 Panel B  Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for MBOs Year T-2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
InsShare (1) 1                   
Concentr3% (2) 0.952 1                  
Concentr5% (3) 0.905 0.953 1                 
Block10% (4) 0.394 0.406 0.485 1                
Block20% (5) 0.330 0.344 0.425 0.372 1               
CeoHd (6) -0.423 -0.423 -0.363 -0.269 -0.153 1              
CeoHdSq(7) -0.335 -0.357 -0.311 -0.277 -0.144 0.927 1             
NonExecHd (8) -0.088 -0.089 -0.058 0.187 0.371 -0.024 -0.040 1            
Ned% (9) 0.354 0.324 0.290 0.158 0.172 -0.276 -0.256 0.165 1           
Duality (10) -0.186 -0.222 -0.162 -0.057 0.025 0.395 0.313 -0.052 -0.186 1          
BoardSz (11) 0.073 0.022 0.008 0.029 0.015 -0.100 -0.077 -0.050 -0.106 -0.214 1         
LnAssets (12) 0.155 0.084 0.035 -0.041 -0.048 -0.269 -0.196 0.003 0.219 -0.164 0.372 1        
SalesGrow (13) 0.235 0.231 0.242 0.069 0.130 -0.068 -0.042 -0.051 0.099 0.113 0.059 -0.105 1       
Mark2Book (14) 0.022 0.034 0.112 0.183 0.051 0.047 0.063 -0.016 -0.002 -0.084 0.032 0.122 0.140 1      
ROA (15) -0.201 -0.197 -0.238 -0.096 -0.184 0.060 0.047 0.048 -0.119 -0.134 0.058 0.223 -0.784 -0.049 1     
Leverage (16) 0.087 0.045 0.024 0.021 -0.108 0.002 0.035 -0.062 0.059 -0.130 0.037 0.157 0.011 -0.160 0.086 1    
AssTurn (17) 0.068 0.056 0.048 0.016 -0.174 -0.030 -0.018 -0.056 -0.100 -0.029 0.160 0.106 0.281 0.109 0.115 0.364 1   
DealVal(18) -0.068 -0.089 -0.113 -0.133 -0.044 -0.083 -0.053 -0.006 0.161 -0.060 0.204 0.411 -0.017 0.029 0.025 0.016 0.059 1  
PE Ratio (19) 0.030 0.021 -0.027 0.018 -0.081 -0.095 -0.026 -0.005 -0.073 -0.043 -0.134 0.235 0.037 0.008 0.089 0.045 0.035 0.037 1 
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Table 3.1.5 Panel C  Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for IBOs Year T-1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
InsShare (1) 1                   
Concentr3% (2) 0.954 1                  
Concentr5% (3) 0.891 0.931 1                 
Block10% (4) 0.418 0.412 0.527 1                
Block20% (5) 0.401 0.363 0.422 0.282 1               
CeoHd (6) -0.114 -0.098 -0.095 -0.013 -0.033 1              
CeoHdSq(7) -0.098 -0.096 -0.100 -0.103 -0.021 0.915 1             
NonExecHd (8) -0.262 -0.245 -0.177 0.094 0.071 0.057 -0.029 1            
Ned% (9) 0.076 0.059 0.102 -0.083 0.262 -0.172 -0.137 0.201 1           
Duality (10) 0.062 0.085 0.103 0.145 -0.040 0.276 0.139 -0.067 -0.047 1          
BoardSz (11) -0.114 -0.140 -0.122 -0.104 0.117 -0.172 -0.156 -0.125 -0.093 -0.050 1         
LnAssets (12) -0.069 -0.169 -0.193 -0.193 0.098 -0.351 -0.265 -0.279 0.095 -0.072 0.501 1        
SalesGrow (13) 0.009 -0.014 -0.021 -0.084 -0.148 0.016 -0.009 0.088 0.007 -0.065 -0.006 0.007 1       
Mark2Book (14) 0.149 0.140 0.080 0.171 -0.019 0.008 0.014 -0.118 -0.017 -0.004 -0.137 0.078 0.040 1      
ROA (15) -0.041 -0.073 -0.111 0.009 -0.068 0.229 0.229 -0.012 -0.245 -0.044 0.016 0.150 0.164 0.418 1     
Leverage (16) 0.189 0.189 0.082 0.073 0.023 0.018 -0.032 -0.022 0.159 0.101 0.085 0.161 0.046 0.014 -0.096 1    
AssTurn (17) -0.164 -0.150 -0.152 -0.054 -0.223 0.482 0.539 0.209 -0.253 0.091 -0.222 -0.461 -0.042 -0.151 0.068 0.081 1   
DealVal(18) -0.186 -0.217 -0.248 -0.290 -0.076 -0.124 -0.066 -0.149 0.007 -0.072 0.315 0.562 -0.058 0.022 0.060 0.069 -0.214 1  
PE Ratio (19) -0.180 -0.166 -0.200 0.016 -0.102 -0.017 -0.035 0.003 -0.130 -0.001 -0.037 0.175 -0.190 0.097 0.174 -0.075 -0.139 0.040 1 
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Table 3.1.5 Panel D  Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for IBOs Year T-2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
InsShare (1) 1                   
Concentr3% (2) 0.945 1                  
Concentr5% (3) 0.879 0.943 1                 
Block10% (4) 0.511 0.535 0.567 1                
Block20% (5) 0.319 0.252 0.293 0.233 1               
CeoHd (6) -0.096 -0.064 -0.081 -0.092 -0.080 1              
CeoHdSq(7) -0.087 -0.088 -0.107 -0.148 -0.064 0.905 1             
NonExecHd (8) 0.052 0.043 0.082 0.145 0.385 0.073 -0.020 1            
Ned% (9) 0.150 0.129 0.129 0.047 0.206 -0.245 -0.169 0.213 1           
Duality (10) -0.077 -0.070 -0.121 -0.012 -0.120 0.159 0.096 -0.099 -0.114 1          
BoardSz (11) -0.199 -0.221 -0.164 -0.083 0.098 -0.240 -0.183 -0.069 -0.076 0.060 1         
LnAssets (12) -0.198 -0.267 -0.249 -0.157 0.038 -0.414 -0.298 -0.235 0.162 0.073 0.565 1        
SalesGrow (13) 0.253 0.244 0.200 0.146 0.141 0.123 0.073 0.033 -0.006 0.110 -0.014 -0.223 1       
Mark2Book (14) 0.060 0.134 0.156 0.122 -0.056 0.202 0.179 -0.055 -0.148 -0.002 0.010 -0.354 0.372 1      
ROA (15) -0.294 -0.298 -0.317 -0.112 -0.174 0.321 0.338 -0.019 -0.308 0.147 0.004 0.005 -0.258 0.090 1     
Leverage (16) 0.162 0.230 0.233 0.160 0.009 0.053 -0.033 -0.008 0.054 0.225 0.033 0.094 -0.048 0.099 -0.026 1    
AssTurn (17) -0.113 -0.082 -0.125 -0.001 -0.039 0.573 0.643 0.164 -0.272 0.070 -0.208 -0.412 -0.043 0.164 0.375 0.149 1   
DealVal(18) -0.210 -0.235 -0.211 -0.237 -0.052 -0.130 -0.067 -0.146 0.089 0.027 0.479 0.566 -0.092 -0.128 0.021 0.044 -0.188 1  
PE Ratio (19) -0.158 -0.157 -0.032 -0.017 0.024 0.021 -0.017 0.052 -0.034 0.011 0.210 0.038 0.102 0.321 0.171 0.154 0.028 -0.001 1 
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3.6 Empirical Results 
3.6.1 Univariate tests 
This section reports the results of the univariate tests of the signed values of 
REM after having partitioned the sample into MBOs and IBOs. The main tests 
analyse the detected abnormal REM proxies from Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
models: abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses. The results from the models of Gunny’s (2010) and 
Lara, et al.’s (2012) are used as alternative measures of REM to increase the 
robustness of the findings.  
3.6.1.1 Univariate test results for management buyouts 
Table 3.2.1A summarises the actual results for the REM proxies and the 
expected results from the hypotheses development for MBOs. In Table 3.2.1A, 
the results are listed in separate sections for year T-1, year T-2 and the 
aggregate values of these two years. Further details of the actual results for 
MBOs are listed in Table 3.2.2.  
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Table 3.2.1A Summary of real earnings management hypotheses and results for MBOs 
Proxies Hypotheses 
Year T-1 Year T-2 Aggregate T-1 + T-2 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual 
RowCFO H2a + -** + -* + -** 
RowProdCos H2c - +** - +* - +** 
RowDiscExp H2b + -*** + - + -** 
RowProd+Disc  - +*** - +** - +*** 
RowCFO+Disc  - +*** - +* - +*** 
GuyRes&Dev H2d + + + -** + - 
GuySGA H2b robust + -** + - + -** 
GuyProdCos H2c robust - +* - +* - +* 
LaraProdCos H2c robust - +* - + - +* 
LaraDiscExp H2b robust + -** + -* + -** 
LaraProd+Disc  - +*** - +** - +** 
Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The first set of hypotheses suggested that, preceding MBOs, managers might 
use negative REM to depress pre-buyout reported earnings in order to 
increasing the possibility that shareholders would accept a lower buyout price. 
The second set of hypotheses suggested that managers might engage in 
positive REM to manipulate earnings upwards preceding MBOs, in an attempt 
to secure external funding. The actual results in Table 3.2.1A suggest that 
managers engage in positive REM prior to MBOs. This supports the second set 
of hypotheses, which are H2-2ai H2-2bi H2-2ci H2-2di. 
 
In year T-1, the results show that managers use nearly every opportunity to 
engage in positive REM to increase reported earnings. Further results from year 
T-1 prior to MBOs are discussed below. 
 
Abnormal cash flows from operations 
Abnormal CFO (RowCFO) is significantly negative, which suggests that 
managers manipulate sales through excessive price discounts or credit sales 
in order to increase reported earnings. 
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Abnormal production costs 
Abnormal production costs (RowProdCos, GuyProdCos, and LaraProdCos) are 
significantly positive, which means that managers use overproduction to 
decrease COGS in an attempt to report higher earnings.  
 
Abnormal discretionary expense cuts 
Abnormal discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp and LaraDiscExp) are 
significantly negative, which shows that managers cut discretionary expenses 
to increase reported earnings. Furthermore, abnormal SG&A expenses 
(GuySGA) are also significantly negative but abnormal R&D expenditures 
(GuyRes&Dev) are insignificant. As reduction of R&D expenditures is easy to 
spot, managers may choose to cut SG&A expenses to increase earnings 
preceding MBOs. Alternatively, managers might perceive cutting R&D 
expenditure as too damaging for a firm’s long-term growth potential.  
 
Aggregated values of REM proxies 
The aggregated values of REM proxies (RowProd+Disc, RowCFO+Disc, and 
LaraProd+Disc) are significantly positive, which suggests that managers engage 
in different types of REM at the same time, and that these manipulations do not 
cancel each other out.  
 
Investigating any possible mean reversals of REM might reveal systematic 
manipulation of REM. For instance, managers might engage in negative REM 
for at least one year to prepare for the extent of positive REM in the following 
year. This action might cancel the overall effects of REM, and reduce the 
possibility of the manipulation being detected. In year T-2, the direction of REM 
manipulation is the same as in year T-1, though some variables are no longer 
significant in year T-2. This indicates that managers engage in positive REM 
selectively or to a lesser extent in year T-2. Hence there is no evidence of a 
mean reversion. The results suggest that some managers might plan more than 
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two years ahead. Further results from year T-2 prior to MBOs are discussed 
below. 
 
Abnormal cash flows from operations 
Abnormal CFO (RowCFO) is significantly negative, which suggests that 
managers engage in sales manipulation of excessive price discount or credit 
sales to increase reported earnings.  
 
Abnormal production costs 
Abnormal production costs (RowProdCos and GuyProdCos) are significantly 
positive, which means that managers use overproduction to decrease COGS 
in an attempt to report higher earnings.  
 
Abnormal discretionary expenses 
Abnormal discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp) are negative but insignificant 
in year T-2, prior to MBOs. This suggests that managers choose not to cut 
discretionary expenses to increase earnings in year T-2. In comparison to sales 
manipulation and overproduction, discretionary expenses cut is easy to spot. 
Further, discretionary expenses cut, such as cancelling employee-training 
programs, are easy to spot and have long-term negative economic 
consequences (Gunny, 2010). Hence, managers may take discretionary 
expenses cut as a final option of REM to minimise the interference of normal 
operations in year T-2, preceding MBOs.  
 
Abnormal expenditure on research and development 
Abnormal R&D expenditures (GuyRes&Dev) are significantly negative only in 
year T-2, whereas abnormal SG&A expenses (GuySGA) are significantly 
negative only in year T-1. This might indicate that managers use SG&A 
expenses cut and R&D expenditures cut as alternatives in order to increase 
reported earnings preceding MBOs. Moreover, R&D and SG&A expenses are 
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two parts of overall discretionary expenses. Engaging in only one method of 
discretionary expenses cut at a time may reduce the risk of being detected and 
minimise interference in normal operations.  
 
As previously stated, the results do not indicate any mean reversion. The 
results of aggregate REM measures (year T-1 + year T-2) are the same as 
those for year T-1 preceding MBOs. This suggests that managers do engage 
in positive REM preceding MBOs. As suggested by the results from years T-1 
and T-2, the aggregate effect of REM on reported earnings is positive, and there 
is no mean reversal of REM in 2 years preceding MBOs. These results indicate 
that some managers might plan more than two years ahead. 
 
In summary, managers engage in positive REM in year T-1 by manipulating 
sales through excessive price discounts or credit sales, overproduction to 
decrease COGS and abnormal cuts to discretionary expenses. Moreover, 
managers engage in positive REM in year T-2 by manipulating sales 
manipulation through excessive price discounts or credit sales and 
overproduction to decrease COGS. The results indicate that, prior to MBOs, 
managers engage in positive REM, choosing the methods that are easy to 
control and less likely to be detected, such as sales manipulation and 
overproduction. As managers are buyers in MBOs, they are likely to remain with 
the firm after buyouts. Consequently, they select REM methods that cause 
minimal interference with their firm’s long-term performance. For instance, 
managers might cut either SG&A or R&D expenditures in a given period.  
 
To conclude, the results suggest that managers engage in positive REM to 
increase reported earnings preceding MBOs. They use more opportunities to 
engage in REM in year T-1 than they do in year T-2. This result is consistent 
with the second set of hypotheses, which predict that managers, who rely on 
external sources of financing, are more likely to engage in positive earnings 
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management prior to MBOs.  
 
The results listed in Table 3.2.1A support hypotheses H2-2ai H2-2bi H2-2ci H2-2di, 
showing that managers engage in positive REM to manipulate earnings 
upwards in an attempt to secure their external funding preceding MBOs.  
 
Table 3.2.2 reports all the details of the univariate test results for MBOs. 
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Table 3.2.2  Summary statistics of REM proxies preceding MBOs 
Panel A.  MBO  Year T-1   
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho1: mean=0 t-Stat2 p-Value REM3 
RowCFO 118 -0.025 0.130 -0.876 0.287 Ha: < 0 -2.106** 0.019 + 
RowProdCos 117 0.043 0.242 -0.919 0.991 Ha: > 0 1.909** 0.029 + 
RowDiscExp 96 -0.111 0.317 -1.876 1.014 Ha: < 0 -3.436*** 0.0004 + 
RowProd+Disc 95 0.162 0.438 -1.124 1.982 Ha: > 0 3.618*** 0.0002 + 
RowCFO+Disc 96 0.136 0.362 -0.902 2.096 Ha: > 0 3.668*** 0.0002 + 
GuyRes&Dev 117 0.000 0.008 -0.036 0.044 Ha: > 0 0.268 0.395 - 
GuySGA 96 -0.038 0.163 -0.724 0.382 Ha: < 0 -2.284** 0.012 + 
GuyProdCos 117 0.029 0.209 -0.946 0.805 Ha: > 0 1.473* 0.072 + 
LaraProdCos 117 0.027 0.204 -0.976 0.616 Ha: > 0 1.452* 0.075 + 
LaraDiscExp 96 -0.047 0.204 -0.545 0.997 Ha: < 0 -2.272** 0.013 + 
LaraProd+Disc 95 0.088 0.327 -1.005 1.092 Ha: > 0 2.612*** 0.005 + 
          
Panel B.  MBO  Year T-2  
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho: mean=0  t-Stat p-Value REM 
RowCFO 116 -0.014 0.111 -0.763 0.259 Ha: < 0 -1.374* 0.086 + 
RowProdCos 113 0.034 0.219 -0.733 0.756 Ha: > 0 1.655* 0.050 + 
RowDiscExp 96 -0.028 0.274 -0.573 1.578 Ha: < 0 -1.013 0.157 + 
RowProd+Disc 93 0.079 0.417 -1.424 1.329 Ha: > 0 1.818** 0.036 + 
RowCFO+Disc 96 0.043 0.260 -1.090 0.661 Ha: > 0 1.611* 0.055 + 
GuyRes&Dev 115 -0.001 0.006 -0.048 0.009 Ha: < 0 -1.802** 0.037 + 
GuySGA 96 -0.017 0.159 -0.569 0.588 Ha: < 0 -1.016 0.156 + 
GuyProdCos 113 0.024 0.184 -0.718 0.748 Ha: > 0 1.374* 0.086 + 
LaraProdCos 113 0.017 0.175 -0.802 0.597 Ha: > 0 1.024 0.154 + 
LaraDiscExp 95 -0.028 0.202 -0.602 0.980 Ha: < 0 -1.351* 0.090 + 
LaraProd+Disc 93 0.060 0.317 -0.915 1.199 Ha: > 0 1.823** 0.036 + 
          
Panel C.  MBO  2 years aggregate  
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho: mean=0  t-Stat p-Value REM 
RowCFO 116 -0.039 0.205 -0.951 0.545 Ha: < 0 -2.058** 0.021 + 
RowProdCos 113 0.079 0.437 -1.652 1.615 Ha: > 0 1.924** 0.028 + 
RowDiscExp 95 -0.140 0.511 -1.760 1.998 Ha: < 0 -2.664** 0.005 + 
RowProd+Disc 93 0.242 0.775 -2.273 2.854 Ha: > 0 3.006*** 0.002 + 
RowCfo+Disc 95 0.177 0.540 -1.993 2.225 Ha: > 0 3.197*** 0.001 + 
GuyRes&Dev 114 -0.001 0.012 -0.085 0.044 Ha: < 0 -0.667 0.253 + 
GuySGA 95 -0.055 0.304 -1.292 0.971 Ha: < 0 -1.759** 0.041 + 
GuyProdCos 113 0.054 0.373 -1.636 1.553 Ha: > 0 1.551* 0.062 + 
LaraProdCos 113 0.045 0.352 -1.779 1.144 Ha: > 0 1.353* 0.089 + 
LaraDiscExp 94 -0.075 0.388 -1.147 1.978 Ha: < 0 -1.870** 0.032 + 
LaraProd+Disc 93 0.148 0.609 -1.602 2.291 Ha: > 0 2.343** 0.011 + 
Note 1: Ho: is Null Hypothesis;   Ha: is Alternative Hypothesis; 
Note 2: Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Chapter 3 
162 
Note 3: REM: This column indicates the real earnings management direction. ‘+’ means income 
increasing earnings management; ‘-’ means income decreasing earnings management. The 
significance of the positive/negative real earnings management is indicated by the ‘*’ in t-Stat 
column. 
 
3.6.1.2 Univariate test results for institutional buyouts 
Table 3.2.1B summarises the actual results for the REM proxies and the 
expected results from the hypotheses development for IBOs. In Table 3.2.1B, 
the results are listed in separate sections for year T-1, year T-2 and the 
aggregate value of these two years. Further details of actual results for IBOs 
are listed in Table 3.2.3.  
 
Table 3.2.1B  Summary of real earnings management hypotheses and results for IBOs 
Proxies Hypotheses 
Year T-1 Year T-2 Aggregate T-1 + T-2 
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual 
RowCFO H1a - -*** - -*** - -*** 
RowProdCos H1c + +*** + +** + +*** 
RowDiscExp H1b - -** - -** - -** 
RowProd+Disc  + +** + +** + +** 
RowCFO+Disc  + +*** + +*** + +** 
GuyRes&Dev H1d - + - -** - - 
GuySGA H1b robust - -* - - - - 
GuyProdCos H1c robust + +** + +** + +** 
LaraProdCos H1c robust + +** + + + +* 
LaraDiscExp H1b robust - -* - -** - -** 
LaraProd+Disc  + + + +* + + 
Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In year T-1, prior to IBOs, the results suggest that managers engage in positive 
REM to increase reported earnings. This result is consistent with hypotheses 
H2-1a, H2-1b, H2-1c, and H2-1d in respect to IBOs. It indicates that managers use 
positive REM to increase pre-buyout earnings in an attempt to increase the 
perceived value of their firms, thus decreasing the possibility of any potential 
IBOs incidence. Further results from year T-1 prior to IBOs are discussed below.  
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Abnormal cash flows from operations 
Abnormal CFO (RowCFO) is significantly negative, which is consistent with 
hypothesis H2-1a, suggesting that managers offer price discounts or more 
lenient credit terms to increase their reported earnings prior to IBOs.  
 
Abnormal production costs 
Abnormal production costs (RowProdCos, GuyProdCos, and LaraProdCos) are 
significantly positive, which is consistent with hypothesis H2-1c. This means that 
managers engage in overproduction to decrease COGS, in an attempt to report 
higher earnings.  
 
Abnormal discretionary expense cuts 
Abnormal discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp and LaraDiscExp) are 
significantly negative, which is consistent with hypothesis H2-1b. Furthermore, 
abnormal SG&A expenses (GuySGA) are significantly negative, suggesting that 
managers cut discretionary SG&A expenses to increase reported earnings. 
Abnormal R&D expenditures (GuyRes&Dev) are positive but insignificant, which 
is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-1d. As a reduction in R&D expenditures is 
easy to spot, managers may choose not to use this method in year T-1 
preceding IBOs. Alternatively, managers might perceive cutting R&D 
expenditure as too damaging to their firm’s long-term growth potential.  
 
Aggregated values of the REM proxies 
Aggregated values of REM proxies (RowProd+Disc, RowCFO+Disc) are 
significantly positive, which suggests that managers engage in different types 
of REM at the same time, and that these manipulations do not cancel each 
other out.  
 
Detecting the mean reversals of REM might reveal systematic manipulation of 
REM for years. For instance, managers might engage in negative REM for at 
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least one year as a preparation for positive REM in the imminent year so that 
to cancel the overall effects of REM and to reduce the possibility of being 
detected. In year T-2 preceding IBOs, the direction and the statistical 
significance of abnormal REM proxies are the same as in year T-1, suggesting 
that managers persistently engage in positive REM from year T-2 onwards. 
Furthermore, the results for the aggregate measures of REM (year T-1 + year 
T-2) are the same as those for year T-1 preceding IBOs. This suggests that 
there is no mean reversal of REM in the two years preceding IBOs, and that 
managers do engage in positive REM preceding IBOs. This may be explained 
by the fact that IBOs are difficult to predict, and thus managers do not tend to 
plan strategically for the manipulation of REM years in advance. 
 
Moreover, abnormal R&D expenditures (GuyRes&Dev) are significantly 
negative only in year T-2, whereas abnormal SG&A expenses (GuySGA) are 
significantly negative only in year T-1. This might suggest that managers cut 
SG&A and R&D expenditures alternatively in order to achieve discretionary 
expenses manipulation preceding IBOs. Engaging only one of these methods 
at a time may reduce the risk of being detected while minimising interference in 
normal operations. 
 
In summary, managers engage in positive REM in year T-1 by sales 
manipulation through excessive price discounts or credit sales, overproduction 
to decrease COGS and cutting abnormal discretionary expenses. Moreover, 
managers engage in positive REM in year T-2 by the same three methods. The 
results indicate that, prior to IBOs, managers use most of the available methods 
of REM to increase their reported earnings, thus increasing their firm's value. 
Furthermore, managers might cut either SG&A or R&D expenditures in order to 
reduce the risk of being detected and minimising interference in normal 
operations. 
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To conclude, the results suggest that managers persistently engage in positive 
REM through sales manipulation, overproduction, and discretionary expense 
cuts in order to increase reported earnings in years T-1 and T-2 preceding IBOs. 
However, there is no evidence of a mean reversion, which suggests that 
managers do not systematically plan REM manipulation for years in advance. 
As IBOs are difficult to predict, once managers realise that their firms are 
undervalued, they will engage in nearly every REM method available to 
increase their firm's value. The findings are consistent with predictions of the 
hypotheses: managers engage in positive REM to reduce firm undervaluation 
and/or increase the potential buyout costs in an attempt to impede any potential 
IBO bidding.14  
 
Table 3.2.3 reports of the all details of the univariate test results for IBOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 I have also investigated the difference in REM behaviours between MBOs and IBOs, but 
the t-test results show that there is no difference between them.  
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Table 3.2.3  Summary statistics of REM proxies preceding IBOs 
Panel A.  IBO  Year T-1   
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho: mean=0 t-Stat p-Value REM 
RowCFO 87 -0.043 0.106 -0.616 0.226 Ha: < 0 -3.762*** 0.0002 + 
RowProdCos 83 0.073 0.232 -0.462 1.275 Ha: > 0 2.885*** 0.003 + 
RowDiscExp 67 -0.050 0.204 -0.609 0.524 Ha: < 0 -2.020** 0.024 + 
RowProd+Disc 64 0.101 0.367 -0.931 1.137 Ha: > 0 2.205** 0.016 + 
RowCFO+Disc 67 0.093 0.208 -0.442 0.622 Ha: > 0 3.655*** 0.0003 + 
GuyRes&Dev 85 0.000 0.007 -0.028 0.029 Ha: > 0 0.617 0.269 - 
GuySGA 67 -0.022 0.118 -0.269 0.326 Ha: < 0 -1.529* 0.066 + 
GuyProdCos 82 0.041 0.194 -0.735 0.752 Ha: > 0 1.935** 0.028 + 
LaraProdCos 83 0.037 0.177 -0.555 0.561 Ha: > 0 1.879** 0.032 + 
LaraDiscExp 67 -0.030 0.167 -0.546 0.425 Ha: < 0 -1.462* 0.074 + 
LaraProd+Disc 64 0.049 0.318 -0.980 0.767 Ha: > 0 1.228 0.112 + 
          
Panel B.  IBO  Year T-2  
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho: mean=0  t-Stat p-Value REM 
RowCFO 82 -0.030 0.088 -0.489 0.136 Ha: < 0 -3.135*** 0.001 + 
RowProdCos 79 0.046 0.209 -0.564 0.676 Ha: > 0 1.948** 0.028 + 
RowDiscExp 65 -0.054 0.212 -0.696 0.493 Ha: < 0 -2.054** 0.022 + 
RowProd+Disc 63 0.096 0.398 -1.037 1.227 Ha: > 0 1.913** 0.030 + 
RowCFO+Disc 65 0.076 0.240 -0.621 0.666 Ha: > 0 2.564*** 0.006 + 
GuyRes&Dev 80 -0.002 0.007 -0.032 0.016 Ha: < 0 -2.273** 0.013 + 
GuySGA 63 -0.021 0.146 -0.419 0.518 Ha: < 0 -1.115 0.135 + 
GuyProdCos 77 0.039 0.179 -0.449 0.666 Ha: > 0 1.938** 0.028 + 
LaraProdCos 79 0.025 0.178 -0.563 0.512 Ha: > 0 1.254 0.107 + 
LaraDiscExp 65 -0.050 0.180 -0.623 0.367 Ha: < 0 -2.248** 0.014 + 
LaraProd+Disc 63 0.057 0.336 -0.930 0.922 Ha: > 0 1.353* 0.091 + 
          
Panel C.  IBO  2 years cumulative  
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho: mean=0  t-Stat p-Value REM 
RowCFO 82 -0.077 0.178 -1.105 0.280 Ha: < 0 -3.926*** 0.000 + 
RowProdCos 78 0.119 0.404 -0.971 1.583 Ha: > 0 2.609*** 0.006 + 
RowDiscExp 64 -0.110 0.393 -1.264 0.916 Ha: < 0 -2.241** 0.014 + 
RowProd+Disc 62 0.192 0.738 -1.888 2.364 Ha: > 0 2.046** 0.023 + 
RowCFO+Disc 64 0.176 0.420 -0.864 1.288 Ha: > 0 3.353** 0.001 + 
GuyRes&Dev 79 -0.001 0.012 -0.059 0.038 Ha: < 0 -0.809 0.211 + 
GuySGA 62 -0.034 0.246 -0.667 0.844 Ha: < 0 -1.088 0.140 + 
GuyProdCos 76 0.076 0.355 -1.146 1.140 Ha: > 0 1.856** 0.034 + 
LaraProdCos 78 0.057 0.324 -1.117 0.698 Ha: > 0 1.549* 0.063 + 
LaraDiscExp 64 -0.080 0.331 -1.169 0.792 Ha: < 0 -1.938** 0.029 + 
LaraProd+Disc 62 0.100 0.622 -1.909 1.689 Ha: > 0 1.261 0.106 + 
Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The proxies from the models of Gunny (2010) and Lara et al. (2012) are used 
as alternative measures of REM. As can be seen from Tables 3.2.1A and 3.2.1B, 
the results of alternative measures are largely consistent with the proxies in the 
main tests. Hence the findings are robust.   
3.6.2 Multivariate tests 
This section reports the results of the multiple OLS regression tests on the 
relationship between REM and corporate governance mechanisms. The main 
dependent variables are the signed value of REM proxies from Roychowdhury’s 
(2006) models, which are abnormal CFO, abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. The robustness tests use the signed values 
of REM proxies, generated using the models of Gunny (2010) and Lara et al. 
(2010) as dependent variables. The independent variables are the proxies for 
corporate governance mechanisms as well as other control variables, such as 
financial leverage.  
 
In this section, the interpretation of regression results will be different from that 
in prior literature, as this study includes dependent variables the value of which 
has been indicated as significantly negative in univariate tests. Hence, if a REM 
proxy in univariate tests is significantly negative, a positive correlation between 
this REM proxy and corporate governance mechanisms indicates that the 
governance mechanisms mitigate REM, and a negative correlation between 
them indicates that the governance mechanisms facilitate REM. 
3.6.2.1 Results for management buyouts 
Table 3.3.1A summarises the relationships rather than correlations from 
multiple OLS regression test results for the MBO samples in year T-1. Further 
details of the regression tests and correlations are listed in Panel A of Tables 
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3.3.2 to 3.3.9 at the end of this section.  
 
In Section 3.6.1.1, the results show that managers engage in positive REM to 
increase reported earnings in year T-1 preceding MBOs, and thus to secure 
their external funds. They typically engage in sales manipulation by offering 
excessive price discounts or credit sales, overproduction and cutting 
discretionary SG&A expenses.   
 
Table 3.3.1A  Summary of the relationships (not Correlations) of regressions results 
for MBOs Year T-1 
 Year T-1 
REM proxy RowCFO RowProdCos RowDiscExp GuyRes&Dev GuySGA GuyProdCos LaraProdCos LaraDiscExp 
Sign1 -** +** -*** + -** +* +* -** 
InsShare            - - + - + + - + 
Concentr3% - + + - + + - + 
Concentr5% - - + + + - - + 
Block10% + - - + * + - - - 
Block20% + + + + - + + - 
CeoHd - + - ** + - * + + - * 
CeoHdSq + - + ** + + * - - + ** 
NonExecHd + - + - - - - - 
Ned% + - - - - - - + 
Duality + + - - * - * + + - 
BoardSz + + - + - * + + - 
LnAssets - + + + - + - + 
SalesGrow -** + + + *** - - - ** + 
Mark2Book + - - - - - + - 
ROA + * - - * - - * - - - 
Leverage - - + * - ** + - - + 
AssTurn + - - + - - - - 
DealVal + - ** + * - + - *** - *** + *** 
1. The sign direction and significant level of REM proxies from univariate tests section 
2. Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Table 3.3.1A summarises the relationships rather than correlations from multiple OLS 
regression test results for MBO samples for year T-1. 
 
This study uses two variables to measure the effects of significant shareholders 
on REM: the aggregate outside ownership concentration and the presence of 
non-managerial large blockholders. The UK Corporate Governance Code 
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suggests that shareholders who hold 3% or more shares in a firm are 
substantial shareholders (FRC, 2010). Similar to prior studies (e.g. Singh and 
Davidson, 2003), the aggregate outside ownership concentration is measured 
by the aggregate shares of a firm’s outside shareholders with at least 3% equity 
(Concentr3%). Although 3% is the majority declaration point, it is still unclear 
whether outside shareholders with this level of ownership have the genuine 
ability and incentives to monitor and influence managers' behaviours. Hence I 
also consider higher thresholds at 5% (Concentr5%). Moreover, as large 
blockholders have the capacity to determine the outcome of particular corporate 
policy decisions, this study measures non-managerial large blockholders by a 
dummy variable, coded 1 if a firm has a non-managerial large shareholder who 
owns at least 10% (or 20%) of the equity (Block10% or Block20%). Including the 
proxies of aggregate outside ownership concentration and non-managerial 
large blockholders in the model might double count the effects of significant 
shareholders; however, these two proxies are designed to measures different 
aspects of the shareholders' monitoring functions. Hence these two kinds of 
variables are separated into different regression models to capture their effects 
on corporate governance.  
 
Non-managerial large blockholders 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders (Block10%) has a 
significant positive relationship with abnormal R&D expenses only 
(GuyRes&Dev). The direction of R&D expenses is insignificant in univariate tests, 
suggesting that the presence of large blockholders is associated with more 
REM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3c.  
 
Gibbs (1993) suggests that, as the role of blockholders is ambiguous and varies 
across firms, they are generally passive and are likely to support managers 
rather than monitoring them, such as their quest for growth rather than residual 
value maximisation. Moreover, as blockholders might invest to fund MBOs, they 
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are likely to side with management for strategic alignment preceding buyouts. 
Positive REM might facilitate the overall execution of MBOs, which eventually 
maximises the interests of these blockholders in the long term. Furthermore, as 
blockholders may perceive R&D expense cuts as too damaging to a firm’s long-
term growth potential, the findings might indicate that they have greater focus 
on R&D expenses.  
 
CEO ownership 
CEO ownership (CeoHd) has a significant negative relationship with abnormal 
discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp and LaraDiscExp) and abnormal SGA 
expenses (GuySGA). Its squared transformation (CeoHdSq) also has a 
significant positive relationship with these REM proxies. The directions of 
discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp and LaraDiscExp) and SGA expenses 
(GuySGA) are significantly negative in univariate tests. The result reveals that 
CEO ownership has a hump-shaped relationship with REM, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3d.  
 
Given that managers engage in positive REM preceding MBOs, the results 
suggest that, at low levels, managerial shareholding on increase is associated 
with more positive REM, but high levels of managerial shareholding on increase 
is associated with less positive REM. The following paragraphs will explain the 
mechanism of managerial interests at low levels first, followed by the 
mechanism of managerial interests at high levels.  
 
In the context of MBOs, low levels of managerial ownership are insufficient to 
act as an incentive mechanism. As managers will remain in a firm after a buyout, 
engaging in REM to facilitate an MBO is in their best interests. Holding more 
shares gives managers more control and power, hence managers find that they 
can follow their own objectives with less fear of discipline (Morck et al., 1988). 
Thus, at low levels, managerial shareholding on increase is associated with 
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more REM, as it is intended to facilitate the execution of MBOs.  
 
Moreover, engaging in REM by cutting discretionary expenses affects the long-
term operations of a firm. As managers will remain in after a buyout, high levels 
of ownership force them to consider the long-term success of the business, lead 
to lower levels of REM. REM by cutting discretionary expenses is also easier 
to spot than other forms of REM are. If selling shareholders perceive that 
managers with high ownership have cheated by engaging in REM preceding 
MBOs, they will demand a higher transaction price or even make a legal 
challenge against management. Thus, at high levels, managerial shareholding 
on increase is associated with less REM.  
 
CEO duality 
CEO duality (Duality) has a significant negative relationship with abnormal SGA 
expenses (GuySGA). The direction of SGA expenses (GuySGA) is significantly 
negative in univariate tests. It suggests that CEO duality is associated with 
more REM, which is consistent with hypothesis H2-3g.  
 
CEO duality enables the CEO to effectively control the information that is 
available to other board members, and thus it may impair effective monitoring 
(Jensen, 1993). Moreover, CEO duality concentrates power in the CEO’s 
position without effective controls and balances on their activities (Cornett et al., 
2008). Hence the practice of CEO duality is associated with more REM.  
 
Moreover, CEO duality (Duality) has a significant negative relationship with 
abnormal R&D expenses (GuyRes&Dev). The direction of R&D expenses 
(GuyRes&Dev) is insignificant in univariate tests. It suggests that CEO duality is 
associated with less REM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3g.  
 
CEO duality increases the responsibility of CEO, which implies they have a high 
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level of trust from shareholders. R&D expense cuts cause long-term damage 
to a firm. As managers will be remain in the firm after MBOs, engaging in less 
REM by cutting discretionary R&D expenses are likely to increase the long-term 
success of a firm. Thus, CEO duality mitigates REM in the form of R&D expense 
cuts, preceding MBOs.   
 
Board size 
Board size (BoardSz) has a significant negative relationship with abnormal SGA 
expenses (GuySGA). The direction of SGA expenses (GuySGA) is significantly 
negative in univariate tests. This means that larger boards are associated with 
more REM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3h.  
 
An effective and cohesive board might have a greater ability to monitor 
managers. However, preceding MBOs, problems associated with coordination 
and communication might arise in larger boards as it becomes more difficult to 
arrange board meetings and reach a consensus. This may in turn lead to slower 
and less-efficient decision-making and to directors becoming less likely to 
criticise the behaviour of top managers (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). 
Moreover, the director free-riding problem also be increased on larger boards 
as the monitoring cost to any individual director falls in proportion to board size 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Hence large board sizes may result in more REM 
preceding MBOs.   
 
Institutional shareholding 
Institutional shareholding (InsShare) has no significant relationship with REM in 
year T-1 prior to MBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3b. This finding 
suggests that higher institutional ownership does not mitigate REM behaviours 
in the years immediately prior to MBOs.  
 
Research by Bushee (2001) indicates that high levels of ownership by 
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institutions with short-term investment horizons may lead corporate managers 
to make operational and accounting decisions that boost short-term earnings 
rather than long-term earnings. Hence the short-term investment horizons 
dominate the focus of transient institutions and lead to weak monitoring of REM. 
The results from univariate tests suggest that managers engage in positive 
REM preceding MBOs, which supports the notion that transient institutions 
quest for short-term growth. Moreover, as a buyout approaches, managers may 
have stronger motivations to engage in REM, which might make them more 
determined to resist pressure from institutional investors. Thus institutional 
ownership has no effect on REM in year T-1, but it mitigates REM in year T-2 
preceding MBOs.  
 
Table 3.3.1B summarises the relationships rather than the correlations from the 
multiple OLS regression test results for MBO samples in year T-2. Further 
details of regression tests and correlations are listed in Panel B of Table 3.3.2 
to Table 3.3.9 at end of this section. It seems that corporate governance 
mechanisms have different effects on REM in year T-1 compared to year T-2 
preceding MBOs. This may be due to different REM strategies being used 
between year T-1 and year T-2.  
 
In Section 3.6.1.1, the results show that managers engage in positive REM by 
sales manipulation, overproduction and decreasing discretionary R&D 
expenses in year T-2 preceding MBOs.  
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Table 3.3.1B  Summary of the relationships (not Correlations) of regressions results 
for MBOs Year T-2 
 Year T-2 
REM proxy RowCFO RowProdCos RowDiscExp GuyRes&Dev GuySGA GuyProdCos LaraProdCos LaraDiscExp 
Sign1 -* +* - -** - +* + -* 
InsShare            - - + - + - + + ** 
Concentr3% + - ** - - + - ** - + 
Concentr5% - - ** + + + - ** - + 
Block10% + - + - - - - + 
Block20% + + * - + - + + - 
CeoHd - - ** + ** + - - - *** + 
CeoHdSq + - + - + - - + 
NonExecHd + - - - * - - - + 
Ned% - - + + - + - - 
Duality - + ** - * + - + ** + ** - * 
BoardSz - + * - + - * + * + * - 
LnAssets + - + + * + - * - + 
SalesGrow - + + - ** + + - - 
Mark2Book - *** + *** - *** + *** - *** + *** + *** - *** 
ROA - + + - ** + + * - - 
Leverage + + - - * - + * + - 
AssTurn + - - + + - * - + 
DealVal + - *** + - ** + *** - *** - *** + *** 
1. The sign direction and significant level of REM proxies from univariate tests section 
2. Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Table 3.3.1B summarises the relationships rather than correlations from multiple OLS 
regression test results for MBO samples for year T-2. 
 
Institutional shareholders 
Institutional shareholding (InsShare) has a positive relationship with abnormal 
discretionary expenses (LaraDiscExp). The direction of discretionary expenses 
(LaraDiscExp) is significantly negative in univariate tests. This suggests that 
high levels of institutional shareholding are associated with less REM of 
discretionary expenses cut, which is consistent with hypothesis H2-3b.  
 
Institutional investors provide a high degree of monitoring, removing the 
incentives for managers to engage in REM to meet short-term earnings goals. 
Moreover, institutional investors can monitor managerial behaviour by 
gathering information concerning the quality of operating decisions, thereby 
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reducing the opportunities for REM manipulation (Bushee, 1998). Furthermore, 
as REM has real economic consequences for a firms’ long-term value, 
institutional investors, who are likely to have a better understanding of the long-
term impact of a firms’ operating decisions, are likely to make more effort to 
monitor and control REM activities.  
 
Outside ownership concentrations 
Outside ownership concentration, both at the 3% and the 5% shareholding 
thresholds (Concentr3% and Concentr5%), have significant negative 
relationships with abnormal production costs (RowProdCos and GuyProdCos). 
The direction of production costs (RowProdCos and GuyProdCos) is significantly 
positive in univariate tests. This suggests that high concentrations of outside 
ownership are associated with less REM, which is consistent with hypothesis 
H2-3a.  
 
As prior literature has shown, substantial equity ownership by outsiders 
generates greater incentive and ability to monitor, and leads to better monitoring 
of management (Cornett et al., 2008). In addition, high equity ownership makes 
outsiders an effective agency of external shareholders, also resulting in strong 
incentives to monitor managers (Bhagat et al., 1999). Hence outside ownership 
concentration mitigates REM. Furthermore, overproduction is difficult to spot 
and this may explain why outside ownership concentration do not persistently 
mitigate overproduction in years T-1 and T-2 preceding MBOs.  
 
Non-managerial large blockholders 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders (Block20%), has a 
significant positive relationship with abnormal production costs (RowProdCos). 
The direction of production costs (RowProdCos) is significantly positive in 
univariate tests. This suggests that the presence of large blockholders is 
associated with more REM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3c.  
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Gibbs (1993) suggests that, as the role of blockholders is ambiguous and varies 
across firms, they are generally passive and are likely to support managers 
rather than monitoring them. As suggested by the results from the univariate 
tests, managers engage in positive REM by overproduction to increase 
earnings preceding MBOs, which might be consistent with the quest for growth 
of blockholders. Moreover, as blockholders may perceive overproduction as too 
damaging for a firm’s growth potential in the near future, this finding might 
indicate that they have a greater focus on abnormal changes of production 
costs.  
 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders is associated with more 
REM in both year T-1 and year T-2. This suggests that blockholders may not be 
a useful corporate governance mechanism prior to MBOs. As blockholders 
might invest to fund MBOs, they are likely to side with management for strategic 
alignment preceding buyouts. Moreover, managers’ higher levels of self-interest 
preceding buyouts might curtail the influence of large blockholders, resulting in 
more REM.  
 
CEO ownership 
CEO ownership (CeoHd) has a significant positive relationship with abnormal 
discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp). Its squared transformation (CeoHdSq) 
has no significant relationship with the REM proxies. The direction of 
discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp) is insignificant in univariate tests. This 
reveals that higher levels of managerial shareholding are associated with more 
REM of discretionary expense cuts, which is consistent with hypothesis H2-3d.  
 
This is evidence that high levels of managerial ownership could lead to 
entrenchment effects. High levels of shareholding give managers more control 
and power, enabling them to follow their own objectives with less fear of 
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discipline (Morck et al., 1988). Hence, prior to MBOs, high levels of managerial 
ownership entrench managers and lead to high levels of discretionary expense 
cuts. 
 
Moreover, CEO ownership (CeoHd) has a significant negative relationship with 
abnormal production costs (RowProdCos and LaraProdCos). The direction of 
production costs (RowProdCos) is significantly positive in univariate tests, and 
the direction of alternative production costs (LaraProdCos) is insignificant. These 
findings suggest that high levels of ownership by management lead to less REM 
by overproduction, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3d.  
 
As managers might plan MBOs several years ahead, they can systematically 
plan their REM methods, schedule their manipulation, and gauge the 
appropriate extent to engage. Cutting discretionary expenses has negative 
economic consequence for a firm in the long term, but overproduction has 
immediate short-term negative economic consequences. Interference in short-
term operations might lead to abnormal firm performance, which is likely to 
attract the attention of shareholders and thus affect the overall plan to execute 
an MBO. Hence in year T-2 preceding MBOs, the optimal plan of management 
should minimise short-term rather than long-term interference in normal 
operations in order to ensure the overall success of an MBO execution. 
Therefore, high managerial ownership leads to low overproduction but high 
discretionary expense cuts.  
 
CEO duality 
CEO duality (Duality) has a significant positive relationship with abnormal 
production costs (RowProdCos, GuyProdCos, and LaraProdCos). The direction of 
production costs (RowProdCos and GuyProdCos) is significantly positive in 
univariate tests, and the direction of alternative production costs (LaraProdCos) 
is insignificant. This reveals that CEO duality is associated with more REM of 
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overproduction, which is consistent with hypothesis H2-3g.  
 
By effectively controlling the information that is available to other board 
members (Jensen, 1993) and concentrating power without effective controls 
and balances (Cornett et al., 2008), CEO duality does impede effective 
monitoring and facilitate REM. As it is more difficult to spot than the 
manipulation of discretionary expenses, overproduction is a safer choice for 
powerful managers. Moreover, as managers will remain in a firm after an MBO, 
they prefer to increase the success of a firm in the long term and thus choose 
to engage in REM that only causes short-term interference in normal operations. 
Thus CEO duality facilitates REM behaviours of overproduction preceding 
MBOs.  
 
Board size 
Board size (BoardSz) has a significant positive relationship with abnormal 
production costs (RowProdCos, GuyProdCos, and LaraProdCos). The direction of 
production costs (RowProdCos and GuyProdCos) is significantly positive in 
univariate tests, and the direction of alternative production costs (LaraProdCos) 
is insignificant. This suggests that larger boards are associated with higher 
REM by overproduction, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3h. Larger size 
might be detrimental to a board's effectiveness and cohesiveness (Jensen, 
1993; Yermack, 1996), leading to weak monitoring of REM.  
 
Summary of findings for management buyouts 
In summary, high levels of institutional shareholding are associated with less 
REM in year T-2, but have no significant relationship with REM in year T-1. 
Institutional investors provide a high degree of monitoring, removing incentives 
for managers to engage in REM to meet short-term earnings goals (Bushee, 
1998). However, as a buyout approaches, managers may have stronger 
motivations to carry out REM, which might make them more determined to 
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resist pressure from institutional investors. Thus institutional ownership has no 
effect on REM in T-1, but it mitigates REM in T-2 preceding MBOs.  
 
Moreover, high outside ownership concentration is associated with less REM in 
year T-2, but have no significant relationship with REM in year T-1. Substantial 
equity ownership by outsiders generates greater incentive and ability to monitor 
managers (Cornett et al., 2008), and results in better monitoring of REM 
behaviours. Overproduction is difficult to spot; this may be the reason that 
outside ownership concentration do not persistently mitigate overproduction in 
years T-1 and T-2 preceding MBOs.  
 
Furthermore, the presence of non-managerial large blockholders is associated 
with more REM in both year T-1 and year T-2. As blockholders might invest to 
fund MBOs, they are likely to side with management for strategic alignment 
preceding buyouts. Positive REM might facilitate the overall execution of MBOs, 
which maximises eventually the interests of non-managerial large blockholders 
in the long term.  
 
CEO ownership has a hump-shaped relationship with REM in year T-1. In the 
context of MBOs, low levels of managerial ownership are insufficient to act as 
an incentive mechanism, but high levels of managerial ownership act as 
incentive mechanism, aligning the interests of shareholders with those of 
managers. In contrast, high CEO ownership is associated with more abnormal 
discretionary expenses, but less abnormal production costs, in year T-2. As 
managers might plan MBOs several years ahead, by minimising short-term 
interference in normal operations by overproduction, managers ensure the 
overall success of MBOs. Therefore, high managerial ownership leads to low 
overproduction but high discretionary expense cuts.  
 
CEO duality is associated with more SGA expenses cut, but less R&D 
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expenses cut in year T-1. R&D expense cutting causes more damage to the 
long-term success of firms than SGA expense cutting does, and if REM by 
cutting R&D expenses is detected, this will affect a CEO’s reputation. However, 
CEO duality is associated with more REM of overproduction in year T-2. As 
managers will remain in a firm after an MBO, they prefer to increase the long-
term success of a firm and thus choose to engage in overproduction that only 
cause short-term interference in normal operations. As managers might 
systematically plan REM strategies several years ahead of an MBO, the 
inconsistency of results between years T-1 and T-2 might be because of the 
systematic arrangement.  
 
Larger boards are associated with more REM both in year T-1 and year T-2. 
Preceding MBOs, having a larger board might be detrimental to its 
effectiveness and cohesiveness, hence leading to weaker monitoring of REM.  
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Table 3.3.2  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
RowCFO) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.020   -0.035  0.011   -0.010  
 (-0.387)   (-0.582)  (0.170)   (-0.171)  
Concentr3%  -0.019   -0.042  0.004   -0.014 
  (-0.271)   (-0.605)  (0.055)   (-0.213) 
Concentr5%   -0.036     -0.016   
   (-0.552)     (-0.264)   
Block10% 0.003 0.003  0.010  0.015 0.016  0.019  
 (0.096) (0.083)  (0.272)  (0.653) (0.646)  (0.800)  
Block20%   0.021  0.019   0.030  0.026 
   (0.633)  (0.564)   (1.178)  (1.110) 
CeoHd -0.118 -0.119 -0.113 -0.390 -0.367 -0.036 -0.039 -0.048 -0.366 -0.356 
 (-0.862) (-0.919) (-0.931) (-0.918) (-0.898) (-0.485) (-0.513) (-0.568) (-1.484) (-1.376) 
CeoHdSq    0.564 0.512    0.663 0.624 
    (0.812) (0.765)    (1.633) (1.549) 
NonExecHd 0.049 0.050 0.023 0.045 0.022 0.167 0.165 0.130 0.165 0.140 
 (0.755) (0.746) (0.297) (0.673) (0.262) (1.337) (1.339) (1.116) (1.319) (1.115) 
Ned% 0.116 0.112 0.110 0.118 0.111 -0.174 -0.172 -0.166 -0.160 -0.158 
 (0.946) (0.961) (0.938) (0.962) (0.956) (-1.451) (-1.494) (-1.540) (-1.392) (-1.457) 
Duality 0.043 0.043 0.039 0.046 0.041 -0.036 -0.036 -0.038 -0.030 -0.031 
 (1.126) (1.098) (0.992) (1.141) (1.008) (-1.281) (-1.314) (-1.304) (-1.122) (-1.142) 
BoardSz 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.792) (0.766) (0.743) (0.832) (0.770) (-1.130) (-1.161) (-1.178) (-1.152) (-1.211) 
LnAssets -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (-1.096) (-1.151) (-1.060) (-1.161) (-1.123) (0.860) (0.864) (0.876) (0.744) (0.684) 
SalesGrow -0.006** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.005** -0.030 -0.030 -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 
 (-2.444) (-2.453) (-2.701) (-2.154) (-2.237) (-1.436) (-1.408) (-1.495) (-1.501) (-1.509) 
Mark2Book 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (1.004) (0.999) (1.014) (0.827) (0.847) (-5.032) (-5.007) (-4.930) (-4.956) (-4.761) 
ROA 0.135* 0.137* 0.131 0.130* 0.128 -0.030 -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.031 
 (1.694) (1.679) (1.571) (1.668) (1.591) (-1.392) (-1.376) (-1.429) (-1.447) (-1.439) 
Leverage -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037 -0.040 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.013 0.016 
 (-0.471) (-0.477) (-0.455) (-0.454) (-0.468) (0.250) (0.249) (0.278) (0.188) (0.225) 
AssTurn 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.025 0.028 
 (0.250) (0.253) (0.375) (0.294) (0.393) (1.321) (1.322) (1.416) (1.410) (1.489) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.098) (1.224) (1.252) (1.076) (1.161) (1.350) (1.361) (1.299) (1.321) (1.248) 
Constant 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.022 0.031 0.022 0.020 0.029 0.040 0.051 
 (0.041) (0.097) (0.038) (0.182) (0.251) (0.275) (0.255) (0.368) (0.487) (0.640) 
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 114 114 114 114 114 
R-squared 0.113 0.113 0.115 0.124 0.125 0.223 0.223 0.227 0.243 0.245 
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F-test 4.800 4.681 5.693 4.485 5.342 4.925 4.859 4.455 4.110 3.745 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.3  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2  (Dependent Variable: 
RowProdCos) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.008   0.021  -0.157   -0.133  
 (-0.050)   (0.122)  (-1.288)   (-1.071)  
Concentr3%  0.032   -0.068  -0.161   -0.244** 
  (0.170)   (-0.344)  (-1.338)   (-2.155) 
Concentr5%   -0.125     -0.268**   
   (-0.694)     (-2.160)   
Block10% -0.072 -0.079  -0.083  -0.047 -0.046  -0.051  
 (-0.895) (-0.911)  (-0.994)  (-0.908) (-0.898)  (-0.997)  
Block20%   0.047  0.038   0.087*  0.076 
   (0.678)  (0.551)   (1.695)  (1.610) 
CeoHd 0.054 0.068 0.102 0.620 0.616 -0.303** -0.302** -0.237* 0.076 0.136 
 (0.303) (0.365) (0.612) (1.189) (1.181) (-2.185) (-2.152) (-1.865) (0.182) (0.336) 
CeoHdSq    -1.174 -1.048    -0.761 -0.772 
    (-1.174) (-1.122)    (-1.009) (-1.045) 
NonExecHd -0.121 -0.097 -0.252 -0.117 -0.250 -0.195 -0.196 -0.366 -0.192 -0.376 
 (-0.359) (-0.275) (-0.774) (-0.336) (-0.687) (-0.738) (-0.741) (-1.534) (-0.714) (-1.559) 
Ned% -0.027 -0.039 -0.020 -0.030 -0.020 0.007 -0.002 -0.011 -0.010 -0.020 
 (-0.163) (-0.255) (-0.139) (-0.187) (-0.138) (0.040) (-0.010) (-0.075) (-0.060) (-0.128) 
Duality 0.043 0.045 0.032 0.037 0.029 0.123** 0.118** 0.104** 0.116** 0.091* 
 (0.752) (0.798) (0.584) (0.676) (0.536) (2.389) (2.271) (2.174) (2.316) (1.892) 
BoardSz 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.026* 0.024* 0.021 0.026* 0.021 
 (0.316) (0.349) (0.292) (0.242) (0.253) (1.920) (1.837) (1.579) (1.889) (1.550) 
LnAssets -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.027 -0.028 -0.024 -0.026 -0.021 
 (-0.043) (-0.065) (0.100) (0.075) (0.228) (-1.431) (-1.476) (-1.248) (-1.353) (-1.094) 
SalesGrow 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.016 
 (1.011) (1.014) (0.885) (0.823) (0.605) (0.564) (0.598) (0.489) (0.610) (0.775) 
Mark2Book -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (-0.128) (-0.136) (-0.047) (-0.014) (0.134) (5.202) (5.262) (5.393) (5.248) (5.119) 
ROA -0.108 -0.104 -0.115 -0.094 -0.094 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.022 
 (-0.952) (-0.886) (-0.998) (-0.859) (-0.821) (0.789) (0.842) (0.772) (0.798) (1.046) 
Leverage -0.039 -0.042 -0.016 -0.044 -0.022 0.186 0.179 0.165 0.192 0.168 
 (-0.236) (-0.255) (-0.099) (-0.271) (-0.137) (1.360) (1.317) (1.209) (1.420) (1.254) 
AssTurn -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023 -0.025 -0.041 -0.041 -0.032 -0.043 -0.036 
 (-0.649) (-0.662) (-0.630) (-0.685) (-0.772) (-1.472) (-1.460) (-1.213) (-1.575) (-1.428) 
DealVal -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-2.398) (-2.566) (-2.690) (-2.369) (-2.364) (-4.600) (-4.701) (-4.640) (-4.487) (-4.668) 
Constant 0.139 0.137 0.064 0.103 0.013 0.190 0.225 0.177 0.169 0.161 
 (0.660) (0.636) (0.340) (0.484) (0.060) (1.177) (1.411) (1.091) (1.029) (0.978) 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 113 113 113 113 113 
R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.063 0.083 0.069 0.229 0.229 0.237 0.236 0.243 
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F-test 2.989 2.848 3.073 2.768 2.747 17.29 18.26 19.25 15.94 19.25 
Prob > F 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.4  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
RowDiscExp) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.339   0.249  0.033   0.038  
 (1.546)   (1.165)  (0.158)   (0.190)  
Concentr3%  0.244   0.138  -0.016   0.070 
  (1.296)   (0.855)  (-0.074)   (0.327) 
Concentr5%   0.172     0.174   
   (1.049)     (0.919)   
Block10% -0.090 -0.076  -0.046  0.010 0.017  0.009  
 (-1.006) (-0.835)  (-0.549)  (0.171) (0.308)  (0.149)  
Block20%   0.017  0.002   -0.118  -0.097 
   (0.229)  (0.032)   (-1.457)  (-1.211) 
CeoHd 0.114 0.110 0.143 -1.605* -1.700** 0.454** 0.438** 0.427** 0.528 0.368 
 (0.361) (0.353) (0.471) (-1.904) (-2.006) (2.582) (2.529) (2.360) (0.824) (0.588) 
CeoHdSq    3.427** 3.642**    -0.143 0.041 
    (2.357) (2.467)    (-0.137) (0.041) 
NonExecHd 0.437 0.378 0.257 0.407 0.330 -0.078 -0.097 0.121 -0.079 0.089 
 (1.032) (0.906) (0.664) (0.957) (0.796) (-0.202) (-0.242) (0.336) (-0.203) (0.214) 
Ned% -0.472 -0.407 -0.406 -0.442 -0.394 0.255 0.264 0.271 0.251 0.282 
 (-0.888) (-0.796) (-0.794) (-0.881) (-0.817) (0.823) (0.879) (0.985) (0.844) (1.012) 
Duality -0.028 -0.020 -0.023 -0.002 0.006 -0.122* -0.124* -0.104 -0.123* -0.106* 
 (-0.329) (-0.230) (-0.268) (-0.023) (0.071) (-1.799) (-1.892) (-1.648) (-1.981) (-1.849) 
BoardSz -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.594) (-0.442) (-0.419) (-0.392) (-0.275) (-0.098) (-0.128) (0.034) (-0.099) (-0.022) 
LnAssets 0.051 0.058 0.064 0.041 0.047 0.025 0.026 0.019 0.025 0.020 
 (1.135) (1.169) (1.229) (0.941) (0.981) (1.098) (1.136) (0.833) (1.072) (0.815) 
SalesGrow 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.130 0.136 0.123 0.130 0.129 
 (1.022) (0.729) (0.449) (1.231) (1.081) (0.869) (0.899) (0.846) (0.867) (0.844) 
Mark2Book -0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.009 -0.007 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-0.117) (-0.065) (0.102) (-0.271) (-0.202) (-3.558) (-3.556) (-3.563) (-3.506) (-3.424) 
ROA -0.411 -0.451 -0.473 -0.432* -0.473* 0.111 0.114 0.105 0.110 0.107 
 (-1.572) (-1.605) (-1.600) (-1.670) (-1.690) (0.783) (0.799) (0.761) (0.784) (0.756) 
Leverage 0.350* 0.369* 0.403* 0.365* 0.395* -0.237 -0.232 -0.235 -0.236 -0.224 
 (1.734) (1.832) (1.817) (1.853) (1.904) (-1.422) (-1.377) (-1.348) (-1.424) (-1.315) 
AssTurn -0.016 -0.010 -0.004 -0.020 -0.014 -0.009 -0.007 -0.022 -0.009 -0.017 
 (-0.301) (-0.175) (-0.075) (-0.394) (-0.250) (-0.163) (-0.121) (-0.416) (-0.161) (-0.339) 
DealVal 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.835) (1.461) (1.638) (2.045) (1.841) (0.903) (0.843) (1.273) (0.933) (0.961) 
Constant -0.601 -0.723 -0.836 -0.474 -0.596 -0.287 -0.299 -0.257 -0.294 -0.250 
 (-1.489) (-1.581) (-1.662) (-1.211) (-1.328) (-1.284) (-1.431) (-1.200) (-1.149) (-0.974) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.203 0.187 0.182 0.275 0.264 0.262 0.261 0.281 0.262 0.274 
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F-test 6.732 5.776 5.911 6.526 6.130 10.37 10.59 9.938 9.787 9.752 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.5  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2  (Dependent Variable: 
GuyRes&Dev) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.001   -0.002  -0.000   0.000  
 (-0.364)   (-0.453)  (-0.038)   (0.061)  
Concentr3%  -0.001   -0.001  0.001   -0.000 
  (-0.347)   (-0.470)  (0.388)   (-0.186) 
Concentr5%   0.001     0.000   
   (0.444)     (0.071)   
Block10% 0.002 0.002  0.003*  -0.000 -0.001  -0.000  
 (1.622) (1.595)  (1.693)  (-0.553) (-0.706)  (-0.593)  
Block20%   0.002  0.002   0.001  0.001 
   (0.753)  (1.165)   (0.898)  (1.105) 
CeoHd 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 
 (0.936) (0.925) (1.029) (0.094) (0.241) (0.613) (0.713) (1.055) (0.668) (0.792) 
CeoHdSq    0.010 0.003    -0.005 -0.005 
    (0.326) (0.092)    (-0.546) (-0.547) 
NonExecHd -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005* 
 (-0.515) (-0.496) (-0.355) (-0.522) (-0.684) (-1.045) (-0.885) (-1.596) (-1.013) (-1.708) 
Ned% -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.826) (-0.918) (-1.031) (-0.796) (-0.888) (0.356) (0.268) (0.211) (0.304) (0.242) 
Duality -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.484) (-1.516) (-1.589) (-1.412) (-1.685) (0.410) (0.445) (0.247) (0.352) (0.154) 
BoardSz 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.034) (1.013) (1.021) (1.072) (0.967) (0.247) (0.276) (0.157) (0.241) (0.129) 
LnAssets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.882) (0.841) (0.885) (0.866) (0.959) (1.680) (1.646) (1.734) (1.703) (1.783) 
SalesGrow 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (5.321) (5.429) (5.179) (4.981) (4.856) (-2.299) (-2.311) (-2.453) (-2.271) (-2.340) 
Mark2Book -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (-0.178) (-0.184) (-0.180) (-0.198) (-0.186) (3.193) (3.207) (3.103) (3.170) (3.078) 
ROA -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (-1.104) (-1.087) (-1.136) (-1.128) (-1.195) (-2.408) (-2.410) (-2.447) (-2.398) (-2.413) 
Leverage -0.008** -0.008** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* 
 (-2.276) (-2.279) (-2.385) (-2.244) (-2.320) (-1.633) (-1.639) (-1.689) (-1.616) (-1.674) 
AssTurn 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.851) (0.853) (0.970) (0.855) (1.028) (0.202) (0.188) (0.311) (0.181) (0.325) 
DealVal -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 
 (-0.073) (-0.020) (-0.421) (-0.082) (-0.698) (-2.126) (-1.966) (-1.853) (-2.034) (-1.927) 
Constant -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (-0.889) (-0.808) (-0.681) (-0.878) (-0.666) (-2.346) (-2.326) (-2.307) (-2.368) (-2.309) 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 113 113 113 113 113 
R-squared 0.298 0.298 0.294 0.299 0.294 0.533 0.533 0.536 0.533 0.536 
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F-test 7.272 7.215 5.326 6.750 5.199 2.518 2.484 2.563 2.323 2.400 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.005 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.6  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
GuySGA) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.117   0.084  0.184   0.174  
 (1.308)   (0.910)  (1.577)   (1.476)  
Concentr3%  0.083   0.101  0.155   0.179 
  (0.869)   (1.101)  (1.253)   (1.448) 
Concentr5%   0.121     0.193   
   (1.301)     (1.500)   
Block10% 0.025 0.030  0.041  -0.003 -0.001  -0.002  
 (0.483) (0.563)  (0.740)  (-0.081) (-0.031)  (-0.041)  
Block20%   -0.001  -0.004   -0.051  -0.049 
   (-0.042)  (-0.108)   (-1.028)  (-1.013) 
CeoHd 0.082 0.080 0.057 -0.546 -0.546* 0.024 0.018 -0.001 -0.147 -0.250 
 (0.609) (0.582) (0.446) (-1.579) (-1.675) (0.187) (0.136) (-0.010) (-0.493) (-0.837) 
CeoHdSq    1.251* 1.197*    0.329 0.481 
    (1.823) (1.960)    (0.695) (1.027) 
NonExecHd -0.158 -0.179 -0.172 -0.169 -0.143 -0.070 -0.085 -0.024 -0.068 0.002 
 (-1.054) (-1.121) (-1.095) (-1.062) (-0.810) (-0.313) (-0.355) (-0.097) (-0.300) (0.009) 
Ned% -0.115 -0.092 -0.087 -0.104 -0.085 -0.123 -0.105 -0.093 -0.113 -0.086 
 (-0.932) (-0.766) (-0.757) (-0.849) (-0.730) (-0.956) (-0.839) (-0.777) (-0.880) (-0.708) 
Duality -0.081* -0.078* -0.080* -0.071 -0.071 -0.073 -0.070 -0.068 -0.069 -0.057 
 (-1.776) (-1.697) (-1.690) (-1.645) (-1.498) (-1.598) (-1.502) (-1.510) (-1.565) (-1.292) 
BoardSz -0.019* -0.019* -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.020* -0.019* -0.018* -0.020* -0.018* 
 (-1.783) (-1.689) (-1.656) (-1.651) (-1.570) (-1.943) (-1.819) (-1.683) (-1.909) (-1.675) 
LnAssets -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.273) (-0.117) (-0.165) (-0.495) (-0.500) (0.189) (0.377) (0.332) (0.112) (0.092) 
SalesGrow -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.005 
 (-0.131) (-0.292) (-0.208) (0.158) (0.192) (0.138) (0.131) (0.214) (0.139) (0.099) 
Mark2Book -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (-0.163) (-0.134) (-0.105) (-0.249) (-0.300) (-3.397) (-3.386) (-3.678) (-3.428) (-3.495) 
ROA -0.207 -0.221* -0.210 -0.214 -0.212 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.003 -0.000 
 (-1.598) (-1.726) (-1.584) (-1.493) (-1.475) (0.063) (0.010) (0.096) (0.083) (-0.010) 
Leverage 0.023 0.030 0.017 0.028 0.014 -0.087 -0.077 -0.076 -0.089 -0.078 
 (0.224) (0.291) (0.163) (0.282) (0.140) (-0.949) (-0.835) (-0.837) (-0.946) (-0.825) 
AssTurn -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.021 0.003 0.004 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 
 (-0.565) (-0.495) (-0.549) (-0.604) (-0.612) (0.090) (0.122) (-0.006) (0.076) (-0.013) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.387) (0.214) (0.097) (0.460) (0.173) (2.959) (2.846) (2.875) (2.942) (2.919) 
Constant 0.172 0.130 0.164 0.218 0.245 0.135 0.085 0.096 0.151 0.129 
 (1.075) (0.833) (1.001) (1.317) (1.332) (0.679) (0.450) (0.507) (0.718) (0.627) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.233 0.225 0.225 0.269 0.255 0.303 0.291 0.299 0.305 0.305 
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F-test 2.605 2.417 2.520 2.515 2.395 6.535 6.244 6.517 6.010 5.628 
Prob > F 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.7  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
GuyProdCos) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.019   0.048  -0.187   -0.160  
 (0.132)   (0.321)  (-1.658)   (-1.374)  
Concentr3%  0.059   -0.056  -0.164   -0.227** 
  (0.375)   (-0.328)  (-1.454)   (-2.154) 
Concentr5%   -0.121     -0.254**   
   (-0.795)     (-2.218)   
Block10% -0.054 -0.061  -0.065  -0.036 -0.039  -0.041  
 (-0.759) (-0.821)  (-0.889)  (-0.751) (-0.818)  (-0.858)  
Block20%   0.076  0.065   0.070  0.060 
   (1.376)  (1.199)   (1.650)  (1.533) 
CeoHd 0.036 0.052 0.080 0.588 0.604 -0.176 -0.167 -0.112 0.249 0.330 
 (0.232) (0.320) (0.577) (1.404) (1.450) (-1.628) (-1.517) (-1.170) (0.822) (1.128) 
CeoHdSq    -1.144 -1.061    -0.855 -0.908 
    (-1.359) (-1.338)    (-1.416) (-1.562) 
NonExecHd -0.091 -0.068 -0.263 -0.087 -0.255 -0.250 -0.242 -0.378 -0.247 -0.387 
 (-0.342) (-0.243) (-1.071) (-0.317) (-0.907) (-0.939) (-0.866) (-1.438) (-0.903) (-1.455) 
Ned% -0.082 -0.090 -0.071 -0.086 -0.073 0.102 0.085 0.076 0.083 0.064 
 (-0.559) (-0.667) (-0.545) (-0.593) (-0.546) (0.739) (0.631) (0.602) (0.590) (0.502) 
Duality 0.054 0.056 0.036 0.048 0.034 0.095** 0.091** 0.080* 0.088** 0.067* 
 (1.011) (1.071) (0.727) (0.965) (0.709) (2.188) (2.071) (1.970) (2.191) (1.707) 
BoardSz 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.021* 0.019* 0.017 0.021* 0.017 
 (0.379) (0.429) (0.344) (0.299) (0.307) (1.803) (1.677) (1.430) (1.753) (1.403) 
LnAssets -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.026* -0.028* -0.025 -0.025 -0.022 
 (-0.079) (-0.080) (0.169) (0.049) (0.308) (-1.714) (-1.781) (-1.577) (-1.613) (-1.378) 
SalesGrow -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.023 0.025 
 (-0.791) (-0.808) (-0.961) (-1.047) (-1.274) (1.144) (1.148) (1.041) (1.204) (1.367) 
Mark2Book -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (-0.202) (-0.208) (-0.095) (-0.068) (0.119) (6.012) (6.088) (6.863) (6.048) (6.480) 
ROA -0.002 -0.001 -0.021 0.012 0.001 0.026 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.030* 
 (-0.024) (-0.006) (-0.250) (0.147) (0.017) (1.373) (1.452) (1.372) (1.379) (1.683) 
Leverage -0.023 -0.025 -0.004 -0.028 -0.010 0.169* 0.161* 0.150* 0.176** 0.154* 
 (-0.181) (-0.203) (-0.030) (-0.226) (-0.080) (1.935) (1.842) (1.739) (2.051) (1.825) 
AssTurn -0.023 -0.023 -0.019 -0.025 -0.024 -0.037 -0.037 -0.030 -0.039* -0.034* 
 (-0.736) (-0.751) (-0.634) (-0.770) (-0.792) (-1.656) (-1.650) (-1.414) (-1.788) (-1.688) 
DealVal -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-1.966) (-2.095) (-2.478) (-1.958) (-2.118) (-4.939) (-4.816) (-4.835) (-4.817) (-4.905) 
Constant 0.119 0.108 0.040 0.084 -0.014 0.164 0.205 0.163 0.141 0.142 
 (0.643) (0.565) (0.239) (0.445) (-0.074) (1.310) (1.642) (1.287) (1.113) (1.091) 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 113 113 113 113 113 
R-squared 0.059 0.060 0.066 0.076 0.074 0.280 0.272 0.279 0.292 0.291 
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F-test 2.291 2.217 2.809 2.089 2.417 19.88 21.15 21.86 17.92 20.44 
Prob > F 0.009 0.012 0.002 0.016 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.8  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
LaraProdCos) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.022   -0.016  0.005   0.017  
 (-0.145)   (-0.104)  (0.055)   (0.205)  
Concentr3%  -0.048   -0.100  0.013   -0.052 
  (-0.306)   (-0.560)  (0.158)   (-0.662) 
Concentr5%   -0.110     -0.080   
   (-0.692)     (-0.980)   
Block10% -0.010 -0.006  -0.013  -0.049 -0.050  -0.052  
 (-0.170) (-0.096)  (-0.198)  (-1.082) (-1.124)  (-1.131)  
Block20%   0.048  0.045   0.042  0.036 
   (0.876)  (0.833)   (1.069)  (0.969) 
CeoHd -0.106 -0.117 -0.099 0.010 0.013 -0.308*** -0.305*** -0.262*** -0.104 -0.085 
 (-0.647) (-0.685) (-0.658) (0.027) (0.038) (-2.826) (-2.805) (-2.655) (-0.357) (-0.302) 
CeoHdSq    -0.241 -0.248    -0.411 -0.346 
    (-0.343) (-0.383)    (-0.845) (-0.735) 
NonExecHd -0.107 -0.121 -0.197 -0.106 -0.211 -0.016 -0.013 -0.134 -0.015 -0.128 
 (-0.347) (-0.400) (-0.650) (-0.341) (-0.643) (-0.135) (-0.111) (-1.439) (-0.122) (-1.327) 
Ned% -0.105 -0.101 -0.102 -0.105 -0.098 -0.168 -0.170 -0.171 -0.177 -0.181 
 (-0.644) (-0.678) (-0.687) (-0.649) (-0.629) (-1.411) (-1.458) (-1.505) (-1.498) (-1.583) 
Duality 0.024 0.022 0.012 0.022 0.011 0.095** 0.095** 0.082** 0.091** 0.078** 
 (0.487) (0.458) (0.249) (0.477) (0.222) (2.298) (2.292) (2.071) (2.305) (2.006) 
BoardSz 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.020* 0.020* 0.017 0.020* 0.017 
 (0.873) (0.888) (0.865) (0.849) (0.852) (1.768) (1.802) (1.478) (1.736) (1.468) 
LnAssets -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.017 -0.017 -0.013 -0.017 -0.012 
 (-0.184) (-0.181) (-0.086) (-0.154) (-0.031) (-1.167) (-1.173) (-0.859) (-1.116) (-0.800) 
SalesGrow -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 
 (-2.073) (-2.054) (-2.049) (-2.052) (-2.039) (-0.604) (-0.611) (-0.518) (-0.578) (-0.437) 
Mark2Book 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.418) (0.416) (0.414) (0.427) (0.501) (5.985) (5.987) (6.072) (5.934) (5.890) 
ROA -0.037 -0.037 -0.053 -0.034 -0.045 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
 (-0.360) (-0.355) (-0.494) (-0.333) (-0.420) (-0.225) (-0.228) (-0.183) (-0.222) (-0.086) 
Leverage -0.181 -0.179 -0.174 -0.182 -0.177 0.038 0.038 0.024 0.041 0.025 
 (-1.288) (-1.284) (-1.214) (-1.292) (-1.248) (0.490) (0.494) (0.301) (0.533) (0.318) 
AssTurn -0.014 -0.014 -0.009 -0.014 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 
 (-0.503) (-0.493) (-0.350) (-0.509) (-0.427) (-0.496) (-0.502) (-0.333) (-0.547) (-0.427) 
DealVal -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (-3.695) (-4.100) (-4.780) (-3.670) (-4.493) (-2.448) (-2.475) (-2.444) (-2.358) (-2.276) 
Constant 0.154 0.165 0.140 0.147 0.132 0.170 0.169 0.132 0.159 0.121 
 (0.910) (0.893) (0.819) (0.833) (0.703) (1.111) (1.133) (0.852) (1.019) (0.758) 
Observations 114 114 114 114 114 113 113 113 113 113 
R-squared 0.071 0.072 0.079 0.072 0.078 0.216 0.216 0.211 0.219 0.211 
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F-test 13.77 14.69 17.49 12.63 15.10 13.43 13.60 10.58 11.92 9.294 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3.9  Regressions results for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
LaraDiscExp) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.136   0.085  0.228**   0.204*  
 (0.996)   (0.588)  (2.028)   (1.802)  
Concentr3%  0.143   0.113  0.167   0.165 
  (0.975)   (0.818)  (1.329)   (1.265) 
Concentr5%   0.104     0.209   
   (0.756)     (1.496)   
Block10% -0.065 -0.067  -0.040  -0.003 0.004  0.001  
 (-0.994) (-0.977)  (-0.623)  (-0.059) (0.091)  (0.028)  
Block20%   -0.044  -0.057   -0.023  -0.020 
   (-0.879)  (-1.141)   (-0.367)  (-0.331) 
CeoHd 0.172 0.185 0.193 -0.789* -0.854* 0.198 0.182 0.180 -0.195 -0.298 
 (0.912) (0.978) (1.008) (-1.759) (-1.940) (1.543) (1.388) (1.404) (-0.535) (-0.811) 
CeoHdSq    1.917** 2.090**    0.757 0.898 
    (2.356) (2.596)    (1.282) (1.545) 
NonExecHd -0.010 -0.011 -0.018 -0.026 0.044 0.099 0.071 0.093 0.103 0.121 
 (-0.033) (-0.036) (-0.059) (-0.084) (0.136) (0.426) (0.273) (0.356) (0.435) (0.437) 
Ned% 0.027 0.044 0.051 0.044 0.051 -0.069 -0.044 -0.038 -0.048 -0.017 
 (0.183) (0.315) (0.374) (0.297) (0.367) (-0.443) (-0.283) (-0.261) (-0.301) (-0.114) 
Duality -0.064 -0.059 -0.049 -0.049 -0.031 -0.092* -0.090* -0.091* -0.084* -0.076 
 (-1.280) (-1.189) (-0.975) (-1.054) (-0.634) (-1.800) (-1.734) (-1.792) (-1.781) (-1.613) 
BoardSz -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 
 (-1.520) (-1.434) (-1.498) (-1.389) (-1.398) (-1.626) (-1.552) (-1.422) (-1.572) (-1.408) 
LnAssets 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.005 
 (0.713) (0.796) (0.920) (0.426) (0.422) (0.297) (0.522) (0.515) (0.142) (0.219) 
SalesGrow 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.004 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.638) (0.470) (0.235) (0.916) (0.795) (-0.250) (-0.201) (-0.183) (-0.238) (-0.225) 
Mark2Book -0.014 -0.014 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (-0.558) (-0.549) (-0.441) (-0.654) (-0.665) (-3.059) (-3.046) (-3.199) (-3.124) (-3.112) 
ROA -0.201 -0.209 -0.222 -0.213 -0.217 -0.016 -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 
 (-1.094) (-1.151) (-1.134) (-1.147) (-1.156) (-0.256) (-0.263) (-0.222) (-0.218) (-0.248) 
Leverage 0.228 0.229 0.262 0.236 0.255 -0.080 -0.065 -0.066 -0.084 -0.068 
 (1.252) (1.289) (1.319) (1.310) (1.364) (-0.759) (-0.609) (-0.627) (-0.808) (-0.655) 
AssTurn -0.034 -0.032 -0.033 -0.036 -0.040 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (-0.809) (-0.783) (-0.754) (-0.907) (-0.996) (0.353) (0.417) (0.300) (0.321) (0.287) 
DealVal 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.711) (2.718) (3.080) (2.923) (3.174) (3.865) (3.511) (3.583) (3.857) (3.528) 
Constant -0.123 -0.170 -0.232 -0.051 -0.097 0.040 -0.024 -0.019 0.077 0.042 
 (-0.680) (-0.940) (-1.217) (-0.280) (-0.505) (0.208) (-0.126) (-0.098) (0.374) (0.197) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.214 0.214 0.205 0.269 0.274 0.378 0.362 0.367 0.387 0.374 
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F-test 7.504 8.268 9.681 6.543 7.981 9.018 9.244 9.628 8.361 8.555 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses:   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6.2.2 Results for institutional buyouts 
Table 3.4.1A summarises the relationships rather than the correlations from the 
multiple OLS regression test results for IBO samples in year T-1. Further details 
of regression tests and correlations are listed in Panel A of Tables 3.4.2 to 3.4.9 
at the end of this section.  
 
In Section 3.6.1.2, the results show that managers engage in positive REM, 
including sales manipulation of excessive price discounts or credit sales, 
overproduction and cutting discretionary SG&A expenses, to increase reported 
earnings in year T-1 preceding IBOs. 
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Table 3.4.1A  Summary of the relationships (not Correlations) of regressions results 
for IBOs Year T-1 
 Year T-1 
REM proxy RowCFO RowProdCos RowDiscExp GuyRes&Dev GuySGA GuyProdCos LaraProdCos LaraDiscExp 
Sign1 -*** +*** -** + -* +** +** -* 
InsShare            + + - - - + + - 
Concentr3% + + - - - + + - 
Concentr5% + + - - - + + - 
Block10% - + - + - + - - 
Block20% - + ** - - - + - - 
CeoHd + + - + ** - ** + * + - * 
CeoHdSq - + - - - + + - 
NonExecHd + + - * + - * + + ** - ** 
Ned% - + + - - + - + 
Duality - * + + - * + - - + 
BoardSz - * + + - ** - + + + 
LnAssets + - - + - - + - 
SalesGrow - - + *** - - - - + 
Mark2Book + ** + + ** - - - + ** + 
ROA - + + - *** + + + + 
Leverage - * + + - * - + + + 
AssTurn + ** - - - *** - - - - 
DealVal + + - - - + * + - 
1. The sign direction and significant level of REM proxies from univariate tests section 
2. Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Table 3.4.1A summarises the relationships rather than correlations from multiple OLS 
regression test results for IBO samples for year T-1. 
 
Non-managerial large blockholders 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders (Block20%) has a 
significant positive relationship with abnormal production costs (RowProdCos). 
The direction of production costs (RowProdCos) is significantly positive in 
univariate tests. This suggests that the presence of large blockholders, with at 
least 20% shareholding, is associated with more REM of overproduction, which 
is inconsistent hypothesis H2-3c.  
 
As the role of blockholders is ambiguous and varies across firms, they are 
generally passive and are likely to support managers in their quest for growth 
rather than maximising the residual value of a firm (Gibbs, 1993). Furthermore, 
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blockholders might be side with management for the purposes of strategic 
alignment or be influenced by existing business relationships with management, 
leading them to support management decisions rather than to question them 
(Pound, 1988). Hence the presence of non-managerial large blockholders 
leads to more REM. Moreover, IBO targets usually have undervalued shares in 
the market, and blockholders might therefore put pressure on managers to 
improve a firm's performance. As managers are unlikely to be able to improve 
firm performance in the short term, they promote it by engaging in positive REM. 
This might also help managers to signal their competence and their firms' 
growth prospects to the market. Furthermore, as blockholders may perceive 
overproduction as too damaging to a firm’s short-term growth potential, this 
finding might indicate greater focus on abnormal changes of production costs 
from the blockholders.  
 
CEO ownership 
CEO ownership (CeoHd) has a significant positive relationship with abnormal 
R&D expenses (GuyRes&Dev) and abnormal production costs (GuyProdCos). Its 
squared transformation (CeoHdSq) has no significant relationship with these 
REM proxies. The direction of production costs (GuyProdCos) is significantly 
positive in univariate tests, and the direction of R&D expenses (GuyRes&Dev) 
is insignificant. The results suggest that high CEO ownership is associated with 
more REM of R&D expenses cut and overproduction, which supports 
hypothesis H2-3d.  
 
Moreover, CEO ownership has significant negative relationships with abnormal 
SGA expenses (GuySGA) and abnormal discretionary expenses (LaraDiscExp). 
The directions of SGA expenses (GuySGA) and discretionary expenses 
(LaraDiscExp) are significantly negative in univariate tests, indicating that these 
behaviours are used to boost earnings. The results indicate that high CEO 
ownership is associated with more REM of SGA expense cuts and discretionary 
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expense cuts, which supports hypothesis H2-3d.  
 
Therefore, high CEO ownership is associated with more REM in year T-1 
preceding IBOs. This is evidence that high levels of managerial ownership 
could lead to entrenchment effects. High levels of shareholding give managers 
more control and power, hence managers find that they can follow their own 
objectives with less fear of discipline from other shareholders on a board (Morck 
et al., 1988). As the incidence of IBOs is difficult to predict, managers will 
engage in every available REM method to increase earnings once they 
perceive that their firm has been undervalued.  
 
Equity ownership by non-executive directors 
Equity ownership by non-executive directors (NonExecHd) has a significant 
negative relationship with abnormal discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp and 
LaraDiscExp) and abnormal SGA expenses (GuySGA). The directions of 
discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp and LaraDiscExp) and abnormal SGA 
expenses (GuySGA) are significantly negative in univariate tests. This finding 
suggests that high levels of equity ownership by non-executive directors are 
associated with more REM, which helps firms to appear more valuable.  
 
Moreover, equity ownership by non-executive directors (NonExecHd) has a 
significant positive relationship with abnormal production costs (LaraProdCos), 
and the direction of production costs (LaraProdCos) is significantly positive in 
univariate tests. This suggests that high levels of equity ownership by non-
executive directors are associated with more REM in order to portray firms as 
more valuable, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3e.  
 
As equity ownership is expected to align the interests of directors with those of 
external shareholders, more equity ownership by directors might create a 
personal incentive to actively monitor managers (Bhagat et al., 1999). However, 
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higher ownership might also make non-executive directors less independent, 
and thus impede effective monitoring. Moreover, non-executive directors may 
perform little or no real monitoring role as they lack the necessary 
independence, time, expertise, and information to challenge management 
activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). In 
addition, IBO targets usually have undervalued shares in the market, and non-
executive directors might therefore put pressure on managers to increase a 
firm's performance. Managers might be less able to improve firm performance 
in the short term, thus they engage in positive REM to make the firm look more 
valuable.  
 
CEO duality 
CEO duality (Duality) has a significant negative relationship with abnormal CFO 
(RowCFO). The direction of CFO (RowCFO) is significantly negative in univariate 
tests. This means that CEO duality is associated with more REM of sales 
manipulation, which supports hypothesis H2-3g.  
 
CEO duality enables CEOs to effectively control the information that is available 
to other board members, and thus may impair effective monitoring (Jensen, 
1993). Moreover, CEO duality concentrates power in the CEO’s position without 
effective controls and balances (Cornett et al., 2008). Preceding IBOs, the 
optimal REM method should be difficult to detect and affect only short-term 
operations. Hence, sales manipulation is subject to a powerful CEO’s choice.  
 
However, CEO duality (Duality) has a significant negative relationship with 
abnormal R&D expenses (GuyRes&Dev). The direction of R&D expenses 
(GuyRes&Dev) is insignificant in univariate tests. This means that CEO duality 
is associated with less REM, which does not support hypothesis H2-3g.  
 
CEO duality increases the responsibility held by a CEO, which implies high 
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levels of trust from shareholders. As R&D expense cuts is easy to spot and 
cause more damage to the long-term success of firms than other forms of REM 
do, any detection of REM in R&D expenses cut will affect a CEO’s reputation. 
Furthermore, as duality increases a CEO's power to control the results of 
corporate events, CEOs worry less about unexpected IBOs. CEO duality also 
leads CEOs to consider the long-term success of their firms, and to maintain 
their reputation, resulting in less REM by R&D expense cuts but more sales 
manipulation.  
 
Board size 
Board size (BoardSz) has a significant negative relationship with abnormal CFO 
(RowCFO). The direction of CFO (RowCFO) is significantly negative in univariate 
tests, which portrays a firm as more valuable. This means that large board size 
is associated with more REM of sales manipulation, which does not support 
hypothesis H2-3h.  
 
Preceding IBOs, larger boards may face more problems when it comes to 
coordinating activities and communicating, as it is more difficult for them to 
arrange board meetings and reach a consensus, leading to slower and less-
efficient decision-making and directors becoming less likely to criticise the 
behaviour of top managers (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Moreover, the 
director free-riding problem may also increase as the monitoring cost to any 
individual director falls in proportion to board size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
Hence, large board size lead to more REM of sales manipulation.  
 
However, board size (BoardSz) has a significant negative relationship with 
abnormal R&D expenses (GuyRes&Dev), and the direction of R&D expenses 
(GuyRes&Dev) is insignificant in univariate tests. This means that board size is 
associated with less REM of R&D expense cuts, which supports hypothesis H2-
3h. As R&D expense cuts are more damaging to the long-term success of firms 
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than sales manipulation is, having more board members might increase the 
possibility of mitigating R&D expense cuts. 
 
Table 3.4.1B summarises the relationships rather than correlations from the 
multiple OLS regression test results for IBO samples in year T-2. Further details 
of the regression tests and correlations are listed in Panel B of Tables 3.4.2 to 
3.4.9 at the end of this section. It seems that some corporate governance 
mechanisms have inconsistent effects on REM in T-1 and T-2, preceding IBOs.   
 
In Section 3.6.1.2, the results show that managers engage in positive REM, 
including sales manipulation, overproduction and decreasing discretionary 
R&D expenses, to increase reported earnings, in year T-2 preceding IBOs.  
 
Table 3.4.1B  Summary of the relationships (not Correlations) of regressions results 
for IBOs Year T-2 
 Year T-2 
REM proxy RowCFO RowProdCos RowDiscExp GuyRes&Dev GuySGA GuyProdCos LaraProdCos LaraDiscExp 
Sign1 -*** +** -** -** - +** + -** 
InsShare            - - + - + + - + 
Concentr3% - * + + - + + - + 
Concentr5% - + - + + + - - 
Block10% + ** - - + ** + - - + 
Block20% - - - - * + - - + 
CeoHd - + - + - + + - 
CeoHdSq - ** + - - * - ** + + - 
NonExecHd + + - + - + + - 
Ned% - + + - - + * + + 
Duality - - + + + - - + 
BoardSz - - + - + + + + 
LnAssets + + - + - + - + 
SalesGrow + - + + ** - - - + 
Mark2Book + - + - + + + + 
ROA + - + - - - - + 
Leverage - ** - - - - - + - 
AssTurn + * + - + + + - - 
DealVal + - - - + + ** + - 
1. The sign direction and significant level of REM proxies from univariate tests section 
2. Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Table 3.4.1B summarises the relationships rather than correlations from multiple OLS 
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regression test results for IBO samples for year T-2. 
 
Outside ownership concentration 
Outside ownership concentration (Concentr3%) has a significant negative 
relationship with abnormal CFO (RowCFO). The direction of CFO (RowCFO) is 
significantly negative in univariate tests. This indicates that the presence of 
outside shareholders with substantial holdings is associated with more REM of 
sales manipulation, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3a.  
 
IBO targets usually have undervalued shares in the market, and outside 
shareholders with substantial holdings might concern about the firm 
performance. They might put pressure on managers by asking them to improve 
firm performance. Managers might then engage in positive REM in order to 
make their firm look more valuable, as they are less likely to be able to improve 
firm performance in the short term. Hence, outside ownership concentration 
leads to more REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs.  
 
Non-managerial large blockholders 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders (Block10%) has a 
significant positive relationship with abnormal CFO (RowCFO) and abnormal 
R&D expenses (GuyRes&Dev). The directions of CFO (RowCFO) and R&D 
expenses (GuyRes&Dev) are significantly negative in univariate tests. This 
means that large blockholders, with at least 10% shareholdings, are associated 
with less REM of sales manipulation and R&D expenses cut, which is consistent 
with hypothesis H2-3c.  
 
Large blockholders are shareholders who have the capacity to determine the 
outcome of particular corporate policy decisions. Among major shareholders, 
large blockholders have the strongest incentives to be active owners, and they 
may have a significant impact on the level of managerial discretions (Florackis 
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and Ozkan, 2009). Thus the presence of large blockholders mitigates REM in 
year T-2 preceding IBOs. Moreover, as blockholders may perceive 
overproduction and R&D expense cuts as too damaging to the short and long-
term growth potential of a firm, these findings might indicate greater focus on 
abnormal changes of production costs and R&D expenses by blockholders.  
 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders is associated with less 
REM in year T-2 but more REM in year T-1 preceding IBOs. In year T-2, as IBO 
firms may have insignificant share undervaluation in the market, blockholders 
effectively monitor managers and lead to less REM. However, IBO firms might 
have significant share undervaluation in the market in year T-1. Managers 
therefore may have stronger motivation to engage in REM, which might make 
them more determined to resist pressure by blockholders. Furthermore, 
preceding buyouts, blockholders might be side with management for strategic 
alignment or that they have been influenced by existing business relationships 
with management, and thus to support management decisions rather than to 
question them (Pound, 1988). 
 
CEO ownership 
CEO ownership (CeoHd) has no significant linear relationships with REM. 
However, the squared transformation of CEO ownership (CeoHdSq) has a 
significant negative relationship with abnormal CFO (RowCFO). The direction of 
CFO (RowCFO) is significantly negative in univariate tests. This reveals that 
managerial ownership has a non-linear relationship with REM, and high 
managerial ownership is associated with more REM of sales manipulation. The 
result is consistent with hypothesis H2-3d.  
 
High levels of shareholding give managers more control and power, enabling 
them to follow their own objectives with less fear of discipline (Morck et al., 
1988). Hence, prior to IBOs, high levels of managerial ownership entrench 
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managers and lead to high levels of sales manipulation.  
 
Moreover, the squared transformation of CEO ownership (CeoHdSq) has a 
significant negative relationship with abnormal SGA expenses (GuySGA). The 
direction of SGA expenses (GuySGA) is insignificant in univariate tests. This 
reveals that managerial ownership has a non-linear relationship with REM, and 
high managerial ownership is associated with less REM of SGA expense cuts. 
This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3d.  
 
High shareholdings might force managers to consider the long-term success of 
their firms. While cuts to SGA expenses might affect the long-term operations 
of a firm, sales manipulation only interferes with short-term operations. 
Moreover, SGA expense cuts are easier to detect than sales manipulation. 
Choosing just one of these REM methods might reduce the chance of REM 
being detected. Furthermore, as high shareholdings by managers may increase 
their power to control the results of corporate events, managers with high 
ownership might be less concerned about unexpected IBOs. Thus managers 
with high shareholdings may focus on the long-term success of their firms, and 
may therefore choose to engage only in sales manipulation rather than SGA 
expense cuts in T-2, prior to IBOs.  
 
Percentage of non-executive directors on board 
The percentage of non-executive directors on boards (Ned%) has a positive 
relationship with abnormal production costs (GuyProdCos). The direction of 
production costs (GuyProdCos) is significantly positive in univariate tests. This 
suggests that high percentages of non-executive directors on boards are 
associated with more REM of overproduction, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H2-3f.  
 
Undervaluation of a firm is less likely to maximise the wealth of its shareholders, 
Chapter 3 
206 
but overproduction could improve short-term earnings to reduce value 
undervaluation and to increase the market's confidence in the future 
performance of a firm. Overproduction interferes in the normal operations of a 
firm in the short term while minimising interference in its long-term operations. 
When non-executive directors put pressure on managers to improve firm 
performance, they may engage in REM of overproduction to increase their 
firm's value in the short term, thereby ensuring the long-term success of the 
business. Thus, having more non-executive directors on a board leads to more 
REM of overproduction. 
 
In addition, as non-executive directors may perceive overproduction as too 
damaging to a firm’s short-term growth potential, this finding might indicate that 
non-executive directors have a greater focus on abnormal changes to 
production costs. On the other hand, firm undervaluation may result in an IBO, 
and buyout firms are not required to hire as many non-executive directors as 
listed firms are. Non-executive directors might therefore be afraid of losing their 
position on a board after a buyout, and thus support managers in facilitating 
REM preceding IBOs.  
 
Summary of findings for institutional buyouts 
In summary, outside ownership concentration is associated with more REM in 
T-2, but it has no significant relationship with REM in T-1. IBO targets usually 
have undervalued shares in the market, and significant shareholders might put 
pressure on managers to improve firm performance. Managers might therefore 
engage in positive REM to make the firm look more valuable. Hence outside 
ownership concentration leads to more REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs.  
 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders is associated with more 
REM in year T-1, but less REM in year T-2. As IBOs are difficult to predict, the 
optimal monitoring strategy for blockholders might to focus on the long-term 
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success of a firm, and thus mitigate REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs. However, 
as firm undervaluation might increase in year T-1 preceding IBOs, managers 
might be more determined to signal the potential growth prospects of their firms 
to the market through engaging in positive REM. In addition, preceding buyouts, 
blockholders might be side with management for strategic alignment, which 
leads them to support management decisions rather than to question them 
(Pound, 1988).  
 
CEO ownership is associated with more REM in year T-1. As the incidence of 
IBOs is difficult to predict, managers will engage in every available REM method 
to increase earnings once they perceive that their firm has been undervalued 
in year T-1 preceding IBOs. In year T-2, the squared transformation of CEO 
ownership is associated with more REM of sales manipulation, but less SGA 
expenses cut. Managers with high shareholding may focus on the long-term 
success of their firm, and in turn choose to engage only in sales manipulation 
rather than SGA expenses cut in year T-2 prior to IBOs.  
 
Equity ownership by non-executive directors is associated with more REM of 
discretionary expense cuts in year T-1, but it has no significant relationship with 
REM in year T-2. Higher ownership might make non-executive directors less 
independent, and thus impede effective monitoring and lead to significant 
relationship in year T-2. In year T-1, when non-executive directors put pressure 
on managers to improve firm performance, managers may engage in REM to 
increase short-term firm value.   
 
High percentage of non-executive directors on boards is associated with more 
REM in year T-2, but it has no significant relationship with REM in year T-1. The 
undervaluation of a firm might result in an IBO. Buyout firms are not required to 
hire as much non-executive directors as listed firms are. Hence non-executive 
directors might be afraid of losing their positions on the board after a buyout, 
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and may therefore support managers preceding IBOs.  
 
CEO duality is associated with more REM of sales manipulation but less REM 
of R&D expenses cut in year T-1. As duality leads CEOs to think about the long-
term success of a firm and to maintain their reputation, CEOs choose to engage 
in sales manipulation rather than in R&D expense cuts. However, CEO duality 
has no relationship with REM in year T-2.  
 
Large board sizes are associated with more REM of sales manipulation but less 
REM of R&D expenses cut in year T-1. As R&D expense cuts are more 
damaging to the long-term success of firms than sales manipulation, having 
more board members might increase the possibility of mitigating R&D expense 
cuts. However, board size has no relationship with REM in year T-2.  
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Table 3.4.2  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
RowCFO) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.012   0.013  -0.063   -0.037  
 (0.195)   (0.212)  (-1.140)   (-0.706)  
Concentr3%  0.016   0.054  -0.090*   -0.008 
  (0.278)   (0.913)  (-1.778)   (-0.177) 
Concentr5%   0.038     -0.021   
   (0.627)     (-0.433)   
Block10% -0.017 -0.018  -0.018  0.049** 0.055**  0.042**  
 (-0.698) (-0.743)  (-0.707)  (2.208) (2.587)  (2.008)  
Block20%   -0.057  -0.060   -0.010  -0.007 
   (-1.546)  (-1.632)   (-0.417)  (-0.276) 
CeoHd 0.001 0.002 0.052 0.034 0.047 -0.064 -0.064 -0.094 0.346 0.372 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.316) (0.089) (0.141) (-0.378) (-0.382) (-0.551) (1.322) (1.265) 
CeoHdSq    -0.067 0.028    -0.901** -1.025** 
    (-0.119) (0.053)    (-2.188) (-2.192) 
NonExecHd 0.160 0.165 0.189 0.156 0.216 0.028 0.018 0.084 -0.043 -0.013 
 (0.682) (0.709) (1.035) (0.639) (1.031) (0.271) (0.183) (0.726) (-0.392) (-0.103) 
Ned% -0.144 -0.144 -0.100 -0.141 -0.097 -0.071 -0.069 -0.074 -0.025 -0.019 
 (-1.302) (-1.328) (-0.938) (-1.199) (-0.856) (-0.869) (-0.861) (-0.884) (-0.313) (-0.232) 
Duality -0.075* -0.075* -0.084** -0.076* -0.084** -0.019 -0.021 -0.020 -0.023 -0.024 
 (-1.903) (-1.925) (-2.284) (-1.894) (-2.300) (-0.487) (-0.542) (-0.447) (-0.607) (-0.584) 
BoardSz -0.015* -0.015* -0.013* -0.015* -0.013* -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (-1.887) (-1.888) (-1.697) (-1.886) (-1.673) (-1.318) (-1.353) (-1.210) (-1.256) (-1.166) 
LnAssets 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.017 
 (1.112) (1.161) (1.370) (1.164) (1.488) (0.966) (0.853) (1.050) (1.300) (1.410) 
SalesGrow -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.022 0.024 
 (-0.265) (-0.264) (-0.460) (-0.266) (-0.475) (1.125) (1.190) (1.243) (1.073) (1.227) 
Mark2Book 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (2.315) (2.278) (2.147) (2.309) (1.964) (0.309) (0.347) (0.427) (0.429) (0.527) 
ROA -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.037 -0.040 0.016 0.009 0.017 0.015 0.016 
 (-0.725) (-0.735) (-0.807) (-0.731) (-0.858) (0.178) (0.101) (0.198) (0.171) (0.179) 
Leverage -0.140* -0.141* -0.147* -0.142* -0.154** -0.213** -0.203** -0.200** -0.245** -0.238** 
 (-1.806) (-1.831) (-1.962) (-1.849) (-2.099) (-2.146) (-2.113) (-2.197) (-2.299) (-2.317) 
AssTurn 0.046** 0.046** 0.043** 0.047** 0.044** 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.034 0.037* 
 (2.060) (2.087) (2.172) (2.060) (2.094) (0.915) (0.889) (0.987) (1.583) (1.746) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.940) (0.944) (0.748) (0.935) (0.738) (0.557) (0.582) (-0.055) (0.476) (-0.087) 
Constant 0.025 0.019 -0.048 0.020 -0.068 0.011 0.032 0.018 -0.079 -0.078 
 (0.218) (0.163) (-0.371) (0.166) (-0.518) (0.089) (0.260) (0.156) (-0.608) (-0.618) 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 78 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.355 0.355 0.375 0.355 0.378 0.366 0.379 0.325 0.393 0.362 
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F-test 3.494 3.601 3.404 3.004 3.583 1.230 1.438 1.003 1.315 1.089 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.278 0.163 0.462 0.221 0.385 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
211 
Table 3.4.3  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
RowProdCos) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.182   0.152  0.008   -0.029  
 (1.102)   (0.911)  (0.035)   (-0.136)  
Concentr3%  0.165   0.035  0.050   0.003 
  (1.012)   (0.236)  (0.233)   (0.018) 
Concentr5%   0.126     0.078   
   (0.776)     (0.363)   
Block10% 0.017 0.022  0.026  -0.030 -0.038  -0.020  
 (0.263) (0.337)  (0.393)  (-0.435) (-0.536)  (-0.302)  
Block20%   0.132*  0.147**   -0.040  -0.036 
   (1.898)  (2.070)   (-0.496)  (-0.446) 
CeoHd 0.702 0.700 0.583 -0.143 -0.167 0.503 0.504 0.533 -0.080 -0.066 
 (1.497) (1.483) (1.374) (-0.125) (-0.159) (1.440) (1.445) (1.560) (-0.111) (-0.088) 
CeoHdSq    1.701 1.460    1.275 1.294 
    (0.994) (0.892)    (0.990) (0.973) 
NonExecHd 0.387 0.369 0.237 0.521 0.310 0.442 0.452 0.492 0.544 0.598 
 (0.709) (0.674) (0.497) (0.956) (0.601) (0.884) (0.903) (1.020) (1.051) (1.134) 
Ned% 0.250 0.253 0.159 0.188 0.110 0.265 0.260 0.263 0.204 0.205 
 (0.918) (0.928) (0.632) (0.686) (0.435) (1.226) (1.187) (1.154) (0.914) (0.904) 
Duality 0.011 0.008 0.022 0.041 0.056 -0.086 -0.084 -0.086 -0.079 -0.082 
 (0.106) (0.075) (0.224) (0.344) (0.500) (-1.075) (-1.030) (-1.078) (-0.928) (-0.973) 
BoardSz 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.014 0.009 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.869) (0.822) (0.555) (0.856) (0.557) (-0.031) (-0.024) (-0.023) (-0.069) (-0.025) 
LnAssets -0.017 -0.014 -0.020 -0.024 -0.029 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.014 0.016 
 (-0.662) (-0.566) (-0.785) (-0.924) (-1.099) (0.747) (0.797) (0.911) (0.506) (0.578) 
SalesGrow -0.027 -0.026 -0.007 -0.024 -0.002 -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 (-0.793) (-0.771) (-0.183) (-0.721) (-0.056) (-0.209) (-0.260) (-0.200) (-0.181) (-0.167) 
Mark2Book 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.348) (0.327) (0.603) (0.158) (0.439) (-0.172) (-0.178) (-0.250) (-0.291) (-0.304) 
ROA 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.020 0.019 -0.254 -0.246 -0.237 -0.255 -0.252 
 (0.067) (0.089) (0.098) (0.154) (0.145) (-1.215) (-1.200) (-1.157) (-1.180) (-1.181) 
Leverage 0.219 0.218 0.241 0.260 0.277 -0.026 -0.035 -0.052 0.017 0.007 
 (1.276) (1.292) (1.581) (1.435) (1.619) (-0.179) (-0.235) (-0.340) (0.117) (0.047) 
AssTurn -0.072 -0.070 -0.060 -0.095 -0.083 0.004 0.006 0.008 -0.018 -0.017 
 (-1.334) (-1.320) (-1.264) (-1.603) (-1.458) (0.124) (0.164) (0.236) (-0.383) (-0.364) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.967) (0.937) (1.619) (1.009) (1.504) (-0.501) (-0.490) (-0.377) (-0.474) (-0.439) 
Constant -0.122 -0.146 -0.002 0.017 0.167 -0.299 -0.320 -0.380 -0.176 -0.230 
 (-0.488) (-0.561) (-0.008) (0.058) (0.558) (-1.108) (-1.171) (-1.430) (-0.587) (-0.754) 
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.211 0.209 0.251 0.224 0.256 0.133 0.134 0.135 0.143 0.142 
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F-test 0.687 0.681 0.990 0.940 1.150 0.876 0.885 0.790 4.787 4.960 
Prob > F 0.779 0.784 0.473 0.527 0.333 0.587 0.578 0.676 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4.4  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
RowDiscExp) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.119   -0.063  0.131   0.189  
 (-0.521)   (-0.268)  (0.481)   (0.689)  
Concentr3%  -0.168   -0.120  0.018   0.052 
  (-0.722)   (-0.531)  (0.062)   (0.202) 
Concentr5%   -0.164     -0.000   
   (-0.775)     (-0.000)   
Block10% -0.051 -0.046  -0.080  -0.017 0.000  -0.043  
 (-0.557) (-0.505)  (-0.830)  (-0.226) (0.003)  (-0.503)  
Block20%   -0.051  -0.049   -0.028  -0.032 
   (-0.787)  (-0.718)   (-0.352)  (-0.426) 
CeoHd -0.612 -0.659 -0.622 0.475 0.092 -0.438 -0.441 -0.433 0.213 -0.081 
 (-1.497) (-1.577) (-1.463) (0.542) (0.106) (-0.923) (-0.922) (-0.922) (0.209) (-0.082) 
CeoHdSq    -2.112 -1.391    -1.412 -0.721 
    (-1.360) (-0.977)    (-0.790) (-0.442) 
NonExecHd -0.660* -0.715* -0.680 -0.818** -0.811* -0.704 -0.722 -0.677 -0.832 -0.733 
 (-1.741) (-1.877) (-1.617) (-2.073) (-1.866) (-1.162) (-1.203) (-1.124) (-1.291) (-1.136) 
Ned% 0.005 0.011 0.078 0.071 0.118 0.271 0.291 0.307 0.341 0.335 
 (0.021) (0.050) (0.347) (0.336) (0.509) (1.161) (1.219) (1.289) (1.314) (1.356) 
Duality 0.029 0.030 0.015 -0.009 -0.013 0.106 0.096 0.090 0.097 0.088 
 (0.502) (0.527) (0.250) (-0.153) (-0.238) (1.404) (1.307) (1.177) (1.331) (1.198) 
BoardSz -0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
 (-0.011) (0.025) (0.168) (-0.117) (0.001) (1.252) (1.265) (1.304) (1.252) (1.254) 
LnAssets -0.012 -0.018 -0.012 -0.002 -0.008 -0.012 -0.018 -0.017 -0.002 -0.010 
 (-0.482) (-0.651) (-0.422) (-0.098) (-0.254) (-0.346) (-0.455) (-0.472) (-0.041) (-0.236) 
SalesGrow 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.054** 0.058*** 0.001 0.008 0.015 0.000 0.013 
 (2.705) (2.771) (2.971) (2.226) (3.059) (0.016) (0.132) (0.244) (0.007) (0.212) 
Mark2Book 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.013 
 (2.226) (2.320) (2.119) (2.278) (2.012) (1.166) (1.095) (0.988) (1.300) (1.026) 
ROA 0.141 0.154 0.135 0.129 0.130 0.225 0.215 0.202 0.207 0.195 
 (0.956) (1.012) (0.876) (0.857) (0.799) (0.653) (0.613) (0.587) (0.571) (0.547) 
Leverage 0.082 0.094 0.049 0.055 0.042 -0.156 -0.132 -0.122 -0.188 -0.156 
 (1.031) (1.147) (0.642) (0.662) (0.477) (-0.954) (-0.780) (-0.714) (-1.072) (-0.878) 
AssTurn -0.040 -0.043 -0.039 -0.015 -0.020 -0.005 -0.011 -0.012 0.025 0.005 
 (-1.091) (-1.155) (-0.983) (-0.316) (-0.425) (-0.112) (-0.218) (-0.244) (0.370) (0.076) 
DealVal -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.376) (-0.314) (-0.591) (-0.573) (-0.319) (-0.658) (-0.505) (-0.618) (-0.782) (-0.696) 
Constant 0.203 0.283 0.141 0.052 0.065 -0.192 -0.116 -0.127 -0.375 -0.251 
 (0.598) (0.709) (0.370) (0.142) (0.138) (-0.415) (-0.225) (-0.270) (-0.646) (-0.450) 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.285 0.291 0.294 0.310 0.303 0.202 0.194 0.195 0.212 0.199 
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F-test 14.31 13.99 16.98 17.48 19.31 0.994 1.016 1.031 1.527 1.262 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.475 0.454 0.442 0.136 0.265 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4.5  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
GuyRes&Dev) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.005   -0.004  -0.006   -0.005  
 (-0.958)   (-0.942)  (-1.299)   (-0.868)  
Concentr3%  -0.003   -0.001  -0.004   0.004 
  (-0.720)   (-0.213)  (-0.707)   (0.652) 
Concentr5%   -0.001     0.007   
   (-0.239)     (1.235)   
Block10% 0.002 0.002  0.002  0.004** 0.003**  0.003*  
 (1.177) (1.072)  (1.125)  (2.301) (2.038)  (1.891)  
Block20%   -0.000  -0.000   -0.007*  -0.006 
   (-0.107)  (-0.078)   (-1.862)  (-1.627) 
CeoHd 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.032 0.036 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.032 0.036 
 (2.342) (2.306) (2.207) (1.002) (1.085) (0.253) (0.265) (0.166) (1.328) (1.555) 
CeoHdSq    -0.014 -0.021    -0.064 -0.074* 
    (-0.261) (-0.392)    (-1.645) (-1.992) 
NonExecHd 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.007 0.021 0.001 0.014 
 (0.840) (0.913) (1.124) (0.779) (1.009) (0.616) (0.624) (1.627) (0.125) (1.028) 
Ned% -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 
 (-0.747) (-0.779) (-0.968) (-0.669) (-0.853) (-1.595) (-1.633) (-1.471) (-1.234) (-1.032) 
Duality -0.003* -0.003* -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (-1.777) (-1.726) (-1.618) (-1.478) (-1.346) (1.251) (1.364) (1.386) (1.152) (1.162) 
BoardSz -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-2.078) (-2.055) (-1.992) (-2.077) (-2.005) (-1.197) (-1.137) (-0.819) (-1.154) (-0.789) 
LnAssets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.011) (0.893) (0.896) (1.051) (0.947) (1.099) (1.031) (1.584) (1.382) (1.654) 
SalesGrow -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.002** 
 (-0.937) (-1.007) (-1.282) (-0.941) (-1.269) (1.599) (1.478) (2.079) (1.553) (2.017) 
Mark2Book -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.055) (-0.047) (0.266) (-0.010) (0.330) (-1.280) (-1.195) (-1.591) (-1.091) (-1.218) 
ROA -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
 (-2.998) (-2.956) (-2.981) (-2.968) (-2.918) (-1.131) (-1.102) (-0.980) (-1.105) (-1.060) 
Leverage -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-1.675) (-1.694) (-1.913) (-1.669) (-1.789) (-0.298) (-0.310) (-0.770) (-0.884) (-1.148) 
AssTurn -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (-2.752) (-2.716) (-2.645) (-2.444) (-2.323) (-0.548) (-0.486) (0.058) (0.605) (1.017) 
DealVal -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.621) (-0.555) (-1.190) (-0.600) (-1.079) (-0.240) (-0.201) (-1.483) (-0.356) (-1.623) 
Constant 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.013 
 (1.418) (1.364) (1.430) (1.420) (1.275) (0.162) (0.064) (-0.844) (-0.616) (-1.250) 
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 78 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.351 0.347 0.335 0.352 0.337 0.171 0.157 0.226 0.194 0.236 
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F-test 2.311 2.233 2.359 2.073 2.073 1.206 1.103 1.138 2.014 2.359 
Prob > F 0.011 0.015 0.010 0.022 0.022 0.294 0.373 0.344 0.028 0.009 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4.6  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
GuySGA) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.108   -0.086  0.043   0.108  
 (-1.236)   (-0.935)  (0.451)   (1.159)  
Concentr3%  -0.142   -0.077  0.023   0.115 
  (-1.551)   (-0.822)  (0.203)   (1.116) 
Concentr5%   -0.079     0.078   
   (-0.857)     (0.816)   
Block10% -0.002 0.002  -0.013  0.061 0.064  0.032  
 (-0.034) (0.029)  (-0.230)  (1.075) (1.071)  (0.494)  
Block20%   -0.048  -0.044   0.006  0.014 
   (-1.092)  (-0.970)   (0.094)  (0.217) 
CeoHd -0.447** -0.483** -0.419** -0.027 -0.140 -0.360 -0.358 -0.397 0.378 0.446 
 (-2.394) (-2.527) (-2.247) (-0.056) (-0.336) (-1.197) (-1.184) (-1.262) (0.913) (1.021) 
CeoHdSq    -0.815 -0.566    -1.601* -1.782** 
    (-1.054) (-0.868)    (-1.766) (-2.283) 
NonExecHd -0.325 -0.363 -0.271 -0.386* -0.343 -0.125 -0.128 -0.134 -0.270 -0.308 
 (-1.438) (-1.554) (-1.324) (-1.676) (-1.427) (-0.487) (-0.492) (-0.456) (-1.010) (-0.982) 
Ned% -0.056 -0.052 -0.021 -0.030 -0.004 -0.140 -0.137 -0.131 -0.061 -0.052 
 (-0.327) (-0.306) (-0.135) (-0.184) (-0.028) (-0.833) (-0.805) (-0.767) (-0.332) (-0.288) 
Duality 0.049 0.050 0.039 0.034 0.029 0.058 0.056 0.055 0.048 0.043 
 (0.954) (1.018) (0.819) (0.550) (0.497) (0.951) (0.921) (0.981) (0.781) (0.742) 
BoardSz -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 (-0.923) (-0.865) (-0.738) (-0.991) (-0.860) (0.466) (0.461) (0.439) (0.492) (0.434) 
LnAssets -0.013 -0.018 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 -0.014 -0.013 
 (-0.734) (-0.936) (-0.479) (-0.525) (-0.473) (-1.285) (-1.273) (-1.132) (-0.665) (-0.568) 
SalesGrow -0.028 -0.028 -0.033 -0.030 -0.033 -0.045 -0.043 -0.037 -0.046 -0.043 
 (-1.009) (-1.033) (-1.273) (-1.034) (-1.290) (-1.356) (-1.316) (-0.992) (-1.424) (-1.208) 
Mark2Book -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.839) (-0.707) (-0.942) (-0.730) (-0.763) (-0.008) (-0.069) (0.023) (0.323) (0.282) 
ROA 0.095 0.105 0.084 0.090 0.084 -0.131 -0.133 -0.133 -0.151 -0.155 
 (1.074) (1.186) (0.968) (0.985) (0.951) (-0.765) (-0.786) (-0.744) (-0.884) (-0.884) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.003 -0.033 -0.022 -0.030 -0.058 -0.054 -0.027 -0.094 -0.081 
 (-0.171) (-0.040) (-0.495) (-0.312) (-0.413) (-0.652) (-0.604) (-0.284) (-0.991) (-0.820) 
AssTurn -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.001 -0.006 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.051 0.056 
 (-0.574) (-0.708) (-0.701) (-0.061) (-0.273) (0.511) (0.494) (0.595) (1.047) (1.306) 
DealVal -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.408) (-0.331) (-1.061) (-0.539) (-0.890) (0.459) (0.486) (0.231) (0.135) (0.048) 
Constant 0.322* 0.386** 0.241 0.264 0.233 0.295 0.306 0.299 0.087 0.078 
 (1.850) (2.042) (1.441) (1.489) (1.343) (1.252) (1.245) (1.170) (0.324) (0.282) 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.196 0.207 0.219 0.207 0.226 0.156 0.154 0.129 0.183 0.171 
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F-test 2.462 2.959 2.831 20.35 9.857 1.089 1.070 0.814 4.384 3.941 
Prob > F 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.392 0.408 0.650 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4.7  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2  (Dependent 
Variable: GuyProdCos) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.136   0.112  0.102   0.056  
 (0.972)   (0.785)  (0.533)   (0.309)  
Concentr3%  0.122   0.081  0.101   0.029 
  (0.894)   (0.592)  (0.528)   (0.193) 
Concentr5%   0.148     0.072   
   (0.991)     (0.417)   
Block10% 0.021 0.025  0.027  -0.047 -0.047  -0.035  
 (0.332) (0.396)  (0.426)  (-0.729) (-0.706)  (-0.540)  
Block20%   0.040  0.051   -0.014  -0.017 
   (0.740)  (0.970)   (-0.221)  (-0.268) 
CeoHd 0.626* 0.625* 0.589 -0.009 -0.006 0.293 0.292 0.317 -0.437 -0.486 
 (1.725) (1.709) (1.649) (-0.011) (-0.007) (0.995) (0.998) (1.112) (-0.732) (-0.797) 
CeoHdSq    1.279 1.165    1.597 1.751 
    (0.952) (0.886)    (1.345) (1.482) 
NonExecHd 0.359 0.345 0.338 0.460 0.409 0.367 0.372 0.356 0.495 0.516 
 (0.911) (0.872) (0.837) (1.148) (0.961) (0.818) (0.823) (0.835) (1.059) (1.113) 
Ned% 0.281 0.284 0.228 0.231 0.190 0.318* 0.316* 0.318* 0.242 0.235 
 (1.302) (1.310) (1.104) (1.054) (0.907) (1.890) (1.879) (1.845) (1.318) (1.282) 
Duality -0.023 -0.025 -0.020 0.001 0.008 -0.039 -0.039 -0.041 -0.030 -0.033 
 (-0.302) (-0.334) (-0.286) (0.009) (0.095) (-0.577) (-0.573) (-0.646) (-0.410) (-0.474) 
BoardSz 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.080) (1.043) (0.927) (1.052) (0.919) (0.204) (0.178) (0.117) (0.145) (0.114) 
LnAssets -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.018 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
 (-0.673) (-0.581) (-0.606) (-0.897) (-0.879) (0.085) (0.148) (0.188) (-0.310) (-0.278) 
SalesGrow -0.040 -0.039 -0.035 -0.038 -0.030 -0.034 -0.033 -0.030 -0.032 -0.030 
 (-1.198) (-1.170) (-0.939) (-1.125) (-0.842) (-0.870) (-0.879) (-0.797) (-0.825) (-0.750) 
Mark2Book -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (-1.001) (-1.031) (-0.778) (-1.153) (-0.895) (0.420) (0.314) (0.183) (0.157) (0.016) 
ROA 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.030 0.029 -0.106 -0.103 -0.100 -0.107 -0.107 
 (0.197) (0.213) (0.233) (0.263) (0.251) (-0.787) (-0.795) (-0.752) (-0.761) (-0.762) 
Leverage 0.071 0.070 0.086 0.101 0.107 -0.048 -0.055 -0.060 0.006 0.004 
 (0.632) (0.630) (0.849) (0.837) (0.890) (-0.455) (-0.504) (-0.545) (0.053) (0.038) 
AssTurn -0.054 -0.053 -0.051 -0.072 -0.068 0.007 0.007 0.008 -0.021 -0.024 
 (-1.429) (-1.405) (-1.375) (-1.596) (-1.481) (0.212) (0.232) (0.253) (-0.479) (-0.566) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.598) (1.572) (1.841) (1.579) (1.678) (1.588) (1.593) (2.008) (1.669) (2.063) 
Constant -0.125 -0.142 -0.087 -0.025 0.029 -0.170 -0.177 -0.193 -0.017 -0.025 
 (-0.590) (-0.641) (-0.399) (-0.104) (0.115) (-0.789) (-0.802) (-0.935) (-0.071) (-0.110) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.173 0.171 0.183 0.183 0.184 0.145 0.144 0.136 0.166 0.162 
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F-test 1.469 1.423 1.619 2.319 2.423 2.226 2.246 2.413 7.057 7.119 
Prob > F 0.148 0.168 0.097 0.010 0.007 0.017 0.016 0.009 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4.8  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
LaraProdCos) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.048   0.012  -0.006   -0.024  
 (0.476)   (0.123)  (-0.046)   (-0.179)  
Concentr3%  0.015   0.014  -0.014   -0.090 
  (0.155)   (0.131)  (-0.101)   (-0.632) 
Concentr5%   0.060     -0.049   
   (0.470)     (-0.324)   
Block10% -0.010 -0.004  0.000  -0.059 -0.058  -0.055  
 (-0.177) (-0.078)  (0.008)  (-0.965) (-0.900)  (-0.871)  
Block20%   -0.032  -0.032   -0.000  0.000 
   (-0.625)  (-0.670)   (-0.007)  (0.006) 
CeoHd 0.131 0.124 0.157 -0.858 -0.873 0.352 0.352 0.392 0.061 0.012 
 (0.415) (0.389) (0.493) (-1.046) (-1.084) (1.203) (1.199) (1.365) (0.107) (0.021) 
CeoHdSq    1.992 2.068    0.636 0.808 
    (1.387) (1.455)    (0.567) (0.767) 
NonExecHd 0.617* 0.585 0.635* 0.774** 0.808** 0.182 0.180 0.152 0.233 0.207 
 (1.716) (1.636) (1.865) (2.019) (2.049) (0.584) (0.574) (0.466) (0.688) (0.597) 
Ned% -0.005 0.001 0.012 -0.077 -0.063 0.292 0.293 0.285 0.262 0.253 
 (-0.022) (0.004) (0.057) (-0.347) (-0.299) (1.635) (1.624) (1.557) (1.391) (1.341) 
Duality -0.063 -0.063 -0.070 -0.027 -0.028 -0.101 -0.101 -0.105 -0.097 -0.100 
 (-0.780) (-0.784) (-0.864) (-0.280) (-0.290) (-1.496) (-1.498) (-1.670) (-1.366) (-1.531) 
BoardSz 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 (0.494) (0.473) (0.531) (0.479) (0.546) (0.383) (0.387) (0.314) (0.353) (0.270) 
LnAssets 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.001 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.517) (0.477) (0.597) (0.051) (0.075) (-0.368) (-0.378) (-0.337) (-0.509) (-0.555) 
SalesGrow -0.035 -0.035 -0.040 -0.032 -0.037 -0.045 -0.045 -0.047 -0.044 -0.044 
 (-1.438) (-1.430) (-1.616) (-1.266) (-1.503) (-1.308) (-1.313) (-1.362) (-1.281) (-1.221) 
Mark2Book 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (2.386) (2.410) (2.400) (2.051) (2.087) (0.602) (0.605) (0.536) (0.531) (0.468) 
ROA 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.022 0.023 -0.036 -0.038 -0.034 -0.037 -0.039 
 (0.052) (0.066) (0.079) (0.140) (0.153) (-0.251) (-0.269) (-0.231) (-0.248) (-0.262) 
Leverage 0.017 0.021 0.019 0.064 0.066 0.002 0.004 -0.004 0.023 0.032 
 (0.202) (0.258) (0.248) (0.749) (0.778) (0.020) (0.040) (-0.035) (0.230) (0.297) 
AssTurn -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.038 -0.042 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.023 -0.027 
 (-0.302) (-0.323) (-0.366) (-0.875) (-0.948) (-0.358) (-0.366) (-0.399) (-0.496) (-0.634) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.504) (0.476) (0.494) (0.532) (0.396) (0.713) (0.713) (1.215) (0.734) (1.164) 
Constant -0.152 -0.141 -0.186 0.011 0.000 -0.039 -0.034 -0.057 0.023 0.043 
 (-0.688) (-0.627) (-0.841) (0.047) (0.000) (-0.170) (-0.149) (-0.247) (0.086) (0.162) 
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 75 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.098 0.096 0.099 0.127 0.130 0.143 0.143 0.125 0.146 0.134 
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F-test 7.534 10.03 6.850 13.02 13.90 2.443 2.439 2.328 8.967 7.529 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4.9  Regressions results for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-2 (Dependent Variable: 
LaraDiscExp) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.176   -0.146  0.106   0.188  
 (-0.943)   (-0.765)  (0.461)   (0.816)  
Concentr3%  -0.213   -0.165  0.048   0.050 
  (-1.074)   (-0.859)  (0.197)   (0.249) 
Concentr5%   -0.193     -0.071   
   (-1.084)     (-0.329)   
Block10% -0.015 -0.012  -0.031  0.001 0.010  -0.035  
 (-0.188) (-0.151)  (-0.370)  (0.019) (0.124)  (-0.415)  
Block20%   -0.037  -0.036   0.085  0.073 
   (-0.680)  (-0.614)   (1.182)  (1.068) 
CeoHd -0.537 -0.586* -0.545 0.057 -0.163 -0.375 -0.374 -0.445 0.547 0.317 
 (-1.563) (-1.677) (-1.564) (0.076) (-0.223) (-1.015) (-1.003) (-1.249) (0.815) (0.470) 
CeoHdSq    -1.155 -0.753    -2.001 -1.558 
    (-0.907) (-0.614)    (-1.522) (-1.368) 
NonExecHd -0.794** -0.835** -0.774** -0.880** -0.859** -0.546 -0.555 -0.709 -0.727 -0.831 
 (-2.246) (-2.359) (-2.131) (-2.381) (-2.269) (-0.891) (-0.911) (-1.201) (-1.212) (-1.399) 
Ned% 0.077 0.077 0.119 0.113 0.135 0.032 0.041 0.031 0.131 0.096 
 (0.387) (0.384) (0.616) (0.586) (0.683) (0.173) (0.224) (0.167) (0.630) (0.493) 
Duality 0.065 0.067 0.058 0.044 0.042 0.085 0.080 0.078 0.073 0.078 
 (0.870) (0.921) (0.811) (0.525) (0.536) (1.354) (1.288) (1.195) (1.157) (1.142) 
BoardSz 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 
 (0.039) (0.097) (0.249) (-0.026) (0.090) (0.335) (0.328) (0.325) (0.352) (0.258) 
LnAssets -0.009 -0.016 -0.009 -0.004 -0.008 0.007 0.005 -0.008 0.022 0.009 
 (-0.426) (-0.649) (-0.387) (-0.190) (-0.326) (0.290) (0.172) (-0.310) (0.797) (0.361) 
SalesGrow 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.026 0.030 0.017 0.025 0.015 
 (1.657) (1.616) (1.499) (1.398) (1.439) (0.584) (0.709) (0.367) (0.571) (0.324) 
Mark2Book 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.012 
 (0.617) (0.764) (0.587) (0.674) (0.636) (1.070) (1.030) (1.375) (1.368) (1.462) 
ROA 0.006 0.020 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.217 0.211 0.230 0.192 0.215 
 (0.044) (0.153) (0.023) (-0.005) (0.019) (1.128) (1.067) (1.153) (0.921) (1.013) 
Leverage 0.064 0.074 0.036 0.049 0.045 -0.003 0.009 0.048 -0.048 -0.027 
 (0.945) (1.092) (0.518) (0.695) (0.639) (-0.034) (0.084) (0.454) (-0.451) (-0.251) 
AssTurn -0.013 -0.016 -0.013 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.013 0.038 0.023 
 (-0.359) (-0.439) (-0.378) (0.034) (-0.102) (-0.104) (-0.157) (-0.294) (0.629) (0.462) 
DealVal -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.306) (-0.242) (-0.761) (-0.427) (-0.455) (-0.876) (-0.764) (-0.621) (-1.179) (-0.938) 
Constant 0.133 0.221 0.091 0.051 0.077 -0.224 -0.187 -0.013 -0.483 -0.282 
 (0.447) (0.628) (0.291) (0.167) (0.202) (-0.599) (-0.457) (-0.034) (-1.082) (-0.687) 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.198 0.207 0.215 0.209 0.216 0.173 0.167 0.180 0.200 0.197 
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F-test 5.106 5.478 4.096 7.298 5.898 0.796 0.832 0.923 4.266 2.743 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.668 0.632 0.542 0.000 0.005 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6.2.3 Comparison of the results between the two types of buyouts 
High outside ownership concentration is associated with less REM in year T-2 
preceding MBOs, but with more REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs. Preceding 
MBOs, substantial equity ownership by outsiders generates greater incentives 
and ability to monitor (Cornett et al., 2008), and leads to better monitoring of 
REM behaviours. However, preceding an IBO, significant shareholders might 
be concerned about a firm's performance and put pressure on managers who 
may in turn respond by engaging in positive REM to make their firm look more 
valuable.  
 
High levels of institutional shareholding are associated with less REM in year 
T-2 preceding MBOs. Institutional investors provide a high degree of monitoring, 
removing incentives for managers to engage in REM behaviours in order to 
meet short-term earnings goals (Bushee, 1998). Furthermore, as REM has real 
economic consequences for the long-term value of firms, institutional investors 
are likely to have a better understanding of the long-term impact of their 
operating decisions, leading them to make more effort in monitoring and 
controlling REM activities. Preceding IBOs, institutional shareholding has no 
effect on REM. This might be because, given a larger firm size, there are more 
institutional investors in IBO firms than there are in MBO firms. As the role of 
institutions is ambiguous and varies across firms, an increase in institutional 
shareholding leads to a decrease in monitoring in IBO firms. Furthermore, as 
institutional investors might have large portfolios, they are less likely to focus 
on all of their investments. As a result, there may be an increase in free-riding 
problem for institutional investors in IBO firms, as the monitoring cost to any 
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individual institution falls in proportion to all institutions.  
 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders is associated with more 
REM both in years T-1 and in T-2 preceding MBOs. As the role of blockholders 
is ambiguous and varies across firms, these shareholders are generally passive 
and are likely to support managers rather than monitoring them (Gibbs, 1993). 
As suggested by the results from the univariate tests, managers engage in 
positive REM in order to increase reported earnings preceding MBOs. This 
supports blockholders in their quest for growth. Moreover, as blockholders 
might invest to fund MBOs, they are more likely to side with management for 
strategic alignment preceding buyouts. Positive REM, which eventually 
maximises the interests of non-managerial large blockholders, might facilitate 
the overall execution of MBOs.  
 
However, preceding IBOs, the presence of non-managerial large blockholders 
is associated with more REM in year T-1, but less REM in year T-2. This might 
be because non-managerial large blockholders have the strongest incentives 
to be active owners, as well as having the capacity to determine the outcome 
of particular corporate policy decisions. Hence, as IBOs are difficult to predict, 
the optimal monitoring strategy for these shareholders might be to focus on the 
long-term success of a firm, and thus mitigate REM in year T-2. However, as 
the undervaluation of a firm may increase in year T-1, managers may have 
stronger motivations to engage in REM, which might make them more 
determined to resist pressure from blockholders. Managers might also attempt 
to signal their competence and the growth prospects of their firms to the market 
through engaging in positive REM. Furthermore, managers might use to 
positive REM, which could lead to an increase of a firm’s value, as a respond 
to the pressure from blockholders.  
 
Preceding MBOs, CEO ownership has a hump-shaped relationship with REM 
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in year T-1. In the context of MBOs, low levels of managerial ownership are 
insufficient to act as incentive mechanism. As managers tend to buy their firm 
in an MBO, engaging in REM in order to facilitate the execution of MBOs is in 
their best interests. However, as managers will remain in a firm after a buyout, 
high levels of ownership make them consider the long-term success of their 
business, leading to lower levels of REM. Furthermore, if selling shareholders 
perceive that managers with high levels of ownership have cheated by 
engaging in REM preceding MBOs, they will demand a higher transaction price 
or even make a legal challenge against management.  
 
In year T-2, high CEO ownership is associated with more discretionary 
expenses cut, but with less overproduction. As managers might plan MBOs 
several years ahead, they can systematically plan their REM methods, 
schedule their manipulation, and gauge the appropriate extent to which they 
can engage in REM. Cutting discretionary expenses has negative economic 
consequence for a firm in the long term, but overproduction has immediate 
short-term negative economic consequences. Interference in short-term 
operations might lead to abnormal firm performance and is likely to attract the 
attention of shareholders, and thus affect the overall execution of an MBO. 
Managers therefore ensure the overall success of MBOs by minimising short-
term interference in normal operations.  
 
Preceding IBOs, CEO ownership is associated with more REM in year T-1. High 
levels of shareholding give managers more control and power, hence managers 
find that they can follow their own objectives with less fear of discipline (Morck 
et al., 1988). As the incidence of IBOs is difficult to predict, managers will 
engage in every available REM method to increase earnings once they 
perceive that their firm has been undervalued in year T-1 preceding IBOs. 
However, the squared transformation of CEO ownership is associated with 
more REM of sales manipulation, but with less SGA expenses cut in year T-2 
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preceding IBOs. High shareholdings might also make managers considers the 
long-term success of their firms. SGA expenses cut might affect the long-term 
operations of a firm, whereas sales manipulation only interferes in short-term 
operations. Moreover, SGA expenses cut is easier to detect than sales 
manipulation is. Therefore, engaging in only one of these REM methods at a 
time might reduce the chances of the REM being detected. Thus managers with 
high ownership may focus on the long-term success of their firm by engaging 
only in sales manipulation rather than cutting SGA expenses in year T-2 prior 
to IBOs. 
 
Therefore, it can be seen that CEO ownership has complex effects on REM 
preceding buyouts. Preceding MBOs, managers might plan MBOs several 
years ahead, thus they can systematically plan their REM activities, 
manipulation schedule, and gauge the appropriate extent to which they can 
engage. High levels of ownership generally lead managers to choose an 
optimal REM plan that ensures the long-term success of their business after a 
buyout. Preceding IBOs, high levels of ownership may lead managers to focus 
on the long-term success of their firm, leading to less REM in T-2. However, in 
year T-1, the pressure of firm undervaluation may cause managers worry about 
becoming the target of an IBO, and high ownership may lead them to use more 
opportunities to engage in REM.  
 
Equity ownership by non-executive directors is associated with more REM in 
year T-1, but it has no significant relationship with REM in year T-2 prior to IBOs. 
In year T-2, higher ownership might make non-executive directors less 
independent, and thus impede their effectiveness as monitors. Moreover, non-
executive directors may perform little or no real monitoring role as they lack the 
necessary independence, time, expertise, and information to challenge 
management activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and 
Kraakman, 1991). In year T-1, REM could be used to improve short-term 
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earnings, reduce the undervaluation of a firm and increase the market's 
confidence in its future performance. Managers might engage in positive REM 
in response to pressure from non-executive directors. Preceding MBOs, equity 
ownership by non-executive directors has no relationship with REM. Managers 
might have several years to plan MBOs ahead. They can systematically plan 
their REM methods, manipulation schedule and the appropriate extent to which 
they engage. This makes it difficult for non-executive directors to spot the REM. 
Furthermore, non-executive directors might be afraid of losing their position on 
a board after a buyout, which in turn compromises their ability to monitor REM 
behaviours. 
 
High percentages of non-executive directors on boards are associated with 
more REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs. Managers might be under pressure from 
non-executive directors to improve firm performance and they may respond by 
engaging in REM through overproduction in order to increase their firm's value 
in the short term firm and to ensure the long-term success of the business. 
Furthermore, certain types of REM could improve short-term earnings to reduce 
undervaluation and to increase the market's confidence in the future 
performance of a firm. Thus having more non-executive directors on a board 
leads to more REM of overproduction. Moreover, as non-executive directors 
may perceive overproduction as too damaging to a firm’s short-term growth 
potential, the findings in this study might indicate that non-executive directors 
have a great focus on abnormal changes to production costs. In addition, a firm 
might have increased undervaluation, placing it at risk of an IBO. As buyout 
firms are not required to hire as many non-executive directors as listed firms 
are, non-executive directors might be afraid of losing their position on boards 
after buyouts; therefore, they support managers in positive REM preceding 
IBOs. Prior to MBOs, if managers have a systematic plan for REM, it will be 
difficult for non-executive directors to detect, and thus the percentages of non-
executive directors on boards has no relationship with REM preceding MBOs.  
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CEO duality is associated with more SGA expense cuts, but with less R&D 
expense cuts in year T-1 preceding MBOs. CEO duality concentrates power in 
the CEO’s position (Cornett et al., 2008) and facilitates the CEO to effectively 
control the information that is available to other board members, potentially 
impairing their role as effective monitors (Jensen, 1993). Hence, CEO duality is 
associated with greater SGA expense cuts. As R&D expense cuts cause more 
damage to the long-term success of a firm than SGA expense cuts do, a CEO's 
reputation will be affected if any REM by R&D expense cuts is detected. If 
selling shareholders perceive that managers have cheated by engaging in REM 
preceding MBOs, they will demand a higher transaction price or even make a 
legal challenge. CEO duality is also associated with more REM of 
overproduction in year T-2 preceding MBOs. Since managers will remain in a 
firm after an MBO, they prefer to increase its long-term success by choosing to 
engage in REM that only causes short-term interference in normal operations. 
In addition, as managers might plan MBOs several years ahead, they can 
systematically plan their REM resolutions, manipulation schedule, and the 
appropriate extent to engage. Thus, the inconsistency of these results might be 
because of the systematic arrangement of REM strategies.  
 
Preceding IBOs, CEO duality is associated with more REM of sales 
manipulation but less REM of R&D expenses cut in year T-1. Prior to IBOs, 
sales manipulation is the optimal REM method as it may be difficult to detect 
and it only affects short-term operations. Cutting R&D expenses causes more 
damage to a firm's long-term success than other forms of REM do, and it will 
affect a CEO’s reputation if it is detected. Furthermore, as duality increases a 
CEO's power to control the results of corporate events, they are less concerned 
about the possibility of unexpected IBOs. CEO duality also leads CEOs to think 
about the long-term success of a firm, and to maintain their reputation. Hence, 
CEO duality lead to less REM of R&D expense cuts preceding IBOs.  
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Larger boards are associated with more REM in years T-1 and T-2 preceding 
MBOs. Larger sizes might be detrimental to boards' effectiveness and 
cohesiveness as they make it more difficult to arrange board meetings and 
reach a consensus, leading to slower and less-efficient decision-making, and 
to directors becoming less likely to criticise the behaviour of top managers 
(Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). Hence, larger boards result in a weaker 
monitoring of REM preceding MBOs.  
 
Larger boards are associated with more REM of sales manipulation but less 
REM of R&D expenses cut in year T-1 preceding IBOs. Problems associated 
with coordination and communication and free-riding directors might arise in 
larger boards (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996), hence large board sizes lead to 
more REM of sales manipulation. However, as R&D expense cuts are easier to 
spot than sales manipulation is, having more board members might increase 
the ability of a board to monitor and detect cuts to R&D expenses, leading to 
less REM. 
 
To conclude, high outside ownership concentration mitigates REM preceding 
MBOs, but it facilitates REM preceding IBOs. Moreover, high institutional 
shareholding mitigates REM preceding MBOs. In addition, the presence of non-
managerial large blockholders facilitates REM in year T-1 preceding both MBOs 
and IBOs. However, it mitigates REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs. Furthermore, 
CEO ownership has complex effects on REM preceding buyouts. Preceding 
MBOs, high ownership generally leads managers to choose an optimal REM 
plan that ensures the long-term success of a business after a buyout. However, 
the pressures of firm undervaluation might cause managers to worry about 
becoming an IBO target, and high ownerships may lead managers to use more 
opportunities to engage in REM preceding IBOs. Additionally, high equity 
ownership by non-executive directors and high percentages of non-executive 
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directors on boards facilitates REM prior to IBOs. CEO duality and large boards 
facilitate REM preceding both MBOs and IBOs, but R&D expense cuts are 
always mitigated.  
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
This section investigates three potential factors that might drive the results of 
this study:  
 
1) Leveraged buyout targets usually have undervalued shares in the market 
relative to firms that remain public (Weir and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986), and 
the degree of undervaluation might affect the results in multivariate tests. 
 
2) The interpretation of the results of multivariate tests is different from that in 
prior literature if the values of dependent variables have been indicated as 
significantly negative in univariate tests. 
 
3) High correlations between sales growth (Sales Growth) and return on assets 
(ROA) in year T-2 preceding MBOs might lead to a problem of multicollinearity 
in the multivariate regression models.  
 
The results of sensitivity analysis suggest that these three factors do not drive 
the results of this study. Therefore, the results in this study are robust.  
 
With regard to the first concern, that the research might be affected by the 
undervaluation of buyout firms, I control for this factor in multivariate tests to 
ensure the robustness of this research. Self-motivated managers are likely to 
exercise REM either to depress earnings in preparation for MBOs or to increase 
earnings to prevent any potential IBOs. As managers cannot precisely 
anticipate IBO offers, they use the industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio as a 
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benchmark to trigger their REM behaviour. Therefore, I re-run all multivariate 
tests with firm undervaluation as an additional control variable in all the 
regression models. As in prior studies (e.g. Alford, 1992; Francis et al., 2005), 
the undervaluation of a firm is measured as the industry-adjusted price-
earnings ratio, which is the difference between the target firm’s price–earnings 
ratio and the median industry price–earnings ratio (PE Ratio).  
 
Table 3.1.6 shows the t-test results for the industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio 
in years T-1 and T-2. The industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio of MBOs is 
significantly negative in both years, which suggests that MBO firms had lower 
price–earnings ratios than their industry peers had. Moreover, the industry-
adjusted price–earnings ratio of IBOs is significantly negative in year T-1, which 
suggests that IBO firms had lower price–earnings ratios than their industry 
peers had one year before the buyouts. Hence, preceding buyouts, both MBO 
and IBO firms were undervalued relative to firms that remained public, which is 
consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g. Weir and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 
1986). Therefore, it is rational to control for firm undervaluation in this study. 
 
Table 3.1.6  T-test results of industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio 
Table 1.6 T-test results of industry-adjusted price earnings ratio 
 Hypothesis Year T-1 Year T-2 
 Ho1: mean=0 t-Stat2 p-Value t-Stat p-Value 
MBOs Ha: < 0 --2.5915*** 0.0054 -2.3274** 0.0108 
IBOs Ha: < 0 -1.6643** 0.0499 -0.0267 0.4894 
Note 1: Ho: is Null Hypothesis, and Ha: is Alternative Hypothesis; 
Note 2: Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to investigate whether firm undervaluation affects the regression results, 
I re-run all the regression tests with undervaluation (PE Ratio) as an additional 
control variable. The OLS regression model in this sensitivity analysis is as 
follows: 
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𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟3% + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟5% + 𝛽4𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘10%
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘20% + 𝛽6𝐶𝑒𝑜𝐻𝑑 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑒𝑜𝐻𝑑𝑆𝑞 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑒𝑑% + 𝛽9𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑧 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽12𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘
+ 𝛽14𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽16𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽17𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙
+ 𝛽18𝑃𝐸 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝜀 
 
Variables definitions:  
PE Ratio: is the industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio (= the difference between 
the target firm’s price–earnings ratio and the median industry price–earnings 
ratio  
 
Panels A and B of Tables 3.5.1 in the Appendix report one example of the OLS 
regression test results from the sensitivity analysis for MBOs in years T-1 and 
T-2. Panels A and B of Tables 3.6.1 in the Appendix report one example of the 
OLS regression test results from the sensitivity analysis for IBOs in years T-1 
and T-2.15   
 
After controlling for undervaluation in the sensitivity analysis, the regression 
results are consistent with those from the multivariate tests in Section 3.6.2. 
This suggests that the degree of undervaluation does not drive the results of 
this study. Hence, the results of this study are robust in this respect.   
 
Secondly, as discussed before, the interpretation of regression results in the 
multivariate tests section will be different from prior literature, as this study 
includes dependent variables for which the value has been indicated as 
significantly negative in univariate tests. Specifically, all the dependent 
variables are REM proxies. If a REM proxy in univariate tests are significantly 
negative, a positive correlation between this REM proxy and corporate 
                                                             
15 Additional sensitivity analysis tables available from the author.  
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governance mechanisms indicates that governance mechanisms mitigate the 
REM, and a negative correlation between them indicates that governance 
mechanisms facilitate the REM. In order to investigate the robustness of the 
results and ensure this kind of interpretation is correct, I have transformed all 
the dependent variables into absolute values and then re-run all of the same 
multivariate regression models.  
 
By transforming all dependent variables into absolute values in sensitivity 
analysis, dependent variables for which the value has been indicated as 
significantly negative in univariate tests will not drive the interpretation of the 
findings of this study. No matter whether the sign of the dependent variable that 
has been indicated in univariate tests is significantly positive, significantly 
negative, or insignificant, the interpretation of the results will be the same. More 
specifically, a positive correlation between an REM proxy and corporate 
governance mechanisms indicates that the governance mechanisms facilitate 
the REM, and a negative correlation between an REM proxy and a corporate 
governance mechanism indicates that the governance mechanism mitigates 
the REM.  
 
Panels A and B of Tables 3.7.1 to 3.7.2 in the Appendix report some example 
of the OLS regression test results from the sensitivity analysis obtained by 
transforming all dependent variables into absolute values for MBOs in years T-
1 and T-2. Panels A and B of Tables 3.8.1 in the Appendix report one example 
of the OLS regression test results from the sensitivity analysis obtained by 
transforming all the dependent variables into absolute values for IBOs in years 
T-1 and T-2. 16 
 
From Table 3.7.1 to 3.8.1, the results in the sensitivity analysis are largely 
                                                             
16 Additional sensitivity analysis tables available from the author.  
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consistent with those from the multivariate tests in Section 3.6.2. Specifically, 
although the level of significance changes for few variables, the correlations 
between the absolute values of REM proxies and corporate governance 
mechanisms are largely consistent with the interpretations from the multivariate 
tests in Section 3.6.2. For instance, abnormal SGA expenses (GuySGA) in year 
T-1 preceding MBOs has been indicated as significantly negative in the 
univariate tests in Section 3.6.1.1, and it has a significant negative relationship 
with CEO duality (Duality) in the multivariate tests of Section 3.6.2.1. This 
indicates that CEO duality is associated with more REM in year T-1 prior to 
MBOs. In Panel A of Table 3.7.2, the absolute value of SGA expenses (GuySGA) 
has a positive relationship with CEO duality (Duality), which also suggests that 
CEO duality is associated with more REM in year T-1 prior to MBOs. In this 
respect, the results from the sensitivity analysis are consistent with the results 
from the multivariate tests. Therefore, the interpretation of the multivariate test 
results for dependent variables for which the value has been indicated as 
significantly negative in univariate tests is correct, and the results of this study 
in this respect are robust. 
 
Third, the high correlation between sales growth (SalesGrow) and return on 
assets (ROA) in year T-2 of MBOs leads to a multicollinearity problem in several 
regression models. Specifically, the regression models with dependent 
variables of discretionary expenses (RowDiscExp), SGA expenses (GuySGA), 
and discretionary expenses (LaraDiscExp) have multicollinearity problems. In 
order to check the validity of the multivariate regression results, this study 
controls for multicollinearity and re-runs the same regression models while 
omitting each of these highly correlated variables in turn to check the validity of 
the models and results.17 The results suggest that the tests from the sensitivity 
                                                             
17 The OLS regression results by omitting each of these highly correlated variables in turn 
are available from the author.  
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analysis are consistent with those from the multivariate tests. Therefore, the 
results in this study are robust, and multicollinearity is not problematic.  
3.8 Conclusion  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a significant increase in the 
number and value of leveraged buyouts in the UK. As leveraged buyouts are a 
distinct and increasingly important type of acquisition in the financial market, 
the self-interested behaviour of managers prior to buyouts may significantly 
affect the buyout transactions. Therefore, this paper investigates whether 
managers engage in different REM behaviours preceding MBOs and IBOs in 
the UK.  
 
As REM uses managerial discretions over operational business decisions, 
good corporate governance should limit managers’ ability and thus may 
potentially restrict REM behaviours. Hence, this study also examines whether 
corporate governance mechanisms, especially outside shareholders and board 
characteristics, can mitigate REM activities. This study extends the REM and 
corporate governance literature to leveraged buyouts setting in a way that 
differs from prior studies in at least five aspects: (1) it extends the study of REM 
and corporate governance to the context of takeovers; (2) by specifying 
different managerial incentives preceding leveraged buyouts, the sample is 
subdivided into MBO and IBO firms for investigation; (3) the effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on REM behaviours in leveraged buyout settings are 
examined; (4) if the dependent variables of REM proxies in univariate tests are 
significantly negative, a positive correlation between a REM proxy and 
corporate governance mechanisms indicates that the governance mechanisms 
mitigate REM, and a negative correlation between them indicates that the 
governance mechanisms facilitate the REM; and (5) it extends REM study in 
the UK context.  
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I hypothesise that managers may engage in negative REM preceding MBOs in 
an attempt to convince shareholders to accept a lower buyout price. In MBOs, 
managers are buyers and are likely to remain with the firm. They usually have 
high levels of personal investment in firms after buyouts. In the context of MBOs, 
the direct involvement of managers in the transaction generates conflicts of 
interests. Managers wish to pay the lowest possible purchase price, whereas 
their shareholders wish to sell their shares for the highest possible price. 
Managers’ personal economic stake may motivate them to depress pre-buyout 
accounting earnings in order to portray their firm as underperforming, hence 
increasing the possibility that shareholders will accept a lower buyout price 
(Perry and Williams, 1994).  
 
I also hypothesise that managers may engage in positive REM preceding 
MBOs, possibly to secure external funding when they have external financing 
requirements. In most cases of MBOs, internal financing by managers is 
insufficient to raise the cash they require to implement a buyout. Managers 
need additional financing from external sources through secured bank loans, 
and further external debt financing through private placements of subordinated 
claims from institutional investors. Managers will be concerned about their 
ability to access external sources of finance, especially when they have fewer 
fixed assets available to secure loans. Hence, managers might manipulate 
earnings upward to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of a 
firm’s value in order to secure financing (Fischer and Louis, 2008).  
 
Moreover, I hypothesise that managers engage in positive REM preceding IBOs 
to reduce the undervaluation of their firms and/or increase the potential buyout 
costs in an attempt to impede any potential IBO bidding. IBO targets usually 
have undervalued shares in the market relative to firms that remain public (Weir 
and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986). Managers are concerned about 
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undervaluation as its potential consequence is an IBO. IBO buyers argue that 
the undervaluation of shares results from the poor decisions of prior managers, 
and they may see a leveraged buyout as a means of turning a failing company 
around (Hafzalla, 2009; Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2005b). Managers 
will wish to retain their managerial discretions within a firm, but third-party 
buyers may wish to take control and engage in active monitoring or make 
changes to a firm’s existing management team after a buyout (Hafzalla, 2009). 
There is also uncertainty associated with the potential for a business to be re-
sold again within several years, threatening managers’ job security (Denis and 
Denis, 1995). Therefore, managers may be motivated to engage in positive 
REM to reduce firm undervaluation and/or increase the potential buyout costs 
in an attempt to impede any potential IBO bidding.  
 
This chapter investigates four types of REM: sales manipulation, production 
manipulation, manipulation of discretionary SG&A expenditures and 
manipulation of R&D expenses. Sales manipulation refers to the behaviour of 
managers that attempts to manipulate sales in an effort to affect reported 
earnings. Managers could cut prices or offer more lenient credit terms towards 
the end of a year in an effort to accelerate sales from the next fiscal year into 
the current year. Managers may also increase prices or offer less lenient credit 
terms towards the end of the year in an effort to delay sales from the current 
year into the next fiscal year. Production manipulation can be achieved by 
producing more (or less) units than necessary. The fixed overhead costs of 
production can thus be spread over a larger (or smaller) number of units, thus 
lowering (or increasing) the fixed costs per unit. Hence, production manipulation 
can decrease (or increase) reported COGS, and the firm can report higher (or 
lower) profits in the current year. Furthermore, as portions of SG&A expenses 
and R&D expenditures are subject to managerial discretion, managers may 
reduce (or increase) these in an effort to increase (or decrease) profits in the 
current year.  
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Empirical tests addresses all UK leveraged buyout companies from 1997 to 
2011, and cross-sectional models developed by Roychowdhury (2006) are 
used to estimate REM proxies in signed values. Specifically, abnormal CFO 
proxies for sales manipulations, abnormal production costs proxies for 
overproduction and abnormal discretionary expenses proxies for discretionary 
expenses manipulation. In addition, alternative REM proxies in signed value 
from the models of Gunny (2010) and Lara et al. (2012) have been used to 
increase the robustness of this study. 
 
The results show that managers engage in positive REM to increase reported 
earnings in both years T-1 and T-2 preceding MBOs (defining the occurrence 
of buyouts at year T-0). Managers engage in positive REM through sales 
manipulation of offering excessive price discount or more credit sales, 
overproduction to reduce COGS and cutting discretionary expenses. This 
supports hypotheses H2-2ai, H2-2bi, H2-2ci, and H2-2di. The findings might be 
explained by the research of Fischer and Louis (2008), which indicates that 
managers engage in positive accrual earnings management to secure external 
funding under external financing requirements and to lower their financing costs.  
 
Moreover, the results show that managers may use more opportunities to 
engage in positive REM in year T-1 than they do in year T-2 prior to MBOs, as 
the results for discretionary expense cuts become less significant, or 
insignificant, in year T-2. The results signal that managers intensively engage 
in REM in the last year before buyouts.  
 
The results also show that either abnormal SG&A expense cuts or abnormal 
R&D expenditure cuts are significant in a given year. This suggests that SG&A 
expense cuts and R&D expenditure cuts could be used as alternatives when 
managers engage in positive REM prior to MBOs. As these types of REM are 
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easy to spot, engaging in only one type of discretionary expenses manipulation 
at a time minimises the risks of detection.  
 
In addition, there is no evidence of mean reversion from year T-2 preceding 
MBOs. The results of aggregate REM measures (year T-1 + year T-2) are the 
same as those for year T-1 preceding MBOs, which suggests that managers do 
engage in positive REM preceding MBOs, and no mean reversion. This 
indicates that some managers might systematically plan the manipulation of 
REM more than two years ahead.  
 
The results reveal that managers engage in positive REM to increase reported 
earnings in years T-1 and T-2 prior to IBOs. Managers engage in positive REM 
through sales manipulation of offering excessive price cuts or more credit sales, 
overproduction to reduce COGS, and cutting discretionary expenses. This 
supports hypotheses H2-1a, H2-1b, H2-1c, and H2-1d. Based on known IBOs, the 
results suggest that managers use positive REM to increase pre-buyout 
earnings in an attempt to increase the perceived value of their firms and/or 
increase the potential costs of a buyout, thus decreasing the probability of an 
IBO actually occurring  
 
Prior to IBOs, the results also show that either abnormal SG&A expense cuts 
or abnormal R&D expenditure cuts is significant in a given year. This suggests 
that managers might engage in either of these practices one at a time (but not 
together), thereby reducing the risk of being detected and minimising 
interference with normal operations.  
 
In addition, the results of aggregate REM measures (year T-1 + year T-2) are 
almost the same as those from both years T-1 and T-2 preceding IBOs, which 
indicates that there is no evidence of mean reversion preceding IBOs. As 
managers do not have much time to prepare REM strategies before IBOs, this 
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finding also suggests that managers do not systematically plan REM 
manipulation for years. Furthermore, as IBOs are difficult to predict, once 
managers realise their firms are undervalued, they will engage in nearly every 
REM methods available in order to increase the value of their firm. 
 
As REM uses managerial discretions over operational business decisions, 
weak corporate governance enables greater managerial discretions to 
manipulate earnings, but good corporate governance limits managers’ ability 
and thus potentially restricts REM behaviours. Hence, corporate governance 
might be important for mitigating REM behaviours. This study provides a new 
angle on REM by examining whether corporate governance mechanisms can 
mitigate REM activities. Boards have essential functions in respect to 
monitoring management behaviour and ensuring that a company operates in 
the long-term interests of its shareholders (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Outside 
shareholders, especially institutional investors, also have strong incentives to 
monitor managers and remove the incentives for managerial myopic 
behaviours (Bushee, 1998). Close monitoring by a board and outside 
shareholders may reduce the self-interested use of managerial discretions, 
thus mitigating REM behaviour. Therefore, this study investigates whether 
corporate governance mechanisms related to outside shareholders and board 
characteristics can mitigate REM activities.  
 
The results of the multivariate tests suggest that corporate governance 
mechanisms have different effects on REM preceding MBOs and IBOs.  
 
Outsiders who hold significant blocks of shares have the opportunity, resources, 
and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence managers (Cornett et al., 2008). 
Their substantial equity ownership means that they can function as effective 
agents of external shareholders, and they have greater incentives and 
capabilities when it comes to monitoring and restricting managerial discretions 
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(Bhagat et al., 1999). Therefore, highly concentrated outside ownership is 
expected to compel managers to make choices that maximise the wealth of 
shareholders rather than serving their own interests by manipulating earnings.  
 
Prior to MBOs, high outside ownership concentration is associated with less 
REM in year T-2, which supports hypothesis H2-3a. Preceding MBOs, substantial 
equity ownership by outsiders generates greater incentives and ability to 
monitor managers (Cornett et al., 2008), and leads to better monitoring of REM 
behaviours. However, high outside ownership concentration is associated with 
more REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H2-3a. Preceding IBOs, outside shareholders with substantial holdings might be 
concerned about firm undervaluation and put pressure on managers to improve 
firm performance. Managers might then engage in positive REM to make the 
firm look more valuable as they are unlikely to be able to genuinely improve 
firm performance in the short term. Hence high outside ownership concentration 
mitigates REM behaviours prior to MBOs, but it facilitates REM preceding IBOs.  
 
Institutional investors remove the incentives for managers to make self-
interested use of their discretions by closely monitoring their behaviour. This 
monitoring can occur either explicitly, through governance practices, or implicitly, 
by information gathering and correctly pricing the impact of managerial 
decisions. If institutions hold substantial equity in the long term, they have 
strong incentives to incur the cost of explicitly monitoring and ensure managers 
do not use REM to meet short-term earnings goals (Bushee, 1998). Institutional 
investors also tend to be more experienced and knowledgeable than other 
investors are, and they are likely to have a better understanding of the long-
term impact of firms’ operating decisions. Institutional investors therefore often 
make more effort to monitor and control REM activities than other investors do.  
 
The results indicate that high levels of institutional shareholding are associated 
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with less REM in year T-2 preceding MBOs, which supports hypothesis H2-3b. 
Institutional investors provide a high degree of monitoring, removing incentives 
for managers to engage in REM behaviour just to meet short-term earnings 
goals (Bushee, 1998). Furthermore, as REM has real economic consequences 
for the long-term value of firms, institutional investors are likely to have a better 
understanding of the long-term impact of their operating decisions, leading 
them to make a greater effort to monitor and control REM activities. Preceding 
IBOs, institutional shareholding has no effect on REM, which is inconsistent 
with hypothesis H2-3b. This might be because, given a larger firm size, there are 
more institutional investors in IBO firms than there are in MBO firms. As the role 
of institutions is ambiguous and varies across firms, increasing the numbers of 
institutional investors leads to a decrease their monitoring function in IBO firms. 
Furthermore, institutional investors might hold large portfolios and only focus 
on the most significant investments. Hence, the problem of investor free-riding 
may arise in IBO firms as the monitoring cost for any individual institution falls 
in proportion to all institutions. Therefore, high levels of institutional 
shareholding mitigate REM preceding MBOs, but have no effect on REM prior 
to IBOs.  
 
Non-managerial large blockholders hold sufficient numbers of shares to give 
them an influential voice in respect to particular corporate policy decisions. 
They have a strong incentive in using their influence and may be effective in 
limiting managerial discretions (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Hence, the 
presence of large blockholders may mitigate REM behaviours. Following the 
majority previous literature (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999), this study tries both a 
10% and a 20% threshold to capture the monitoring and control effects of 
blockholders for robustness.  
 
The presence of non-managerial large blockholders is associated with more 
REM in both years T-1 and T-2 preceding MBOs, which is inconsistent with 
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hypothesis H2-3c. As the role of blockholders is ambiguous and varies across 
firms, these shareholders are generally passive and are likely to support 
managers rather than monitoring them (Gibbs, 1993). As suggested by the 
results from the univariate tests, managers engage in positive REM to increase 
earnings preceding MBOs, which supports blockholders' quest for growth. 
Furthermore, as blockholders might invest to fund MBOs, they are likely to side 
with management for strategic alignment preceding buyouts. Positive REM 
might actually facilitate the overall execution of MBOs, which eventually 
maximises the long-term interests of non-managerial large blockholders  
 
Preceding IBOs, the presence of non-managerial large blockholders is 
associated with more REM in year T-1, but less REM in year T-2, which does 
not support hypothesis H2-3c. Non-managerial large blockholders have the 
strongest incentives to be active owners, and they have the capacity to 
determine the outcome of particular corporate policy decisions. Hence, as IBOs 
are difficult to predict, the optimal monitoring strategy for these shareholders 
might be to focus on the long-term success of a firm, and thus mitigate REM in 
year T-2. However, as firm undervaluation may increase in year T-1, managers 
might have stronger motivations to engage in REM, which may make them 
more determined to resist any pressure from blockholders. Positive REM might 
also help managers to signal their competence and their firms' potential growth 
perspectives to the market. Moreover, IBO targets usually have undervalued 
shares in the market, and blockholders might put pressure on management to 
improve firm performance. Hence, managers might engage in REM to make 
their firm appear more valuable. Therefore, the presence of non-managerial 
large blockholders facilitates REM behaviours preceding MBOs and IBOs in 
year T-1. 
 
Managerial ownership can give rise to agency problems, such as REM, which 
are influenced by a variety of alignment and entrenchment effects (Short and 
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Keasey, 1999). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that where managers 
hold shares in their company, their interests are more likely to align with those 
of other shareholders and discourage them from making decisions that 
compromise the principles of firm value maximisation. However, Morck et al. 
(1988) found that high levels of managerial ownership could lead to 
entrenchment effects. If managers have too much ownership of a firm, they can 
turn back to pursuing their own objectives and ignore the interests of other 
owners, such as consumption of perquisites (Short and Keasey, 1999). Hence, 
similar to prior studies, this study tests for the non-linear effect of management 
ownership on REM.  
 
The results indicate that CEO ownership is generally associated with more 
REM preceding MBOs, which supports hypothesis H2-3d. In year T-1, CEO 
ownership has a hump-shaped relationship with REM. In the context of MBOs, 
low levels of managerial ownership are insufficient to act as incentive 
mechanism. As managers tend to buy their firm, engaging in REM to facilitate 
the execution of an MBO is in their best interests. However, as managers will 
remain in the firm after buyouts, high levels of ownership lead managers to 
consider the long-term success of a business, resulting in lower levels of REM. 
Furthermore, if selling shareholders perceive that managers with high 
ownership have cheated by engaging in REM preceding MBOs, they will 
demand a higher transaction price or even make a legal challenge against 
management.  
 
In year T-2, high CEO ownership is associated with more cuts to discretionary 
expenses, but less manipulation of sales. As managers might plan MBOs 
several years ahead, they can systematically plan their REM resolutions, 
schedule their manipulation and gauge the appropriate extent to which they can 
engage in. Interference in short-term operations might lead to abnormal firm 
performance, which is likely to attract the attention of shareholders, and thus 
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affect the overall MBO execution plan. By planning to minimise short-term 
interference in normal operations, managers ensure the overall success of 
MBOs. 
 
Preceding IBOs, CEO ownership generally is associated with more REM, which 
also supports hypothesis H2-3d. In year T-1 preceding IBOs, CEO ownership is 
associated with more REM. High levels of shareholding gives managers more 
control and power, enabling managers to follow their own objectives with less 
fear of discipline (Morck et al., 1988). As the incidence of IBOs is difficult to 
predict, managers will engage in every REM methods available to increase 
earnings once they perceive that their firm has been undervalued in year T-1. 
However, CEO ownership is associated with more REM of sales manipulation, 
but with less SGA expense cuts in year T-2 preceding IBOs. High shareholdings 
might also encourage managers to consider the long-term success of their firms. 
SGA expense cuts might affect long-term operations, while sales manipulation 
only interferes with short-term operations. Moreover, SGA expense cuts are 
easier to detect than sales manipulation is. Engaging in only one of these 
methods of REM at a time might reduce the chance of detection. Managers with 
high shareholdings may therefore focus on the long-term success of their firm 
by choosing to engage only in sales manipulation in year T-2 prior to IBOs.  
 
It can be seen, then, that CEO ownership has complex effects on REM 
preceding leveraged buyouts, but high levels of CEO ownership generally lead 
to high levels of REM. Preceding MBOs, as managers might plan MBOs several 
years ahead, high ownership generally leads management to choose the 
optimal REM plan, which ensures the long-term success of the business after 
buyouts. Preceding IBOs, high ownership may also lead managers to focus on 
the long-term success of their firms, leading to less REM in year T-2. However, 
in year T-1, the pressure of firm undervaluation may cause managers worry 
about becoming an IBO target, and high ownership may lead managers to use 
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more opportunities to engage in REM.  
 
Non-executive directors with high equity ownership should be more likely to 
protect the interests of other shareholders, as their ownership in a firm aligns 
their interests more to those of external shareholders and gives them good 
reason to monitor managers (Bhagat et al., 1999). High levels of equity 
ownership by non-executive directors are therefore expected to mitigate REM.  
 
The results suggest that equity ownership by non-executive directors has no 
relationship with REM preceding MBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H2-3e. Managers might systematically plan their REM strategies several years 
ahead of MBOs, this makes it difficult for non-executive directors to spot REM 
behaviours, and may explain why equity ownership by non-executive directors 
has no relationship with REM preceding MBOs.   
 
Prior to IBOs, equity ownership by non-executive directors is associated with 
more REM in year T-1, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3e. Higher 
ownership might make non-executive directors less independent, and thus 
impede their ability to effectively monitor managers. Moreover, non-executive 
directors may perform little or no real monitoring role as they lack the necessary 
independence, time, expertise, and information to challenge management 
activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). In 
addition, IBO targets usually have undervalued shares in the market, and non-
executive directors might put pressure on management to improve firm 
performance. Managers might be less likely to genuinely improve firm 
performance in the short term and respond to the pressure by engaging in 
positive REM to make firms look more valuable. Therefore, equity ownership 
by non-executive directors does not mitigate REM prior to MBOs, and it 
facilitates REM prior to IBOs.  
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Non-executive directors have more independence than executive directors 
have. This may mean that they will be more incentivised in respect to monitoring 
managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). They have no economic or 
psychological affiliation with the management that may interfere with their ability 
to challenge managerial operational practices (Fama, 1980). A high percentage 
of non-executive directors is therefore expected to mitigate REM preceding 
buyouts. 
 
The results indicate that high percentages of non-executive directors on boards 
have no impact on REM prior to MBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H2-3f. This may be because systematic planning by managers preceding MBOs 
makes it difficult for non-executive directors to spot REM. Moreover, non-
executive directors may perform little or no real monitoring role as they lack the 
necessary independence, time, expertise and information in order to challenge 
management activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and 
Kraakman, 1991).  
 
Preceding IBOs, the results suggest that high percentages of non-executive 
directors on boards facilitate REM in year T-2 preceding IBOs. This is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3f. Managers might be under pressure from non-
executive directors to improving firm performance. In response to this pressure, 
managers may engage in REM by overproduction in order to increase a firm's 
value in the short term and to ensure the long-term success of the business. 
Furthermore, certain types of REM could improve short-term earnings and 
reduce undervaluation in order to increase market confidence in the future 
performance of a firm. Moreover, as non-executive directors may perceive 
overproduction as too damaging to a firm’s growth potential in the short term, 
this finding might indicate that non-executive directors pay significant attention 
to abnormal changes of production costs. In addition, there might be an 
increase in firm undervaluation, which might result in an IBO. As buyout firms 
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are not required to hire as many non-executive directors as listed firms are, 
non-executive directors might be afraid of losing their position on a board after 
a buyout, leading them to support managers in positive REM preceding IBOs. 
 
CEO duality facilitates a CEO to conceal or reveal certain information to 
members of a board, reducing transparency and potentially impairing a board's 
ability to monitor business operations effectively (Jensen, 1993). It also 
impedes certain controls and balances that normally curb the activities of CEOs 
(Cornett et al., 2008). CEO duality might therefore impede effective monitoring 
and lead to more REM. The results suggest that CEO duality is associated with 
more REM preceding both MBOs and IBOs, except in the case of R&D expense 
cuts, which supports hypothesis H2-3g. As cutting R&D expenses causes more 
damage to the long-term success of a firm than other forms of REM do, a CEO's 
reputation will be affected if this form of REM is detected. Furthermore, CEO 
duality leads CEOs to consider the long-term success of a firm and therefore 
leads to less REM by R&D expense cuts.  
 
Large board may ensure a minimum required knowledge base (Vafeas, 2005), 
and provide more resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Initially, adding more 
directors to serve a board may extend the ability of monitoring, and especially 
increasing the number of non-executives is expected to have a more positive 
impact than increasing executive directors (Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009). 
Larger boards are therefore expected to mitigate REM preceding buyouts. The 
results suggest that large boards are associated with more REM preceding both 
MBOs and IBOs, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2-3h. Larger board sizes 
might in fact be detrimental the effectiveness and cohesiveness of boards, as 
they make it more difficult to arrange board meetings and reach a consensus, 
leading to slower and less-efficient decision-making, and to directors becoming 
less likely to criticise the behaviour of top managers (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 
1996).  
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In the sensitivity analysis section, I investigated three potential factors that 
might drive the results of this study: 1) Leveraged buyout targets usually have 
undervalued shares in the market relative to firms that remain public (Weir and 
Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986), and the degree of firm undervaluation might affect 
the results in the multivariate tests. 2) The interpretation of the results from the 
multivariate tests differs from that in prior literature if the value of dependent 
variables has been indicated as significantly negative in the univariate tests. 3) 
High correlations between sales growth (SalesGrow) and return on assets (ROA) 
in year T-2 of MBOs might lead to a problem of multicollinearity in multivariate 
regression models. The sensitivity analysis results suggest that these three 
factors do not drive the results of this study. Therefore, the results in this study 
are robust.   
 
In summary, my findings have implications for policy-makers regarding board 
characteristics and outside shareholders. My results suggest that managers are 
motivated to engage in positive REM to secure external funding and to lower 
their financing costs preceding MBOs. Furthermore, managers are motivated 
to use positive REM to increase pre-buyout earnings in an attempt to increase 
the perceived value of their firm and/or increase the potential buyout costs, thus 
decreasing the probability of any potential IBO bidding, which might threaten 
their long-term job security.  
 
My results suggest that managers engage in REM prior to both MBOs and IBOs. 
This implies that shareholders and potential investors should carefully 
scrutinise the relevant accounting earnings figures, as managers have been 
found to engage in REM prior to leveraged buyouts. Moreover, good corporate 
governance mechanisms can mitigate REM preceding leveraged buyouts. 
Specifically, high concentrations of outside ownership and high levels of 
institutional shareholding mitigate REM behaviours prior to MBOs. High CEO 
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ownership, the presence of non-managerial large blockholders, CEO duality, 
and large boards all facilitate REM prior to both MBOs and IBOs. High equity 
ownership by non-executive directors and high percentages of non-executive 
directors on board facilitate REM prior to IBOs. 
 
This study has focused on managerial REM behaviours preceding leveraged 
buyouts. It suggests that managers use positive REM to reduce firm 
undervaluation and increase potential buyout costs in an attempt to impede any 
potential IBO bidding. In other words, the IBO samples in this study are firms 
that might attempted to increase their firm value by engaging in positive 
earnings management, but fail to conceal their underperformance and 
ultimately become IBO targets. It would be ideal to have a control group 
including firms that might attempt to increase their firm value by engaging in 
positive earnings management, successfully concealing their 
underperformance and ultimately impeding any IBO bidding. Due to the 
limitations of the data, this study does not have such a control group. In other 
words, this study is based on actual rather than predicted IBO events data. 
Future research may overcome this issue by including a control group of firms 
that are not subject to IBO biddings but have high likelihood of being at risk of 
a takeover. Drawing on prior literature, future research could construct a model 
to identify firms with a high likelihood of being taken over in the market. By 
adding IBO firm characteristics into the model, it might be possible to distinguish 
firms with high likelihood of IBO takeover risks from firms with high likelihood of 
other takeover type risks. This might be a solution for this issue.  
 
One corporate governance mechanism is identified as possibly having different 
effects on different types of REM simultaneously. For instance, CEO duality 
(Duality) is associated with more SGA expenses (GuySGA) but less R&D 
expenses (GuyRes&Dev) in year T-1 preceding MBOs. My explanation is based 
on the perception of short or long-term firm value maximisation from the 
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perspective of a firm's governance authority. Future research may explore other 
factors that might influence the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms on different types of REM. For instance, if future research could 
consider the specific business environments or characteristics of a firm, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms might change. For 
instance, in an industry that usually requires high levels of R&D investment, the 
governance authority might have high likelihood to constrain the reduction of 
R&D expenses.  
 
Finally, although it was hypothesised that managers might engage in negative 
REM to conceal the real performance of a firm preceding MBOs, increasing the 
possibility of shareholders accepting a lower buyout price, the result was 
inconsistent with this hypothesis. This might be because managers 
systematically use multiple earnings management tools at the same time (both 
REM and AEM), and this issue will be explored in Chapter 4.  
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4. Chapter 4: The Relationship between Accrual-Based 
Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management Prior to 
Leveraged Buyouts 
4.1 Introduction 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between two types of earnings 
management, AEM and REM, preceding leveraged buyouts. This question is 
important because examining only one earnings management technique at a 
time may not explain the overall effect of earnings management activities if 
managers use AEM and REM as complements or as substitutes for each other 
(Fields et al., 2001). Depending on whether they participate in leveraged 
buyouts or not, managers might have different incentives for engaging in 
earnings management, and their choice of earnings management strategies 
might be different. Thus I subdivide leveraged buyouts into MBOs and IBOs.  
 
In Chapters 1 and 2 respectively, I investigated managers’ AEM and REM 
behaviours prior to leveraged buyouts. As discussed in prior chapters, in MBOs, 
managers are buyers that are likely to remain with the firm. They usually have 
high levels of personal investment in the firm after the buyouts. Hence I 
hypothesised that managers’ personal economic stake may motivate them to 
engage in negative earnings management to portray the firm as relatively 
underperforming, so that shareholders might accept a lower buyout price. My 
findings in the previous two chapters suggest that managers engage in negative 
AEM preceding MBOs, which is consistent with this hypothesis. However, my 
findings also suggest that managers engage in positive REM preceding MBOs, 
which counters the hypothesis. Considering both approaches in conjunction, it 
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is worth asking whether or not there is a relationship between AEM and REM 
preceding MBOs.  
 
With regard to IBOs, IBO targets usually have undervalued shares in the market 
relative to firms that remain public (Weir and Wright, 2006; Jensen, 1986). Firm 
undervaluation attracts IBO buyers, who wish to take control and engage in 
active monitoring or make changes to the firm’s existing management team 
after the buyout (Hafzalla, 2009). Even if managers are not dismissed initially, 
the uncertainty regarding whether the business will be re-sold again within 
several years threatens managers’ job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). As 
firm undervaluation attracts IBO buyers, the reduction of firm undervaluation is 
likely to reduce the possibility of becoming an IBO target. Hence I hypothesised 
that, in order to avoid becoming a target, managers might engage in positive 
earnings management to reduce firm undervaluation and/or increase the 
potential buyout costs in an attempt to impede any potential IBO bidding. The 
research indicates no evidence of systematic AEM compared to non-buyout 
firms prior to IBOs, which is inconsistent with this hypothesis. However, 
previous findings suggest that managers engage in positive REM preceding 
IBOs, which is consistent with this hypothesis.  
 
Table 4.1.1 summarises the earnings management results in the previous two 
chapters.  
 
Table 4.1.1  Summary of earnings management hypotheses and results 
 Hypotheses 
Actual Results 
AEM (Accruals) REM (Real) 
MBOs - - + 
IBOs + / + 
Note: ‘+’ means positive earnings management; ‘-’ means negative earnings management; ‘/’ 
means no evidence of systematic earnings management.  
 
The inconsistency of the results in Table 4.1 raises the first research question:  
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1) Is there any relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs and IBOs?  
 
Although both types of earnings management aim to conceal a company’s 
actual performance, AEM and REM have distinct characteristics and impacts 
on firm performance. AEM is achieved by changing discretionary accrual 
choices within the boundary of GAAP. AEM typically takes place after the fiscal 
year end, and it changes the amount of accounting accruals without affecting 
cash flows (Kim and Sohn, 2013; Gunny, 2010). However, AEM has relatively 
higher risks of detection and, in the long-term, AEM carried out in the current 
period must be reversed in the future (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Young, 
1999). Furthermore, managers may have limited flexibility to exercise AEM 
(Gunny, 2010).  
 
REM involves changing the operating decisions of a business, and managers 
have greater discretion when making operating decisions. REM consists of sub-
optimal operating decisions made during a financial year, which are less likely 
to be scrutinised by internal and external auditors. However, REM affects 
current and future cash flows as well as accounting accruals (Kim and Sohn, 
2013). For instance, sales manipulation of excessive credit sales leads to 
higher trade receivable but lower cash flows. Furthermore, managers do not 
have perfect control over the exact amount of REM attained (Zang, 2012). In 
addition, REM distorts the current period's normal operations, which is 
generally value destroying, particularly for the long-term success of a business 
(Kim and Sohn, 2013).  
 
Both AEM and REM are associated with relative benefits and drawbacks. 
Therefore, managers may balance the use of different types of earnings 
management to meet their earnings manipulation targets in different 
circumstances, and to minimise the associated risks and costs at the same time. 
Accordingly, I hypothesise that there is a relationship between AEM and REM 
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preceding both MBOs and IBOs.  
 
A few prior studies examined the relationship between AEM and REM (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Zang, 2012). Cohen et al. 
(2008) investigated the impact of the post-SOX (Sarbanes–Oxley Act) scrutiny 
of accounting practices on the levels of AEM and REM. They found that firms 
switched from AEM to REM due to the increase in potential AEM costs imposed 
by SOX. Cohen and Zarowin (2010a) focused on both AEM and REM activities 
around seasoned equity offerings, and found that the costs of using AEM were 
positively related to the tendency to use REM in the year of seasoned equity 
offerings. These studies do not examine the costs of engaging in REM; hence 
they do not show the substitutive relationship as a function of the relative costs 
of the two earnings management strategies (Zang, 2012).  
 
Zang (2012) introduced a set of variables that explain the constraints of each 
earnings management methods in investigating the relationship between AEM 
and REM. She established a recursive equation system that captures a 
sequence of decisions, in which AEM occurs after REM in order to offset an 
unexpectedly high (or low) REM impact. She found that managers trade off the 
two types of earnings management based on their relative costs, and adjust the 
level of AEM according to the level of REM realised. The limitation of the study 
by Zang (2012) is that her study is based on the whole market, while managers 
might have different incentives for their choice of earnings management 
strategies in different settings, such as leveraged buyouts. The above three 
studies do not adopt a simultaneous equations system that considers the 
decisions made for AEM and REM as being determined jointly.  
 
Prior literature usually assumes that AEM and REM might be related 
sequentially in the sense that REM is engaged prior to AEM (e.g. Lara et al., 
2012; Zang, 2012). This is because REM needs to be engaged in reasonably 
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far ahead of the publication of the corporate reports in order to be feasible, 
whereas AEM is likely to be more flexibly arranged in the short run after fiscal 
year end (Kim and Sohn, 2013). Zang (2012) even suggests that AEM occurs 
after REM in order to offset an unexpectedly high (or low) REM impact. However, 
this sequential relationship is merely based the expectations on theoretical 
and/or practical considerations that REM must be made during an accounting 
period, and AEM is made after a fiscal year end. Moreover, if AEM and REM 
have a sequential relationship, which sequence the relationship is likely to be 
in. Prior studies do not actually test whether they get the sequence right.  
 
Hence, this raises the question that whether there might really be a relationship 
given AEM and REM have distinct differences. Specifically, AEM is managerial 
discretion which focuses on distorting the impression of a firm’s financial 
position through changing discretionary accrual choices within the boundary of 
GAAP. It therefore directly influences the amount of accounting accruals and 
has no direct effect on cash flows (Kim and Sohn, 2013). REM distort normal 
operations in the current period to influence both accounting accruals and cash 
flows, and this impact is less likely to reverse in future (Kim and Sohn, 2013).  
 
In contrast to prior literature, this study suggests that managers might consider 
both AEM and REM jointly, rather than consecutively. Given the availability of 
two earnings management methods, managers might consider the degree that 
they could engage in each type of earnings management before they really 
engage in each of them. This might because the limited flexibility to exercise 
AEM constrains managers, and they also face uncertainty as to which 
accounting treatments the auditor will allow at that time (Gunny, 2010). 
Moreover, both AEM and REM are associated with different drawback, the risk 
preference might lead managers to balance the use of each earnings 
management method.  
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Prior literature tends to simply use the aggregate measure of REM to 
investigate its potential relationship with AEM (e.g. Lara et al., 2012; Zang, 
2012). The aggregation of quite different types of REM activities in prior studies 
might have increased the noise in the measure, which might lead to spurious 
results. This is because managers might adopt different strategies in terms of 
the different types of REM according to their potential long-term or short-term 
effects.  
 
There might be a potential link between AEM and REM. In contrast to argue the 
sequence of AEM and aggregated REM, this study examines whether AEM and 
disaggregated REM might be related. As managers might adopt different 
strategies in terms of the different types of REM, the potential relationship 
between AEM and disaggregate types of REM might be different. Hence, this 
study uses disaggregate types of REM in investigation, which might provide a 
relatively more reliable result.  
 
However, a potential relationship between AEM and REM is not a foregone 
conclusion. As AEM and REM have distinct differences, investigating AEM and 
REM behaviours separately is still valid. Moving from independent AEM and 
REM to interdependent AEM and REM, this chapter makes a further method 
based development to investigate the potential relationship between AEM and 
REM.   
 
This study differs from prior literature in at least two aspects: First, this study 
extends the research on the relationship between AEM and REM into leveraged 
buyout settings by considering the impact of managerial incentives in different 
types of leveraged buyouts. Specifically, as managers may have different 
earnings management incentives in different types of leveraged buyouts, their 
earnings management strategy might vary. Hence I subdivide leveraged 
buyouts into MBO and IBO groups to examine the potential different effects. My 
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sample includes all UK firms who made leveraged buyout announcements 
during the period from 1997 to 2011 and were finally delisted from the London 
Stock Exchange. Accordingly, the sample has been divided into MBOs and 
IBOs.  
 
Before comparing the MBO and IBO samples, it is worth first considering 
management’s choice to participate in buyouts. Before choosing to participate 
in an MBO, the earnings management behaviours of managers are driven by 
incentives that are unrelated to the buyouts, such as pursuing annual bonus 
plans or meeting analysts’ expectations. These incentives for MBO firms are 
similar to those for IBO firms or non-buyout firms. However, once managers 
decide to take part in an MBO, the buyout-related incentives might begin to 
drive earnings management behaviour of managers. From then on, as long as 
the new incentives are unrelated to the earnings management that is already 
being made, comparing MBO and IBO samples is appropriate and makes it an 
ideal setting for this investigation. In other words, earnings management 
behaviours in IBO firms are expected to be different from those in MBO firms 
once managers decide to take part in MBOs.  
 
Moreover, managerial incentives in earnings management decisions may be 
confounded by other factors that are unrelated to the buyout, such as beating 
expectation benchmark. This study has excluded these factors by using the 
earnings management of non-leveraged buyout industrial peers as a standard 
setting to calculate the abnormal AEM and REM of buyout firms. Therefore, any 
abnormal AEM or REM detected in this process is taken to be earnings 
management relating to leveraged buyouts. Due to this control, exploring 
earnings management behaviours prior to MBOs and IBOs is appropriate. 
 
Managers have different incentives to engage in earnings management in 
different types of leveraged buyouts. These may have different effects on the 
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relationships between AEM and REM. Prior to MBOs, as discussed before, 
managers might engage in negative earnings management in order to portray 
their firm as relatively underperforming, so that shareholders accept a lower 
buyout price (DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams, 1994). Managers would 
then expect to increase their firm's value and profitability once the buyout was 
completed, in order to maximise the value of their equity. In this case, AEM is 
the best choice, as it can conceal real firm value in the present and reverse firm 
value in future. Furthermore, AEM only affects accounting accruals, and it 
causes little or no interference in the operation of the firm’s normal business. 
However, the cost of AEM is the associated high risk of detection it carries, in 
comparison with REM. Nevertheless, In MBOs, internal and external auditors 
might be less likely to scrutinise negative AEM than traditional positive AEM, 
which implies a low risk of detection. In contrast, REM cannot be reversed, and 
it interferes with a firm's normal operation in the current period, which is 
generally a value-destroying strategy in the long term (Kim and Sohn, 2013). 
Therefore, managers are likely to engage in more AEM or they might prefer to 
engage in AEM preceding MBOs.  
 
In the previous two chapters, I demonstrated the findings of my study, which 
reveal that managers engage in negative AEM, and also in positive REM, 
preceding MBOs. By considering the managerial preference on AEM, it may be 
possible to detect a relationship between AEM and REM, and the potential 
relationship might be as follows: 
 
In most MBO cases, managers find that internal financing is insufficient to meet 
the cash required to implement the buyouts. Hence, managers will engage in 
positive REM to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the 
firm’s value to secure financing (Fischer and Louis, 2008). However, positive 
REM might increase a firm's value, and thus shareholders might demand a 
higher selling price. As managers intend to buy their firm at a relatively cheap 
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price, they will also engage in negative AEM. The advantage of AEM makes it 
as an ideal tool to adjust the final earnings figures and pre-buyout firm value.  
 
Hence managers might engage in positive REM during the accounting period, 
to increase earnings, and engage in negative AEM after the end of the 
accounting period, to adjust earnings down to the target level of earnings 
management in total. The total level of earnings management should be 
relatively positive in order to enhance external financiers’ perceptions of the 
firm’s value preceding MBOs. Moreover, as only AEM can be reversed in the 
future, the combination of positive REM and negative AEM could conceal more 
of a firm's value prior to an MBO, for a pre-set earnings target. In addition, 
engaging in both AEM and REM might make the analysis of the real 
performance of a firm more complicated for outsiders. Hence it might help to 
persuade shareholders to accept managers’ offer price and make potential 
competing bidders spend more time preparing their bids.  
 
Therefore, if the total earnings management target is slightly positive and easy 
to achieve, managers might engage in more positive REM and more negative 
AEM to conceal more of a firm's value. Hence AEM and REM might have a 
complementary relationship. Moreover, if the total earnings management target 
is aggressively positive and difficult to beat, managers might engage in more 
positive REM and less negative AEM with the primary goal of achieving the 
target level of earnings management. Thus AEM and REM might have a 
substitutive relationship. Therefore, there might be a complimentary or 
substitutive relationship between AEM and REM prior to MBOs.  
 
Prior to IBOs, managers might engage in positive earnings management to 
minimise the undervaluation of their firm, so that to retain their control and 
management positions (Hafzalla, 2009). While AEM can be used to increase 
earnings figures without affecting the normal operation of a business, it is 
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associated with a higher risk of detection in comparison to REM. Prior to IBOs, 
managers’ ability to predict IBOs is much less accurate, and they usually do not 
have a long time to prepare. Furthermore, when the positive AEM is reversed 
in the future, it might affect the firm's value leading to further undervaluation. In 
contrast, REM is less likely to be scrutinised by internal and external auditors, 
as it involves changing operating decisions. The negative effects of REM are 
more likely to occur in the long term compared to AEM reversion, but it is not a 
concern of management at the time. Therefore, preceding IBOs, managers are 
likely to engage in more REM or they might prefer to engage in REM.  
 
In the previous two chapters, I predicted that managers might engage in 
positive earnings management preceding IBOs in an attempt to increase the 
value of their firm and impede any IBO bids. My findings suggest that managers 
engaged in positive REM preceding IBOs, whereas there was no evidence of 
greater AEM being carried out than in non-buyout firms prior to IBOs. By 
considering the managerial preference for REM, it may be possible to detect a 
relationship between AEM and REM, and the potential relationship might be as 
described below.   
 
Prior to IBOs, the total level of earnings management should be positive, in 
order to increase a firm's value. As managers usually do not have a long time 
to prepare earnings management strategies, they are likely to start positive 
REM during the accounting period to increase earnings. Moreover, managers 
might also consider how much AEM they could engage when they manipulate 
REM, as AEM could be engaged after an accounting period end. Hence, if the 
earnings management target is easy to beat, managers might increase REM 
and decrease AEM in consideration of the relative benefits and risks. In this 
case, AEM and REM might have a substitutive relationship. If the earnings 
management target is hard to beat, managers might increase both REM and 
AEM practices concurrently to ensure that the earnings management target can 
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be achieved. Hence AEM and REM might have a complementary relationship. 
Therefore, there might be a substitutive or complimentary relationship between 
AEM and REM prior to IBOs.  
 
Second, this study constructs a simultaneous equation system to capture the 
relationship between AEM and REM. Prior literature suggests that AEM and 
REM jointly depend on each other (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010a). For instance, if a cost-related factor affects the level of one earnings 
management method, managers may adjust the level of another earnings 
management method simultaneously. This implies that, although managers 
engage in AEM and REM at different points in time, decisions about the level 
of different earnings management methods are made simultaneously.  
 
Related researches have used a simultaneous equation system to examine 
how managers use multiple accounting and operating measures to achieve one 
or more goals. For instance, Beatty et al. (1995) constructed a simultaneous 
equations system to investigate how managers in the banking industry use two 
accruals accounts (loan loss provisions and loan charge-offs) and three 
operating transactions (pension settlement transactions, miscellaneous gains 
and losses due to asset sales, and issuance of new securities) to achieve three 
goals (optimal primary capital, reported earnings, and taxable income levels). 
Barton (2001) and Pincus and Shivaram (2002) also used simultaneous 
equations systems, and found that derivative hedging and accruals 
management are simultaneously determined in order to manage earnings 
volatility. Therefore, a simultaneous equations system might be suitable for 
capturing the relationships between AEM and REM preceding leveraged 
buyouts.  
 
Moreover, prior literature has investigated the relationship between AEM and 
REM by considering a set of factors that may constrain managers’ ability to 
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engage in earnings management and the degree to which they can do so (e.g. 
Zang, 2012; Lara et al., 2012). They indicate that the relative costs and 
managers’ ability to use AEM and REM constrain the relationship between the 
two earnings management methods. For instance, if managers are less able to 
use REM or the associated costs are high, they tend to use more AEM. Similarly, 
if the abilities to use AEM are constrained or the costs attached are high, 
managers tend to use more REM. In respect to the buyouts setting, this raises 
a second research question: 
 
2) Do the constraints of earnings management methods have asymmetric 
effects on the relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs and IBOs?  
 
As in previous studies (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Zang, 2012), this study 
assumes that AEM is constrained by scrutiny from auditors, the corporate 
governance mechanisms of audit committees and flexibility within a firm's 
accounting systems.  
 
This study uses Big 5 auditors and auditor tenure as a proxy for scrutiny from 
auditors. Larger audit firms tend to deliver a higher audit quality than smaller, 
less well-known firms do, because they are less willing to accept questionable 
accounting methods and are more likely to detect and report errors and 
irregularities (e.g. Becker et al., 1998). Audit quality increases with tenure, as 
the risk of not detecting errors due to unfamiliarity decreases (Stice, 1991).  
 
Larger audit committees are desirable to elevate their organisational status, and 
are thus more likely to be acknowledged as an authoritative body by the 
external and internal audit functions (Louis Braiotta et al., 2010). This may 
enhance the performance of the internal audit function of audit committees 
(Abbott et al., 2004; Vafeas, 2005). Higher equity ownership by audit committee 
members aligns the interests of these directors with those of external 
Chapter 4 
265 
shareholders, which creates a personal incentive to actively monitor managers 
(Bhagat et al., 1999). Audit committee members with high levels of shareholding 
are less likely to collude with management to manipulate earnings, because it 
would ultimately harm their own interests (Vafeas, 2005).  
 
The length of operating cycles is used as a proxy for the flexibility within a firm’s 
accounting systems. Firms with longer operating cycles have greater flexibility 
for AEM as they have larger accruals accounts and a longer period for accruals 
to reverse (Zang, 2012).  
 
Moreover, in line with previous literature (e.g. Zang, 2012; Lara et al., 2012), 
this study expects that REM is likely to be constrained by firm performance, 
market-leader status in the industry, financial health, institutional ownership, the 
degree of firm undervaluation, board size and the percentage of non-executive 
directors on boards.  
 
Firms with relatively good performance are less likely to use REM to improve 
their earnings figures because managers do not need to engage in earnings 
management to produce better accounting results when their firm already 
perform well (Becker et al., 1998; Bédard et al., 2004). Firms without market-
leader status are less likely to use REM because it erodes their competitive 
advantage. Market-leader firms usually have more competitive advantages 
than their followers do, including greater cumulative experience and bargaining 
power with suppliers and customers, which makes REM less costly for them 
(Zang, 2012). Firms with poor financial health tend to bear a relatively high 
marginal cost of deviating from optimal business strategies, so REM might be 
perceived as relatively costly manipulations (Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2012). 
Firms with high institutional ownership are less likely to engage in REM 
because their operation is closely monitored by institutions (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Institutional investors are more sophisticated and informed than other 
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investors, and they provide a high degree of monitoring, removing the 
incentives for myopic behaviour among managers (Bushee, 1998). Firms with 
a high degree of undervaluation are more likely to use REM to improve their 
firm value to secure their external financing prior to MBOs, or to impede any 
potential IBOs.  
 
Larger boards may have increased abilities when it comes to monitoring 
management, and they bring various skills and expertise to support and review 
the performance of a firm (Ronen and Yaari, 2007). Non-executive directors are 
better advisers, as they provide or facilitate access to external resources which 
are critical to a firm’s success (Daily et al., 2003). Non-executive directors are 
also more independent than executive directors, and are therefore expected to 
have greater incentives to carry out monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983a).  
 
In the previous two chapters, I investigated the existence of AEM and REM. I 
also investigated how corporate governance mechanisms, such as board 
structure and audit committee characteristics, affect the two earnings 
management methods. However, this chapter differs from the prior chapters as 
it investigates the relationship between AEM and REM using a simultaneous 
equations system. I also investigate how the constraints of the two earnings 
management methods affect the potential relationship between AEM and REM. 
Specifically, in addition to the corporate governance mechanisms discussed in 
the previous two chapters, this chapter includes firm characteristics, such as 
market-leader status in the industry, as additional constraints on the two 
earnings management methods.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the prior 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the proposed research 
design. Section 4 reports the empirical results and findings. Section 5 is 
sensitive analysis. Section 6 presents the conclusion.  
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4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 The relationship between accruals and real earnings management  
Although both types of earnings management aim to conceal a company’s 
actual performance, AEM and REM have distinct characteristics and impacts 
on firm performance. AEM involves changing discretionary accrual choices 
within the boundary of GAAP. It therefore directly influences the amount of 
accounting accruals and has no direct effect on cash flows (Kim and Sohn, 
2013). AEM typically takes place after the end of a fiscal year, when the need 
for earnings management is certain (Gunny, 2010). However, as AEM is 
achieved by changing the accounting methods or estimates used, ex-post 
aggressive accounting choices with respect to accruals carry a higher risk of 
attracting scrutiny from auditors or regulators (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a). 
Moreover, AEM must take place after most real operating activities are 
completed, and relying on AEM only is risky for managers. Managers may have 
limited flexibility to exercise AEM, and they also face uncertainty as to which 
accounting treatments the auditor will allow at that time (Gunny, 2010). 
Furthermore, from a long-term perspective, AEM carried out in the current 
period, must be reversed in the future (Young, 1999).  
 
REM involves changing the operating decisions of a business, and managers 
have great discretion about making operating decisions. Hence REM is sub-
optimal operating decisions made during a financial year, and it is less likely to 
be scrutinised by internal and external auditors. The drawback is that REM can 
have direct consequences on current and future cash flows as well as 
accounting accruals (Kim and Sohn, 2013). For instance, sales manipulation in 
the form of excessive credit sales leads to higher trade receivable but lower 
cash flows. Moreover, when managers alter real business operating decisions 
to manage earnings, they usually do not have perfect control over the exact 
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amount of real activities manipulation attained (Zang, 2012). In addition, REM 
influences short-term reported earnings at the expense of distorting normal 
operations in the current period, and thus it is generally value destroying, 
particularly for the long-term success of the business (Kim and Sohn, 2013).  
 
As both AEM and REM are associated with relative benefits and drawbacks, 
engaging either one alone might not be a wise choice for managers. However, 
given the portfolio of earnings management strategies, managers are likely to 
use multiple earnings management tools at the same time to meet their 
earnings manipulation targets in different circumstances. Managers may also 
balance the use of different types of earnings management to minimise the 
associated risks and costs at the same time (Zang, 2012). Hence there might 
be a potential substitutive or complementary relationship between AEM and 
REM. Generally, if an earnings management targets is difficult to beat, 
managers might use AEM and REM as complements in an attempt to achieve 
the expected earnings management level. Moreover, if an earnings 
management target is easy to achieve, managers might use AEM and REM as 
substitutes according to their relative costs and benefits. In addition, given that 
REM should be engaged prior to AEM, if the realised unexpected level of REM 
is too high, AEM might be used to offset the unexpected level of earnings 
management to achieve desired goal in total.  
 
A number of empirical studies have investigated how managers use 
combinations of accounting accruals and real activities manipulation to achieve 
one or more goals, and their results suggest that there is a relationship between 
AEM and REM (e.g. Beatty et al., 1995; Barton, 2001; Pincus and Shivaram, 
2002; Badertscher, 2011; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Lara 
et al., 2012; Zang, 2012).  
 
Barton (2001) investigated managers' incentives to maintain a desired level of 
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earnings volatility through derivative hedging and accruals management, using 
data from 1994 to 1996 for a sample of non-financial, non-regulated Fortune 
500 firms. He found a negative relationship between foreign exchange and 
interest rate derivative holdings and discretionary accruals, which suggests 
they are partial substitutes for smoothing earnings. 
 
Pincus and Shivaram (2002) examined managers' incentives to maintain a 
desired level of earnings volatility through hedging with commodity derivatives 
and manipulating accruals accounts in oil and gas producing firms. They found 
a sequential process whereby managers first determine the extent to which they 
hedge oil price risk by derivatives and then, especially in the fourth quarter, 
manage the volatility of residual earnings by trading off abnormal accruals and 
hedging with derivatives in order to smooth the income.  
 
Beatty et al. (1995) investigated how commercial bank managers minimised the 
combination costs of deviating from optimal primary capital, taxable income 
levels and reported earnings by manipulating two accruals accounts (loan loss 
provisions and loan charge-offs) and three operating transactions (pension 
settlement transactions, miscellaneous gains and losses such as asset sales, 
and issuance of new securities). Beatty et al. (1995) found that managers 
simultaneously manipulated discretionary accounts (loan loss provisions and 
loan charge-offs) and one operating transaction (issuance of new securities) to 
adjust the level of regulatory capital. They also found that the discretion in each 
of these manipulation choices depended on the levels of the other two as well 
as on the level of miscellaneous gains and losses.  
 
Badertscher (2011) examined how the degree and duration of overvaluation 
affected managers' choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms. 
He found that, during a sustained period of overvaluation, managers engage in 
accruals management in the early stages and then move to real transactions 
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management in order to sustain their overvalued equity. Moreover, they found 
that the longer a firm is overvalued, the more likely its managers engage in 
accruals management outside the boundaries of GAAP. Badertscher (2011) 
suggested that the duration of overvaluation is an important determinant in 
managers’ choice of earnings management strategies.  
 
These empirical studies reveal that there is a relationship between AEM and 
REM because managers use both of them simultaneously to achieve one or 
more earnings manipulation targets. In contrast to previous studies, this 
research examines the relationship between AEM and REM in leveraged 
buyout settings. As managers have different earnings management incentives 
in different types of leveraged buyouts, which may affect the relationships 
between AEM and REM differently prior to MBOs and IBOs.  
4.2.2 The relationships of earnings management preceding management 
buyouts 
In MBOs, managers will remain in the firm after buyouts. As discussed before, 
managers intend to engage in negative earnings management to portray the 
firm as relatively underperforming prior to a buyout, so that shareholders accept 
a lower buyout price (DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams, 1994). Once the 
buyout transaction is completed, managers then expect to increase their firm 
value and profitability as much as possible to increase the value of their equity. 
Thus the optimal earnings management method for managers is the one that 
conceals real firm performance prior to a buyout, and allows the concealed 
earnings to then be reversed after the buyout. As AEM can be used to do both, 
it is a suitable choice for managers prior to a buyout. Further, AEM only affects 
accounting accruals, and it has little or no interference of the firm’s normal 
business operations. However, the cost of AEM is the associated high risk of 
detection in comparison with REM. Yet in MBOs, internal and external auditors 
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might be less likely to scrutinise negative AEM than traditional positive AEM, 
which implies a lower risk of detection. In contrast, REM made in the current 
period cannot be reversed in the future, and thus is not an ideal method of 
earnings manipulation. In addition, REM influences short-term reported 
earnings at the expense of distorting current operations, hence it generally 
destroys firm value, particularly for the long-term success of the business (Kim 
and Sohn, 2013). Therefore, preceding MBOs, managers are likely to engage 
in more AEM or they might prefer to engage in AEM.  
 
In the previous two chapters, I predicted that managers might engage in 
negative earnings management preceding MBOs in an attempt to buy their firm 
at a relatively cheap price. My findings suggested that managers engage in 
negative AEM preceding MBOs, but managers engage in positive REM 
preceding MBOs. By considering the managerial preference on AEM, this may 
suggest a relationship between AEM and REM, which might be as follows:  
 
In MBOs, management is part of the investment group buying the firm. In most 
cases, the internal financing by managers is insufficient to meet the cash 
required to implement the buyout. Managers will therefore consider their ability 
to access external funding, and thus they will engage in positive REM to 
enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value 
(Fischer and Louis, 2008). However, this apparent increased value of the firm 
may lead shareholders to demand a higher selling price, which in turn increases 
the cost of an MBO. Therefore, in order to buy their firm at a relatively cheap 
price, managers will also engage in negative AEM practices. As discussed 
above, AEM is an ideal tool for adjusting the final earnings figures and pre-
buyout firm value, because it can be used to conceal present real firm value, 
which may then be reversed without interfering with normal business operations. 
 
Hence, by carefully planning the buyout case, managers are likely to engage in 
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positive REM during the accounting period to increase sales and earnings 
figures and then, after the accounting period ends, they may engage in negative 
AEM to decrease those earnings figures according to the realised positive REM 
in order to achieve the target level of earnings management in total. By 
considering the combined effects of AEM and REM practices, the total level of 
earnings management should be relatively positive, which may positively 
influence external financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value, helping firms to 
secure financing preceding MBOs. Moreover, as only AEM will reverse in future, 
for a pre-set goal of earnings management in total, a combination of positive 
REM and negative AEM practices may enable managers to conceal more of a 
firm’s value prior to MBOs. In other words the purpose of negative AEM is to 
adjust earnings figures down, and to conceal the real value of a firm prior to 
MBOs. In addition, engaging in both AEM and REM might make it more difficult 
for outsiders to analyse a firm’s real performance and thus assess its true value. 
This may help persuade shareholders accept managers’ offer price, and cause 
potential competing bidders to spend more time preparing their biddings.  
 
Therefore, if the total earnings management target is slightly positive and easy 
to achieve, managers might engage in more positive REM and more negative 
AEM to conceal more of the value of a firm before a buyout, and then reverse 
the firm value after buyouts. This may imply that AEM and REM have a 
complementary relationship, more positive REM being associated with more 
negative AEM prior to MBOs, or more negative AEM being associated with 
more positive REM. Moreover, if the total earnings management target is 
aggressively positive and difficult to beat, managers might engage in more 
positive REM and less negative AEM with the primary goal to achieve the target 
level of earnings management in total. This may imply that AEM and REM have 
a substitutive relationship, more positive REM being associated with less 
negative AEM prior to MBOs, or more negative AEM being associated with less 
positive REM. Therefore, there might be a complimentary or substitutive 
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relationship between AEM and REM prior to MBOs. Accordingly, I hypothesise 
as follows:  
 
Either 
H3-1a: There is a positive relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs 
or 
 
H3-1b: There is a negative relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs 
 
4.2.3 The relationships of earnings management preceding institutional 
buyouts 
In IBOs, managers are motivated to engage in positive earnings management 
to minimise firm undervaluation and thus to retain their control and 
management position (Hafzalla, 2009). AEM improves earnings figures without 
interfering with the normal operating of the business. However, as previously 
mentioned, the cost of AEM is the associated high risk of detection in 
comparison with REM. Furthermore, managers’ ability to predict IBOs is much 
less accurate than in MBOs, and they tend to be much more uncertain about 
the actual event happening. Hence managers usually do not have a long time 
to prepare for it, and cannot therefore carefully plan the degree of AEM 
manipulation or the time schedule. Thus managers bear relatively higher risks 
when engaging in AEM than REM. Furthermore, AEM made in the current 
period must be reversed in the future (Young, 1999). When the mean reversion 
of AEM occurs in the near future, it might further reduce the firm value and make 
the situation worse.  
 
In contrast, REM is less likely to be scrutinised by internal and external auditors, 
as it involves changing discretionary business operating decisions. Moreover, 
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REM made in the current period is less likely to reverse in the future. REM might 
affect the long-term success of the business, which is likely to occur in the long 
future in comparison to AEM reversion. Nevertheless, the long-term success of 
the business is often not a concern of management at the time of engaging in 
earnings management, when the focus is on increasing current earnings.  
Therefore, preceding IBOs, managers are likely to engage in more REM or they 
might prefer to engage in REM.  
 
In the previous two chapters, I predicted that managers might engage in 
positive earnings management preceding IBOs in an attempt to increase firm 
value and thus impede any IBO biddings. My findings suggested that managers 
engage in positive REM preceding IBOs, whereas there is no evidence of 
making more use of AEM than non-buyout firms prior to IBOs. By considering 
the managerial preference on REM, there might be a relationship between AEM 
and REM. I attempt to describe this potential relationship below. 
 
Prior to IBOs, firm undervaluation attracts potential IBO buyers, who wish to 
take control of the firm, to engage in active monitoring or to make changes to 
the firm’s existing management team after the buyouts (Hafzalla, 2009). In 
order to retain their position in management, their control of the firm and even 
long-term job security, managers are motivated to engage in positive earnings 
management in order to minimise firm undervaluation. As managers do not 
usually have a long time in which to prepare earnings-management strategies, 
and as they tend to prefer REM in this circumstance, they are likely to engage 
in positive REM during the accounting period to increase sales and earnings 
figures. Managers might also consider how much AEM they could engage after 
the accounting period end when they manipulate REM.  
 
The total level of earnings management should be relatively positive in order to 
increase a firm's value preceding an IBO. Hence if the earnings management 
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target is easy to achieve, managers might increase REM and decrease AEM 
practices by considering the relative benefits and risks. In this case, AEM and 
REM may appear to have a substitutive relationship, more positive REM being 
associated with less positive AEM prior to IBOs, or more positive AEM being 
associated with less positive REM. Moreover, if the earnings management 
target is hard to beat, managers might increase positive REM and positive AEM 
concurrently to ensure that their earnings management target can be achieved. 
This may imply that AEM and REM have a complementary relationship, in which 
more positive REM is associated with more positive AEM prior to IBOs, or more 
positive AEM is associated with more positive REM. Therefore, there might be 
a complimentary or substitutive relationship between AEM and REM prior to 
IBOs. Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows: 
 
Either 
H3-2a: There is a positive relationship between AEM and REM preceding IBOs 
or 
 
H3-2b: There is a negative relationship between AEM and REM preceding IBOs 
 
4.2.4 Constraints affecting the relationship between accruals and real 
earnings management 
The relationship between AEM and REM might be affected by the relative 
constraints on the two earnings management methods. Both AEM and REM 
are costly: AEM has relatively high risks of detection (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010a) and REM interferes with normal business operation (Kim and Sohn, 
2013). Managers’ ability to use earnings management methods might be 
constrained by the accounting environment and firm-specific characteristics. In 
other words, given a desired level of earnings management, when discretion is 
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more constrained for one earnings management tool, managers will tend to use 
more of the other (Zang, 2012). Therefore, the constraints of the two earnings 
management methods should be included in the investigation of the 
relationships between AEM and REM.  
 
Two studies examined the impact of the constraints of AEM on the choice of 
earnings management strategies. Cohen et al. (2008) focused on the 
heightened post-SOX scrutiny of accounting practice and its impact on the 
levels of AEM and REM. They found that AEM declined but REM increased 
after the passage of SOX, which suggests that firms switched from AEM to REM 
due to the increased potential costs of AEM imposed by SOX. Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010a) examined both AEM and REM activities around seasoned 
equity offerings. They controlled a set of variables that explain managers' ability 
to use AEM, including auditor characteristics and the probability of litigation, 
and the costs of doing so. They found that the costs of using AEM were 
positively related to the tendency to use REM in the year of seasoned equity 
offerings. Neither of the studies examined the constraints of engaging in REM, 
hence they do not show the substitutive relationship as a function of the relative 
costs of the two earnings management strategies (Zang, 2012).  
 
Lara et al. (2012) investigated the association between accounting 
conservatism and both AEM and REM by controlling for the constraints of both 
AEM and REM. They found a negative association between accounting 
conservatism and AEM, but a positive association between accounting 
conservatism and REM. They suggest that conservatism facilitated the 
monitoring of managerial accounting choices, potentially limiting the 
opportunities for engaging in AEM and leading managers to shift to potentially 
more costly REM practices. 
 
Zang (2012) investigated the relationship between AEM and REM by including 
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a set of variables that explain the constraints of both earnings management 
methods. She suggests that AEM occurs after REM, and that AEM is used to 
offset an unexpectedly high or low impact from REM. She established a 
recursive equation system to capture the sequence of managers' decisions. 
She found that managers balance the use of the two types of earnings 
management based on their relative constraints, and that managers adjust the 
level of AEM according to the level of REM realised.   
 
While these studies examined the relationship between AEM and REM in a 
general setting, managers might have different incentives for their choice of 
earnings management strategies in other settings, such as leveraged buyouts. 
Furthermore, although the above studies include the incentive of constraints 
when examining the choices of managerial earnings-management strategies, 
they do not adopt a simultaneous equation system that considers the decisions 
made for AEM and REM as being jointly determined.  
 
Different from prior literature, this study will examine whether managerial 
incentives in MBOs and IBOs affect the relationships between AEM and REM 
in addition to the relative constraints associated with each method of earnings 
management. As the buyout settings provide more complicated incentives for 
managers to determine their earnings management strategies, the relationship 
between AEM and REM might be more than the simple substitutive relationship 
shown in prior studies.  
4.2.5 Constraints on accruals earnings management 
Similar to previous literature (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Zang, 2012), this 
study expects that AEM is constrained by scrutiny from auditors, corporate 
governance mechanisms of audit committees, and flexibility within firms’ 
accounting systems. This study uses Big 5 auditors and auditor tenure to proxy 
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for scrutiny from auditors. Audit committee size and equity ownership by 
members of the audit committee are used to proxy for corporate governance 
mechanisms of audit committee. The length of operating cycles is used to proxy 
for flexibility within firms’ accounting systems.  
4.2.5.1 Big 5 auditors  
Big 5 audit firms are expected to deliver a higher audit quality than smaller, less 
well-known firms, because large audit firms are less willing to accept 
questionable accounting methods and are more likely to detect and report 
errors and irregularities (Becker et al., 1998). They also have more resources 
to invest in improving the quality of their work. Hence Big 5 audit firms have 
greater incentives to detect and disclose misstatement by managers, which 
differentiates the quality of their audits (DeAngelo, 1981). Prior literature 
suggested that Big 5 auditor firms have lower litigation rates and charge higher 
audit fees for a higher audit quality, or have a monopoly on pricing (e.g. 
Palmrose, 1986a; Palmrose, 1988). Big 5 auditors are likely to be more 
experienced, and they are likely to constrain accruals earnings management 
(Francis et al., 1999). Hence firms with Big 5 auditors may have a lower level 
of AEM. Similar to prior studies (e.g. Palmrose, 1986a; Palmrose, 1988), this 
study uses a dummy variable to measure whether a firm’s auditor is one of the 
Big 5 auditors (Big5). Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows:  
 
H3-3a: Preceding MBOs, firms with Big 5 auditors have a lower level of AEM 
 
H3-3b: Preceding IBOs, firms with Big 5 auditors have a lower level of AEM 
4.2.5.2 Auditor tenure 
The audit quality increases with tenure, as the risk of not detecting errors due 
to unfamiliarity decreases (Stice, 1991). New auditors lack sufficient knowledge 
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regarding firm-specific risks, and they usually incur significant start-up costs in 
initial audits as they familiarise themselves with a client's operations. In this 
case, there is an increased risk that they will not detect errors. Auditors learn 
during auditing process and their experience with a client increases, thereby 
resulting in greater efficiency in the collection and evaluation of evidence (Stice, 
1991). Research by Myers et al. (2003) found that longer audit firm tenure is 
associated with less extreme income-increasing and income-decreasing 
accruals, which suggests that AEM becomes more limited over longer tenures. 
Hence firms with longer auditor tenure may have a lower level of AEM.    
 
However, some researchers argued that extended auditor-client relationships 
might impair auditor independence and thus decrease the quality of audits. 
Extended auditor tenure might have a detrimental effect on an auditor's 
independence as its objectivity about a client may be reduced over time. 
Decreased auditor independence might lead auditors to support more 
aggressive accounting choices that reach the boundaries of GAAP and 
ultimately result in failures to detect material fraud and/or misstatements (Myers 
et al., 2003).  
 
Similar to prior literature (Zang, 2012), this study measures auditor tenure 
(LNAuditTn) as the natural logarithm of the number of total consecutive years 
that a firm is audited by the same auditor. In respect to these arguments, I 
hypothesise as follows: 
 
H3-4a: Preceding MBOs, firms with longer auditor tenure have a lower level of 
AEM 
 
H3-4b: Preceding IBOs, firms with longer auditor tenure have a lower level of 
AEM 
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4.2.5.3 Audit committee size  
The board is the provider of various resources, and larger numbers of directors 
will expand the available resources of the board (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Adding more directors to serve an audit committee may ensure a minimum 
required knowledge base (Vafeas, 2005). In addition, the effectiveness of an 
audit committee is significantly related to audit committee power (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993). Larger audit committees have a higher organisational status, 
and are thus more likely to be acknowledged as an authoritative body by 
external and internal audit functions (Louis Braiotta et al., 2010). The increased 
organisational status and power of the audit committee may enhance the 
performance of its internal audit function (Abbott et al., 2004; Vafeas, 2005). 
Hence firms with larger audit committees may have a lower level of AEM. 
Similar to prior researches (e.g. Xie et al., 2003; Vafeas, 2005; Bédard et al., 
2004; Lin et al., 2006), this study uses the number of members in an audit 
committee as a measurement of its size (AudComSz). Accordingly, I hypothesise 
as follows:  
 
H3-5a: Preceding MBOs, firms with larger audit committees have a lower level 
of AEM 
 
H3-5b: Preceding IBOs, firms with larger audit committees have a lower level of 
AEM 
4.2.5.4 Equity ownership by members of the audit committee 
Directors who own more equity in a firm are expected to protect shareholder 
interests more effectively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As equity ownership 
aligns the interests of directors and external shareholders, more equity 
ownership by the directors creates a personal incentive to actively monitor 
(Bhagat et al., 1999). Furthermore, large shareholders have a powerful 
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personal incentive to exercise effective monitoring, because their equity 
ownership makes them an effective agent of external shareholders (Bhagat et 
al., 1999). A higher level of equity ownership held by audit committee members 
is likely to mitigate the risk of these directors colluding with management to 
manipulate earnings, because such collusion would also ultimately harm their 
own interests (Vafeas, 2005).  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, prior to MBOs, managers are likely to adopt 
negative AEM in an attempt to depress the MBO offer price. As a lower MBO 
offer price generates a lower premium for selling shareholders, the negative 
AEM harms the interests of selling shareholders. Thus members of an audit 
committee with high equity ownership are inclined to actively monitor negative 
AEM, which leads to less AEM preceding MBOs. 
 
However, prior to IBOs, the findings in prior chapters suggest that managers 
are likely to exercise positive AEM in an attempt to increase the value of a firm. 
The share ownership might impair the independence of audit committee 
members and lead to a reduced level of monitoring. Hence members of audit 
committee holding high equity ownership might compromise to upwards AEM, 
leading to higher levels of AEM preceding IBOs. Similar to prior literature (Klein, 
2002; Lin et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2003), this study uses the common stock 
cumulatively owned by audit committee members to proxy for this constraint 
(AudShare). Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows:  
 
H3-6a: Preceding MBOs, higher equity ownership by members of the audit 
committee have a lower level of AEM 
 
H3-6b: Preceding IBOs, higher equity ownership by members of the audit 
committee have a higher level of AEM  
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4.2.5.5 Length of operating cycle 
The length of operating cycles is used to measure for the flexibility within firms’ 
accounting systems. Firm with longer operating cycles have greater flexibility 
for AEM as they have larger accruals accounts and a longer period for accruals 
to reverse (Zang, 2012). For instance, if a firm has larger credit trading with 
suppliers and customers than their industry peers have, they will also have 
higher accruals. Hence firms with shorter lengths of operating cycle might have 
a lower level of AEM as it offers less flexibility for AEM. Similar to prior literature 
(Lara et al., 2012), this study measures the operating cycle (OpeCycle) as the 
days receivable plus the days inventory less the days payable at the beginning 
of the year, as defined by Dechow (1994). Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows: 
 
H3-7a: Preceding MBOs, firms with shorter length of operating cycle have a lower 
level of AEM 
 
H3-7b: Preceding IBOs, firms with shorter length of operating cycle have a lower 
level of AEM 
4.2.6 Constraints on real earnings management choices 
Similar to previous studies (e.g. Zang, 2012; Lara et al., 2012) this study 
expects REM to be constrained by firm performance, market-leader status in 
the industry, financial health, institutional ownerships, board size and the 
percentage of non-executive directors on board.  
4.2.6.1 Firm performance 
Firms with relatively better performance are less likely to use REM to improve 
their earnings figures. Therefore, in more profitable firms, managers are less 
likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management behaviours to 
produce better accounting results, as their firm already performs well (Becker 
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et al., 1998; Bédard et al., 2004). Consequently, pernicious earnings 
management, such as REM, is rarely exercised in firms that are more profitable. 
Similar to prior literature (e.g. Bédard et al., 2004), this study measures firm 
performance by the current year's return on assets (ROA). Accordingly, I 
hypothesise as follows:  
 
H3-8a: Preceding MBOs, firms with better performance have a lower level of 
REM 
 
H3-8b: Preceding IBOs, firms with better performance have a lower level of REM 
4.2.6.2 Market-leader status in the industry 
REM is unlikely to increase the long-term value of a firm, as it departs from 
optimal operating decisions for a business. REM might be particularly costly for 
firms in industries with intense competition. Within an industry, firms are likely 
to face various levels of competition, and thus deviating from optimal business 
strategies may lead to different impacts on their performance. Market-leader 
firms usually enjoy more competitive advantages than their followers do 
because they have greater cumulative experience, higher ability to benefit from 
economies of scale, more bargaining power with suppliers and customers, 
higher attention from investors and greater influence on their competitors (Woo, 
1983). Hence REM might be less costly for market-leader firms where the 
erosion of their competitive advantage would be relatively small (Zang, 2012). 
Similar to prior literature (e.g. Lara et al., 2012; Zang, 2012), this study 
measures market-leader status by a firm’s market share in its industry 
(MarketSh). Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows: 
 
H3-9a: Preceding MBOs, firms without market-leader status have a lower level 
of REM 
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H3-9b: Preceding IBOs, firms without market-leader status have a lower level of 
REM 
4.2.6.3 Financial health 
A firm with poor financial health is likely to bear a relatively high marginal cost 
of deviating from optimal business strategies, such as sharp decreases in cash 
flow for a financial difficulty firm. In this case, REM might be perceived as a 
relatively high-cost manipulation, while the primary goal of managers is to 
improve operations (Zang, 2012). Evidence from the survey by Graham et al. 
(2005) suggests that if a firm experiences financial distress, managers’ efforts 
to survive will dominate their reporting concerns. Therefore, a firm with poor 
financial health is likely to engage in less REM. Similar to prior literature (e.g. 
Lara et al., 2012; Zang, 2012), a modified Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 2000) is 
used in this study as a proxy for financial health (Z-score). Accordingly, I 
hypothesise as follows: 
 
H3-10a: Preceding MBOs, firms with poor financial health have a lower level of 
REM 
 
H3-10b: Preceding IBOs, firms with poor financial health have a lower level of 
REM 
4.2.6.4 Institutional ownership 
Managers find it difficult to engage in REM when their operations are being 
monitored closely by institutional investors (Bushee, 1998). Institutional 
investors provide a high degree of monitoring for removing incentives on 
managerial myopic behaviour. This can occur either explicitly, through 
governance practices, or implicitly, through information gathering concerning 
Chapter 4 
285 
the quality of operating decisions and correctly pricing the impact of managerial 
decisions. Institutions that intend to hold substantial equity in the long-term 
have strong incentives to incur the cost of explicit monitoring to ensure that 
managers do not use REM to meet short-term earnings goals (Bushee, 1998).  
 
Moreover, institutional investors are more sophisticated and informed than 
other investors are. As REM has real economic consequences for the long-term 
value of firms, institutional investors are likely to have a better understanding of 
the long-term impact of firms’ operating decisions, leading to more effort in 
monitoring REM activities. Prior studies suggest that institutional investors play 
a monitoring role in reducing REM practice.18 Bushee (1998) reports that firms 
with high institutional ownership are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid 
a decline in earnings. Roychowdhury (2006) found a negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and REM to avoid reporting negative earnings. 
Similar to prior literature (e.g. Bushee, 1998), this study measures institutional 
ownership (InsShare) as the total percentages of shares that are held by 
institutions. Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows:  
 
H3-11a: Preceding MBOs, firms with higher institutional ownership have a lower 
level of REM 
 
H3-11b: Preceding IBOs, firms with higher institutional ownership have a lower 
level of REM 
4.2.6.5 The degree of firm undervaluation 
Firms with a high degree of share undervaluation are more likely to use REM 
                                                             
18 However, there is also evidence that 'transient' institutions, or those with a high portfolio 
turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings, increase managerial myopic behaviour (e.g. 
Bushee 1998; Bushee 2001). In this study, I focus on the average effect of institutional 
ownership on firms’ earnings management activities without looking into the investment 
horizon of different institutions.  
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to increase earnings figures because they are particularly likely to become the 
target of a takeover. Leveraged buyout targets usually have undervalued 
shares in the market relative to firms that remain public (Weir and Wright, 2006; 
Jensen, 1986), and the degree of firm undervaluation might affect REM 
behaviours preceding buyouts.  
 
Prior to MBOs, managers will consider their ability to access external funding 
to support their buyout and highly undervalued firms might struggle to access 
external funding. Hence managers in firms with a high degree of undervaluation 
are more likely to engage in positive REM to enhance prospective external 
financiers’ perceptions of their firm’s value (Fischer and Louis, 2008).  
 
Prior to IBOs, firms with a high degree of undervaluation are more likely to 
attract potential IBO buyers, as it could be an avenue for turning a failing 
company around by imposing a more efficient system of corporate governance 
or hiring a different management team (Hafzalla, 2009). Hence, in order to 
retain their control and management position even long-term job security, 
managers in firms with a high degree of undervaluation are more likely to 
engage in positive REM to minimise firm undervaluation. As managers cannot 
precisely anticipate IBO offers, they might use the industrial adjusted price-
earnings ratio as a benchmark to trigger their REM behaviours. Similar to prior 
studies (e.g. Alford, 1992; Francis et al., 2005), this study measures the 
undervaluation of a firm as the industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio (PE Ratio), 
which is the difference between the target firm’s price-earnings ratio and the 
median industry price-earnings ratio. Accordingly, I hypothesise as follows: 
 
H3-12a: Preceding MBOs, firms with a higher degree of firm undervaluation have 
a higher level of REM 
 
H3-12b: Preceding IBOs, firms with a higher degree of firm undervaluation have 
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a higher level of REM 
4.2.6.6 Board size 
A larger board provides various resources (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and 
ensure a minimum required knowledge base (Vafeas, 2005). Moreover, the 
ability of a board to monitor managers can increase as more directors are 
added. Increasing the number of non-executives is expected to have a more 
positive impact than increasing executive directors would have (Andres et al., 
2005; Guest, 2009). Boards have two essential functions: monitoring 
management and bringing various skills and expertise to support and review 
the performance of a firm (Ronen and Yaari, 2007). Both of these functions are 
associated with the responsibilities of mitigating managerial REM behaviours, 
because REM may rely on managerial discretions in making operational 
decisions. Hence firms with larger board size may have an increased 
monitoring function, leading to a lower level of REM. Similar to prior research 
(e.g. Vafeas, 2005; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), board size in this study is 
measured by the total number of directors on the board (BoardSz). Accordingly, 
I hypothesise as follows: 
 
H3-13a: Preceding MBOs, firms with a larger board size have a lower level of 
REM 
 
H3-13b: Preceding IBOs, firms with a larger board size have a lower level of REM 
4.2.6.7 The percentage of non-executive directors the board 
Adding non-executive directors to serve a board will expand the available 
resources of the board (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). While executive directors 
have better knowledge about a company and its industry, non-executive 
directors are 'boundary spanners' who provide knowledge and resources. Non-
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executive directors function as advisers, as they provide or facilitate access to 
external resources which are critical to a firm’s success (Daily et al., 2003). 
Moreover, the ability of a board to monitor can increase as more directors are 
added, and especially increasing the number of non-executives is expected to 
have a more positive impact than increasing executive directors (Andres et al., 
2005; Guest, 2009). 
 
Agency theory suggests that non-executive directors are more independent 
than executive directors are, thus they are expected to have greater incentives 
to monitor managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Elshandidy and Hassanein, 
2014). Furthermore, apart from being directors of a firm, non-executive 
directors have no economic or psychological affiliation that may interfere with 
their ability to question management (Fama, 1980). Conversely, as part of the 
management team, executive directors often have incentives to underperform 
their monitoring role (Vafeas, 2005). As non-executive directors can monitor 
managers more effectively, adding more non-executive directors is expected to 
lead to less REM. Hence firms with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors on their boards might have lower levels of REM. Similar to prior 
research (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Osma, 2008), in this study, the 
percentage of non-executive directors on a board is measured by the proportion 
of non-executive directors to all directors (NED%). Accordingly, I hypothesise 
as follows: 
 
H3-14a: Preceding MBOs, firms with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board have a lower level of REM 
 
H3-14b: Preceding IBOs, firms with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board have a lower level of REM 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data and sampling 
This study investigates all UK leveraged buyouts of listed firms in the London 
Stock Exchange who made buyout announcements during the period from 
1997 to 2011. This setting has significant advantages: First, most of what is 
currently known about leveraged buyouts results from research based on US 
samples from the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams, 
1994). It is questionable whether the US evidence can be generalised to the 
UK. In the UK, leveraged buyouts are less likely to be related to hostile 
takeovers, have lower debt levels, focus more on growth opportunities and are 
commonly financed by privately placed mezzanine funds rather than junk bonds 
(Toms and Wright, 2005).  
 
Second, the period studied covers the second wave of leveraged buyouts in the 
UK, which is different from the first wave in the 1980s. In this wave, more private 
equity and debt financiers provided financial backup in the buyout transactions. 
There was increased support from target shareholders through, for example, 
irrevocable undertakings (a binding agreement on target shareholders to 
accept a buyout offer) (Renneboog et al., 2007). Moreover, the increased use 
of squeeze-out provisions aiming to acquire all shares reduced the risks for 
buyers and facilitated the completion of going-private transactions (Davis and 
Day, 1998).  
 
The data for the samples is collected from Thomson ONE Banker. I exclude 39 
firms in the financial industry (ICB code between 8000 and 8999) because they 
are subject to the external scrutiny of bodies like the Financial Services 
Authority (Weir et al., 2005a), which may affect their corporate governance. The 
corporate governance data is hand collected from annual reports and 
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Datastream provides the earnings, total assets, and other financial data needed 
to detect abnormal AEM and REM.   
 
This study uses the cross-sectional model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) 
to estimate abnormal AEM. The model parameters are estimated by industry 
and I require each firm-year to have at least six observations with the same 
four-digit ICB code19. Four-digit codes are used for matching wherever possible, 
and if no appropriate match is found, three-digit or two-digit codes are used. 
This approach reflects the research design of Perry and Williams (1994). 
Moreover, this study uses the cross-sectional regression models by 
Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate abnormal CFO, production costs and 
discretionary expenses for each firm. The model parameters are estimated by 
industry and I require each firm-year to have at least six observations with the 
same two-digit code. The industry-matched firms are collected from firms not 
involved in an leveraged buyouts. Two-digit codes are used for matching 
wherever possible, as in Roychowdhury (2006).  
 
As the last year prior to a buyout offer first being made public is the most likely 
period to reflect systematic earnings manipulation, as suggested by prior 
literature (e.g. Perry and Williams, 1994), this study examines the relationships 
between AEM and REM behaviours in the last year prior to buyouts. After 
deleting observations with missing data, the number of initial and final 
regression samples is listed on table 4.1.220.  
 
As it is difficult to collect financial data for firms undergoing buyouts, the final 
                                                             
19 As suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), a minimum of six firms are needed in each 
firm-year portfolio in order to give the minimum degrees of freedom to perform statistical 
tests. 
20 For the leveraged buyouts studies in the UK, this sample size is large enough in comparison 
to Weir et al.’s (2005a) examination of 96 LBOs; Renneboog et al. (2007) investigate 177 
leveraged buyouts.  
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sample still has some missing financial data, which varies between different 
observations. As detecting each type of REM requires different financial data in 
models, some observations might have missing data in one model but have 
complete data for all other models. For instance, some observations might have 
complete data on abnormal overproduction costs detection but incomplete data 
on abnormal R&D investment cuts detection. Hence the number of 
observations varies in different REM proxies.  
 
Table 4.1.2  Sample 
 MBOs IBOs 
Initial sample 149 102 
Deleting 
Financial firms 
25 14 
Non-financial firms 124 88 
Deleting 
Observations with missing financial data 
6 1 
AEM & REM sample 118 87 
Deleting 
Observations with missing corporate governance data 
3 2 
Final sample 115 85 
 
4.3.2 Accruals earnings management measures 
Similar to Chapter 2, this study adopts discretionary accruals from the cross-
sectional model of Dechow et al. (1995) to proxy for AEM21.  
 
Normal accruals are estimated using the following model:  
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1𝑖 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2𝑖 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
 
                                                             
21 This paper adopts the same approach as that of prior studies by breaking the total accruals 
into two components: discretionary accruals (abnormal accrual) and nondiscretionary 
accruals (normal accruals) (e.g. Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Subramanyam, 
1996; Sok-Hyon and Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). 
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Where: 
TAit: is the current total accruals, calculated as the change in non-cash current 
assets minus the change in current liabilities, excluding the current portion of 
long-term debt, minus depreciation and amortization 
Ait: is the total assets at the end of period t, and Ait-1 is lagged total assets 
Salesit: is the sales during period t, and (Δ)Salesit=Salet-Salest-1 
∆ARit: is the change in receivables 
PPEit: is the property, plant, and equipment 
 
Total accruals are first regressed on the equation (1) using data from peer firms 
in year t to estimate the parameters for calculating the expected normal 
accruals for each leveraged buyouts firm in year t. The parameter estimates a0, 
ai, b1i, and b2i of 𝛼0, 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽1𝑖, and 𝛽2𝑖 from the previous step are then combined 
with the data for each leveraged buyout firm in the event year t, to generate 
estimated discretionary accruals (AccruDeit), as follows:  
 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝐷𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
− [𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1𝑖 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
)
+ 𝛽2𝑖 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
)]                                        (2) 
 
Where: 
 AccruDeit: is abnormal accrual or discretionary accruals 
 
The estimated abnormal discretionary accruals (AccruDe) represent the 
magnitude of accruals earnings management, which is the difference between 
current accruals and expected normal accruals. Specifically, zero abnormal 
discretionary accruals indicate that a firm’s current accruals are the same as 
expected, which means no earnings management is detected. Positive 
abnormal discretionary accruals indicate income-increasing earnings 
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management, while negative abnormal discretionary accruals indicate income-
decreasing earnings management.  
 
Kothari, et al.’s (2005) model and Dechow et al.’s (1995) are developed to 
detect AEM behaviours in the US firms. The differences of accounting systems 
between the UK and the US might affect the effectiveness of model, thus might 
compromise the reliability of the models to apply in the UK context. For instance, 
Yoon and Miller (2002) and Yoon et al. (2006) suggest that the modified Jones 
model does not fit for Korean firms in AEM detection. Thus, this study uses the 
models developed by Dechow et al. (1995) and Jones’s (1991) alternatively to 
increase the robustness of my results. 
4.3.3 Real earnings management measures 
Similar to Chapter 3, this study adopt three measures to detect the level of REM 
from the cross-sectional models developed by Roychowdhury (2006): abnormal 
levels of CFO, production costs and discretionary expenses. Following the 
method employed in other studies, this study decomposes the actual CFO, 
production costs and discretionary expenses into their normal (expected) 
portion and abnormal (unexpected) portion by estimating the following 
equations for each industry and year. The abnormal level of CFO, production 
costs and discretionary expenses, which indicate REM practices, are the 
difference between their actual level and their normal level. The models are 
shown as follows:  
 
The normal level of CFO is assumed to be a linear function of sales and 
changes in sales, and is estimated from:  
 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
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The normal level of production costs is estimated from:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
The normal level of discretionary expenses is estimated from:  
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
CFOt: is cash flow from operations of Roychowdhury (2006) model 
ProdCost: is production costs, according to Roychowdhury’s (2006) model, 
calculated as the sum of costs of goods sold and changes of inventory  
DiscExpt: is discretionary expenses according to Roychowdhury's (2006) model, 
calculated as the sum of advertising, research and development (R&D), and 
selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (advertising data is not 
available for UK firms, and it is considered as part of SG&A) 
Salest: is the sales during period t, and (Δ)Salest=Salet-Salest-1 
At: is the total assets at the end of period t 
 
This study also uses Gunny’s (2010) models to capture REM activities from 
R&D expense and SG&A expenditure.  
 
The normal level of R&D expense is estimated using the following model:  
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠&𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1𝑀𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽3
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4
𝑅𝐷𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
Res&Devt: is the R&D expense according to Gunny's (2010) model 
MVt: is the natural log of market value 
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Qt: is Tobin’s Q 
INTt: is internal funds (calculated as Income before Extraordinary Items + 
Depreciation and Amortization + R&D Expense)   
 
The normal level of SG&A is estimated using the following model:  
 
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑡−1
 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑉𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑄𝑡  +  𝛽3
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
 +  𝛽4
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝐷 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where: 
SGAt: is selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses according to 
Gunny's (2010) model 
DD: is the dummy variable equal to one when total sales decrease between t-
1 and t, zero otherwise. 
 
Specifically, R&D expense cuts and SG&A expenditure cuts are normal 
business operating decisions at managers’ discretion. In contrast, AEM involves 
changing discretionary accrual choices within the boundary of GAAP. It 
therefore directly influences the amount of accounting accruals, and has no 
direct effect on cash flows (Kim and Sohn, 2013). Hence, R&D expense cuts 
and SG&A expenditure cuts are REM behaviours rather than AEM practices.  
 
For robustness, this study uses two types of aggregate REM, which is similar 
to those used in prior studies (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010a; Zang, 2012). The first aggregation includes abnormal production costs 
and abnormal discretionary expenses (Prod+DisEx)22 . It equals the sum of 
                                                             
22 Abnormal production costs is not multiplied by minus one because higher production 
costs indicate overproduction to reduce the cost of goods sold. We do not combine 
abnormal production costs and abnormal CFO. Roychowdhury (2006) suggests that the same 
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abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses multiply by 
minus one [= abnormal production costs + (-1* abnormal discretionary 
expenses)]. A higher amount of Prod+DisEx indicates a higher likelihood that 
the firm engaged in overproduction and cut discretionary expenditures to 
manipulate reported earnings upwards. The second aggregation includes 
abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses (CFO+DisEx). It equals 
the sum of abnormal CFO and abnormal discretionary expenses, after each 
have been multiplied by minus one [= (-1* abnormal CFO) + (-1* abnormal 
discretionary expenses)]. Higher CFO+DisEx indicates a higher likelihood that 
the firm engaged in sales manipulations and cut discretionary expenditures to 
manipulate reported earnings upwards.  
 
The existing REM detecting models are developed by the US research to detect 
REM behaviours in the US financial market (e.g. Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 
2006). The differences of financial market and accounting systems between the 
UK and the US might affect the effectiveness of REM detecting models, thus 
the reliability of the models in UK application might be compromised. Hence, 
this study adopts different REM detection models as alternatives, both 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) and Gunny’s (2010) models, to increase the 
robustness and reliability of results in this study. A consistent result might imply 
that the country difference is insignificant and my results are reliable. 
4.3.4 Control variables and variable measurements 
This study includes firm size to control for size effects. Larger firms are likely to 
be under close scrutiny by outsiders, such as financial or investment analysts, 
than small firms are, which can potentially reduce managers’ opportunities to 
exercise earnings management (Koh, 2003; Hussain, 2000). Moreover, large 
firms might have alternative methods of influencing investors’ perceptions of 
                                                             
activities that lead to abnormally high production costs also lead to abnormally low CFO, 
thus adding these two amounts leads to double counting (Cohen and Zarowin,2010).  
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their performance because they produce more information for public access, 
and thereby reduces the need for earnings management (LaFond and Watts, 
2008). Hence firm size may affect managers’ earnings management practices. 
In line with previous research, this study uses the natural logarithm of total 
assets as a proxy for firm size (LnAssets).  
 
This study controls for the potential sales growth prospects of firms, because 
firms with higher growth prospects are more likely to engage in earnings 
management. Market has greater reaction to earnings announcements from 
firms with high-growth opportunities (Collins and Kothari, 1989). Moreover, 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) report that market has asymmetric response to 
positive vs. negative earnings surprises, and the absolute magnitude of the 
price response to negative surprises is significantly greater than the price 
response to positive surprises, particularly for high-growth firms. This implies 
that managers of high-growth firms have greater incentives to avoid negative 
earnings surprises, such as missing earnings expectations (Matsumoto, 2002). 
Thus managers of high-growth firms may have strong incentives to engage in 
earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises. Similar to prior 
studies, growth prospects in this study are measured as the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of common equity (Mark2Book).  
 
Financial leverage shows debt-contracting motivations for earnings 
management. High leverage is associated with the closeness of debt covenants 
violations (Press and Weintrop, 1990), and debt covenant violation is related to 
the choice of earnings management strategy (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 
Highly leveraged firms tend to have income-increasing earnings management 
in order to prevent violation of their debt covenants. Moreover, higher leverage 
ratios are associated with higher costs of debt financing (Piot and Janin, 2007). 
As debt increases, managers may use income-increasing earnings 
management to present a more favourable financial position when negotiating 
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with lenders. Thus leverage ratio is likely to have a relationship with earnings 
management. Similar to prior studies, leverage in this study is measured by the 
ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage).  
 
This study controls for the potential financial constraints of acquirers. If a firm is 
financially constrained but has potential valuable projects in which to invest, it 
can use earnings management to signal its positive prospects and raise its 
share price in the short term. Hence this enables a firm to raise capital to make 
the investments (Linck et al., 2013). Prior studies use the ability of acquirers to 
obtain external finance as a proxy for financial constraints such as financial 
leverage or free cash flows (e.g. Park and Shin, 2004). However, financial 
information on acquirers was unavailable for this study. The key issue in this 
setting is whether acquirers are able to raise sufficient cash to complete their 
buyout. Hence this study measures the potential financial constraints of 
acquirers by the relative value of the deal, a reflection of how much money is 
required for a buyout. Deal value shows the ability of acquirers to seek external 
financing, and therefore it is an appropriate proxy for financial constraint. 
Specifically, the deal value is the total cash paid to shareholders in buyout 
transactions. In IBOs, as the acquirer comes from outside the firm, financial 
constraint is measured by the total deal value. In MBOs, as managers are 
acquirers and they only need to purchase shares held by other shareholders, 
financial constraint is measured by deal value, excluding the portion assumed 
to purchase shares owned by managers. Accordingly, financial constraint is 
measured by deal value (DealVal).  
4.3.5 Model 
Given a portfolio of earnings management strategies, prior literature suggests 
that AEM and REM are likely to be jointly dependent (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a). Specifically, if managers set or change a target 
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level of one earnings management method, they will adjust the level of another 
earnings management method simultaneously to achieve an optimal level of 
total earnings management. Moreover, managers are likely to consider the 
relative costs and their own abilities when planning their overall earnings 
management strategies (Zang, 2012). Hence, as AEM and REM are likely to be 
jointly determined, estimating the relationship between AEM and REM using 
OLS regression might be subject to the problem of endogeneity.   
 
In order to account for potential simultaneity when examining how managers 
use multiple accounting and operating measures, prior empirical research has 
used a system of simultaneous equations (e.g. Beatty et al., 1995; Barton, 2001; 
Pincus and Shivaram, 2002; Badertscher, 2011).  
 
Beatty et al. (1995) investigated how commercial bank managers minimised the 
combination costs of deviating from optimal primary capital, taxable income 
levels and reported earnings by manipulating two accrual accounts (loan loss 
provisions and loan charge-offs) and three operating transactions (pension 
settlement transactions, miscellaneous gains and losses such as asset sales, 
and issuance of new securities). They suggest that minimising the combination 
costs by engaging in each of the five earnings management methods results in 
a system of five simultaneously determined equations. Each of the equations 
includes one earnings management proxy as a dependent variable, and all 
other earnings management methods are treated as endogenous variables in 
the right-hand side of the equation.  
 
Barton (2001) investigated managers' incentives to maintain a desired level of 
earnings volatility through derivative hedging and accruals management. He 
developed a set of simultaneous equations in which AEM is an endogenous 
variable in a derivatives equation and the derivatives is an endogenous variable 
in the AEM equation. Moreover, he embedded a correction for self-selection 
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equation in the simultaneous equations system. This additional equation aims 
to control for the factor that only about 72% of the sample firms reported using 
derivatives, and each factor behind the decision to use derivatives might have 
a different effect on the extent of derivatives used.   
 
Pincus and Shivaram (2002) examined managers' incentives in oil and gas 
producing firms to maintain a desired level of earnings volatility through hedging 
with commodity derivatives and manipulating accruals accounts. They suggest 
that, given a firm hedging, managers' decisions about the extent of hedging and 
smoothing with accruals are likely to be simultaneous, and each of these 
decisions can affect the others. In their simultaneous equations, the 'extent-of-
smoothing' with accruals is an endogenous variable in the 'extent-of-hedging' 
equation, and the extent of hedging is an endogenous variable in the extent-of-
smoothing with accruals equation.   
 
Badertscher (2011) examined how the degree and duration of overvaluation 
affects management’s choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms 
(AEM, REM and AEM outside the boundaries of GAAP). Badertscher (2011) 
suggests that firm overvaluation and the three earnings management methods 
are endogenous variables in a system of simultaneous equations, in which each 
equation includes the dependent variables from the three other equations as 
right-hand-side variables.  
 
To address potential simultaneity, these prior studies used a 2SLS instrumental 
variables approach. In the first stage, each endogenous variable is regressed 
on all exogenous variables and instruments. In a well-specified model, where 
instruments are uncorrelated with the unobserved errors term but correlated 
with the endogenous variables, the predicted values of the endogenous 
variables from the first stage are uncorrelated with the errors term. In the 
second stage, these predicted values replace the endogenous variables in the 
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right-hand-side of the equation and yield consistent parameter estimations 
(Beatty et al., 1995; Greene, 2011; Hussain, 2000). 2SLS is a single-equation 
estimation method, which estimates each equation in the simultaneous system 
separately (Greene, 2011).  
 
Under the null hypothesis that none of the earnings management methods is 
jointly determined, OLS provides a consistent and efficient estimation, while 
2SLS provides a consistent but inefficient estimation. Under the alternative that 
some of the earnings management variables are jointly dependent, only the 
2SLS estimates will be consistent. The Hausman (1978) test compares the 
vector of coefficients between the two estimations, and a significant difference 
between the coefficients indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis. Thus, there 
are problems of endogeneity between earnings management methods, and 
2SLS estimation for a simultaneous equations system is appropriate (Beatty et 
al., 1995).   
 
A 3SLS instrumental variables approach could also be used to address 
potential simultaneity. 3SLS is the most common system estimation method, 
which estimates a system of structural equations jointly. 3SLS produces 
estimates from a three-step process: The first stage regresses each 
endogenous variable on all exogenous variables and obtains predicted values 
for the endogenous regressors. The second stage produces a 2SLS to obtain 
a consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances. 
The third stage performs a generalised least squares (GLS)-type estimation 
using the covariance matrix produced in the second stage, with the 
instrumented values in place of the right-hand-side endogenous variables 
(Greene, 2011; StataCorp, 2013; Hussain, 2000).  
 
3SLS estimates a system of structural equations jointly, while 2SLS estimates 
each equation in the simultaneous system separately. Under the null of no 
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misspecification, 3SLS is efficient and consistent whereas 2SLS is consistent 
but not efficient. However, any specification error in the structure of the model 
will be transmitted throughout the system by inconsistent estimated covariance 
matrix in 3SLS. In contrast, in 2SLS, the limited information estimators will 
confine the misspecification to the particular equation in which it appears 
(Beatty et al., 1995; Greene, 2011). Moreover, as the finite-sample variation of 
the estimated covariance matrix is transmitted throughout the system in 3SLS, 
the finite-sample variance of 3SLS may will be as large as or larger than that of 
2SLS (Greene, 2011).  
 
As in prior research (e.g. Beatty et al., 1995; Barton, 2001; Pincus and 
Shivaram, 2002; Badertscher, 2011), simultaneous equations system is 
appropriate for this study when estimating the relationships between AEM and 
REM preceding leveraged buyouts. Therefore, this study uses the following 
simultaneous equations system to address the potential simultaneity. For every 
endogenous variable, this study uses one instrument, which is correlated with 
the endogenous variable but is exogenous to the structural equation. The 
system is properly identified as each equation includes only one endogenous 
variable (AEM proxy/REM proxy), and excludes three or more exogenous 
variables (constraints of REM/AEM). The system of equations used in this study 
is as follows:  
 
𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑃𝐸 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑧𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐸𝐷%𝑡 + 𝜌1𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡
+ 𝜌2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡 + 𝜌3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝜌4𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡       (1) 
 
𝐴𝐸𝑀𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝜃1𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐴𝑢𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑆𝑧𝑡
+ 𝛾4𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑂𝑝𝑒𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝜑1𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑡
+ 𝜑3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝜑4𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡       (2) 
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Where: 
REMt: is the abnormal REM according to Roychowdhury’s (2006) models and 
Gunny's (2010) models as follows: 
CFO: is the abnormal cash flow from operation (CFO) detected using 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) model 
ProdCos: is the abnormal production costs detected using Roychowdhury's 
(2006) model 
DiscExp: is the abnormal discretionary expenses detected using 
Roychowdhury's (2006) model 
Res&Dev: is the abnormal R&D expense detected using Gunny's (2010) model 
SGA: is the abnormal selling, SG&A expense detected using Gunny's (2010) 
model 
Instrumental variables of REMt:  
CFOt-1, ProdCost-1, DisExpt-1, Res&Devt-1, SGAt-1: are lagged values of REM 
proxies 
 
AEMt: is accruals earnings management detected by the cross-sectional model 
of Dechow et al. (1995) (AccruDe)  
Instrumental variables of AEMt: 
SalesGrow: is the sales-growth ratio, which is an instrument of AEMt 
 
AEM constraints: 
Big5: is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm is audited by one of the Big 5 
auditors 
LNAuditTn: is the natural logarithm of auditor tenure years (measured by the 
number of consecutive years in which a firm uses the same auditor) 
AudComSz: is the audit committee size, which is the total number of members 
on the audit committee  
AudShare: is the cumulative common stock owned by audit committee 
members 
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OpeCycle: is the length of operating cycles, measured as the days inventory 
outstanding (DIO) plus the days sales outstanding (DSO) minus the days 
payable outstanding (DPO) (length of operating cycles = DIO+DSO-DPO) 
 
REM constraints: 
ROA: is the return on assets ratio, which measures firm performance 
MarketSh: is the market-leader status in the industry, which is measured by a 
firm’s market share in its industry using the two-digits industry code 
Z-score: is the financial health status of a firm, which is measured by a modified 
Altman’s Z-score 
InsShare: is institutional ownership, which is the accumulated percentage of 
institutional shareholding 
BoardSz: is the number of directors on the board 
NED%: is the percentage of non-executive directors on the main board 
 
Control Variables: 
LnAssets: is the natural logarithm of total assets 
Mark2Book: is the market capitalization divided by the book value of 
shareholders’ equity 
Leverage: is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
PE Ratio: is the industry-adjusted price to earnings ratio ( = the difference 
between the target firm’s price-earnings ratio and the median industry price-
earnings ratio) 
DealVal: is the total cash paid to shareholders in buyout transactions; for MBOs, 
it is the deal value excluding the portion assumed to purchase shares owned 
by managers (=Deal Value * (1- CEO’s shareholding); for IBOs, it is the total 
deal value (unit: Million Pounds) 
 
In MBOs, it is predicted that AEM and REM have relationships, and thus α1 in 
equation 1 and θ1 in equation 2 are expected to be positive or negative. 
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Moreover, In IBOs, it is predicted that AEM and REM have relationships, and 
thus α1 in equation 1 and θ1 in equation 2 are expected to be positive or negative.  
 
Due to potential endogeneity, this study applies a simultaneous equations 
system, and use 2SLS and 3SLS to estimate the endogenous equations. 
Besides 2SLS and 3SLS, generalised method of moments (GMM) could also 
be used to estimate endogenous equation. However, GMM estimation is 
consistent and efficient only if the endogenous equation have 
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation problem (Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, 
GMM models tend to use multiple time lagged data, which would mean that I 
will lose a lot of sample size due to limited past data availability.  
 
Both 2SLS and 3SLS estimation approaches require instrument variable. A 
good instrument variable should satisfy three conditions: (1) it is not a weak 
instrument that only marginally relevant; (2) it must be an exogenous variable 
in the endogenous equation; (3) it should highly correlated with the endogenous 
variables (Wooldridge, 2013). This research tests whether the instrument 
variables used are acceptable. The results suggest that lagged REM works 
quite well as REM instrument, while sales growth is not a good instrument of 
AEM but still acceptable. The detailed discussion of instruments is in section 
4.3.6. This might suggest that the results should be interpreted properly.  
 
Moreover, as the data availability in leveraged buyouts setting constrains this 
study, it is not feasible to include more variables in the simultaneous equation 
models as prior literature (e.g. Lara et al., 2012; Zang, 2012), such as marginal 
tax rates. 
4.3.6 Endogeneity and instrument variables 
The variables analysed are subject to a potential endogeneity bias, since the 
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decisions on levels of AEM and REM might be determined simultaneously. 
Similar to prior studies (e.g. Beatty et al., 1995; Barton, 2001; Pincus and 
Shivaram, 2002; Badertscher, 2011), this research uses a simultaneous 
equations system to address potential simultaneity. Prior literature also 
suggests that the solution for endogeneity is to use a 2SLS regression model, 
which relies upon instrumental variables to generate predicted values of the 
endogenous variables (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). Valid instruments used to 
predict the explanatory variables must be highly correlated with the explanatory 
variables deemed to be endogenous, but must also be uncorrelated with the 
error term from the structural models used to explain each earnings 
management choice (Badertscher, 2011; Greene, 2011). Moreover, when the 
instruments are weak or partially endogenous, 2SLS methods can produce 
estimates that are more biased than OLS methods are. Hence this study would 
need to obtain powerful, exogenous instrumental variables for each of the 
earnings management variables. However, it is difficult to identify instrumental 
variables that satisfy the aforementioned conditions in most accounting 
research settings, and accounting theory does not provide guidance on how to 
find good instruments for earnings management (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
This is particularly true with respect to earnings management because there is 
no well-developed theory of the economic determinants for the different 
earnings management choices (Badertscher, 2011).  
 
Despite the potential concerns regarding identifying proper instruments, it is still 
important to control for endogeneity. In order to identify instruments for REM, I 
relied upon the accounting and finance literature (e.g. Larcker and Rusticus, 
2010), and found that lagged endogenous regressor might be a potential 
instrument for endogenous variables. In this case, an implicit assumption has 
been made that the exogenous part of the regressor persists over time, but that 
the endogenous part does not persist over time (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  
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For REM, this study adopts a two-stage process to investigate whether lagged 
regressor (REMt-1) is a valid instrument of it. First, for the two-stage least 
squares estimation to be reliable, there is a 'rule of thumb' that the t-statistic of 
instruments in first-stage regressions must be greater than about 3.3. A t-
statistic of less than 3.3 indicates a weak instrument (Adkins and Hill, 2011). In 
this study, the t-statistic of the instrument, lagged regressor of REM (REMt-1), is 
greater than 3.3 for both MBOs and IBOs, which pass the rule of thumb. 
 
Second, one commonly used diagnostic of weak instruments is the F statistic 
for joint significance of the instruments in first-stage regression. A widely used 
‘rule of thumb’ suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) views an F statistic of 
less than 10 as an indication of weak instruments. Moreover, a formal test for 
weak instruments is proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). The test statistic used 
is the minimum eigenvalue of a matrix analog of the F statistic, which was 
originally proposed by Cragg and Donald (1993) to test nonidentification. Stock 
and Yogo (2005) presumed identification and interpret a low minimum 
eigenvalue as indicating weak instruments. Hence, the null hypothesis is that 
the instruments are weak against the alternative that they are strong (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009). The test of Stock and Yogo (2005) concerns that weak 
instruments can lead to size distortion of Wald tests on the parameters in finite 
samples. The Wald test is a joint statistical significance of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural model at a 5% level (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
If we are willing to tolerate distortion of a 5% Wald test based on the 2SLS 
estimator, so that the true size can be at most 15%, then we reject the null 
hypothesis if the test statistic exceeds the test statistic tabulated by Stock and 
Yogo (2005) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
 
In this study, the F statistic for the joint significance of the instrument, lagged 
regressor of REM (REMt-1), is greater than 10 both for MBOs and for IBOs, 
which pass the rule of thumb. Furthermore, the minimum eigenvalue of the F 
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statistic is greater than critical values tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005) both 
for MBOs and for IBOs, which rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are weak. Therefore, the lagged regressor of REM (REMt-1) is a valid instrument 
of REM both for MBOs and for IBOs in this study.  
 
Follow this approach, this study investigates whether lagged regressor of AEM 
(AEMt-1) is a valid instrument of AEM. However, the t-statistic of the instruments 
and the F statistic for the joint significance of instruments in the first-stage 
regressions suggests that the lagged regressor of AEM (AEMt-1) is a weak 
instrument of AEM, both for MBOs and for IBOs.  
 
In order to identify an appropriate instrument for AEM, this study draws more 
widely on relevant literature in accounting and finance fields and tested every 
potential instrument suggested in these studies, such as operating earnings 
volatility (Hazarika et al., 2012), auditing quality and auditor characteristics 
(Cornett et al., 2009), the two-year lagged regressor of AEM (Aerts and Zhang, 
2014) and managerial ownership (Short and Keasey, 1999). Unfortunately, 
these instruments are all weak both for MBOs and for IBOs in this study.  
 
However, sales growth (SalesGrow) is identified as a potential instrument for 
AEM. Sales growth is likely to affect earnings management, as growth in sales 
will affect accruals, such as inventory and receivables, which in turn affects 
AEM. Furthermore, large growth in sales often inflates the market's 
expectations of future cash flows, which could affect earnings management 
(Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). In times of rapid growth, a company may also 
experience pressure to maintain or exceed its anticipated growth rates, and 
thus causes the practices of earnings management to achieve a targeted 
growth rate, or alternatively to mask downturns (Carcello and Nagy, 2004).  
 
In order to test whether sales growth (SalesGrow) is a valid instrument of AEM, 
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this study used the same aforementioned two-stage process. First, it is found 
that the t-statistic of the instrument, sales growth, is greater than 3.3 for MBOs, 
which passed the ‘rule of thumb’. Second, the F statistic for the joint significance 
of the instrument, sales growth, is greater than 10 for MBOs, which pass the 
‘rule of thumb’. The minimum eigenvalue of the F statistic for MBOs is also 
greater than critical values tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005), which rejects 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. Therefore, sales growth is a 
valid instrument of AEM for MBOs in this study. However, the t-statistic of 
instruments and the F statistic for joint significance of instruments in first-stage 
regressions suggested that sales growth is a weak instrument of AEM for IBOs.  
 
This study has tested almost every potential instrument for AEM that is available, 
and sales growth (SalesGrow) is the only valid instrument found, even though it 
is a strong instrument for MBOs only. I also tested whether sales growth is a 
valid instrument of AEM for the whole sample (mixed both MBOs and IBOs). 
The t-statistic of instrument, sales growth, is greater than 3.3, which pass the 
‘rule of thumb’. Furthermore, the F statistic for joint significance of the 
instrument, sales growth, is greater than 10, which pass the ‘rule of thumb’. 
Moreover, the minimum eigenvalue of the F statistic is greater than critical 
values tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005), which rejects the null hypothesis 
that the instrument is weak. Therefore, sales growth (SalesGrow) is a valid 
instrument of AEM for the sample as a whole (mixed both MBOs and IBOs) in 
this study.  
 
In this study, as the variables of AEM and REM are subject to a potential 
endogeneity bias, the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is used to investigate 
potential endogeneity. The principal of Hausman test provides a way to test 
whether an explanatory variable is endogenous or not in a structural equation. 
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the regressor is exogenous 
against the alternative that it is endogenous. If there is little difference between 
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the OLS and instrument variable estimators, we could conclude that the 
regressor is exogenous, and there is no need to instrument. Otherwise, if there 
is considerable difference between OLS and instrument variable estimators, we 
reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that the regressor is endogenous 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
 
For the MBOs, in structural equation 1, I use sales growth as the instrument of 
AEM in Hausman test. In structural equation 2, I use lagged REM as the 
instrument of REM in Hausman test. Table 4.3.1 in the Appendix shows the 
results of Hausman tests. The results of Hausman tests for model REM (1) (in 
which the dependent variable is CFO) and model AEM (1) are significant, which 
suggests that these two models do not pass Hausman test. This means 
abnormal CFO and AEM are endogenous in model REM (1) and model AEM 
(1). Moreover, the result of Hausman tests for model REM (4) (in which the 
dependent variable is R&D expense) is significant, which suggests this model 
does not pass Hausman test. However, the reverse relationship in model AEM 
(4) passes Hausman test, as the result of Hausman test is insignificant. This 
means AEM is endogenous in model REM (4) and R&D expense is exogenous 
in model AEM (4). Furthermore, the results suggest that model AEM (3) does 
not pass Hausman test, but the reverse relationship in model REM (3) (in which 
the dependent variable is discretionary expenses) passes Hausman test. This 
means abnormal discretionary expenses is endogenous in model AEM (3) and 
AEM is exogenous in model REM (3).  
 
For the IBOs, in structural equation 1, I use sales growth as the instrument of 
AEM in Hausman test. In structural equation 2, I use lagged REM as the 
instrument of REM in Hausman test. Table 4.3.2 in the Appendix shows the 
results of Hausman tests. The result of Hausman test for model REM (3) (in 
which the dependent variable is discretionary expenses) is significant, which 
suggests that this model does not pass Hausman test. But the reverse 
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relationship in model AEM (3) passes Hausman test. This means AEM is 
endogenous in model REM (3) and abnormal discretionary expense is 
exogenous in model AEM (3). Moreover, the results in Table 4.3.2 suggest that 
no other model is subject to a potential endogeneity bias.  
4.3.7 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 4.2.1 shows the summary statistics of all variables for MBOs. Table 4.2.2 
shows the summary statistics of all variables for IBOs. Tables 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 
show the Pearson correlation matrix for MBOs and IBOs respectively.  
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Table 4.2.1  Summary Statistics for MBOs 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
CFO 118 -0.025 0.130 -0.876 -0.060 -0.012 0.024 0.287 
ProdCos 117 0.043 0.242 -0.919 -0.050 0.039 0.128 0.991 
DisExp 96 -0.111 0.317 -1.876 -0.206 -0.089 0.032 1.014 
Res&Dev 117 0.000 0.008 -0.036 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044 
SGA 96 -0.038 0.163 -0.724 -0.082 -0.016 0.023 0.382 
CFOt-1 116 -0.014 0.111 -0.763 -0.052 -0.008 0.027 0.259 
ProdCost-1 113 0.034 0.219 -0.733 -0.056 0.028 0.154 0.756 
DisExpt-1 96 -0.028 0.274 -0.573 -0.148 -0.065 0.057 1.578 
Res&Devt-1 115 -0.001 0.006 -0.048 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 
SGAt-1 96 -0.017 0.159 -0.569 -0.063 -0.008 0.011 0.588 
Accruals 114 -0.013 0.091 -0.316 -0.052 -0.009 0.010 0.431 
SalesGrow 117 0.350 2.175 -0.554 -0.064 0.036 0.139 21.687 
Big5 118 0.669 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AuditTn(years) 117 7.162 4.173 1.000 3.000 7.000 11.000 15.000 
LNAuditTn 117 1.734 0.764 0.000 1.099 1.946 2.398 2.708 
AudComSz 118 2.576 1.317 0.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 8.000 
AudShare 118 0.048 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.034 0.563 
OpeCycle 115 69.95 213.62 -662.09 13.27 65.72 105.75 1,474.76 
ROA 117 0.063 0.182 -1.054 0.026 0.090 0.139 0.521 
MarketSh 118 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.045 
Z-score 117 1.560 4.694 -46.661 1.319 1.960 2.732 8.218 
InsShare 117 0.355 0.218 0.000 0.197 0.321 0.502 0.890 
PE Ratio 117 -3.836 16.718 -58.560 -12.100 -4.090 0.000 88.090 
BoardSz 117 6.060 1.544 3.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 11.000 
NED% 117 0.442 0.143 0.000 0.375 0.429 0.500 0.750 
TotalAssets(£1,000) 117 123,822 346,748 1,370 22,582 53,357 101,019 3376400 
LnAssets 117 10.822 1.260 7.223 10.025 10.885 11.523 15.032 
Mark2Book 117 1.729 1.774 -1.676 0.798 1.225 2.104 10.741 
Leverage 117 0.098 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.148 0.715 
DealVal(£1,000) 117 163.363 910.358 0.110 11.637 31.831 82.601 9,802.954 
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Table 4.2.2  Summary Statistics for IBOs 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
CFO 87 -0.043 0.106 -0.616 -0.079 -0.031 0.008 0.226 
ProdCos 83 0.073 0.232 -0.462 -0.009 0.076 0.171 1.275 
DisExp 67 -0.050 0.204 -0.609 -0.122 -0.051 0.019 0.524 
Res&Dev 85 0.000 0.007 -0.028 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.029 
SGA 67 -0.022 0.118 -0.269 -0.089 -0.021 0.008 0.326 
CFOt-1 82 -0.030 0.088 -0.489 -0.067 -0.019 0.015 0.136 
ProdCost-1 79 0.046 0.209 -0.564 -0.015 0.037 0.149 0.676 
DisExpt-1 65 -0.054 0.212 -0.696 -0.145 -0.039 0.031 0.493 
Res&Devt-1 80 -0.002 0.007 -0.032 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.016 
SGAt-1 63 -0.021 0.146 -0.419 -0.114 -0.006 0.040 0.518 
Accruals 82 -0.000 0.082 -0.449 -0.035 -0.002 0.044 0.245 
SalesGrow 86 0.230 0.716 -0.895 0.010 0.085 0.230 5.169 
Big5 87 0.828 0.380 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AuditTn(years) 86 6.558 4.497 1.000 3.000 6.000 9.000 18.000 
LNAuditTn 86 1.609 0.793 0.000 1.099 1.792 2.197 2.890 
AudComSz 87 2.874 0.986 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 5.000 
AudShare 87 0.028 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.393 
OpeCycle 84 47.85 190.87 -749.96 16.30 41.57 83.55 1,154.14 
ROA 86 0.033 0.205 -0.876 0.028 0.073 0.110 0.413 
MarketSh 87 0.008 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.139 
Z-score 86 1.327 1.661 -5.024 0.713 1.255 2.320 7.554 
InsShare 86 0.372 0.186 0.000 0.288 0.370 0.500 0.905 
PE Ratio 86 -2.069 16.341 -52.470 -7.400 -3.220 3.550 74.700 
BoardSz 86 6.721 1.719 1.000 5.000 7.000 8.000 10.000 
NED% 86 0.527 0.131 0.000 0.444 0.528 0.625 0.750 
TotalAssets(£1,000) 86 551,899. 1452680 3,447 41,021 118,081 533,565 11700000 
LnAssets 86 11.773 1.749 8.145 10.622 11.678 13.187 16.278 
Mark2Book 86 2.085 15.146 -92.143 0.861 1.681 2.409 103.703 
Leverage 86 0.200 0.193 0.000 0.036 0.162 0.308 0.825 
DealVal(£1,000) 86 510.559 1,369.592 1.010 26.030 114.375 531.220 11,730.530 
 
High correlations between right hand side variables may lead to the risk of 
multicollinearity in regression analysis. There is a rule of thumb that if 
correlations exceed 0.7, there might be a potential multicollinearity in the 
regression analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2012). Moreover, VIFs provide a 
formal test of multicollinearity, and the VIFs are lower than the critical value of 
10, indicating no risk of multicollinearity (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2012). I have 
checked correlations and VIFs and find no multicollinearity problems in any of 
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the models.  
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Table 4.2.3  Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for MBOs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1)CFO 1                 
(2)ProdCos -0.299 1                
(3)DisExp 0.169 -0.466 1               
(4)Res&Dev -0.118 0.085 -0.075 1              
(5)SGA -0.174 -0.521 0.515 0.015 1             
(6)Prod+DisEx -0.242 0.800 -0.904 0.134 -0.568 1            
(7)CFO+DisEx -0.505 0.475 -0.936 0.134 -0.389 0.861 1           
(8)CFOt-1 0.443 -0.425 0.014 -0.28 -0.019 -0.148 -0.14 1          
(9)ProdCost-1 -0.169 0.773 -0.391 0.149 -0.496 0.662 0.383 -0.34 1         
(10)DisExpt-1 -0.049 -0.406 0.479 0.165 0.466 -0.466 -0.4 -0.318 -0.558 1        
(11)Res&Devt-1 -0.147 0.12 -0.197 0.344 -0.163 0.199 0.232 -0.12 0.146 -0.261 1       
(12)SGAt-1 -0.082 -0.554 0.509 -0.073 0.766 -0.559 -0.417 -0.041 -0.573 0.641 -0.291 1      
(13)Prod+DisExt-1 -0.05 0.676 -0.445 -0.049 -0.508 0.629 0.398 0.094 0.859 -0.904 0.249 -0.652 1     
(14)CFO+DisExt-1 -0.101 0.597 -0.51 0.007 -0.482 0.576 0.479 -0.084 0.743 -0.918 0.353 -0.656 0.941 1    
(15)Accruals -0.014 0.134 -0.061 0.227 -0.153 0.122 0.059 -0.304 0.106 0.301 -0.011 -0.14 -0.132 -0.167 1   
(16)SalesGrow -0.123 0.12 0.028 0.466 -0.001 0.052 0.024 -0.572 0.077 0.516 0.011 0.004 -0.316 -0.275 0.428 1  
(17)Big5 0.104 -0.042 0.127 -0.058 -0.055 -0.105 -0.17 -0.039 -0.177 0.136 -0.031 0.114 -0.157 -0.136 -0.008 -0.001 1 
(18)LNAuditTn 0.107 -0.047 0.032 0.055 -0.049 -0.018 -0.063 0.077 0.016 -0.07 0.018 -0.021 0.084 0.044 -0.044 -0.187 -0.038 
(19)AudComSz 0.048 0.036 0.125 0.046 -0.069 -0.062 -0.108 -0.092 0.036 0.091 -0.016 -0.13 -0.037 -0.053 0.148 0.051 0.117 
(20)AudShare 0.019 -0.007 -0.035 -0.043 -0.025 0.02 0.048 0.131 0.011 -0.05 -0.003 -0.135 0.033 0.022 0.117 -0.063 -0.186 
(21)OpeCycle 0.022 0.026 -0.144 -0.18 -0.015 0.111 0.12 0.169 0.054 -0.154 -0.027 0.032 0.119 0.084 -0.162 -0.357 0.007 
(22)ROA 0.208 -0.093 -0.196 -0.152 -0.32 0.033 0.096 0.273 -0.121 -0.28 0.048 -0.246 0.08 0.187 -0.043 -0.208 0.099 
(23)MarketSh 0.087 -0.080 0.047 0.010 -0.131 -0.077 -0.066 0.067 -0.150 0.012 0.066 0.066 -0.105 -0.039 0.024 -0.075 0.201 
(24)Z-score 0.067 -0.034 -0.068 -0.018 -0.066 0.028 0.035 0.095 -0.034 -0.054 0.001 -0.046 0.017 0.015 -0.035 -0.044 0.164 
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(25)InsShare -0.051 -0.069 0.227 -0.02 0.218 -0.253 -0.171 -0.06 -0.093 0.096 0.04 0.238 -0.136 -0.089 -0.115 -0.06 0.016 
(26)PE Ratio -0.365 -0.006 -0.291 -0.028 -0.033 0.211 0.403 0.126 -0.017 -0.089 0.01 -0.05 0.032 0.04 0.001 -0.066 0.035 
(27)BoardSz 0.022 -0.01 0.101 0.153 -0.176 -0.012 -0.082 -0.037 -0.071 0.146 0.026 -0.116 -0.086 -0.123 0.177 0.134 0.098 
(28)NED% 0.08 -0.07 0.018 -0.048 -0.03 -0.063 -0.04 -0.065 -0.149 0.171 -0.108 0.05 -0.222 -0.151 0.043 0.025 0.113 
(29)LnAssets 0.029 -0.077 0.185 0.039 -0.163 -0.198 -0.168 -0.004 -0.105 0.01 0.161 -0.033 -0.095 -0.013 0.039 0.008 0.3 
(30)Mark2Book 0.191 -0.075 -0.069 -0.104 -0.208 -0.009 -0.021 0.15 -0.094 -0.134 -0.292 -0.15 0.014 0.085 0.079 -0.053 -0.021 
(31)Leverage -0.138 0.009 0.1 -0.013 0.002 -0.146 -0.044 -0.02 -0.017 0.011 0.081 -0.059 -0.051 -0.032 0.071 -0.051 -0.078 
(32)DealVal 0.059 -0.087 0.114 0.002 -0.072 -0.137 -0.123 0.043 -0.179 0.099 0.029 0.132 -0.175 -0.124 0.033 -0.029 0.097 
                   
  (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)   
(18)LNAuditTn 1                 
(19)AudComSz 0.059 1                
(20)AudShare 0.055 0.317 1               
(21)OpeCycle 0.088 -0.045 0.069 1              
(22)ROA -0.016 0.078 0.044 0.236 1             
(23)MarketSh 0.099 0.302 -0.077 0.012 0.143 1            
(24)Z-score 0.14 0.204 0.044 0.253 0.673 0.15 1           
(25)InsShare 0.009 -0.013 -0.375 -0.153 -0.209 0.069 -0.202 1          
(26)PE Ratio -0.072 -0.018 0.249 0.036 0.158 -0.008 0.102 -0.162 1         
(27)BoardSz 0.076 0.437 -0.073 -0.049 0.104 0.353 0.116 0.048 -0.093 1        
(28)NED% -0.013 0.197 -0.046 -0.007 -0.168 0.057 -0.24 0.282 -0.163 -0.008 1       
(29)LnAssets 0.12 0.351 -0.156 0.029 0.301 0.606 0.27 0.174 -0.065 0.431 0.207 1      
(30)Mark2Book -0.045 0.143 -0.087 -0.06 0.395 0.242 0.19 -0.04 0.044 0.109 -0.011 0.07 1     
(31)Leverage 0.032 0.13 -0.091 -0.047 -0.021 -0.028 -0.045 0.272 -0.149 0.125 0.204 0.262 -0.117 1    
(32)DealVal -0.016 0.058 -0.06 0.001 0.066 0.577 0.044 -0.053 0.002 0.158 0.152 0.403 0.059 0.047 1   
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Table 4.2.4  Pearson pairwise Correlation matrix for IBOs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1)CFO 1                 
(2)ProdCos -0.426 1                
(3)DisExp -0.168 -0.752 1               
(4)Res&Dev 0.027 0.024 -0.278 1              
(5)SGA -0.136 -0.732 0.559 -0.004 1             
(6)Prod+DisEx 0.044 0.933 -0.94 0.206 -0.733 1            
(7)CFO+DisEx -0.261 0.798 -0.908 0.298 -0.49 0.909 1           
(8)CFOt-1 0.665 -0.524 0.229 0.185 0.124 -0.262 -0.435 1          
(9)ProdCost-1 -0.111 0.642 -0.783 0.348 -0.667 0.839 0.807 -0.303 1         
(10)DisExpt-1 -0.11 -0.672 0.831 -0.338 0.542 -0.805 -0.767 0.224 -0.844 1        
(11)Res&Devt-1 0.071 -0.238 0.04 0.412 0.201 -0.066 -0.06 0.154 0.001 -0.118 1       
(12)SGAt-1 -0.021 -0.639 0.548 -0.032 0.759 -0.635 -0.526 0.149 -0.612 0.542 0.216 1      
(13)Prod+DisExt-1 -0.028 0.764 -0.852 0.321 -0.638 0.865 0.85 -0.296 0.961 -0.96 0.002 -0.611 1     
(14)CFO+DisExt-1 -0.052 0.678 -0.81 0.255 -0.52 0.797 0.818 -0.512 0.855 -0.952 0.056 -0.525 0.939 1    
(15)Accruals -0.254 0.198 0.048 -0.075 -0.18 0.024 -0.012 -0.219 0.116 0.021 0.057 -0.071 0.01 0.003 1   
(16)SalesGrow -0.03 -0.042 0.295 -0.105 -0.125 -0.188 -0.284 0.093 -0.073 0.033 -0.028 -0.021 -0.098 -0.077 0.133 1  
(17)Big5 -0.068 0.162 0.008 0.018 -0.136 0.091 0.042 -0.15 0.104 -0.101 -0.144 -0.117 0.132 0.138 -0.047 -0.092 1 
(18)LNAuditTn -0.053 -0.054 0.073 0.052 0.108 -0.093 -0.049 0.103 -0.083 0.119 0.186 0.096 -0.099 -0.159 0.055 -0.22 0.039 
(19)AudComSz 0.046 -0.112 0.064 -0.092 -0.057 -0.085 -0.052 0.059 -0.199 0.247 -0.102 -0.03 -0.224 -0.223 -0.065 -0.059 0.252 
(20)AudShare 0.069 0.067 -0.251 0.103 -0.117 0.248 0.208 0.162 0.1 -0.208 0.172 -0.1 0.176 0.13 0.119 0.009 -0.045 
(21)OpeCycle -0.048 0.19 -0.128 -0.006 -0.234 0.21 0.158 -0.175 0.17 -0.048 -0.013 -0.209 0.129 0.119 0.009 -0.328 0.265 
(22)ROA 0.146 -0.029 0.138 -0.267 -0.062 -0.057 -0.207 0.091 -0.139 0.007 -0.126 -0.145 -0.069 -0.036 0.051 0.164 0.085 
(23)MarketSh 0.074 -0.08 0.118 -0.055 0.038 -0.106 -0.145 -0.024 -0.084 0.109 0.015 0.043 -0.103 -0.073 -0.023 -0.083 0.149 
(24)Z-score 0.34 -0.11 -0.16 -0.315 -0.121 0.108 -0.008 0.139 -0.07 -0.162 -0.074 -0.113 0.066 0.126 0.043 0.067 -0.024 
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(25)InsShare -0.148 0.201 0.09 -0.064 -0.041 0.048 -0.03 -0.228 0.104 -0.024 0.101 0.083 0.041 0.117 0.198 0.007 0.054 
(26)PE Ratio -0.021 0.048 -0.088 0.089 -0.141 0.091 0.108 0.018 0.11 -0.119 0.021 -0.221 0.134 0.108 0.179 -0.054 0.02 
(27)BoardSz -0.231 0.119 -0.059 -0.199 -0.205 0.12 0.156 -0.242 0.052 0.108 -0.084 -0.124 0.067 -0.003 -0.012 -0.031 0.131 
(28)NED% -0.219 0.276 -0.11 0.066 -0.202 0.213 0.194 -0.292 0.262 -0.015 -0.072 -0.119 0.141 0.099 -0.012 -0.025 0.171 
(29)LnAssets -0.098 -0.025 0.211 -0.076 -0.088 -0.084 -0.101 -0.048 0.032 0.086 0.036 -0.14 -0.022 -0.012 -0.016 0.013 0.344 
(30)Mark2Book 0.152 0.064 0.219 -0.051 -0.031 -0.072 -0.235 0.165 -0.17 0.138 -0.078 0.077 -0.164 -0.194 -0.117 0.039 -0.001 
(31)Leverage -0.323 0.255 0.125 -0.039 -0.101 0.027 -0.007 -0.461 0.062 0.009 0.086 -0.157 -0.011 0.124 0.228 0.034 0.165 
(32)DealVal 0.028 0.013 0.1 -0.058 -0.124 -0.037 -0.087 -0.025 0.021 0.061 -0.028 -0.082 -0.038 -0.026 0.079 -0.056 0.129 
                   
  (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)   
(18)LNAuditTn 1                 
(19)AudComSz 0.051 1                
(20)AudShare -0.055 0.086 1               
(21)OpeCycle 0.279 0.129 -0.024 1              
(22)ROA 0.178 -0.12 0.074 0.028 1             
(23)MarketSh 0.089 0.271 -0.113 0.029 0.065 1            
(24)Z-score 0.107 -0.055 0.224 0.097 0.745 0.025 1           
(25)InsShare -0.148 -0.081 -0.183 0.02 -0.041 -0.066 -0.156 1          
(26)PE Ratio -0.145 0.013 0.083 -0.001 0.042 -0.066 0.008 0.061 1         
(27)BoardSz 0.208 0.384 -0.223 0.15 0.011 0.256 -0.082 -0.092 -0.034 1        
(28)NED% -0.113 0.232 -0.025 0.093 -0.226 -0.034 -0.321 0.085 -0.099 0.081 1       
(29)LnAssets 0.241 0.219 -0.28 0.104 0.15 0.405 -0.103 -0.071 -0.023 0.436 0.05 1      
(30)Mark2Book -0.076 -0.223 -0.091 0.013 0.418 -0.019 0.117 0.15 0.025 -0.124 -0.01 0.077 1     
(31)Leverage -0.009 0.012 -0.187 -0.106 0.017 0.087 -0.327 0.259 0.122 0.099 0.27 0.451 0.186 1    
(32)DealVal 0.021 0.035 -0.12 0.029 0.06 0.226 -0.064 -0.187 -0.088 0.284 -0.005 0.562 0.022 0.23 1   
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4.4 Results and Findings 
This section reports the results for the relationships between AEM (AccruDe) 
and REM from the simultaneous equations system. Five measures are used as 
proxies for different REM tools: sales manipulation (CFO), overproduction 
(ProdCos), discretionary expense cuts (DisExp), R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev) 
and SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA). Hence, for the simultaneous equations 
system, there are 5 sets of models for each of the REM measures respectively.  
 
Prior research tends to aggregate REM when investigating the relationships 
between AEM and REM (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; 
Zang, 2012). While I also do this, I subsequently disaggregate the components 
of REM, as different types of REM might cancel each other and result in weak 
or insignificant relationships between AEM and aggregate REM. Managers also 
have different incentives for specific types of REM, due to their potential long 
or short-term effects as well as the costs associated with each strategy. This 
might result in diverse relationships between AEM and different types of REM. 
My investigation is expected to reveal a clearer relationship between AEM and 
different types of REM, thus providing a better understanding of managers’ 
earnings-management strategies and behaviours. 
 
Tables 4.3.2 and 4.3.4 at the end of section 4.4.1 and section 4.4.2 respectively 
show the results of simultaneous equations system estimated by 2SLS for 
MBOs and IBOs respectively. It can be seen that AEM has some impact on 
REM, but REM has an unclear impact on AEM in MBOs. For IBOs, AEM and 
REM have unclear impacts on each other.  
 
Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 at the end of section 4.4.1 and section 4.4.2 respectively 
show the results of simultaneous equations system estimated by 3SLS for 
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MBOs and IBOs respectively. It can be seen that AEM and REM have an impact 
on each other for MBOs and IBOs. As discussed before, 2SLS estimates each 
equation in the simultaneous system separately, while 3SLS estimates the 
whole system of structural equations jointly by performing a third stage GLS-
type estimation using the covariance matrix produced in the second stage 
(Greene, 2011; StataCorp, 2013). Hence 3SLS might better address the 
simultaneous relationships, and thus the results of 3SLS estimation might be 
more reliable. This study therefore interprets the results from the 3SLS 
estimations.  
 
The interpretation of these regression results will be different from that in prior 
literature. This study includes AEM and REM proxies as dependent variables, 
and some of their signed values have been indicated as significantly negative 
in univariate tests in previous chapters (AEM proxy in Section 2.5.1, Univariate 
tests, in Chapter 2 and REM proxies in Section 3.6.1, Univariate tests, in 
Chapter 3). Mathematically, if a dependent variable has different sign to the 
independent variable, a positive relationship between them actually means that 
the independent variable leads to lower levels of earnings management, and a 
negative relationship between them actually means that the independent 
variable leads to higher levels of earnings management. For instance, the sign 
direction of sales manipulation (CFO) is significantly negative in univariate tests 
for MBOs. Firm performance (ROA) has a positive relationship with sales 
manipulation (CFO), suggesting that firm performance leads to less sales 
manipulation. This means that firms with better performance are associated 
with less REM of sales manipulation.  
4.4.1 Results for management buyouts 
Prior to MBOs, managers have been found to engage in positive REM. As 
discussed in univariate tests section of Chapter 3, managers engage in four out 
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of five types of REM to boost earnings. Sales manipulation, by cutting price or 
offering more lenient credit terms toward the end of the year in an effort to 
accelerate sales from the next fiscal year into the current year, leads to 
significant negative abnormal CFO (- CFO). Overproduction, by producing more 
units than necessary to spread fixed costs over a larger number of units in order 
to lower fixed costs per unit, can decrease reported COGS in an attempt to 
increase profits, leading to significant positive abnormal production costs (+ 
ProdCos). Discretionary expenses can be cut to increase profits, leading to 
significant negative abnormal discretionary expenses (- DisExp). R&D 
expenses can be manipulated in an effort to affect profits, but the results for 
abnormal R&D expense cuts in univariate tests is insignificant (Res&Dev). This 
means managers have no systematic R&D expense cuts behaviour, but this 
does not mean no manager engage in it. As R&D expenses tend to be beneficial 
for future firm performance, cutting R&D expenses might be seen as 
detrimental to the firm, and thus managers might try to avoid it. SG&A expenses 
can also be cut in an effort to increase profits, leading to significant negative 
abnormal SG&A expenses (- SGA). Managers possibly engage in positive REM 
to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value to 
secure financing for MBOs.  
 
Further, managers have been also found to engage in negative AEM to 
decrease earnings figures. As discussed in univariate tests of Chapter 2, 
managers engage in negative discretionary accruals, leading to significantly 
negative abnormal discretionary accruals (- Accruals). Managers might use 
negative AEM to conceal the real value of a firm prior to MBOs, so that they do 
not have to pay much to outside shareholders.  
 
Considering the combined effects of AEM and REM practices, the total level of 
earnings management should be relatively positive in order to enhance external 
financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value to secure financing preceding MBOs. 
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Panel A of Table 4.1.3 shows the results for the combined effects of AEM and 
REM practices for MBOs. It can be seen that the total level of earnings 
management (the combination of AEM and both types of REM aggregations: 
AEM+Prod+DisEx and AEM+CFO+DisEx) is significantly positive prior to MBOs. 
This is consistent with the prediction that the total level of earnings 
management would be positive preceding MBOs. 
 
Table 4.1.3 Panel A  Summary Statistics of earnings management in total for MBOs 
Panel A  Total level of earnings management for MBOs 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho1: mean=0 t-Stat2 p-Value REM3 
AEM+Prod+DisEx 95 0.150 0.460 -1.114 1.954 Ha: > 0 3.174*** 0.001 + 
AEM+CFO+DisEx 96 0.123 0.381 -0.941 2.083 Ha: > 0 3.158*** 0.001 + 
Note 1. Ho: is Null Hypothesis; Ha: is Alternative Hypothesis 
Note 2: Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 3: This column indicates the direction of AEM+REM. ‘+’ means income increasing 
earnings management; ‘-’ means income decreasing earnings management. The significance of 
the positive or negative REM is shown by the ‘*’ in t-Stat column.  
 
Table 4.3.1 shows the results for the relationships between AEM and REM prior 
to MBOs, estimated by 3SLS. Panel B of Table 4.3.1 shows the results of 3SLS 
regressions for the AEM and REM aggregations, prior to MBOs. It can be seen 
that AEM and REM aggregations (both Prod+DisEx and CFO+DisEx) have no 
impact on each other. However, Panel A of Table 4.3.1 reveals that AEM and 
specific types of REM have impacts on each other. Table 4.1.4 summarises the 
results for the relationships between AEM and specific types of REM prior to 
MBOs.  
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Table 4.1.4  Summary of 3SLS regressions results for MBOs (not regression 
correlations) 
Table 4.1.4  Summary of 3SLS regressions results for MBOs (not regression correlations) 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO Accruals ProdCos Accruals DisExp Accruals Res&Dev Accruals SGA Accruals 
Sign1 (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) ( ) (-) (-) (-) 
Accruals(-)1 - ***  + ***  + ***  + ***  - ***  
CFO(-)  - ***         
ProdCos(+)    + ***       
DisExp(-)      + *     
Res&Dev( )        + ***   
SGA(-)          - *** 
ROA + *        - **  
MarketSh     - *      
Z-score         + *  
InsShare     + *      
PE Ratio - ***    - ***      
BoardSz           
NED%     - **      
Big5           
LNAuditTn           
AudComSz           
AudShare           
OpeCycle           
Note 1: This is sign direction of earnings management proxies in bracket from univariate tests 
of prior chapters. (+) means significantly positive; (-) means significantly negative; ( ) means 
insignificant sign direction.  
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Table 4.3.1 Panel A  3SLS Regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruDe ProdCos AccruDe DisExp AccruDe Res&Dev AccruDe SGA AccruDe 
Sign (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (?) (-) (-) (-) 
Accruals -0.992***  2.434***  1.918***  0.109***  -1.049***  
 (-4.026)  (4.344)  (3.156)  (7.465)  (-3.239)  
CFO  -0.316***         
  (-3.362)         
ProdCos    0.230***       
    (6.170)       
DisExp      0.095*     
      (1.842)     
Res&Dev        8.915***   
        (8.312)   
SGA          -0.291*** 
          (-3.990) 
ROA 0.172*  -0.023  -0.046  -0.001  -0.349**  
 (1.906)  (-0.116)  (-0.178)  (-0.287)  (-2.551)  
MarketSh 0.916  -0.163  -10.928*  -0.009  -1.151  
 (0.399)  (-0.033)  (-1.658)  (-0.106)  (-0.334)  
Z-score -0.002  0.001  -0.004  0.000  0.008*  
 (-0.817)  (0.177)  (-0.504)  (0.196)  (1.900)  
InsShare -0.051  0.029  0.257*  0.001  0.097  
 (-0.949)  (0.240)  (1.654)  (0.390)  (1.190)  
PE Ratio -0.002***  -0.000  -0.003***  -0.000  0.000  
 (-4.120)  (-0.329)  (-2.655)  (-0.039)  (0.144)  
BoardSz 0.003  -0.008  -0.018  0.000  -0.007  
 (0.389)  (-0.491)  (-0.912)  (0.093)  (-0.696)  
NED% 0.114  -0.119  -0.442**  -0.001  -0.051  
 (1.432)  (-0.683)  (-2.055)  (-0.335)  (-0.453)  
Big5  -0.001  0.003  0.003  0.001  -0.004 
  (-0.075)  (0.210)  (0.141)  (0.151)  (-0.174) 
LNAuditTn  -0.004  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  0.000 
  (-0.347)  (-0.130)  (-0.139)  (-0.189)  (0.024) 
AudComSz  0.005  0.003  0.011  0.000  0.007 
  (0.742)  (0.450)  (1.144)  (0.013)  (0.772) 
AudShare  0.037  0.070  0.117  0.020  0.048 
  (0.456)  (0.903)  (1.192)  (0.474)  (0.495) 
OpeCycle  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.930)  (-1.122)  (-1.151)  (-0.036)  (-1.478) 
LnAssets -0.008 0.001 -0.009 0.003 0.082** -0.004 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 
 (-0.615) (0.062) (-0.294) (0.394) (2.357) (-0.407) (0.507) (-0.487) (-0.393) (-0.352) 
Mark2Book 0.012 0.008 -0.019 0.006 -0.011 0.010 -0.001* 0.009* 0.005 0.004 
 (1.597) (1.461) (-1.151) (1.268) (-0.476) (1.394) (-1.740) (1.819) (0.383) (0.582) 
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Leverage -0.122 0.003 -0.101 0.048 -0.219 0.031 -0.008 0.076 0.029 0.040 
 (-1.155) (0.032) (-0.425) (0.629) (-0.794) (0.352) (-0.955) (0.951) (0.204) (0.462) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.400) (0.449) (-0.535) (0.595) (1.431) (0.060) (-0.291) (0.353) (0.340) (0.129) 
Constant -0.023 -0.047 0.312 -0.087 -0.708** -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.059 -0.013 
 (-0.175) (-0.547) (1.050) (-1.014) (-2.108) (-0.034) (-0.090) (0.048) (0.333) (-0.135) 
Observations 111 111 110 110 93 93 109 109 93 93 
R-squared -0.185 -0.124 -0.511 -0.143 -0.235 -0.054 -0.695 -0.294 -0.085 -0.014 
Wald chi2 48.21 15.98 25.91 41.97 28.80 14.54 70.89 81.53 29.00 22.38 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.100 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.013 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.1 Panel B  3SLS Regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx AccruDe CFO+DisEx AccruDe 
Accruals 0.325  -0.987  
 (0.325)  (-1.359)  
Prod+DisEx  0.038   
  (1.288)   
CFO+DisEx    -0.011 
    (-0.255) 
ROA 0.110  -0.139  
 (0.266)  (-0.458)  
MarketSh 9.746  9.442  
 (0.946)  (1.218)  
Z-score 0.001  0.007  
 (0.054)  (0.710)  
InsShare -0.426*  -0.204  
 (-1.699)  (-1.118)  
PE Ratio 0.003*  0.006***  
 (1.751)  (4.337)  
BoardSz 0.023  0.019  
 (0.737)  (0.829)  
NED% 0.355  0.377  
 (1.051)  (1.502)  
Big5  -0.002  0.001 
  (-0.088)  (0.039) 
LNAuditTn  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.077)  (-0.053) 
AudComSz  0.011  0.011 
  (1.103)  (1.169) 
AudShare  0.095  0.112 
  (0.909)  (1.082) 
OpeCycle  -0.000*  -0.000 
  (-1.683)  (-1.588) 
LnAssets -0.076 0.004 -0.074* 0.000 
 (-1.437) (0.368) (-1.885) (0.006) 
Mark2Book -0.013 0.009 -0.008 0.009 
 (-0.364) (1.401) (-0.288) (1.379) 
Leverage -0.052 0.047 0.289 0.035 
 (-0.131) (0.546) (0.949) (0.405) 
DealVal -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.393) (0.221) (-1.379) (0.139) 
Constant 0.848 -0.106 0.702* -0.061 
 (1.643) (-1.054) (1.859) (-0.600) 
Observations 92 92 93 93 
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R-squared 0.154 0.113 0.147 0.073 
Wald chi2 15.98 10.28 29.92 10.14 
Prob > chi2 0.192 0.416 0.003 0.429 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.2 Panel A  2SLS Regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruDe ProdCos AccruDe DisExp AccruDe Res&Dev AccruDe SGA AccruDe 
Sign1 (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (?) (-) (-) (-) 
Accruals -0.342***  0.595**  -0.493  0.097***  -0.275**  
 (-3.137)  (2.331)  (-1.157)  (7.514)  (-2.319)  
CFO  -0.538         
  (-1.381)         
ProdCos    0.065       
    (1.617)       
DisExp      0.306     
      (1.096)     
Res&Dev        -0.062   
        (-0.040)   
SGA          -0.077 
          (-0.906) 
ROA 0.220**  -0.136  -0.566  -0.006  -0.420***  
 (2.423)  (-1.028)  (-1.501)  (-0.671)  (-4.012)  
MarketSh 0.897  -0.323  -11.925**  -0.011  -1.592  
 (0.546)  (-0.078)  (-2.086)  (-0.066)  (-0.793)  
Z-score -0.003  0.002  0.006  0.000  0.011***  
 (-1.521)  (0.597)  (0.661)  (0.963)  (4.596)  
InsShare -0.046  -0.046  0.187  0.006  0.161***  
 (-1.053)  (-0.365)  (1.246)  (1.093)  (2.817)  
PE Ratio -0.002*  -0.000  -0.003  -0.000  0.000  
 (-1.836)  (-0.407)  (-1.593)  (-0.098)  (0.034)  
BoardSz 0.002  -0.003  0.004  -0.000  -0.012  
 (0.196)  (-0.143)  (0.256)  (-0.268)  (-1.144)  
NED% 0.110  -0.125  -0.377  -0.007  -0.072  
 (1.484)  (-0.806)  (-0.938)  (-0.839)  (-0.847)  
Big5  0.016  0.005  -0.016  -0.004  -0.006 
  (0.645)  (0.292)  (-0.514)  (-0.225)  (-0.294) 
LNAuditTn  0.009  -0.002  0.000  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.603)  (-0.144)  (0.011)  (-0.192)  (-0.178) 
AudComSz  0.004  0.004  0.010  0.006  0.011 
  (0.481)  (0.546)  (0.701)  (0.768)  (1.095) 
AudShare  0.127  0.121  0.055  0.105  0.084 
  (0.856)  (1.071)  (0.270)  (0.928)  (0.727) 
OpeCycle  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-1.114)  (-1.106)  (-0.071)  (-1.002)  (-1.011) 
LnAssets -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.079 -0.013 0.000 -0.000 -0.009 0.000 
 (-0.667) (-0.065) (-0.130) (0.217) (1.399) (-0.585) (0.371) (-0.045) (-0.520) (0.019) 
Mark2Book 0.007 0.011* -0.008 0.005 0.016 0.009 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.008 
 (1.033) (1.666) (-0.468) (0.957) (0.489) (0.724) (-0.962) (0.535) (-0.058) (1.226) 
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Leverage -0.214* -0.015 0.028 0.052 -0.060 0.004 -0.009 0.036 -0.002 0.033 
 (-1.786) (-0.145) (0.130) (0.705) (-0.310) (0.031) (-1.230) (0.466) (-0.021) (0.394) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.902) (1.298) (-1.336) (0.769) (4.405) (-0.237) (-0.036) (0.766) (1.429) (0.341) 
Constant 0.016 -0.077 0.200 -0.065 -0.869* 0.135 0.001 -0.027 0.126 -0.055 
 (0.123) (-0.661) (0.821) (-0.740) (-1.700) (0.473) (0.121) (-0.306) (0.724) (-0.491) 
Observations 114 111 113 110 96 93 113 109 96 93 
R-squared 0.239  0.040 0.085 0.218   0.064 0.239 0.100 
Wald chi2 66.88 7.350 63.21 14.42 109.2 6.167 329.6 10.86 51.31 17.23 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.801 0.000 0.368 0.000 0.070 
Hausman (F) 3.354* 4.769** 0.450 0.088 0.364 8.326*** 18.417*** 0.715 0.482 .001 
 Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1: Sign is the sign direction from univariate tests of Chapter One and Chapter Two, 
(-) means significant negative, (+) means significant positive, and (?) means 
insignificant direction.  
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Table 4.3.2 Panel B  2SLS Regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx Accruals CFO+DisEx Accruals 
Accruals 0.615*  0.824*  
 (1.800)  (1.865)  
Prod+DisEx  -0.042   
  (-0.653)   
CFO+DisEx    -0.138 
    (-0.904) 
ROA 0.163  0.378  
 (0.504)  (0.958)  
MarketSh 9.474  9.525  
 (1.242)  (1.559)  
Z-score 0.000  -0.003  
 (0.035)  (-0.390)  
InsShare -0.387*  -0.130  
 (-1.730)  (-0.762)  
PE Ratio 0.003  0.005*  
 (1.442)  (1.723)  
BoardSz 0.019  -0.003  
 (0.662)  (-0.150)  
NED% 0.318  0.306  
 (0.680)  (0.725)  
Big5  -0.007  -0.016 
  (-0.309)  (-0.633) 
LNAuditTn  -0.001  -0.004 
  (-0.089)  (-0.250) 
AudComSz  0.012  0.010 
  (1.088)  (0.883) 
AudShare  0.082  0.081 
  (0.612)  (0.507) 
OpeCycle  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.912)  (-0.622) 
LnAssets -0.075 -0.000 -0.068 -0.004 
 (-1.138) (-0.018) (-1.168) (-0.270) 
Mark2Book -0.018 0.009 -0.029 0.006 
 (-0.333) (1.235) (-0.776) (0.603) 
Leverage -0.120 0.019 0.196 0.024 
 (-0.363) (0.186) (0.823) (0.232) 
DealVal -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-3.659) (-0.005) (-3.765) (-0.208) 
Constant 0.884 -0.046 0.815 0.026 
 (1.440) (-0.362) (1.530) (0.143) 
Observations 95 92 96 93 
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R-squared 0.155  0.211  
Wald chi2 170.0 11.95 96.69 9.836 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.455 
Hausman (F) 0.095 2.643 1.408 2.169 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.4.1.1 Results for earnings management relationships  
AEM and sales manipulation 
AEM has a negative impact on REM of sales manipulation (CFO), and REM of 
sales manipulation also has a negative impact on AEM. The sign directions of 
AEM and sales manipulation are both significantly negative, suggesting that 
sales manipulation leads to less AEM, or AEM leads to less sales manipulation, 
which is consistent with hypothesis H3-1b. This also implies a causal relationship 
between AEM and sales manipulation: managers’ decisions on the level of AEM 
and sales manipulation are likely to be made jointly, and they depend on each 
other. Managers tend to have relatively more leeway in terms of the volume and 
detectability with sales manipulation, so they are likely to be somewhat 
overaggressive in this to ensure they hit minimum benchmarks.  
 
AEM and overproduction 
AEM has a positive impact on REM of overproduction (ProdCos), and REM of 
overproduction also has a positive impact on AEM. The sign direction of AEM 
is significantly negative, but the sign direction of overproduction is significantly 
positive. This suggests that overproduction leads to less AEM, or AEM leads to 
less overproduction, which is consistent with hypothesis H3-1b. This also implies 
a causal relationship between AEM and overproduction: managers’ decisions 
on the level of AEM and overproduction are likely to be made jointly, and they 
depend on each other.  
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AEM and sales, general and administrative expenditure cuts 
AEM has a negative impact on REM of SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA), and REM 
of SG&A expenditure cuts also has a negative impact on AEM. The sign 
directions of AEM and SG&A expenditure cuts are both significantly negative. 
Hence, this suggests that SG&A expenditure cut leads to less AEM, or AEM 
leads to less SG&A expenditure cut, which is consistent with hypothesis H3-1b. 
This also implies a causal relationship between AEM and SG&A expenditure 
cuts: managers’ decisions on the levels of AEM and SG&A expenditure cuts are 
likely to be made jointly, and they depend on each other.  
 
Summary and explanation 
To sum up, prior to MBOs, REM of sales manipulation (CFO), overproduction 
(ProdCos), and SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA) leads to less AEM. AEM also 
leads to less REM of sales manipulation, overproduction, and SG&A 
expenditure cuts. Thus these types of REM and AEM might have a substitutive 
relationship.  
 
Prior to MBOs, managers have been found to engage in positive REM and 
negative AEM. Managers engage in positive REM to increase earnings and 
portray a better future performance to external financiers. Positive REM is 
expected to enhance external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value in order 
to secure finance preceding MBOs. Managers also engage in negative AEM to 
conceal the true value of their firm so they will not have to pay too much to 
outside shareholders. External financiers might not be concerned about AEM, 
as it will only decrease the price they have to pay in the transaction. Preceding 
MBOs, management might have the primary goal of securing external financing, 
thus they might set an aggressively positive target for total earnings 
management. Panel A of Table 3.1.3 shows that the level of earnings 
management in total is significantly positive prior to MBOs, which is consistent 
with this prediction. Hence managers might choose to engage in more positive 
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REM and less negative AEM, and thus result in REM of sales manipulation, 
overproduction, and SG&A expenditure cuts lead to less AEM prior to MBOs.  
 
Moreover, managers might have asymmetric control over the exact amount of 
different REM tools attained. Managers tend to have relatively more leeway in 
terms of the volume and detectability with sales manipulation (CFO) than they 
have with overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts. This might be because 
managers can precisely determine the level of inventory they hold for an 
accounting period, and they can precisely determine the level of SG&A 
expenditure cuts for an accounting period. Hence, by consistently using multiple 
REM tools to boost earnings and decreasing negative AEM, managers might 
increase their chances of achieving their target level of earnings management 
in total. 
 
In addition, exceeding the earnings management target might lead to higher 
buyout costs for managers, and a failure to beat the target might lead to 
difficulties when it comes to seeking funds for an MBO. Hence combining these 
tools might help managers to achieve their overall earnings management target 
precisely. Furthermore, if managers run out of REM options, AEM could also be 
used to adjust the overall effects of earnings management.  
 
AEM and research and development expense cuts 
AEM has a positive impact on REM of R&D expense cut (Res&Dev), and REM 
of R&D expense cut also has a positive impact on AEM. The sign direction of 
AEM is significantly negative. There is no evidence of systematic R&D expense 
cuts if only considers R&D expense cuts. This suggests that R&D expense cut 
leads to less AEM, or AEM leads to less R&D expense cut, which is consistent 
with hypothesis H3-1b. This also implies a causal relationship between AEM and 
R&D expense cuts: managers’ decisions on the level of AEM and R&D expense 
cuts are likely to be made jointly, and they depend on each other.  
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AEM and discretionary expenses cut 
AEM has a positive impact on REM of discretionary expenses cut (DisExp), and 
REM of discretionary expenses cut also has a positive impact on AEM. The sign 
directions of AEM and discretionary expense cuts are both significantly 
negative, suggesting that cutting discretionary expenses leads to more AEM, or 
AEM leads to more cutting of discretionary expenses, which is consistent with 
hypothesis H3-1a. This also implies a causal relationship between AEM and 
cutting discretionary expenses: managers’ decisions on the level of AEM and 
discretionary expense cuts are likely to be made jointly, and they depend on 
each other. 
 
Discretionary expenses includes both SG&A expenditures and R&D expenses. 
SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA) are significantly negative in univariate tests, 
which suggest positive REM. There is no systematic R&D expense 
manipulation (Res&Dev). Increasing R&D expenses tends to be beneficial for 
the future success of firms, while cutting R&D expenses might be detrimental 
to the firm. Thus managers might try to minimise the manipulation of R&D 
expenses. Some managers might engage in negative REM by increasing R&D 
expenses, while others may engage in positive REM by decreasing R&D 
expenses, leading to insignificant results in univariate tests. Hence the 
combined effects of R&D expenses manipulation might lead to a positive impact 
between discretionary expenses cut and AEM. This might suggest that cutting 
discretionary expenses is a complementary of AEM. 
4.4.1.2 Results for constraints on earnings management 
Table 4.3.1 also shows the results for the relationships between earnings 
management and its constraints, estimated by 3SLS, prior to MBOs. Table 4.1.4 
also summarises the results for these relationships. 
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Firm performance 
Firm performance (ROA) has a positive relationship with REM of sales 
manipulation (CFO). The sign direction of sales manipulation is significantly 
negative, suggesting that firms with better performance are associated with less 
sales manipulation, which is consistent with hypothesis H3-8a.  
 
Managers are less likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management 
to produce better accounting results in more profitable firms, as their firm 
already perform well (Becker et al., 1998; Bédard et al., 2004). Hence, firms 
with relatively better performance might be less likely to engage in sales 
manipulation.  
 
Moreover, firm performance has a negative relationship with REM of SG&A 
expenditure cuts (SGA). The sign direction of SG&A expenditure cuts is 
significantly negative. This suggests that firms with better performance are 
associated with more SG&A expenditure cutting, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H3-8a.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, cutting SG&A expenditure might have negative 
economic consequence for a firm in the long-term, but sales manipulation 
brings an immediate short-term negative economic consequence. Interfering in 
short-term operations might lead to abnormal firm performance, which is likely 
to attract the attention of shareholders and thus affect the overall execution plan 
for an MBO. Managers in better-performing firms might be more eager to 
execute MBOs. Hence, in better-performing firms, managers might choose to 
minimise short-term rather than long-term interference in normal operations. 
Moreover, managers in a firm with better performance might need slightly 
positive REM in order to secure financing. As SG&A expenditure cuts are easier 
to control, and the effects can be more precisely estimated, managers in better-
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performing firms might choose to cut SG&A expenditure rather than engage in 
sales manipulation prior to MBOs.   
 
Market-leader status 
Market-leader status in the industry (MarketSh) has a negative relationship with 
REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). The sign direction of discretionary 
expenses cuts is significantly negative, suggesting that firms without market-
leader status are associated with less discretionary expenses cutting, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H3-9a. 
 
REM might be particularly costly for firms in an industry with intense competition, 
as it departs from optimal operating decisions of the business. Deviating from 
optimal business strategies may lead to different impact on firm performance. 
Market-leader firms usually have more competitive advantages than their 
followers, such as greater cumulative experience, economies of scale, more 
bargaining power with suppliers and customers, higher attention from investors 
and greater influence on their competitors (Woo, 1983). This might suggest that 
REM might be less costly for market-leader firms, as the erosion of their 
competitive advantage is relatively small (Zang, 2012). This implies that firms 
without market-leader status are less likely to engage in REM due to the 
relatively high costs. Hence firms without market-leader status have a lower 
level of REM of discretionary expenses cut prior to MBOs.  
 
Financial health 
Financial health (Z-score) has a positive relationship with REM of SG&A 
expenditure cut (SGA). The sign direction of SG&A expenditure cuts is 
significantly negative, suggesting that firms with poor financial health have a 
higher level of SG&A expenditure cuts, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H3-10a.  
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A firm in financial distress might be less likely to find external financial support 
for an MBO and might have difficulty repaying debts after a buyout. Cutting 
SG&A expenditure might have a negative impact on a firm's performance in the 
long-term, but this manipulation is easy to implement and control. Hence 
managers might choose to cut SG&A expenditure to improve their financial 
situation in the short term and to support the execution of an MBO  
 
Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership (InsShare) has a positive relationship with REM of 
discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). The sign direction of discretionary 
expenses cuts is significantly negative, suggesting that firms with higher 
institutional ownership have lower levels of discretionary expense cutting, 
which is consistent with hypothesis H3-11a.  
 
As institutional investors provide a high degree of monitoring through 
governance practices and information gathering concerning the quality of 
operating decisions, managers find it difficult to manipulate REM when 
institutional investors closely monitor their operations (Bushee, 1998). 
Moreover, institutions with the intention of holding substantial equity ownership 
over a long-term have strong incentives to incur the cost of explicitly monitoring 
for removing incentives on managerial myopic behaviour. Furthermore, 
institutional investors might have a better understanding of the long-term impact 
of firms’ operating decisions, leading to more effort in monitor and control REM 
activities. In addition, as discretionary expense cuts is easier to spot than other 
types of REM, institutional investors might have high chance to spot it in close 
monitoring. Therefore, firms with higher institutional ownership have lower 
levels of discretionary expense cuts.  
 
Firm undervaluation 
The degree of firm undervaluation (PE Ratio) has a negative relationship with 
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REM of sales manipulation (CFO). The sign direction of sales manipulation is 
significantly negative, suggesting that firms with higher degrees of 
undervaluation are associated with more sales manipulation, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H3-12a. 
 
Moreover, the degree of firm undervaluation (PE Ratio) has a negative 
relationship with REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). The sign direction 
of discretionary expenses cuts is significantly negative, suggesting that firms 
with higher degrees of firm undervaluation are associated with more 
discretionary expenses cuts, which is consistent with hypothesis H3-12a.   
 
I have found that MBO firms are undervalued in the market. Prior to MBOs, 
managers’ ability to access external funding might be constrained in highly 
undervalued firms. Hence managers in firms with high degree of undervaluation 
are more likely to engage in positive REM to enhance prospective external 
financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value to secure external financing (Fischer 
and Louis, 2008). Therefore, firms with higher degree of firm undervaluation are 
associated with more sales manipulation and discretionary expense cuts.  
 
Percentage of non-executive directors on board 
The percentage of non-executive directors on board (NED%) has a negative 
relationship with REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). The sign direction 
of discretionary expense cuts is significantly negative, suggesting that firms with 
higher percentages of non-executive directors on their boards are associated 
with more cutting of discretionary expenses, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H3-12a.  
 
Non-executive directors might perform little or no real monitoring role, as they 
lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, and information to challenge 
management activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and 
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Kraakman, 1991). Hence a board with a high percentage of non-executive 
directors might be less likely to challenge managers, leading to more use of 
discretionary expenses cuts. Moreover, buyout firms are not required to hire as 
many non-executive directors as listed firms are. Non-executive directors might 
be afraid of losing their position on a board after a buyout, and thus they support 
managers who engage in REM preceding MBOs.  
4.4.2 Results for institutional buyouts 
Prior to IBOs, managers are motivated to engage in positive earnings 
management in an attempt to minimise firm undervaluation. I have found in prior 
chapters that IBO firms have undervalued shares in the market. Firm 
undervaluation tends to attract IBO buyers (Hafzalla, 2009), and IBOs threaten 
managers’ long-term job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). Under these 
conditions, managers are likely to engage in positive earnings management to 
avoid becoming a potential target for an IBO. They often do not have much time 
to prepare an earnings-management strategy, and they prefer REM in this 
circumstance. Thus, given the portfolio of earnings management strategies, 
managers are likely to engage in both REM and AEM according to their 
expected earnings management target in total and the associated benefits and 
drawbacks.  
 
Managers have been found to engage in positive REM prior to IBOs. As 
discussed in univariate tests section of Chapter 3, managers engage in four out 
of five types of REM to boost earnings prior to IBOs, and their REM behaviours 
are the same as those prior to MBOs. They engage in sales manipulation (- 
CFO), overproduction (+ ProdCos), cutting discretionary expenses (- DisExp) and 
cutting SG&A expenses (- SGA). Nevertheless, the result of abnormal R&D 
expense cuts in univariate tests is insignificant (Res&Dev), suggesting no 
evidence of greater R&D expense cuts behaviour compared to non-buyout 
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firms.  
 
This study has found no evidence that, prior to IBOs, managers engage in AEM 
to a greater degree than non-buyout firms do. As discussed in univariate tests 
section of Chapter 2, managers show no systematic AEM behaviour, resulting 
in an insignificant sign direction for abnormal discretionary accruals (AccruDe), 
but this does not mean no manager engage in AEM.  
 
Considering the combination effects of AEM and REM practices, the total level 
of earnings management should be positive in order to increase the firm value 
preceding IBOs. Panel B of Table 4.1.3 shows the results of the combination 
effects of AEM and REM practices for IBOs. It can be seen that the total level 
of earnings management (the combination of AEM and both types of REM 
aggregations: AEM+Prod+DisEx and AEM+CFO+DisEx) is significantly positive 
prior to IBOs. This is consistent with the prediction that the total level of earnings 
management is positive preceding IBOs.  
 
Table 4.1.3 Panel B  Summary Statistics of earnings management in total for IBOs 
Panel B  Total level of earnings management for IBOs 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Ho1: mean=0 t-Stat2 p-Value REM3 
AEM+Prod+DisEx 64 0.100 0.378 -0.862 1.124 Ha: > 0 2.115** 0.019 + 
AEM+CFO+DisEx 67 0.093 0.221 -0.449 0.609 Ha: > 0 3.429*** 0.001 + 
Note 1. Ho: is Null Hypothesis; Ha: is Alternative Hypothesis; 
Note 2: Note of T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 3: This column indicates the direction of AEM+REM. ‘+’ means income increasing 
earnings management; ‘-’ means income decreasing earnings management. The significance of 
the positive/negative real earnings management is indicated by the ‘*’ in t-Stat column. 
 
Table 4.3.3 shows the results for the relationships between AEM and REM, 
estimated by 3SLS, prior to IBOs. Panel B of Table 4.3.3 shows the results of 
3SLS regressions for AEM and REM aggregations prior to IBOs. It can be seen 
that AEM and the first type of REM aggregation (CFO+DisEx) do influence each 
other, and the second type of REM aggregation (Prod+DisEx) has a single-
direction impact on AEM but not reverse. This is consistent with the findings of 
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prior studies (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Zang, 2012): 
AEM and aggregation of REM have impact on each other.  
 
However, the inclusion of the REM aggregation might make inconsistent results 
more difficult to interpret. Managers have different incentives for specific types 
of REM due to potential long-term or short-term effects as well as different costs 
associated, thus different types of REM might cancel each other or give rise to 
inconsistent results. It is better to focus on the relationships between AEM and 
specific types of REM in Panel A of Table 4.3.3. The interpretation of the results 
for the relationships between AEM and specific types of REM might provide a 
better understanding of managers’ earnings management strategies and 
behaviours preceding IBOs. Table 4.1.5 summarises the results for the 
relationships between AEM and specific types of REM prior to IBOs.  
 
As discussed previously in the methodology section, sales growth (SalesGrow) 
is a weak instrument of AEM for IBOs, hence the results for the relationships 
between AEM and REM from structural equation 1 (model REM (1)-(5)) for IBOs 
might be not as reliable as those for MBOs.  
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Table 4.1.5  Summary of 3SLS regressions results for IBOs (not regression 
correlations) 
Table 4.1.5  Summary of 3SLS regressions results for IBOs (not regression correlations) 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO Accruals ProdCos Accruals DisExp Accruals Res&Dev Accruals SGA Accruals 
Sign1 (-) ( ) (+) ( ) (-) ( ) ( ) ( ) (-) ( ) 
Accruals( )1 - **  + **  + **      
CFO(-)  - ***         
ProdCos(+)    + ***       
DisExp(-)      + ***     
Res&Dev( )           
SGA(-)          - *** 
ROA           
MarketSh           
Z-score     - *  - *    
InsShare           
PE Ratio           
BoardSz       - **    
NED%           
Big5           
LNAuditTn           
AudComSz           
AudShare        + *   
OpeCycle           
Note 1: sign direction of earnings management proxies in bracket from univariate tests of prior 
chapters. (+) means significantly positive; (-) means significantly negative; ( ) means 
insignificant sign direction.  
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Table 4.3.3 Panel A  3SLS Regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruDe ProdCos AccruDe DisExp AccruDe Res&Dev AccruDe SGA AccruDe 
Sign (-) (?) (+) (?) (-) (?) (?) (?) (-) (?) 
Accruals -2.480**  4.591**  2.844**  0.041  -1.452  
 (-2.392)  (2.011)  (2.069)  (0.743)  (-1.415)  
CFO  -0.302***         
  (-3.574)         
ProdCos    0.147***       
    (3.561)       
DisExp      0.185***     
      (3.594)     
Res&Dev        -1.301   
        (-0.696)   
SGA          -0.374*** 
          (-4.610) 
ROA -0.121  0.034  0.375  0.004  0.038  
 (-1.003)  (0.120)  (1.436)  (0.447)  (0.262)  
MarketSh 0.333  -0.231  0.682  0.002  0.128  
 (0.477)  (-0.146)  (0.513)  (0.038)  (0.177)  
Z-score 0.024  -0.018  -0.063*  -0.002*  -0.011  
 (1.333)  (-0.378)  (-1.817)  (-1.946)  (-0.489)  
InsShare 0.056  -0.007  -0.076  -0.008  0.009  
 (0.564)  (-0.029)  (-0.348)  (-1.298)  (0.055)  
PE Ratio 0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  
 (0.762)  (-0.242)  (-0.908)  (0.619)  (-0.447)  
BoardSz -0.006  0.017  -0.014  -0.001**  -0.012  
 (-0.791)  (0.931)  (-0.843)  (-2.442)  (-1.064)  
NED% -0.047  0.222  -0.117  0.002  -0.095  
 (-0.495)  (0.980)  (-0.566)  (0.281)  (-0.754)  
Big5  -0.000  0.000  -0.010  -0.004  -0.010 
  (-0.015)  (0.013)  (-0.423)  (-0.148)  (-0.471) 
LNAuditTn  -0.002  0.001  -0.004  0.010  -0.003 
  (-0.232)  (0.122)  (-0.288)  (0.682)  (-0.188) 
AudComSz  -0.002  -0.004  -0.000  -0.007  -0.008 
  (-0.333)  (-0.612)  (-0.035)  (-0.745)  (-0.847) 
AudShare  0.041  0.070  0.098  0.219*  0.089 
  (0.412)  (0.700)  (0.783)  (1.752)  (0.706) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.370)  (0.322)  (0.887)  (1.017)  (0.356) 
LnAssets -0.031 -0.013* 0.024 -0.008 0.061* -0.014 0.001 -0.013* -0.002 -0.003 
 (-1.467) (-1.875) (0.540) (-1.144) (1.913) (-1.426) (1.007) (-1.703) (-0.108) (-0.329) 
Mark2Book 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.073) (0.833) (0.140) (0.129) (-0.028) (-0.149) (-0.235) (0.186) (0.043) (0.263) 
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Leverage 0.169 0.084 -0.384 0.100* -0.423* 0.129* -0.013 0.195*** 0.080 0.089 
 (0.821) (1.499) (-0.792) (1.804) (-1.749) (1.959) (-1.138) (3.608) (0.490) (1.295) 
DealVal 0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.805) (1.605) (-0.731) (0.983) (-0.679) (0.358) (-0.678) (1.108) (-0.466) (-0.191) 
Constant 0.279 0.129* -0.327 0.073 -0.439 0.164 0.004 0.116 0.139 0.051 
 (1.392) (1.712) (-0.739) (0.932) (-1.249) (1.502) (0.386) (1.490) (0.661) (0.467) 
Observations 76 76 75 75 62 62 74 74 60 60 
R-squared -2.029 0.112 -1.557 0.045 -0.698 -0.055 0.045 0.189 -0.587 -0.092 
Wald chi2 21.62 27.23 19.79 31.21 16.12 17.57 15.26 17.49 22.49 31.27 
Prob > chi2 0.042 0.002 0.071 0.001 0.186 0.063 0.228 0.064 0.032 0.001 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.3 Panel B  3SLS Regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx AccruDe CFO+DisEx AccruDe 
Accruals -2.786  -2.493*  
 (-1.129)  (-1.869)  
Prod+DisEx  -0.064**   
  (-2.048)   
CFO+DisEx    -0.203*** 
    (-3.695) 
ROA -0.755  -0.293  
 (-1.458)  (-1.132)  
MarketSh -1.811  -1.049  
 (-0.725)  (-0.790)  
Z-score 0.131  0.044  
 (1.515)  (1.315)  
InsShare 0.265  0.057  
 (0.592)  (0.268)  
PE Ratio 0.001  0.000  
 (0.905)  (0.731)  
BoardSz 0.036  0.017  
 (1.165)  (0.993)  
NED% 0.421  0.173  
 (1.051)  (0.848)  
Big5  -0.013  -0.009 
  (-0.477)  (-0.398) 
LNAuditTn  -0.002  -0.004 
  (-0.161)  (-0.283) 
AudComSz  -0.003  -0.001 
  (-0.282)  (-0.096) 
AudShare  0.158  0.111 
  (1.155)  (0.856) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000 
  (1.024)  (0.998) 
LnAssets -0.051 -0.008 -0.036 -0.010 
 (-0.975) (-0.787) (-1.138) (-1.018) 
Mark2Book 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.560) (0.287) (-0.306) (-0.419) 
Leverage 0.551 0.132* 0.465* 0.157** 
 (1.231) (1.940) (1.957) (2.320) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.413) (0.178) (-0.085) (-0.077) 
Constant -0.124 0.093 0.182 0.124 
 (-0.205) (0.835) (0.523) (1.152) 
Observations 61 61 62 62 
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R-squared -0.071 0.039 -0.585 -0.119 
Wald chi2 9.717 8.09 15.59 18.60 
Prob > chi2 0.641 0.620 0.211 0.046 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.4 Panel A  2SLS Regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruDe ProdCos AccruDe DisExp AccruDe Res&Dev AccruDe SGA AccruDe 
Sign (-) (?) (+) (?) (-) (?) (?) (?) (-) (?) 
Accruals -0.032  58.599  4.118  -0.074  -1.647*  
 (-0.032)  (0.041)  (1.524)  (-1.085)  (-1.689)  
CFO  -0.092         
  (-0.677)         
ProdCos    0.043       
    (0.765)       
DisExp      0.041     
      (0.887)     
Res&Dev        -0.366   
        (-0.132)   
SGA          -0.006 
          (-0.052) 
ROA -0.189**  -1.597  0.750**  0.004  0.000  
 (-2.517)  (-0.040)  (2.018)  (0.468)  (0.003)  
MarketSh 0.524  -6.471  1.764  0.010  0.227  
 (1.205)  (-0.044)  (1.170)  (0.313)  (0.444)  
Z-score 0.031***  -0.361  -0.137**  -0.002  0.001  
 (2.607)  (-0.041)  (-2.291)  (-1.291)  (0.057)  
InsShare -0.011  -4.226  -0.406  0.001  0.160  
 (-0.116)  (-0.040)  (-1.071)  (0.146)  (1.063)  
PE Ratio 0.000  -0.010  -0.001  0.000  0.000  
 (0.313)  (-0.041)  (-1.603)  (1.399)  (0.177)  
BoardSz -0.014**  -0.009  -0.025  -0.001*  -0.012  
 (-2.247)  (-0.011)  (-1.217)  (-1.656)  (-1.250)  
NED% -0.047  2.083  -0.005  -0.000  -0.259*  
 (-0.672)  (0.051)  (-0.014)  (-0.001)  (-1.813)  
Big5  -0.010  -0.013  -0.016  -0.009  -0.018 
  (-0.549)  (-0.633)  (-0.834)  (-0.467)  (-0.884) 
LNAuditTn  0.005  0.007  -0.002  0.003  -0.005 
  (0.577)  (0.767)  (-0.231)  (0.311)  (-0.386) 
AudComSz  -0.004  -0.004  -0.008  -0.005  -0.007 
  (-0.627)  (-0.551)  (-1.178)  (-0.742)  (-1.016) 
AudShare  0.184*  0.169  0.220**  0.194*  0.194* 
  (1.692)  (1.432)  (2.243)  (1.705)  (1.746) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.959)  (0.727)  (1.175)  (1.277)  (0.979) 
LnAssets 0.008 -0.013 0.762 -0.011 0.046 -0.006 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.378) (-1.581) (0.039) (-1.381) (1.145) (-0.455) (-0.501) (-1.466) (-0.054) (-0.306) 
Mark2Book 0.002 0.000 0.074 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.396) (1.108) (0.041) (0.647) (-0.261) (0.314) (-0.930) (0.811) (-0.747) (0.959) 
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Leverage -0.156 0.158* -8.357 0.161** -0.408 0.124 0.004 0.193** 0.069 0.128 
 (-0.834) (1.894) (-0.040) (2.048) (-1.190) (1.363) (0.322) (2.410) (0.538) (1.314) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000** -0.001 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.725) (2.084) (-0.040) (1.866) (-0.752) (0.198) (0.757) (1.776) (-0.184) (0.126) 
Constant -0.026 0.115 -5.883 0.102 -0.011 0.074 0.015 0.118 0.135 0.053 
 (-0.162) (1.572) (-0.041) (1.331) (-0.028) (0.618) (1.258) (1.552) (0.601) (0.466) 
Observations 82 76 79 75 67 62 82 74 67 60 
R-squared 0.338 0.187  0.172  0.105  0.186  0.103 
Wald chi2 46.27 22.73 0.095 22.68 112.8 17.57 16.91 25.62 26.20 16.42 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.012 1 0.012 0.000 0.063 0.153 0.004 0.010 0.088 
Hausman (F) 0. 041 0.002 0.226 0.276 9.063*** 0.007 2.046 0.072 0.924 0.483 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.4 Panel B  2SLS Regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx AccruDe CFO+DisEx AccruDe 
Accruals 17.444  -4.224**  
 (0.578)  (-1.992)  
Prod+DisEx  -0.010   
  (-0.400)   
CFO+DisEx    -0.040 
    (-0.856) 
ROA 0.643  -0.704**  
 (0.239)  (-1.980)  
MarketSh 1.064  -2.426  
 (0.139)  (-1.515)  
Z-score -0.193  0.118**  
 (-0.340)  (2.136)  
InsShare -1.678  0.452  
 (-0.483)  (1.290)  
PE Ratio -0.003  0.001*  
 (-0.468)  (1.730)  
BoardSz 0.003  0.032  
 (0.028)  (1.447)  
NED% 1.734  0.049  
 (0.684)  (0.145)  
Big5  -0.016  -0.016 
  (-0.808)  (-0.823) 
LNAuditTn  -0.001  -0.002 
  (-0.119)  (-0.197) 
AudComSz  -0.008  -0.008 
  (-1.091)  (-1.154) 
AudShare  0.206*  0.223** 
  (1.954)  (2.234) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000 
  (1.116)  (1.208) 
LnAssets 0.086 -0.005 -0.026 -0.005 
 (0.286) (-0.394) (-0.657) (-0.386) 
Mark2Book -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.108) (0.770) (0.010) (0.194) 
Leverage -1.184 0.122 0.437 0.130 
 (-0.422) (1.336) (1.337) (1.417) 
DealVal -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.351) (0.151) (0.364) (0.109) 
Constant -0.619 0.059 -0.225 0.063 
 (-0.295) (0.526) (-0.523) (0.554) 
Observations 64 61 67 62 
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R-squared  0.097  0.100 
Wald chi2 4.527 16.12 110.2 17.13 
Prob > chi2 0.972 0.096 0.000 0.071 
Hausman (F) 1.895 0.359 20.395*** 0 .108 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.4.2.1 Results for earnings management relationships 
AEM and sales manipulation 
AEM has a negative impact on REM of sales manipulation (CFO), and REM of 
sales manipulation also has a negative impact on AEM. The sign direction of 
sales manipulation is significantly negative. There does not appear to be a 
systematic AEM behaviour if only AEM manipulation is considered. This 
suggests that sales manipulation leads to more AEM, or AEM leads to more 
sales manipulation, which is consistent with hypothesis H3-2a. This also implies 
a causal relationship between AEM and sales manipulation: managers’ 
decisions on the levels of AEM and sales manipulation are likely to be made 
jointly, and they depend on each other. As previously discussed, managers tend 
to have relatively more leeway both in volume and detectability with sales 
manipulation, so they are likely to be somewhat overaggressive to ensure they 
hit minimum benchmarks.  
 
AEM and overproduction 
AEM has a positive impact on REM of overproduction (ProdCos), and REM of 
overproduction also has a positive impact on AEM. The sign direction of 
overproduction (ProdCos) is significantly positive. There is no evidence of 
systematic AEM behaviour when only consider AEM manipulation. This 
suggests that overproduction leads to more AEM, or AEM leads to more 
overproduction, which is consistent with hypothesis H3-2a. This also implies a 
causal relationship between AEM and overproduction: managers’ decisions on 
the levels of AEM and overproduction are likely to be made jointly, and they 
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depend on each other. 
 
AEM and sales, general and administrative expenditure cuts 
REM of SG&A expenditure cut (SGA) has a negative impact on AEM, but AEM 
has no impact on REM of SG&A expenditure cuts. The sign direction of SG&A 
expenditure cuts is significantly negative. There is no evidence of systematic 
AEM behaviour if only AEM manipulation is considered. This implies that the 
causality of this relationship runs from SG&A expenditure cuts to AEM: 
managers’ decisions on the levels of SG&A expenditure cuts are likely to affect 
their decision to engage in AEM, and no reverse impact. This also suggests that 
cutting SG&A expenditure leads to more AEM, which is consistent with 
hypothesis H3-2a.  
 
Summary and explanation 
To sum up, prior to IBOs, REM by sales manipulation (CFO), overproduction 
(ProdCos) and cutting SG&A expenditure (SGA) leads to more AEM prior to IBOs. 
Furthermore, AEM leads to more REM by sales manipulation and 
overproduction. Thus these types of REM and AEM might have a 
complementary relationship.  
 
Prior to IBOs, managers appear to engage in positive REM, but there is no 
evidence of systematic AEM. Managers engage in positive REM to increase 
earnings in an attempt to increase firm value and impede any potential IBO 
bidding. Shareholders may be concerned about improvements in firm 
performance and while not caring about REM behaviours. This might be 
because firm undervaluation will not maximise their wealth. There is no 
evidence of systematic AEM behaviour if only AEM manipulation is considered, 
but this does not mean AEM does not take place.  
 
Preceding IBOs, management might have a primary goal to increase their firm's 
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value, thus they might set an aggressively positive target for total earnings 
management. Panel B of Table 4.1.3 shows that the total earnings management 
is significantly positive prior to IBOs, which is consistent with this prediction. 
Managers might choose to engage in more positive REM and more AEM. Thus 
REM of sales manipulation, overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts leads 
to more AEM prior to IBOs.  
 
Moreover, as previously discussed, managers might have more leeway in terms 
of the amount and detectability of sales manipulation than they have with 
overproduction and SG&A expenditure. Managers might therefore consistently 
use multiple REM methods to boost earnings in order to increase their chances 
of achieving their target level of overall earnings management.   
 
In addition, exceeding the earnings management target might lead to higher 
expectations from investors regarding future performance, which might be 
difficult to achieve. Failure to beat the earnings management target might have 
an insignificant impact on a firm's value, so it would still attract IBO bids. Hence, 
combining these earnings management tools might help managers to beat their 
overall earnings management target appropriately. Furthermore, if managers 
run out of the REM methods, AEM could be used as a last resort to achieve the 
overall effects of earnings management.  
 
AEM and research and development expense cuts 
AEM has no impact on REM of R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev), and REM of R&D 
expense cuts has no impact on AEM. Managers have neither systematic R&D 
expense cuts behaviour nor AEM behaviour if only one of these behaviours is 
considered. This implies that there is no causality of relationship between AEM 
and R&D expense cuts: managers’ decisions on the levels of AEM and R&D 
expense cuts are likely to be made separately. This also suggests that cutting 
R&D expenses and AEM have no impact on each other, which is inconsistent 
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with hypotheses H3-2a and H3-2b.  
 
Since managers usually do not have a long time to prepare earnings 
management strategies prior to IBOs, they might cut R&D expenses and use 
AEM at the time when they need it. This implies that managers might have no 
systematic manipulation of R&D expense cuts and AEM, and thereby the 
stochastic manipulation of R&D expense cuts and AEM might lead to no 
relationship between R&D expense cuts and AEM prior to IBOs.  
 
AEM and discretionary expenses cuts 
AEM has a positive impact on REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp), and 
REM of discretionary expense cuts also has a positive impact on AEM. The sign 
direction of discretionary expense cuts is significantly negative. There does not 
appear to be a systematic AEM behaviour if only AEM manipulation is 
considered. This suggests that cutting discretionary expenses leads to less 
AEM, or that AEM leads to less cutting of discretionary expenses, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H3-2b. This also implies a causal relationship 
between AEM and cutting discretionary expenses: managers’ decisions on the 
levels of AEM and discretionary expense cuts are likely to be made jointly, and 
depend on each other.  
 
Discretionary expenses consists of both SG&A expenditure and R&D expense. 
Cuts in SG&A expenditure (SGA) are found to be significantly negative in 
univariate tests, which suggests positive REM. There is no systematic 
manipulation of R&D expenses (Res&Dev) if only abnormal R&D expenses are 
considered. Since increasing R&D expenses is likely to increase the future 
success of a firm, and cutting R&D expenses is generally detrimental to a firm’s 
performance, managers are likely to cut R&D expenses only as a last resort. 
As is the case with IBOs, some managers might engage in negative REM by 
increasing R&D expense, while others engage in positive REM by decreasing 
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R&D expense, and thus leads to insignificant results in univariate tests. Hence 
the overall effects of R&D expense manipulation might lead to a negative 
impact between discretionary expenses cut and AEM, suggesting that 
discretionary expenses cut is a substitutive of AEM.  
4.4.2.2 Results for constraints on earnings management 
Table 4.3.4 also shows the results on the relationships between earnings 
management and its constraints, estimated by 3SLS, prior to MBOs. Table 4.1.5 
also summarises the results on the relationships between them prior to IBOs. 
 
Financial health 
Financial health (Z-score) has a negative relationship with REM of discretionary 
expense cuts (DisExp). The sign direction of discretionary expenses cuts is 
significantly negative, suggesting that firms with poor financial health are 
associated with less cutting of discretionary expenses, which is consistent with 
hypothesis H3-10b.  
 
Moreover, financial health has a negative relationship with R&D expense cuts 
(Res&Dev). The sign direction of R&D expense cuts is insignificant, suggesting 
that firms with poor financial health are associated with more R&D expense 
cutting, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H3-10b. In other words, firms with 
good financial health will not cut R&D expenditure as it is good for firm growth, 
but 'desperate' firms would cut it in order to improve their earnings. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.6.3, firms with poor financial health are likely to 
bear a relatively high marginal cost when deviating from optimal business 
strategies, and this REM strategy might be perceived as too costly when 
managers are primarily aiming to improve operations (Zang, 2012). However, I 
have found in Chapter 3 that IBO firms are undervalued in the market, and 
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managers have the incentive to engage in earnings management to improve 
firm performance and impede any potential IBO bids. The negative impact of 
R&D expense cuts might happen in the long-term future in comparison to 
potential IBOs in short-term future, and managers might have more precise 
control in terms of the volume and detectability of it. In order to impede any 
potential IBO bids, managers in firms with poor financial health might choose 
to cut expenditure selectively. Firms with poor financial health have a higher 
level of R&D expense cutting but a lower level of discretionary expenses cuts.  
 
Board size 
Board size (BoardSz) has a negative relationship with REM by cutting R&D 
expenses (Res&Dev). The sign direction of R&D expense cuts is insignificant. 
This suggests that firms with larger board sizes are associated with less cutting 
of R&D expenses, which is consistent with hypothesis H3-13b. 
 
As previously discussed, firms with larger boards may have increased abilities 
in monitoring, leading to lower levels of REM (Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009). 
Although larger boards might be less efficient, the cutting of R&D expenditure 
is easy to spot and likely to have further impacts on the long-term success of a 
business. This explains why firms with larger board sizes are associated with 
less R&D expense cutting.  
 
Audit committee equity ownership 
Equity ownership by members of the audit committee (AudShare) has a positive 
relationship with AEM (AccruDe). There is no evidence of systematic AEM 
behaviour compared to non-buyout firms. This suggests that higher equity 
ownership by members of the audit committee is associated with more AEM, 
which is consistent with hypothesis H3-6b.  
 
The share ownership might jeopardise the independence of audit committee 
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members. Members of audit committees with higher equity ownership might 
therefore perform less monitoring. Hence higher equity ownership by audit 
committee members might compromise to upwards AEM, leading to higher 
levels of AEM preceding IBOs. 
4.4.3 Comparison of results between the two types of buyouts 
4.4.3.1 Comparison of earnings management relationships 
Prior to MBOs, managers typically engage in four out of five types of REM in 
order to boost earnings: sales manipulation (CFO), overproduction (ProdCos), 
discretionary expense cuts (DisExp) and SG&A expense cuts (SGA). There is 
no evidence of systematic use of the fifth type of REM, R&D expense cuts 
(Res&Dev), but this does not mean that managers do not use them. Increasing 
R&D expenditure is good for firm growth, and cutting R&D expenditure is 
generally detrimental to firm performance in the future, thus managers might 
use it as last resort. Positive REM might increase earnings, implying to external 
financiers that managers are diligent and that the firm will have better 
performance in the future. It is expected to enhance external financiers’ 
perceptions of a firm’s value in order to secure finance prior to MBOs. Managers 
also engage in negative AEM in order to decrease their earnings figures, but 
external financiers might not be concerned about this, as it will reduce the price 
they have to pay in the MBO transactions.  
 
Considering the combined effects of AEM and REM practices, I found the total 
level of earnings management to be positive. Panel A of Table 4.1.3 shows that 
the total level of earnings management (both AEM+Prod+DisEx and 
AEM+CFO+DisEx) is significantly positive prior to MBOs. This may be in order 
to enhance external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value, and thereby to 
secure financing, preceding MBOs. 
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Prior to IBOs, managers have been found typically engaged in four out of five 
types of REM in an effort to increase earnings. They engage in sales 
manipulation (CFO), overproduction (ProdCos), discretionary expenses cut 
(DisExp), and SG&A expenses cut (SGA). There is no evidence of systematic 
R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev), suggests that this strategy is only used as a last 
resort. Furthermore, there is no evidence that managers engage in AEM to a 
greater degree than non-buyout firms prior to IBOs. As AEM is at high risk of 
detection, managers might engage in AEM on different degree. Firm 
undervaluation preceding IBOs will not maximise shareholders’ wealth, thus 
shareholders might be concerned about the improvement of firm performance 
and do not care about REM or AEM behaviours in this circumstance.  
 
Considering the combined effects of AEM and REM practices, I found the total 
level of earnings management to be positive, possibly to increase firm value 
preceding IBOs. Panel B of Table 4.1.3 shows that the total level of earnings 
management (both AEM+Prod+DisEx and AEM+CFO+DisEx) is significantly 
positive prior to IBOs. This may be in order to minimise firm undervaluation, and 
thereby to impede any IBO bids prior to IBOs.  
 
The relationships between AEM and different types of REM vary between 
MBOs and IBOs, this might be due to the different incentives for each strategy. 
Prior to MBOs, sales manipulation (CFO) and AEM have a negative causal 
relationship, which suggests either that sales manipulation leads to less AEM, 
or more AEM leads to less sales manipulation. Overproduction (ProdCos) and 
AEM have a negative causal relationship that either overproduction leads to 
less AEM, or more AEM leads to less overproduction. SG&A expenditure cuts 
(SGA) and AEM have a negative causal relationship that either SG&A 
expenditure cuts lead to less AEM, or more AEM leads to less SG&A 
expenditure cuts. Thus, REM of sales manipulation, overproduction, and SG&A 
expenditure cut might have substitutive relationships with AEM. This also 
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implies that managers’ decisions AEM and these types of REM are likely to be 
made jointly and depending on each other.  
 
Prior to MBOs, managers have been found to engage in positive REM, in an 
attempt to secure financing, and negative AEM, possibly to conceal the true 
value of the firm. As the total level of earnings management is positive, the 
primary goal of managers might be to secure external finance. Hence managers 
might set an aggressively positive target for total earnings management and, 
therefore, engage in more positive REM and less negative AEM, resulting in a 
negative impact between AEM and REM of sales manipulation, overproduction, 
and SG&A expenditure cut prior to MBOs.  
 
Moreover, R&D expense cut (Res&Dev) and AEM have a negative causal 
relationship, which implies either that R&D expense cuts lead to less AEM, or 
more AEM leads to less R&D expense cut. This suggests that R&D expense 
cuts and AEM might have a substitutive relationship. Furthermore, discretionary 
expenses cut (DisExp) and AEM have a positive relationship that either 
discretionary expenses cuts lead to more AEM, or more AEM leads to more 
discretionary expense cuts. This might suggest that discretionary expense cuts 
and AEM have a complementary relationship. Discretionary expenses consist 
of SG&A expenditure and R&D expense cut. Managers might vary the use of 
R&D expense manipulation, and thereby cutting or increasing R&D expenditure 
based on the long- or short-term goals of the business. Hence the combined 
effects of R&D expenses manipulation might be lead to a positive impact 
between discretionary expense cuts and AEM. This also means that managers’ 
decisions on AEM and these specific REM are likely to be made jointly and 
depending on each other. 
 
Prior to IBOs, sales manipulation (CFO) and AEM have a positive causal 
relationship, which suggests either that sales manipulation leads to more AEM, 
Chapter 4 
359 
or more AEM leads to more sales manipulation. Overproduction (ProdCos) and 
AEM have a positive relationship, which suggests that either overproduction 
leads to more AEM, or more AEM leads to more overproduction. SG&A 
expenditure cuts (SGA) lead to less AEM, and the causality of this relationship 
runs only from SG&A expenditure cuts to AEM. Thus, REM by sales 
manipulation, overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts might have 
complementary relationships with AEM. This also means that managers’ 
decisions on the levels of AEM and these types of REM are likely to be made 
jointly, and that they depend on each other. 
 
Prior to IBOs, managers are motivated to engage in positive earnings 
management in an attempt to increase the value of their firm and thereby 
impede any IBO bidding. Managers have been found to engage in positive REM, 
but show no systematic AEM behaviour. As the total level of earnings 
management is positive, managers might aim to engage both in AEM and in 
REM in order to increase a firm's value. Hence, managers might set an 
aggressively positive target for total earnings management using more positive 
REM and more AEM, which results in a positive relationship between AEM and 
REM by sales manipulation, overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts, prior 
to IBOs. 
 
Moreover, R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev) and AEM have no impact on each 
other, suggesting no causality of relationship between them. This means 
managers’ decisions to use AEM and R&D expense cuts are likely to be made 
separately. There is no systematic behaviour of cutting R&D expense or AEM if 
only one of them is considered. Due to the time constraints prior to IBOs, 
managers might cut R&D expenditures or using AEM that is available when 
they need it. Hence, the stochastic manipulation of R&D expense cuts and AEM 
might explain why there is no relationship between them prior to IBOs. 
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Furthermore, discretionary expenses cut (DisExp) and AEM have a negative 
causal relationship, which implies either that discretionary expenses cuts lead 
to less AEM, or more AEM leads to less discretionary expenses cuts. This might 
suggest that discretionary expense cuts and AEM have a substitutive 
relationship. This also means that managers’ decisions AEM and discretionary 
expense cuts are likely to be made jointly and depending on each other. 
Managers might be diverse in their use of R&D expense cuts, depending on 
their long or short-term vision for their business. They might also have different 
AEM behaviours according to their levels of risk aversion regarding the 
likelihood of AEM being detected. Hence the combined effects may explain the 
negative relationship between discretionary expenses cuts and AEM.  
 
In summary, there are some differences regarding the relationships between 
AEM and REM between MBOs and IBOs. Prior to MBOs, managers have been 
found to engage in positive REM, in an attempt to secure financing for MBOs, 
and negative AEM, possibly to conceal the true value of their firms. Managers 
might attempt to achieve the primary goal of securing external financing, and 
thus choose to engage in more positive REM and less negative AEM. This 
might explain the negative relationship between AEM and sales manipulation, 
overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts, prior to MBOs. Although there is 
no evidence of systematic R&D expense cutting behaviour, R&D expense cuts 
and AEM have a negative impact on each other. Hence REM of sales 
manipulation, overproduction, SG&A expenditure cuts and R&D expense cuts 
have substitutive relationships with AEM. In addition, discretionary expense 
cuts and AEM have a positive impact on each other, suggesting REM by cutting 
discretionary expenses has a complementary relationship with AEM.  
 
Prior to IBOs, managers are motivated to engage in positive earnings 
management in an attempt to increase their firm's value. There is evidence that 
they engage in positive REM but no evidence of systematic AEM. In order to 
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achieve the target of positive total earnings management, managers might 
engage in more positive REM and more AEM. This might explain the positive 
relationship between AEM and REM of sales manipulation, overproduction and 
SG&A expenditure cuts, prior to IBOs. Hence each of these three REM methods 
has complementary relationships with AEM. Furthermore, discretionary 
expense cuts and AEM have a negative impact on each other, suggesting 
discretionary expense cuts have a substitutive relationship with AEM. In 
addition, there is no impact between R&D expense cuts and AEM, and this 
might be because there are no systematic R&D expense cuts and AEM 
behaviours.  
 
These differences can be explained by the fact that managers usually have a 
long time to prepare earnings-management strategies and choose the best 
volume proportion of both AEM and REM prior to MBOs. Managers use positive 
REM to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value 
to secure managers’ external financing. Positive REM could increase earnings, 
thus to imply management efforts and better future performance of the firm to 
external financiers. Furthermore, external financiers might have no concern of 
AEM, as this will reduce the money they have to pay in the transaction.  
 
However, managers usually do not have a long time to prepare earnings 
management strategies prior to IBOs. Managers might have the needs to 
engage in both AEM and REM to boost earnings. Shareholders might have no 
concern about AEM and REM behaviours preceding IBOs. This might because 
firm undervaluation will not maximise shareholders’ wealth. Hence managers 
might engage in AEM or REM when they have the needs to do positive earnings 
management. As the need for earnings management can occur at any time 
during an accounting period, managers might have no choice of which 
strategies to employ. They only engage in the earnings management method 
that is available in that time. Hence they do not have a systematic approach to 
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earnings management, resulting in less relationship being detected between 
AEM and REM in the case of IBOs. Moreover, as it is difficult to find a proper 
instrument for accounting researches, the weak instrument of AEM for IBOs 
might impede this study to find more relationships between AEM and REM.  
4.4.3.2 Comparison of constraints on earnings management 
Prior to MBOs, firms with better performance (ROA) are associated with less 
REM of sales manipulation (CFO). Managers in more profitable firms tend to 
engage in less income-increasing earnings management to produce better 
accounting results, as their firm already perform well (Becker et al., 1998; 
Bédard et al., 2004). Moreover, firms with better firm performance are 
associated with more REM of SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA). SG&A 
expenditure cuts might have negative economic consequence of a firm in the 
long-term, but sales manipulation has immediate short-term negative economic 
consequence. The interference of short-term operations might lead to abnormal 
firm performance and attracts the attention of shareholders, thus affecting the 
overall MBO execution plan. Managers in better-performing firms might be 
more eager to execute MBOs, and thus might choose to minimise short-term 
rather than long-term interference in normal operations. These managers might 
also need a slightly positive REM in order to enhance prospective external 
financiers’ perceptions of their firm’s value and to secure financing. As SG&A 
expenditure cuts are easier to control and their effects can be more precisely 
estimated, managers in better-performing firms might choose to engage in 
SG&A expenditure cutting rather than sales manipulation prior to MBOs.  
 
Prior to IBOs, firm performance (ROA) has no impact on REM. I have found in 
prior chapters that IBO firms have undervalued shares in the market. Firm 
undervaluation attracts IBO buyers (Hafzalla, 2009), and IBOs threaten 
managers’ long-term job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). Managers might be 
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reluctant to take any risk on their job security, and choose to engage in REM 
no matter how their firm is performing preceding IBOs. Hence, prior to IBOs, 
firm performance might not be a constraint on REM.  
 
Prior to MBOs, firms without market-leader status (MarketSh) are associated 
with less REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). REM is unlikely to 
increase the long-term value of a firm, as it departures from optimal operating 
decisions of the business. Market-leader firms usually have more competitive 
advantages over their followers, as they usually have greater cumulative 
experience, higher ability to benefit from economies of scale, more bargaining 
power with suppliers and customers, higher attention from investors, and 
greater influence on their competitors (Woo, 1983). Hence REM might be less 
costly for market-leader firms, as the erosion to their competitive advantage is 
relatively small (Zang, 2012). Prior to IBOs, market-leader status (MarketSh) 
has no impact on REM. As previous discussed, I have found in prior chapter 
that firm undervaluation of IBO targets attracts IBO buyers (Hafzalla, 2009), and 
thereby threaten managers’ long-term job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). 
Managers might be reluctant to risk their job security and choose to engage in 
REM even without market-leader status. Hence market-leader status might not 
be a constraint on REM prior IBOs.  
 
Prior to MBOs, firms with poor financial health (Z-score) are associated with 
more REM of SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA). A financial distressed firm might 
be less likely to find external investors to support MBOs as well as to repay the 
debts after buyouts. SG&A expenditure cut might have a negative impact on 
the long-term performance of a firm, but this manipulation is easy to implement 
and control. Hence managers might focus on the short-term operating and 
choose to cut SG&A expenditures in order to improve the perception of their 
financial situation.  
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Prior to IBOs, firms with poor financial health (Z-score) are associated with less 
REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). Moreover, firms with poor financial 
health are associated with more REM of R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev). This 
implies that financial healthy firms would not cut R&D expenses as it is good 
for firm growth, but “desperate” firms would cut R&D expenses to improve their 
performance. A firm with poor financial health is likely to bear a relatively high 
marginal cost from deviating of optimal business strategies, such as sharply 
decrease of cash flow for a financial difficulty firm. Hence REM might be 
perceived as relatively high costly manipulations, and the primary goal of 
managers is to improve operations (Zang, 2012). However, as previously 
discussed, firm undervaluation threatens managers’ long-term job security, and 
thereby managers have incentive to engage in earnings management to 
improve earnings in order to impede any potential IBO biddings. Cutting R&D 
expenses might have negative impact on of a firm’s long-term success among 
all other types of discretionary expenses cuts, but this might happen in the long-
term future in comparison to potential IBOs in the short-term future. Moreover, 
managers might have precise control both in volume and detectability of R&D 
expense cuts, and this manipulation are less likely to affect short-term firm 
performance. Hence, in order to impede any potential IBO bidding, managers 
in firms with poor financial health might choose to engage in REM selectively.  
 
Prior to MBOs, firms with higher institutional ownership (InsShare) are 
associated with less REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). Institutional 
investors provide a high degree of monitoring through either governance 
practices or information gathering and correctly pricing the quality of operating 
decisions (Bushee, 1998). Moreover, as REM has real economic 
consequences for firms’ long-term value, institutional investors, who are more 
sophisticated and informed than other investors, are likely to have a better 
understanding of the long-term impact of firms’ operating decisions, leading to 
more effort in monitor and control REM activities. In addition, as discretionary 
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expense cuts is easier to spot than other types of REM, institutional investors 
might have high chance to spot it in close monitoring. Prior to IBOs, institutional 
ownership (InsShare) has no impact on REM. Firm value undervaluation will not 
maximise shareholders’ wealth, or even not lead to a good sales price in 
buyouts. Prior to IBOs, institutional investors might expect the market to value 
their investments correctly, and thus they do not mitigate positive REM, which 
could signal the future performance of a firm to the market.  
 
Prior to MBOs, firms with higher degrees of undervaluation (PE Ratio) are 
associated with more REM of sales manipulation (CFO). Moreover, firms with 
higher degrees of undervaluation are associated with more REM of 
discretionary expense cuts (DisExp). Prior to MBOs, managers will consider 
their ability to access external finance to support MBOs, as highly undervalued 
firms might have difficulty to find external funding. Hence managers in firms with 
high degree of firm undervaluation are more likely to engage in positive REM 
to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the firm’s value to 
secure external financing (Fischer and Louis, 2008). Prior to IBOs, the degree 
of firm undervaluation (PE Ratio) has no impact on REM. Since most of the IBO 
firms in the sample suffer from some degree of undervaluation, there might not 
be sufficient variability in the data.   
 
Prior to MBOs, board size (BoardSz) has no impact on REM. This might be 
because the variable of board size picks up different things in different 
circumstances. Prior to IBOs, larger board size (BoardSz) are associated with 
less REM of R&D expense cut (Res&Dev). The monitor ability of a board can 
increase as more directors are added, and especially increasing the number of 
non-executives is expected to have a more positive impact than increasing 
executive directors (Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009). Furthermore, board has 
essential functions of bringing various skills and expertise to support and review 
the performance of a firm (Ronen and Yaari, 2007), which are associated with 
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the responsibilities of mitigating REM behaviours. In addition, cutting R&D 
expenses is easier to spot, and R&D expense cuts might have further impacts 
on the long-term success of the business.  
 
Prior to MBOs, firms with higher percentages of non-executive directors on their 
boards (NED%) are associated with more REM of discretionary expense cuts 
(DisExp). Non-executive directors might lack the necessary independence, time, 
expertise and information to challenge management activities effectively, and 
thereby perform little or no real monitoring role (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson 
and Kraakman, 1991). Hence high proportions of non-executive directors on 
board might be less likely to challenge managers, leading to more REM of 
discretionary expense cuts. Moreover, it is not required for buyout firms to hire 
as much non-executive directors as listed firms. Non-executive directors might 
be afraid of losing their position on the board after buyouts, and thus support 
managers to engage in REM preceding MBOs. Prior to IBOs, the percentage 
of non-executive directors on board (NED%) has no impact on REM. As 
previously discussed, non-executive directors might perform little or no real 
monitoring role (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991), high 
percentages of non-executive directors on board might be less likely to 
constrain REM behaviours.  
 
Prior to MBOs, equity ownership by members of the audit committee (AudShare) 
has no impact on AEM (AccruDE). This might be because that non-executive 
directors are more likely to mitigate traditionally positive AEM rather than 
negative AEM. Although high levels of shareholding increases the incentives 
for audit committee members to monitor managers, it is still difficult for them to 
spot negative AEM preceding MBOs. Prior to IBOs, higher equity ownership by 
members of the audit committee (AudShare) is associated with more AEM. 
Directors with more equity ownership are expect to protect shareholder 
interests more effectively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, high equity 
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ownership might reduce the independence of audit committee members, and 
thus lead to lower levels of monitoring. Hence higher equity ownership by audit 
committee members might compromise to upwards AEM, leading to higher 
levels of AEM preceding IBOs. 
 
To conclude, the results show that better firm performance (ROA) is associated 
with less sales manipulation but more SG&A expenditure cuts preceding MBOs. 
Firms without market-leader status (MarketSh) and high institutional ownership 
(InsShare) are associated with less discretionary expense cuts prior to MBOs. 
High degrees of firm undervaluation (PE Ratio) is associated with more sales 
manipulation and more discretionary expense cuts prior to MBOs. High 
percentage of non-executive directors on board (NED%) is associated with 
more discretionary expense cuts prior to MBOs.  
 
Firms with poor financial health (Z-score) are associated with more SG&A 
expenditure cuts prior to MBOs. But poor financial health (Z-score) is associated 
with less discretionary expenses cut (DisExp) and more R&D expense cut 
(Res&Dev) prior to IBOs. In addition, large board sizes (BoardSz) are associated 
with less R&D expense cut (Res&Dev) prior to IBOs. High equity ownership by 
members of the audit committee (AudShare) is associated with more AEM prior 
to IBOs. 
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
This section investigates two potential factors that might drive the results of this 
study: 1) the validity of using 3SLS to explore the impact of simultaneous 
equations system on the relationships between AEM and REM; 2) the results 
are not sensitive to this particular measure of AEM.  
 
With regard to the first concern, this study compares the results of the 
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simultaneous equations system estimated by 3SLS, 2SLS, and OLS approach. 
The results of the OLS estimation are listed in Table 4.3.5 (OLS Regression 
Results for MBOs) and Table 4.3.6 (OLS Regression Results for IBOs) in the 
Appendix. It can be seen that the 3SLS estimation finds the most significant 
relationships between potentially endogenous variables. The 2SLS estimation 
also estimation finds some significant relationships between potential 
endogenous variables. But the OLS estimation seems fail to find significant 
relationships between potential endogenous variables.  
 
The significant results from the 2SLS estimations are consistent with the 
significant results from the 3SLS estimation. Furthermore, 3SLS estimates the 
whole system of structural equations jointly by performing a third stage GLS-
type estimation using the covariance matrix produced in the second stage 
(Greene, 2011; StataCorp, 2013). This might suggest that 3SLS better address 
the simultaneous relationships than other methods. Hence this suggests that 
the results of 3SLS regressions regarding the relationships between the two 
endogenous variables (AEM and REM) are valid. The results also suggest that 
OLS regression does not estimate simultaneous relationships in structural 
equations system. This is consistent with the suggestion in prior literature (e.g. 
Greene, 2011) that 3SLS and 2SLS approaches rather than OLS could be able 
to estimate potential simultaneity.  
 
The findings regarding constraints on earnings management from the 3SLS 
estimation are largely consistent with those from the 2SLS and OLS 
regressions. The constraints of earnings management variables are not 
endogenous variables. Hence, the consistent results in 3SLS regressions, 
2SLS regressions, and OLS regressions suggest that the findings regarding 
constraints on earnings management are robust for both MBOs and IBOs in 
this study. Therefore, my results estimated by 3SLS approach are robust.  
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Second, this study adopts discretionary accruals from Jones’s (1991) cross-
sectional model as an alternative to proxy for AEM in order to investigate 
whether the results are sensitive to a particular measure of AEM. Jones’s (1991) 
model are as follows:  
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1𝑖 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2𝑖 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
 
Where: 
TAit: is current total accruals, calculated as the change in non-cash current 
assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the current portion of 
long-term debt, minus depreciation and amortization 
Ait: is total assets at the end of period t, and Ait-1 is lagged total assets 
Salesit: is the sales during period t, and (Δ)Salesit=Salet-Salest-1 
PPEit: is property, plant, and equipment 
 
Jones’s (1991) model proposed an assumption that nondiscretionary accruals 
vary with a firm's economic circumstances. The results in Jones (1991) show 
that this model successfully explains around one quarter of the variation in total 
accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). Jones’s (1991) model attempts to control for 
contemporaneous performance in estimating nondiscretionary accruals, 
whereas empirical assessments (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995) of this models 
suggest that estimated discretionary accruals might be significantly influenced 
by a firm’s both contemporaneous and past performance (Kothari et al., 2005). 
The following empirical studies provides evidence to support the validity of 
Jones’s (1991) model (e.g. Frankel et al., 2002; Becker et al., 1998; Klein, 2002; 
Xie et al., 2003).  
 
Table 4.1.6 shows the summary statistics for alternative AEM (AccruJo) as 
detected using Jones’s (1991) cross-sectional model. Panel A of Table 4.1.6 
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shows the detailed summary statistics for alternative AEM. Panel B of Table 
4.1.6 shows the T-test results of alternative AEM. It can be seen that alternative 
AEM is significantly negative prior to MBOs. This indicates that managers 
engage in negative AEM prior to MBOs, which is consistent with the results in 
Chapter 2. Alternative AEM has insignificant difference with 0 prior to IBOs. This 
indicates that managers do not have a systematic AEM behaviours compared 
to non-buyout firms prior to IBOs, which is consistent with the results in Chapter 
2. Panel C of Table 4.1.6 reports the percentage of AEM directions prior to 
buyouts.  
 
Table 4.1.6  Summary Statistics for AEM from Jones’s (1991) model 
Panel A. Summary Statistics for AEM  
Group Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
MBO AccruJo 114 -0.012 0.074 -0.211 -0.041 -0.006 0.011 0.438 
IBO AccruJo 82 -0.002 0.086 -0.449 -0.034 -0.001 0.047 0.239 
          
Panel B. T-test for AEM in Signed Value  
Group Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. H0a: mean=0 t-Statb p-Value AEMc 
MBO AccruJo 114 -0.012 0.074 Ha: < 0 -1.751** 0.041 - 
IBO AccruJo 82 -0.002 0.086 Ha: < 0 -0.224 0.412 ? 
 
Panel C. The direction of AEM (1=positive, 0= negative)  
Group Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev.      
MBO AccruJo 114 0.398 0.491      
IBO AccruJo 82 0.476 0.502      
Note a: H0: is Null Hypothesis;   Ha: is Alternative Hypothesis; 
Note b: T-test significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note c: This column indicates the AEM direction. “+” means positive AEM; “-“ means negative 
AEM; “?” means insignificant in direction. 
 
Table 4.4.1 and Table 4.4.2 in the Appendix shows the results of 3SLS 
regression by using AEM from the cross-sectional model of Jones (1991).23 It 
can be seen that the results by replacing AEM with the proxy from cross-
sectional model of Jones (1991) are largely consistent with the results in main 
                                                             
23 The detailed 2SLS and OLS regression results by using AEM from the cross-sectional 
model of Jones (1991) are available from the author. 
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tests and previous two sensitivity tests. Therefore, the results of this study are 
not sensitive to the particular measure of AEM.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This study investigates the relationship between AEM and REM preceding both 
MBOs and IBOs. This question is important because examining only one 
earnings management method at a time may not explain the overall effect of 
earnings management activities if managers use AEM and REM as 
complements or as substitutes for each other (Fields et al., 2001). This study 
also examines the relationship between AEM and REM by controlling for a set 
of factors that may constrain managers' ability and the degree to engage in 
earnings management. Similar to previous research (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010a; Zang, 2012), this study assumes that AEM is constrained by scrutiny 
from auditors, the corporate governance mechanisms of audit committees and 
the level of flexibility within firms’ accounting systems. Furthermore, in line with 
previous literature (e.g. Zang, 2012; Lara et al., 2012), this study expects that 
REM is likely to be constrained by firm performance, market-leader status in 
the industry, financial health, institutional ownership, the degree of firm 
undervaluation, board size and the percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board. I extends the earnings management literature by investigating the 
relationship between AEM and REM into leveraged buyout settings. I also use 
a simultaneous equations system to estimate the relationships between AEM 
and REM. I find that 3SLS and 2SLS approaches provide better estimations of 
potential simultaneity than OLS regression.  
 
AEM and REM have distinct characteristics and impacts on the performance of 
a firm. AEM typically takes place after the fiscal year end, and it changes the 
amount of accounting accruals without affecting cash flows (Kim and Sohn, 
2013; Gunny, 2010). However, AEM has relatively higher risks of detection and, 
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from a long-term perspective, AEM made in the current period must reverse in 
the future (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010a; Young, 1999). Furthermore, managers 
may have limited flexibility to exercise AEM (Gunny, 2010). By contrast, REM 
is sub-optimal operating decisions made during a financial year, which is less 
likely to be scrutinised by internal and external auditors. However, REM affects 
current and future cash flows as well as accounting accruals (Kim and Sohn, 
2013). Moreover, managers do not have perfect control over the exact amount 
of REM attained (Zang, 2012). In addition, REM distorts current period normal 
operations, which is generally value destroying, particularly for the long-term 
success of a business (Kim and Sohn, 2013). Therefore, as both AEM and REM 
are associated with relative benefits and drawbacks, managers may balance 
the use of different types of earnings management to beat their earnings 
manipulation targets in different circumstances and also to minimise the 
associated risks and costs.  
 
Prior to MBOs, my findings in Chapter 3 suggested that managers engaged in 
four out of five types of REM to boost earnings. Sales manipulation, by cutting 
price or offering more lenient credit terms toward the end of the year in an effort 
to accelerate sales from the next fiscal year into the current year, leads to 
significant negative abnormal CFO (- CFO). Overproduction, by producing more 
units than necessary to spread fixed costs over a larger number of units, lowers 
fixed costs per unit. This behaviour could decrease reported COGS in order to 
increase profits. Overproduction results in significant positive abnormal 
production costs (+ ProdCos). Discretionary expenses cuts increase profits, 
leading to significant negative abnormal discretionary expenses (- DisExp). 
Increasing or cutting R&D expenses could affect profits, but the results of 
abnormal R&D expense cuts in univariate tests is insignificant (Res&Dev). This 
means that managers have no systematic R&D expense cuts behaviour if it is 
only considered, but this does not mean no manager engage in it. SG&A 
expense cuts increase profits, leading to significant negative abnormal SG&A 
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expenses (- SGA). Positive REM could increase earnings, thus to imply 
management diligence and better firm performance in the future to external 
financiers. Furthermore, my findings in Chapter 2 suggested that managers 
engaged in negative AEM to decrease earnings figures. As discussed in the 
univariate tests section, managers engage in negative AEM and results in 
significantly negative discretionary abnormal accruals (- AccruDe).  
 
Considering the combined effects of AEM and REM practices, I find in this 
chapter, that the total level of earnings management is positive. This may be to 
enhance external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value to secure financing 
preceding MBOs. Therefore, managers might engage in positive REM and 
negative AEM proportionately to achieve a slightly positive total earnings 
management. Hence, I hypothesise that there is a positive relationship between 
AEM and REM preceding MBOs (hypothesis H3-1a). Moreover, managers might 
also choose to engage in more positive REM and less negative AEM to achieve 
an aggressively positive total earnings management. Accordingly, I hypothesise 
that there is a negative relationship between AEM and REM preceding MBOs 
(hypothesis H3-1b).  
 
Prior to IBOs, managers might be motivated to engage in positive earnings 
management in an attempt to increase their firm's value. I found in prior 
chapters that IBO firms had undervalued shares in the market. Firm 
undervaluation attracts potential IBO buyers (Hafzalla, 2009), and IBOs 
threaten managers’ long-term job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). Hence 
once managers aware their firm has been undervalued, they are likely to 
engage in positive earnings management in order to increase their firm’s value 
and avoid becoming a potential IBO target.  
 
My findings in Chapter 3 suggested that managers engaged in four out of five 
types of REM to boost earnings. Managers’ REM behaviours in IBOs are similar 
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to those they use in MBOs. They engage in sales manipulation (- CFO), 
overproduction (+ ProdCos), cutting discretionary expenses (- DisExp) and 
cutting SG&A expenses (- SGA). Nevertheless, the result of abnormal R&D 
expense cuts in univariate tests is insignificant (Res&Dev), which suggests that 
firms do not systematically engage in R&D expense cuts to manipulate earnings 
if only R&D expenses manipulation is considered. R&D expenses tend to be 
beneficial for future firm performance, and cutting R&D expenses might be seen 
as detrimental to the firm, thus managers might try to avoid it.  
 
Moreover, my findings in Chapter 2 found no evidence that firms subsequently 
targeted in IBOs engage in AEM to a greater degree than non-buyout firms do 
(AccruDe). As AEM is at high risk of detection, managers might have diverse 
degrees of AEM behaviours. Firm undervaluation preceding IBOs will not 
maximise shareholders’ wealth, thus shareholders might concern about the 
improvement of firm performance and do not care about REM or AEM 
behaviours in this circumstance.  
 
Considering the combined effects of AEM and REM practices, I find, in this 
chapter, that the total level of earnings management is positive, possibly to 
increase firm value preceding IBOs. Therefore, managers might engage in 
positive REM and AEM proportionately to achieve an aggressively positive total 
earnings management. Hence I hypothesise that there is a positive relationship 
between AEM and REM preceding IBOs (hypothesis H3-2a). Moreover, 
managers might also choose to engage in more positive REM and less AEM to 
achieve a slightly positive total earnings management. Thus I hypothesise that 
there is a negative relationship between AEM and REM preceding IBOs 
(hypothesis H3-2b). 
 
Empirical tests address all UK leveraged buyout firms from 1997 to 2011. 
Cross-sectional Roychowdhury’s (2006) models and Gunny’s (2010) models 
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are used to detect REM proxies in signed value. Specifically, abnormal CFO 
(CFO) proxies for sales manipulations, abnormal production costs (ProdCos) 
proxies for overproduction, abnormal discretionary expense cuts (DisExp) 
proxies for the manipulation of discretionary expenses, abnormal R&D expense 
cuts (Res&Dev) proxies for manipulation of discretionary R&D expenses and 
abnormal SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA) proxies for the manipulation of 
discretionary SG&A expenditures. Moreover, this study adopts discretionary 
accruals from the cross-sectional model of Dechow et al. (1995) to proxy for 
AEM. Furthermore, this study adopts the cross-sectional model of Jones (1991) 
as an alternative measure of AEM to investigate whether the results are 
sensitive to a particular measure of AEM.  
 
Similar to prior literature (e.g. Beatty et al., 1995; Barton, 2001; Pincus and 
Shivaram, 2002; Badertscher, 2011), this study uses the simultaneous 
equations system to investigate the potential simultaneity between AEM and 
REM. This study uses 3SLS and 2SLS to explore the impact of simultaneous 
equations system on the findings. 3SLS and 2SLS estimations rely upon 
instrumental variables to generate predicted values of endogenous variables 
(Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). It is difficult to identify good instrumental 
variables in most accounting research settings, because there is no well-
developed theory of the economic determinants for different earnings 
management choices (Badertscher, 2011). In order to identify instruments for 
REM, I rely upon the accounting and finance literature (e.g. Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010), and find that lagged regressor of REM (REMt-1) is a valid 
instrument of REM for both MBOs and IBOs in this study. However, this study 
have tested almost every potential instrument for AEM by drawing more widely 
on relevant literature in accounting and finance fields (e.g. Hazarika et al., 2012; 
Cornett et al., 2009; Aerts and Zhang, 2014), and finally find that sales growth 
(SalesGrow) is the only valid instrument for AEM, even it is a strong instrument 
for the MBO data and the mixed whole sample data only.  
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The results presented in this chapter suggest that the relationships between 
AEM and different types of REM might vary between MBOs and IBOs due to 
their different incentives. Prior to MBOs, sales manipulation (CFO) and AEM 
have a negative causal relationship, which suggests either that sales 
manipulation leads to less AEM, or more AEM leads to less sales manipulation. 
Overproduction (ProdCos) and AEM have a negative causal relationship, which 
implies either that overproduction leads to less AEM, or more AEM leads to less 
overproduction. SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA) and AEM have a negative 
causal relationship that either SG&A expenditure cuts leads to less AEM, or 
more AEM leads to less SG&A expenditure cuts. These results are consistent 
with hypothesis H3-1b, that there is a negative causal relationship between AEM 
and REM of sales manipulation (CFO), overproduction (ProdCos), and SG&A 
expenditure cuts (SGA). These types of REM might therefore have substitutive 
relationships with AEM. This also means that managers’ decisions to use AEM 
and these types of REM are likely to be made jointly and depend on each other.  
 
Prior to MBOs, managers engaged in positive REM in an attempt to secure 
financing for MBOs, and negative AEM possibly to conceal the true value of 
their firm. As the total level of earnings management is positive, the primary 
goal of managers might be to secure their external financing. Hence, managers 
might set an aggressively positive target for total earnings management. In 
order to achieve this target, managers might therefore engage in more positive 
REM and less negative AEM, resulting in a negative impact between AEM and 
REM of sales manipulation, overproduction, and SG&A expenditure cuts prior 
to MBOs.  
 
Moreover, R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev) and AEM have a negative causal 
relationship, which suggests either that R&D expense cuts lead to less AEM, or 
more AEM leads to less cutting of R&D expense. This is consistent with 
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hypothesis H3-1b, suggesting that R&D expense cuts and AEM might have a 
substitutive relationship. Furthermore, discretionary expense cuts (DisExp) and 
AEM have a positive causal relationship that discretionary expense cuts lead 
to more AEM, or more AEM leads to more discretionary expense cuts. This is 
consistent with hypothesis H3-1a, and implies that discretionary expense cuts 
and AEM have a complementary relationship. This also means that managers’ 
decisions to use AEM and these specific REM are likely to be made jointly and 
depend on each other. 
 
Discretionary expenses includes both SG&A expenditures and R&D expenses. 
There is no systematic R&D expense cuts if only consider R&D expense 
manipulation. This might be due to long-term or short-term vision of 
management toward the business that some managers might increase R&D 
expense, but others might cut R&D expense. Hence, the combined effects 
might result in a positive impact between discretionary expense cuts and AEM.  
 
Prior to IBOs, sales manipulation (CFO) and AEM have a positive causal 
relationship, which suggests that sales manipulation leads to more AEM, or 
AEM leads to more sales manipulation. Overproduction (ProdCos) and AEM 
have a positive causal relationship, suggesting that overproduction leads to 
more AEM, or AEM leads to more overproduction. SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA) 
leads to less AEM, and the causality of this relationship runs only from SG&A 
expenditure cuts to AEM. These results are consistent with hypothesis H3-2a, 
that there are positive causal relationships between AEM and REM of sales 
manipulation, overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts. Thus, these types of 
REM might have complementary relationships with AEM. This also means that 
managers’ decisions on the levels of AEM and these types of REM are likely to 
be made jointly and depend on each other. 
 
Prior to IBOs, managers are motivated to engage in positive earnings 
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management in an attempt to increase firm value and thereby impede any IBO 
bidding. They have been found to engage in positive REM, and there is no 
evidence of systematic AEM behaviour. As the total level of earnings 
management is positive, the primary goal of management might be to engage 
in both AEM and REM in order to increase the value of their firm. Hence 
managers might set an aggressively positive target for total earnings 
management. In order to achieve this target, managers might engage in more 
positive REM and more AEM, resulting in a positive relationship between AEM 
and REM of sales manipulation, overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts 
prior to IBOs. 
 
Moreover, R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev) and AEM have no impact on each 
other, thus there is no causality of relationship between them. This is 
inconsistent with hypotheses H3-2a and H3-2b. This means that managers’ 
decisions to use AEM and to cut R&D expenses are likely to be made separately. 
There is no systematic R&D expense cuts and AEM if only one of these 
variables is considered. Due to the time constraint prior to IBOs, managers 
might engage in R&D expense cuts and AEM that is available to them at the 
time when they need. Hence the stochastic manipulation of R&D expense cuts 
and AEM might explain why there is no relationship between R&D expense cuts 
and AEM prior to IBOs.  
 
In addition, discretionary expense cuts (DisExp) and AEM have a negative 
causal relationship, suggesting either discretionary expense cuts lead to less 
AEM, or more AEM leads to less discretionary expense cuts. This is consistent 
with hypothesis H3-2b, and implies that discretionary expense cuts and AEM 
have a substitutive relationship. This means that managers’ decisions to use 
AEM and discretionary expense cuts are likely to be made jointly and depend 
on each other. Discretionary expenses include both SG&A expenditures and 
R&D expenses. Managers might have diverse uses of R&D expense cuts due 
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to long-term or short-term vision of their business. They might also have 
different AEM behaviours due to their levels of risk aversion in respect to the 
detection of AEM. Hence the combined effects might result in a negative 
relationship between discretionary expense cuts and AEM.  
 
In summary, there are some differences regarding the relationships between 
AEM and REM between MBOs and IBOs. Prior to MBOs, there are negative 
impacts between AEM and REM of sales manipulation (CFO), overproduction 
(ProdCos), and SG&A expenditure cut (SGA) prior to MBOs. Moreover, although 
there is no evidence of its systematic use, R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev) and 
AEM have a negative impact on each other. In addition, as the manipulation of 
R&D expenses and SG&A expenditure cuts might interfere with or possibly 
cancel each other, discretionary expenses cuts (DisExp) and AEM have a 
positive impact on each other. Hence REM of sales manipulation, 
overproduction, SG&A expenditure cuts and R&D expense cuts have 
substitutive relationships with AEM. REM of discretionary expenses cuts has a 
complementary relationship with AEM.  
 
Moreover, prior to IBOs, there are positive impacts between AEM and REM of 
sales manipulation, overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts. Furthermore, 
there is no impact between R&D expense cuts and AEM, and this might be 
because there is no systematic R&D expense cuts and AEM behaviours. In 
addition, as the manipulation of R&D expenses and SG&A expenditure cuts 
might interfere with or possibly cancel each other, discretionary expense cuts 
and AEM have a negative impact on each other. Hence REM of sales 
manipulation, overproduction and SG&A expenditure cuts have complementary 
relationships with AEM. REM of discretionary expense cuts has a substitutive 
relationship with AEM. R&D expense cuts and AEM have no relationship.  
 
The reason for the differences between AEM and REM might be that managers 
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usually have a long time to prepare earnings management strategies and to 
decide the optimum volume proportion of AEM and REM prior to MBOs. 
Managers engage in positive REM in order to enhance prospective external 
financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value and thereby secure external finance. 
Positive REM could boost earnings, thus to signal managers’ work efforts and 
better future performance of the firm to external financiers. Managers also 
engage in negative AEM to conceal the true value of their firms so that they 
have not to pay too much to outside shareholders. Furthermore, future owners 
of the firm will benefit from the reversal of AEM after an MBO transaction, as 
this could increase the future firm value. External financiers might therefore 
have no concerns about AEM, as it will reduce the price they have to pay in the 
transaction.  
 
However, prior to IBOs, managers usually do not have a long time to prepare 
earnings management strategies. They might intend to engage in both AEM 
and REM in order to increase earnings. Shareholders might not care about AEM 
and REM behaviours preceding IBOs, as firm undervaluation will not maximise 
their wealth. Hence managers might engage in AEM or REM when they have 
the needs to do positive earnings management. As the need to manage 
earnings may occur at any time during an accounting period, managers might 
have limited choice of earnings management methods at that time. They only 
engage in the earnings management methods that is available at that time point. 
Hence managers do not have a systematic plan for their earnings management 
behaviours, and thus leading to fewer relationships between AEM and REM. 
Moreover, as it is difficult to find a proper instrument for accounting researches, 
the weak instrument of AEM for IBOs might impede this study to find more 
relationships between AEM and REM.  
 
The results presented in this chapter also suggest that the effects of earnings 
management constraints are likely to vary between MBOs and IBOs.  
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Firms with relatively better performance are less likely to increase earnings by 
engaging in income-increasing earnings management, as they already perform 
well (Becker et al., 1998; Bédard et al., 2004). Consequently, pernicious 
earnings management, such as REM, is rarely exercised in more profitable 
firms. The results suggest that, prior to MBOs, firms with better firm 
performance (ROA) are associated with less REM of sales manipulation (CFO), 
which is consistent with hypothesis H3-8a. Moreover, firms with better firm 
performance are associated with more REM of SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA), 
which is inconsistent with hypothesis H3-8a. SG&A expenditure cuts might have 
long-term negative economic consequence on a firm, but sales manipulation 
has immediately short-term negative economic consequence. Interference 
short-term operations might lead to abnormal firm performance, which are likely 
to attract the attention of shareholders, hence affecting the overall plan of MBO 
execution. Managers in better-performing firms might be more eager to execute 
MBOs, and thus might choose to minimise short-term rather than long-term 
interference in normal operations.   
 
Prior to IBOs, firm performance (ROA) has no impact on REM, which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H3-8b. I have found in Chapter 3 that IBO firms have 
been undervalued in the market. Firm undervaluation attracts IBO buyers 
(Hafzalla, 2009), and threatens managers’ long-term job security (Denis and 
Denis, 1995). Managers might be unwilling to take any risk on their job security, 
and choose to engage in REM no matter their firm performance preceding IBOs. 
Hence firm performance might not affect REM prior IBOs.  
 
Market-leader firms usually enjoy more competitive advantages than their 
followers, because they have greater cumulative experience, higher ability to 
benefit from economies of scale, more bargaining power with suppliers and 
customers, higher attention from investors, and greater influence on their 
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competitors (Woo, 1983). REM departs from optimal operating decisions of the 
business, thereby is unlikely to increase the long-term value of a firm. Firms are 
likely to face various levels of competition in their industry, and thus deviating 
from optimal business strategies may lead to different impact on firm 
performance. Hence REM might be less costly for market-leader firms, as the 
erosion to their competitive advantage is relatively small (Zang, 2012).  
 
The results suggest that, prior to MBOs, firms without market-leader status 
(MarketSh) are associated with less REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp), 
which is consistent with hypothesis H3-9a. Firms without market-leader status 
usually have less competitive advantages than their market-leaders, thus the 
erosion of their competitive advantage by REM is relatively large (Zang, 2012). 
Hence firms without market-leader status might bear relatively high costs for 
departures from optimal operating decisions of the business, resulting in less 
REM. Prior to IBOs, firms with market-leader status has no impact on REM, 
which is inconsistent with hypothesis H3-9b. As previously discussed, I have 
found that IBO firms have been undervalued in the market, which threatens 
managers’ long-term job security. Hence managers might choose to engage in 
REM even without market-leader status to secure their jobs.  
 
Firms with poor financial health are likely to bear a relatively high marginal cost 
when deviating from optimal business strategies, such as sharp decrease of 
cash flows for a financial difficulty firm. In this case, REM might be perceived 
as a relatively high costly behaviour (Zang, 2012). Hence, in a financial 
distressed firm, managers’ efforts to survive in the difficulties will dominate their 
reporting concerns (Graham et al., 2005). The results suggest that, prior to 
MBOs, firms with poor financial health (Z-score) are associated with more REM 
of SG&A expenditure cuts (SGA), which is inconsistent with hypothesis H3-10a. 
A financial distressed firm might be less likely to find external financial support 
for MBOs, and might also have difficulty to repay the debts after buyouts. 
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Although cutting SG&A expenditures might negatively affect firm performance 
in the long-term, this manipulation is easy to implement and control. Hence 
managers might focus on short-term operations and choose to engage in SG&A 
expenditure cuts to improve the perception of their financial situation.  
 
Prior to IBOs, firms with poor financial health (Z-score) are associated with less 
REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp), which is consistent with 
hypothesis H3-10b. Moreover, firms with poor financial health are associated with 
more REM of R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev), which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H3-10b. This implies that firms with good financial health would not 
cut R&D expenses as it is good for firm growth, but “desperate” firms would cut 
R&D expenses to improve their earnings anyway. REM might be perceived as 
a relatively high costly manipulation in poor financial health firms (Zang, 2012). 
However, I have found that IBO firms have been undervalued in the market, 
which might motivate managers to improve firm performance. R&D expense 
cuts might have negative impact on the long-term success of the firm among 
all other types of discretionary expenses cuts, but this might happen in the long-
term future in comparison to potential IBOs in short-term future. Hence 
managers in firms with poor financial health might choose to engage in REM 
selectively, in order to impede any potential IBO bidding.  
 
Institutional investors might provide a high degree of monitoring on REM 
behaviours either through governance practices, or through information 
gathering and correctly pricing the impact of managerial decisions (Bushee, 
1998). Moreover, institutional investors are more sophisticated and informed 
than other investors. They are likely to have a better understanding of the long-
term impact of firms’ operating decisions, leading to more effort in monitor and 
control REM activities.  
 
The results suggest that, prior to MBOs, firms with higher institutional ownership 
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(InsShare) are associated with less REM of discretionary expense cuts (DisExp), 
which is consistent with hypothesis H3-11a. As discretionary expense cuts are 
easier to spot than other types of REM, institutional investors might have a high 
chance to spot it in close monitoring. Prior to IBOs, institutional ownership has 
no impact on REM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H3-11b. Institutional 
investors might have difficulties to spot REM behaviours the same as other 
shareholders. Moreover, Institutional investors usually have large portfolios of 
investments, and they are less likely to pay sufficient attention to every 
investments. Hence high shareholding by institutions may not be particularly 
helpful in respect to monitoring REM behaviours. 
 
Managers in firms with high degrees of share undervaluation will consider their 
ability to access external funding to support MBOs, as highly undervalued firms 
might be difficult to find external financing. Hence, prior to MBOs, managers in 
highly undervalued firms are more likely to engage in positive REM to enhance 
prospective external financiers’ perceptions of their firms’ value in order to 
secure external financing (Fischer and Louis, 2008). The results suggest that, 
prior to MBOs, firms with higher degrees of firm undervaluation (PE Ratio) are 
associated with more REM of sales manipulation (CFO) and more REM of 
discretionary expense cuts (DisExp), which are consistent with hypothesis H3-
12a. Prior to IBOs, the results suggest that, prior to IBOs, the degree of firm 
undervaluation (PE Ratio) has no impact on REM, which is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H3-12b. As most of the IBO firms in my sample suffer from some 
degrees of undervaluation, there might not be sufficient variability in the data.  
 
Larger boards may ensure a minimum required knowledge base (Vafeas, 2005), 
and make more resources available (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Initially, adding 
more directors to a board may increase its ability to monitor managers (Andres 
et al., 2005; Guest, 2009). Large boards are therefore expected to mitigate 
REM. However, the results suggest that, prior to MBOs, board size (BoardSz) 
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has no impact on REM, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H3-13a. This might 
be because the variable of board size picks up different things in different 
circumstances. Prior to IBOs, firms with larger board sizes are associated with 
less REM of R&D expense cuts (Res&Dev), which is consistent with hypothesis 
H3-13b. R&D expense cuts is easy to spot, and it might have further impacts on 
the long-term success of a business. As large board may increase the ability of 
monitoring (Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009), increasing directors on a board 
leads to a lower level of REM.  
 
Non-executive directors are more independent than executive directors, 
thereby they are expected to have greater monitoring incentives (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). However, as non-executive directors might lack the necessary 
independence, time, expertise and information to challenge management 
activities effectively, they are also criticised as performing little or no real 
monitoring role (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). Hence 
high proportion of non-executive directors on board might lead to more REM. 
The results suggest that, prior to MBOs, firms with higher percentages of non-
executive directors on their boards (NED%) are associated with more REM of 
discretionary expense cuts (DisExp), which is inconsistent with hypothesis H3-
14a. This might be because buyout firms are not required to hire as much non-
executive directors as listed firms. Non-executive directors might be afraid of 
losing their position on boards after buyouts, and thus supporting managers to 
engage in more REM preceding MBOs. Prior to IBOs, the percentage of non-
executive directors on a board has no impact on REM, which is inconsistent 
with hypothesis H3-14b. As previously discussed, non-executive directors might 
lack the necessary independence, time, expertise, and information to challenge 
management activities effectively (Patton and Baker, 1987; Gilson and 
Kraakman, 1991). Hence, high proportion of non-executive directors on board 
might be less likely to constrain REM behaviours.  
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Audit committee members with high levels of equity ownership are expected to 
protect shareholder interests more effectively (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As 
equity ownership aligns the interests between directors and external 
shareholders, more equity ownership by directors creates a higher personally 
based incentive to monitor (Bhagat et al., 1999). Furthermore, large 
shareholders have a powerful personal incentive to exercise effective 
monitoring, because high levels of ownership make them an effective agency 
of external shareholders (Bhagat et al., 1999).  
 
The results suggest that, prior to MBOs, the equity ownership by members of 
audit committee (AudShare) has no impact on AEM (AccruDe), which is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H3-6a. This might be because non-executive 
directors are more likely to mitigate traditional positive AEM rather than negative 
AEM. Although high shareholdings increase the incentive of audit committee 
members to monitor managers, it is still difficult for them to spot negative AEM 
preceding MBOs. Prior to IBOs, higher equity ownership by members of the 
audit committee is associated with more AEM, which is consistent with 
hypothesis H3-6b. This might be because high share ownership might jeopardise 
the independence of audit committee members, hence they might compromise 
to upwards AEM, leading to higher levels of AEM preceding IBOs. 
 
To conclude, the relationships of AEM and REM vary between MBOs and IBOs. 
Prior to MBOs, my findings in prior chapters suggested that managers engaged 
in positive REM and negative AEM. In this chapter, I find that the total level of 
earnings management is positive. Moreover, there are negative impacts 
between AEM and REM of sales manipulation, overproduction and SG&A 
expenditure cuts prior to MBOs. Furthermore, although there is no evidence of 
systematic R&D expense cuts, R&D expense cuts and AEM have a negative 
impact on each other. In addition, discretionary expense cuts and AEM have a 
positive impact on each other. Prior to MBOs, by combining AEM and REM 
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tools, managers intend to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions 
of their firm’s value in order to secure external financing for the buyouts. The 
relationships between AEM and REM also reveal that managers carefully 
prepare earnings management strategies in respect to the optimum volume 
proportion of both AEM and REM prior to MBOs.  
 
Prior to IBOs, my findings in prior chapters suggested that managers engaged 
in positive REM but no evidence of systematic AEM. In this chapter, I find that 
the total level of earnings management is positive. Moreover, there are positive 
impacts between AEM and REM of sales manipulation, overproduction and 
SG&A expenditure cuts. Furthermore, there is no impact between R&D 
expense cuts and AEM. In addition, discretionary expenses cuts and AEM have 
a negative impact on each other. Prior to IBOs, by combining AEM and REM 
tools, managers intend to increase their firm's value in an effort to avoid 
becoming a potential IBO target. The relationships between AEM and REM also 
reveal that managers usually do not have a systematic plan for their earnings 
management behaviours prior to IBOs, and they might simply engage in the 
earnings management method that is available to them.  
 
Moreover, managers’ earnings management behaviours are likely to be 
constrained prior to leveraged buyouts. However, the effects of these 
constraints on earnings management are different preceding MBOs and IBOs. 
Preceding MBOs, better firm performance is associated with less sales 
manipulation but more SG&A expenditure cuts. Firms without market-leader 
status and high institutional ownership are associated with less discretionary 
expense cuts prior to MBOs. High degree of firm undervaluation is associated 
with more sales manipulation and more discretionary expense cuts prior to 
MBOs. High percentage of non-executive directors on a board is associated 
with more discretionary expense cuts prior to MBOs.  
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This implies that better firm performance constrains sales manipulation, but 
facilitates SG&A expenditure cuts preceding MBOs. Firms without market-
leader status and high institutional ownership constrain REM prior to MBOs. 
High degree of firm undervaluation motivates managers to engage in more 
REM prior to MBOs. High percentage of non-executive directors on a board 
facilitates REM preceding MBOs.  
 
In addition, firms with poor financial health are associated with more SG&A 
expenditure cuts prior to MBOs. This implies that poorer financial health 
motivates managers to engage in more REM. Prior to IBOs, poor financial 
healthy firms are associated with less discretionary expense cuts and more 
R&D expense cuts. This suggests that poor financial health constrains 
discretionary expense cuts, but motivate managers to cut more R&D expenses 
prior to IBOs.  
 
Furthermore, larger board size is associated with less R&D expense cuts prior 
to IBOs. This implies that large boards mitigate REM prior to IBOs. High equity 
ownership by members of audit committee is associated with more AEM prior 
to IBOs, suggesting that high equity ownership by members of audit committee 
facilitates AEM.  
 
This study contributes to our knowledge of earnings management literature by 
investigating the relationship between AEM and REM prior to leveraged 
buyouts. It argues that, given the portfolio of earnings management strategies, 
managers are likely to use multiple earnings management tools at the same 
time to meet their earnings manipulation targets in different circumstances. By 
subdividing leveraged buyouts into MBOs and IBOs, this study finds that 
managers’ earnings management strategies regarding the relationships 
between AEM and REM is different in each setting. Moreover, this study 
contributes to knowledge that managers’ earnings management behaviours are 
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likely to be constrained by firm performance, market-leader status in the 
industry, financial health, institutional ownerships, board size and the 
percentage and equity ownership of non-executive directors on the board. In 
addition, this study adopts 3SLS and 2SLS methods to explore the impact of 
simultaneous equations system on the relationships between AEM and REM. 
The findings suggest that AEM and REM sequentially affect each other.  
 
However, it is difficult to identify good instrumental variables in most accounting 
research settings, because there is no well-developed theory of the economic 
determinants for the different earnings management choices (Badertscher, 
2011). This study has tested almost every potential instrument for AEM, but only 
find that sales growth (SalesGrow) is a valid instrument of AEM for MBOs only. 
Hence the results regarding the relationships between AEM and REM for 
structural equation 1 (model REM (1)-(5)) of IBOs might not be as reliable as 
that of MBOs. Future research may overcome this issue by adopting other 
econometric methods rather than using a weak instrument in 3SLS or 2SLS 
estimations. Moreover, future research may draw more widely on relevant 
literature in accounting and finance fields than this study in order to find a valid 
instrument for investigation, thus increasing the reliability of the results for IBOs. 
This might be a solution for this issue.  
 
In addition, I do not explore the potential relationships between different types 
of REM. First, such an investigation would require construct a simultaneous 
equations model. In the simultaneous equations model, a series of factors that 
would have impact on specific types of REM only need to be identified in order 
to distinguish different equations. However, it is difficult to identify the factors 
that might have impact on specific types of REM only, thus being unable to 
develop simultaneous equations model for investigation. Second, the 
simultaneous equations model might not be possible to use because only 
limited data is available for leveraged buyouts setting, and one missing variable 
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would cause the simultaneous equations model unable to apply. Future 
research may draw more widely on relevant literature in accounting and finance 
fields than this study, and thus be able to construct a simultaneous equations 
system to investigate how different types of REM are simultaneously 
interrelated. Future research could also investigate the potential relationships 
between different types of REM in a setting other than leveraged buyouts, which 
might have sufficient data to support the simultaneous equations model.  
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5. Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
Leveraged buyouts are a distinct and increasingly important type of acquisition 
in the UK financial market. In both MBOs and IBOs, purchasers always seek 
the lowest possible purchase price, and selling shareholders expect to sell their 
shares at the highest possible price. However, information asymmetries 
generally exist between better-informed managers and less well informed 
outsiders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A detailed analysis of earnings 
information can help shareholders to assess whether the price they have been 
offered in a leveraged buyout is fair (Bull, 1989). Investment bankers also make 
extensive use of accounting earnings for firm valuation in leveraged buyouts 
(DeAngelo, 1990). Earnings information thus has great value relevance to 
investors and other financiers of a firm, who make increased demands for such 
information when making decisions (Aharony and Barniv, 2004). Hence the 
heavy reliance placed on accounting numbers creates powerful incentives for 
managers to manipulate earnings, thereby earnings management is a potential 
issue prior to leveraged buyouts.  
 
Corporate governance mechanisms are expected to have an impact on 
earnings management behaviours (Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al., 
2003). Traditionally, good corporate governance is expected to be related to a 
lower level of earnings management in general, and less upward manipulation 
of earnings in particular (e.g. Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003). However, in the 
context of MBO’s, managerial incentives might direct managers towards a 
downward manipulation of earnings in order to exploit external shareholders, 
though this might be tempered by the need to seek financial support from 
private equity investors. In contrast, in the context of IBOs, managerial 
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incentives might drive managers engage in an upward earnings management, 
in order to protect their long-term job security, rather than maximising the long-
term interests of shareholders. If board structure really does have an important 
influence on corporate governance, it will be interesting to explore whether 
boards or shareholders with good corporate governance characteristics differ 
in their influence on earnings management in the context of MBOs or IBOs. 
Therefore, it is worth investigating earnings management behaviours and 
corporate governance mechanisms in leveraged buyout settings. As different 
buyout types may provide managers and shareholders with different incentives 
regarding earnings management and corporate governance, leveraged 
buyouts have been subdivided into MBOs and IBOs for investigation. 
 
This research investigated the use of AEM and REM and how they are affected 
by corporate governance mechanisms preceding MBOs and IBOs in the UK 
market. There are three empirical studies in this thesis. The first study (Chapter 
2) investigated the existence of AEM, and the effects of audit committee 
characteristics and external audit quality on AEM prior to MBOs and IBOs. The 
second study (Chapter 3) examined the existence of REM, and the effects of 
the shareholding by outsiders and board characteristics on REM activities 
preceding MBOs and IBOs. As managers might have adopt different strategies 
in terms of the different types of REM, according to their potential long-term or 
short-term effects, this study investigated disaggregated components of REM 
in addition to aggregate REM. Moreover, examining either AEM or REM at a 
time separately may not explain the overall effect of earnings management 
activities if managers use both of them as complements or as substitutes for 
each other (Fields et al., 2001). Hence, the third empirical study (Chapter 4) 
examined the potential relationships between AEM and REM preceding MBOs 
and IBOs by controlling a set of factors that may constrain managers’ ability 
and the degree to engage in earnings management.   
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5.2 Results and findings 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) focuses on AEM and the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms (audit committee characteristics and 
external audit quality) on AEM prior to MBOs and IBOs. The findings suggest 
that managers engaged in negative AEM to decrease earnings prior to MBOs. 
This might because negative AEM could reduce outsiders' perception of the 
earnings potential of a firm, enabling managers to depress the purchase price 
of MBOs. This implies that managers are self-interested preceding MBOs, and 
they engage in negative AEM in an attempt to pay a lower price to selling 
shareholders.  
 
Regarding IBOs, this study finds no evidence of systematic AEM compared to 
non-buyout firms. This might be related to the fact that many managers are 
unable to predict IBOs. Instead, managers’ behaviours might be mainly driven 
by the perception of undervaluation. This study finds that IBO firms have 
undervalued shares in the market, and undervaluation might make firms 
become potential IBO targets, rather than the actual IBO offer. IBOs threaten 
managers’ long-term job security (Denis and Denis, 1995), and thus managers’ 
behaviours are likely to be driven by the perception of undervaluation.  
 
As expected, the findings suggest that the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on AEM vary prior to MBOs and IBOs. First, the financial expertise 
of audit committees has no impact on negative AEM prior to MBOs. It might be 
that even financially literate directors are usually so focused on avoiding 
positive AEM and ignore negative AEM. They may perceive negative AEM as 
accounting conservatism, and therefore do not intervene. Prior to IBOs, the 
financial expertise of audit committees is associated with less AEM. This implies 
that including financial experts on audit committees mitigates AEM preceding 
IBOs, as the financial experts make the internal control judgements of audit 
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committees more like those of experts, hence effectively facilitate the reporting 
process and reduce agency issues (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001).  
 
Second, equity ownership by audit committee members has no impact on 
negative AEM prior to MBOs. This might be because audit committee members 
do not take sufficient care of the MBO context, and are less likely to focus on 
negative AEM. Prior to IBOs, high equity ownership by audit committee 
members is associated with more AEM. The share ownership might jeopardise 
the independence of audit committee members, thereby leading to lower levels 
of monitoring. Hence audit committee members with high equity ownership 
might compromise their monitoring role and lead to more AEM preceding IBOs.  
 
Third, Big 5 auditors have no impact on negative AEM prior to MBOs. This might 
be because Big 5 auditors are usually trained to focus on mitigating positive 
AEM. They may perceive negative AEM as accounting conservatism, and thus 
do not intervene. Preceding IBOs, the presence of a Big 5 auditor is associated 
with less AEM. This implies that hiring Big 5 auditors mitigates AEM behaviours 
prior to IBOs. Big 5 auditors tend to deliver high quality audits because they are 
less willing to accept questionable accounting methods and are more likely to 
detect and report errors and irregularities (e.g. Becker et al., 1998).  
 
To summarise, in relation to corporate governance, the results suggest that the 
quality of audit committees and external auditing have a greater impact on AEM 
in IBO firms than it does in MBO firms. This might be because audit committees 
and external auditors do not take sufficient care of the MBO context to spot 
negative AEM. Traditionally, they might focus on limiting positive AEM in order 
to mitigate managers' attempts to boost earnings.   
 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) focuses on REM and the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms (the shareholding of outsiders and board 
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characteristics) on REM preceding MBOs and IBOs. This chapter examines five 
types of disaggregated REM behaviour prior to buyouts in order to explore 
management strategy in all REM activities. The five types of REM behaviours 
are as follows: (1) sales manipulation, by cutting prices or offering more lenient 
credit terms toward the end of the year in an effort to accelerate sales from the 
next fiscal year into the current year; (2) overproduction, by producing more 
units than necessary to spread fixed costs over a larger number of units, thus 
lower fixed costs per unit to decrease the reported costs of goods sold; (3) 
cutting discretionary expenses to increase reported earnings; (4) cutting SG&A 
expenses to increase reported profits; (5) cutting R&D expenses to reduce 
costs and increase profits.  
 
The results suggest that managers engage in the first four types of REM to 
boost earnings prior to both MBOs and IBOs. For MBOs, this finding seems 
counter intuitive, as it suggests that managers manipulate the perception of a 
firm’s value upwards. However, it might be related to the need to show good 
operational performance to external financiers. Private equity investors tend to 
invest in MBOs if they expect a profitable firm performance (Fischer and Louis, 
2008). These financiers are likely to spot AEM, but detecting REM is more 
difficult for them. As internal financing by managers might be insufficient to 
implement a buyout, managers may engage in positive REM to enhance 
prospective external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value and thereby secure 
financing for MBOs.  
 
Prior to IBOs, the results are in line with expectations that managers tend to 
protect their long-term job security through positive REM. The findings suggest 
that IBO firms are undervalued in the market. Firm undervaluation attracts IBO 
buyers (Hafzalla, 2009), and IBOs threaten managers’ long-term job security 
(Denis and Denis, 1995). Hence once managers are aware that their firm has 
been undervalued, they are likely to engage in positive REM in an attempt to 
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increase firm value and thereby impede any potential IBO bidding. In addition 
to this, this study is unable to find any evidence of greater R&D expense cuts 
for MBOs or IBOs compared with non-buyout firms. This might be because 
cutting R&D expenses is comparatively easily observable and too damaging to 
firm growth, and managers might try to minimise it.  
 
As expected, the findings suggest corporate governance mechanisms have 
different impacts on REM preceding MBOs and IBOs. First, equity ownership 
by non-executive directors has no impact on positive REM preceding MBOs. 
Equity ownership might make non-executive directors less independent. These 
directors might be side with managers and inactively to detect positive REM 
behaviours. Prior to IBOs, high equity ownership by non-executive directors is 
associated with more positive REM. Since IBO firms have undervalued shares 
in the market, non-executive directors might put pressure on managers to 
improve firm performance. As managers are less likely to improve firm 
performance in the short term, they may then choose to engage in positive REM.   
 
Second, non-managerial large blockholders are associated with more positive 
REM preceding both MBOs and IBOs. Prior to MBOs, as blockholders might 
invest to fund the buyouts, they are likely to side with management for strategic 
alignment. Furthermore, as positive REM might increase firm performance and 
share prices, these blockholders might be benefit from selling their shares 
during a buyout. Prior to IBOs, firm undervaluation might be a concern to non-
managerial large blockholders, as they hold quite large portions of shares. 
These blockholders might therefore put pressure on managers to improve firm 
performance. In response to this pressure, managers might be more likely to 
engage in REM in order to portray better firm performance in the short term.  
 
Third, CEO ownership is generally associated with more positive REM 
preceding MBOs and IBOs. This implies that managers with high shareholdings 
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facilitate REM behaviours. This might be because high levels of ownership 
entrench managers by enhancing their control and power (Morck et al., 1988). 
Hence, managers find that they can follow their own objectives with less fear of 
discipline from other shareholders prior to MBOs and IBOs.  
 
Fourth, CEO duality generally is associated with more positive REM preceding 
MBOs. This implies that CEO duality facilitates REM prior to MBOs. It 
concentrates power in the CEO’s position with less effective controls and 
balances (Cornett et al., 2008). In turn, this may impede effective monitoring 
and lead to more REM prior to MBOs. Prior to IBOs, the results reveal that CEO 
duality is associated with more sales manipulation and less R&D expense cuts. 
As IBOs are unpredictable, CEO duality might make managers consider the 
long-term success of the firm. Cutting R&D expenses is too damaging to firm 
growth, hence CEO duality is associated with less cutting of R&D expenses. 
However, firm undervaluation threatens managers, as they might lose their jobs 
in IBOs. CEO duality enhances managers' control and power, leading to more 
REM of sales manipulation, which is less likely to affect the long-term success 
of the firm. 
 
Fifth, institutional shareholding has no effect on positive REM preceding both 
MBOs and IBOs. Although institutional investors are likely to have a better 
understanding of the long-term impact of a firms’ operating decisions (Bushee, 
1998), it might still be difficult for them to spot REM behaviours. Moreover, 
institutions usually have large portfolios of investments, and they are less likely 
to pay sufficient attention to small proportions of their investment. Hence 
increasing the shareholding of institutions may not be particularly helpful in 
respect to monitoring REM behaviours.  
 
To summarise, the results suggest that the high equity ownership by outsiders 
or board characteristics do not mitigate positive REM prior to MBOs. This might 
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because high shareholding by management and CEO duality increase the 
control and power of the managers. Hence, they are less fearful of discipline 
and engage in more positive REM prior to MBOs. Moreover, as REM involves 
changing business operational decisions, it might be difficult for outsiders to 
spot REM behaviours prior to MBOs. Thus there might be a bigger agency issue 
in respect to REM than AEM. Prior to IBOs, the results suggest that the high 
equity ownership both by outsiders and by managers leads to more positive 
REM. This might be related to the undervaluation of firms. Outsiders might put 
pressure on managers to improve a firm's performance, and managers might 
engage in positive REM in response. Furthermore, high equity ownership 
entrenches managers, thus they might engage in more positive REM to protect 
their long-term job security. 
 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) focuses on the potential relationship 
between AEM and REM preceding MBOs and IBOs. Prior to MBOs, the two 
preceding chapters reveal that managers engage in positive REM and negative 
AEM. This raises the question of whether REM and AEM manipulations are 
strategically used to meet the different incentives or not. Positive REM 
increases earnings, suggesting that managers are diligent and talented as well 
as signalling a firm's positive long-term growth prospects to external financiers. 
External financiers might be less concerned about negative AEM, as it might 
reduce the cost of a buyout transaction. While prior research (e.g. Gunny, 2010; 
Zang, 2012) has suggested that AEM is conducted after REM, this research 
seeks to investigate this potential relationship in more detail. Specifically, this 
study examines whether AEM and REM are jointly determined or not, and 
whether their relationship is complementary or substitutive.  
 
Prior to MBOs, I find that positive REM (by means of sales manipulation, 
overproduction, SG&A expenditure cuts and R&D expense cuts) has 
substitutive relationships with negative AEM. This suggests that at least part of 
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REM is pre-planned, not just AEM, as the expectation. This also means that 
managers’ decisions to use AEM and these types of REM are likely to be made 
jointly and depending on each other. Prior to MBOs, I find that the total level of 
earnings management is positive, possibly to enhance external financiers’ 
perceptions of a firm’s value in order to secure financing preceding MBOs. 
Managers might have aggressively positive targets for total earnings 
management, resulting in substitutive relationships between AEM and REM 
prior to MBOs.  
 
Prior to IBOs, managers are motivated to engage in positive earnings 
management in an attempt to improve the perception of their firm's value. The 
prior two chapters reveal that, prior to IBOs, managers engage in positive REM, 
but there is no evidence of greater use of AEM compared to non-buyout firms. 
Shareholders might have no concerns regarding REM or AEM behaviours that 
increase a firm's value, as undervaluation is less likely to maximise their wealth.  
 
Prior to IBOs, the results show that positive REM by means of sales 
manipulation and overproduction has complementary relationships with AEM. 
This suggests that both AEM and parts of REM are positively related, and that 
managers’ decisions to use AEM and these types of REM are jointly determined. 
Moreover, greater SG&A expenditure cuts lead to less AEM, and the causality 
of this relationship runs only from SG&A expenditure cuts to AEM. This 
suggests that AEM might be used to make up for potential shortfalls in SG&A 
expenditure cuts. Prior to IBOs, the total level of earnings management is found 
to be positive, possibly because managers use positive earnings management 
in an attempt to increase their firm's value and thereby impede any IBO bidding. 
Hence managers might pre-set an aggressively positive goal of earnings 
management prior to IBOs, resulting in complementary relationships between 
AEM and REM.  
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The findings also suggest that the constraints of earnings management have 
different effects preceding MBOs and IBOs. First, firms without market-leader 
status tend to engage in less positive REM prior to MBOs. This implies that 
firms with market-leader status engage in more positive REM prior to MBOs. 
REM might be less costly for market-leader firms, as the erosion to their 
competitive advantage is relatively small (Zang, 2012). Prior to IBOs, market-
leader status has no impact on positive REM. As previously discussed, IBO 
firms have been found to be undervalued in the market. Firm undervaluation 
attracts IBO buyers (Hafzalla, 2009), and IBOs threaten managers’ long-term 
job security (Denis and Denis, 1995). Managers might therefore be reluctant to 
take any risks on their job security, and choose to engage in REM regardless 
of whether or not their firm has market-leader status.  
 
Second, high degrees of firm undervaluation are associated with more positive 
REM prior to MBOs. As highly undervalued firms might find it difficult to obtain 
external funding to support MBOs, managers in these firms are more likely to 
engage in positive REM. Prior to IBOs, firm undervaluation has no impact on 
positive REM. Since most of the IBO firms in the sample suffer from some 
degree of undervaluation, there might not be sufficient variability in the data. 
 
Third, firms with poor financial health are associated with more REM prior to 
MBOs. Firms that are experiencing financial distress might be less likely to find 
external financial support for MBOs. They might also have difficulty in repaying 
debts after buyouts. As a result, the firms’ managers are likely to engage in 
more REM. Prior to IBOs also, firms with poor financial health tend to engage 
in more positive REM, in this case by cutting R&D expenses. This implies that 
firms with good financial health minimise the use of REM in order to ensure 
their future growth, while ‘desperate’ firms would use REM to improve their 
earnings.  
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Fourth, better firm performance is related to less sales manipulation and more 
SG&A expenditure cuts preceding MBOs. SG&A expenditure cuts might have 
negative economic consequences for a firm in the long term, but sales 
manipulation has immediate short-term negative economic consequence. 
Managers in better-performing firms might be more eager to execute MBOs, 
and thus they might choose to minimise short-term interference in normal 
operations. Prior to IBOs, firm performance has no impact on positive REM. As 
firm undervaluation might affect their long-term job security, managers thus 
engage in positive REM regardless of their current firm performance.  
 
To summarise, the results suggest that market-leader status, the degree of firm 
undervaluation, financial health and firm performance are all constraints on 
REM prior to MBOs. In contrast, prior to IBOs, financial health is the only 
constraint on REM. This implies that firm characteristics are less likely to 
constrain REM prior to IBOs. This might be because firm undervaluation causes 
managers to worry about becoming an IBO target and strongly motivates them 
to engage in REM.  
5.3 Implications 
Overall, the findings of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have several implications for 
investors, policy makers and regulators for the development of governance 
mechanisms. These are as follows: 
 
 Prior to MBOs, the findings suggest that managers engage in positive REM 
and negative AEM. Managers use positive REM to increase earnings, 
thereby enhancing external financiers’ perceptions of a firm’s value in order 
to secure financing. Moreover, managers use negative AEM to reduce the 
future-earnings expectations of outside shareholders in an attempt to 
reduce the purchasing price. Therefore, the findings reveal that managers 
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manipulate the perceptions of a firm’s value prior to MBOs to cheat 
shareholders and external financiers. Current shareholders should carefully 
scrutinise financial reports before agreeing to an MBO offer. Moreover, 
private equity investors should examine financial accounts more carefully 
to evaluate the true potential of a firm before investing in MBOs.  
 
 Positive REM by means of sales manipulation, overproduction, SG&A 
expenditure cuts and R&D expense cuts has substitutive relationships with 
negative AEM prior to MBOs. This reveals that managers carry out 
systematic manipulations of AEM and REM prior to MBOs. Shareholders 
might be able to increase their monitoring of managers in an attempt to 
protect their wealth prior to MBOs.  
 
 The findings suggest that managers engage in positive REM but show no 
evidence of greater AEM compared to non-buyout firms prior to IBOs. 
Shareholders focus on the long-term growth of a firm should increase the 
monitoring of REM behaviours, as a perception of firm undervaluation might 
cause managers to engage in REM  
 
 Positive REM by means of sales manipulation, overproduction and SG&A 
expenditure cuts has complementary relationships with AEM prior to IBOs. 
This reveals that managers use AEM and REM jointly, and that these two 
earnings management tools are complementary. Thus, shareholders 
should pay attention to AEM behaviour. Although there is no systematic 
AEM, this does not mean managers have no AEM behaviour.  
 
 Non-managerial large blockholders are associated with more positive REM 
preceding MBOs. This has implications for regulators and policy makers, 
suggesting that the ownership of each non-managerial shareholder should 
be limited to less than 10% in order to prevent one individual from becoming 
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a non-managerial large blockholder. Moreover, this implies that 
shareholders should pay attention to the presence of non-managerial large 
blockholders in their firms, which might lead to high levels of REM 
behaviours.  
 
 High CEO ownership and CEO duality lead to more positive REM preceding 
both MBOs and IBOs. This implies that shareholders should be aware of 
high managerial ownership, which could lead to high REM behaviours. In 
addition, separating the role of CEO and chairman could help to mitigate 
REM behaviours, as managers’ control and power might be limited.  
 
 Audit committee characteristics and Big 5 auditors have no impact on 
negative AEM prior to MBOs. This reveals that audit committees or external 
auditors are unlikely to mitigate negative AEM prior to MBOs. Audit 
committees and external auditors should therefore be aware of the MBO 
context and aim to mitigate negative AEM. Moreover, internal and external 
auditors should be trained to spot negative AEM in addition to traditionally 
positive AEM. 
 
 Institutional shareholding does not mitigate positive REM prior to MBOs or 
IBOs. This suggests that, although institutional investors are likely to have 
a better understanding of the long-term impact of a firms’ operating 
decisions (Bushee, 1998), it is still difficult for them to spot REM behaviours. 
This implies that institutional investors are not particularly helpful in respect 
to mitigate REM behaviours.  
5.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This thesis is subject to some limitations. First, I suggest that managers use 
positive earnings management to reduce firm undervaluation and increase the 
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potential buyout costs in an attempt to impede any potential IBO bidding. In 
other words, the IBO samples in this study are firms that attempted to increase 
their value by engaging in positive earnings management but failed and 
eventually became IBO targets. It would be ideal to include a control group in 
the study, including undervalued firms that attempted to increase their firm 
value by engaging in positive earnings management and were successful in 
impeding any IBO bidding. Due to the limitations on the data available, this 
study does not have such a control group. In other words, this study is based 
on data from actual rather than predicted IBO events. 
 
Future research might construct a control group that includes firms that are not 
subject to IBO biddings but do have a high likelihood of takeover risks. Drawing 
on prior literature, future research might be able to construct a model to identify 
firms with high likelihood of takeover in the market. Moreover, by adding the 
characteristics of IBO firms into the model, it might be possible to distinguish 
firms with a high likelihood of being targeted by an IBO from firms with a risk of 
being subject to other types of takeover. This might overcome the limitation of 
this study. 
 
Second, in the Chapter 4, I use a weak instrument for AEM in IBOs. Hence the 
results regarding the relationships between AEM and REM for IBOs might not 
be as reliable as those obtained for MBOs. Future research could overcome 
this issue by adopting other econometric methods rather than using weak 
instrument in 3SLS or 2SLS approach. Moreover, future research could draw 
more widely on relevant literature in accounting and finance fields than this 
study has, in order to find a valid instrument for investigation. This would 
increase the reliability of the results for IBOs. 
 
Third, the existing AEM and REM detecting models are developed by the US 
research to detect earnings management behaviours in the US financial market 
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(e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Gunny, 2010; Kothari et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 
2006). The differences of accounting systems and financial market between the 
UK and the US might affect the effectiveness of AEM and REM detecting 
models, thus the reliability of the models in UK application might be 
compromised. In order to increase the robustness and reliability of my results, 
this study adopts more than one AEM or REM detection models to generate 
consistent results.  
 
Moreover, as the data availability in leveraged buyouts setting constrains this 
study, it is not feasible to include more variables in both multiple OLS models 
and simultaneous equations system. Hence, this study uses different proxies 
for the dependent variable to check whether the results are consistent and not 
sensitive to the selection of variables. Furthermore, a few models in this study 
have potential endogenous problem, and I use instrument variable as a solution 
for endogeneity.  
 
The results of this study suggest several potential avenues for future research. 
First, in the Chapter 3, I suggest that a given corporate governance mechanism 
may have different effects on different types of REM simultaneously. My 
explanation is based on the perception of short-term or long-term firm value 
maximisation of the governance authorities in a firm. Future research could 
explore other factors that might influence the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms on different types of REM. For instance, when the 
specific business environments or firm characteristics of a firm are considered, 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms might change. 
 
Second, I have not explored the potential relationships between different types 
of REM in this thesis. This is because it is difficult to identify other factors that 
might affect specific types of REM. Thus it is too complicated to develop a 
simultaneous equations model for investigation. Moreover, the limitations on 
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available data have prevented this study goes further to explore this issue. Only 
limited data is available on the leveraged buyouts setting, which might 
insufficient to support the developed empirical model. Future research might 
draw more widely on relevant literature in accounting and finance fields than 
this study has, hence being able to construct a simultaneous equations system 
to investigate how different types of REM are simultaneously interrelated. 
Moreover, future research could investigate the potential relationships between 
different types of REM in a setting other than leveraged buyouts, which might 
have sufficient data to support the empirical model.  
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Appendix 
List of Variables 
Chapter 2 
AccruKo: is abnormal accruals, detected using the cross-sectional model of Kothari et 
al. (2005)   
AccruDe: is abnormal accruals, detected using the cross-sectional model of Dechow et 
al. (1995) 
Ned%AudCom: is the percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee 
AudComSz: is the number of members on the audit committee size 
AuditSz2BoardSz: is the ratio of audit committee size to board size 
FinancialExp: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the audit committee has financial 
expertise; 
AudShare: is the percentage of common stock cumulatively owned by audit committee 
members 
3%holdAudCom: is a dummy variable coded 1 if at least one non-executive director 
on the audit committee has at least a 3% shareholding 
Big5: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm uses a Big 5 Auditor 
LNAudFees: is the natural logarithm of audit fees 
AudFees/AssetsSqrt: is the fee ratio of audit fees to the square root of total assets  LN 
LNNonAudFees: is the natural logarithm of non-audit fees 
NonAudit Fees/Assets SQroot: is the fee ratio of non-audit fees to the square root of 
total assets 
NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt: is the fee ratio of non-audit fees to the total auditor fees 
NED%: is the percentage of non-executive directors on the main board 
BoardSz: is the number of directors on the board 
Duality: is a dummy variable coded 1 if the board has CEO duality 
LNMarketVal: is the natural logarithm of the market value 
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InsShare: is the percentage of cumulative institutional Shareholding 
LagROA: is the lagged return on assets 
Leverage: is the ratio of total debt to total assets 
SalesGrow: is the percentage of sales growth 
FreeCashFlow: is defined as funds from operations - capital expenditure - cash 
dividend, scaled by total assets. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
REMit: represents real earnings management proxies of the following variables, 
which is dependent variable in the model:  
1. Main REM proxies from Roychowdhury’s (2006) model: 
RowCFO: is the abnormal CFO detected using Roychowdhury's (2006) model 
RowProdCos: is abnormal production costs 
RowDiscExp: is abnormal discretionary expenses 
 
2. Alternative REM proxies from Gunny’s (2010) Model: 
GuyRes&Dev: is the abnormal R&D expense detected using Gunny’s (2010) 
model 
GuySGA: is abnormal SG&A expenses 
GuyProdCos: is abnormal production costs 
 
3. Alternative REM proxies from Lara, et al. (2010)’s Model: 
LaraProdCos: is the abnormal production costs detected using Lara (2012) 
model 
LaraDiscExp: is abnormal discretionary expenses 
 
Independent variables: 
InsShare: is institutional shareholding (=the cumulative institutional 
shareholding); 
Chapter 5 
409 
Concentr3% (5%): is ownership concentration (=the sum of the shares of firm’s 
outside shareholders with equity ownership greater than 3% (or 5%) ) 
Block10% (20%): is large blockholders, a dummy variable coded 1 if a firm has 
a non-managerial large shareholder who own at least 10% (or 20%) equity 
ownership  
CeoHd: is the CEO’s shareholding 
CeoHdSq: is the squared transformation of the CEO’s shareholding 
NonExecHd: is the non-executive shareholding (=the percentage of equity 
ownership held by non-executive directors) 
Ned%: is the percentage of non-executive directors on a firm's main board 
Duality: means CEO duality, a dummy variable coded 1 if a board has CEO 
duality 
BoardSz: is the number of directors on a firm's board 
 
Control variables:  
LnAssets: is the natural logarithm of total assets 
SalesGrow: is the percentage of sales growth ratio 
Mark2Book: is the market-to-book ratio (= market capitalization divided by the 
book value of shareholders’ equity) 
ROA: is the return-on-assets ratio (=earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by total assets) 
Leverage: is the financial leverage ratio (= total liabilities divided by total assets) 
AssTurn: is the assets turnover ratio (= total sales to total assets) 
DealVal: is the total cash paid to shareholders in buyout transactions. For MBOs, 
it refers to the value of the deal excluding the portion required to purchase 
shares owned by managers (=Deal Value * (1- CEO’s shareholding); for IBOs, 
it is the total deal value (unit: £million) 
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Chapter 4 
REMt: is the abnormal REM according to Roychowdhury’s (2006) models and 
Gunny's (2010) models as follows: 
CFO: is the abnormal cash flow from operation (CFO) detected using 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) model 
ProdCos: is the abnormal production costs detected using Roychowdhury's 
(2006) model 
DiscExp: is the abnormal discretionary expenses detected using 
Roychowdhury's (2006) model 
Res&Dev: is the abnormal R&D expense detected using Gunny's (2010) model 
SGA: is the abnormal selling, SG&A expense detected using Gunny's (2010) 
model 
Instrumental variables of REMt:  
CFOt-1, ProdCost-1, DisExpt-1, Res&Devt-1, SGAt-1: are lagged values of REM 
proxies 
 
AEMt: is accruals earnings management detected by the cross-sectional model 
of Dechow et al. (1995) (AccruDe)  
Instrumental variables of AEMt: 
SalesGrow: is the sales-growth ratio, which is an instrument of AEMt 
 
AEM constraints: 
Big5: is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if a firm is audited by one of the Big 5 
auditors 
LNAuditTn: is the natural logarithm of auditor tenure years (measured by the 
number of consecutive years in which a firm uses the same auditor) 
AudComSz: is the audit committee size, which is the total number of members 
on the audit committee  
AudShare: is the cumulative common stock owned by audit committee 
members 
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OpeCycle: is the length of operating cycles, measured as the days inventory 
outstanding (DIO) plus the days sales outstanding (DSO) minus the days 
payable outstanding (DPO) (length of operating cycles = DIO+DSO-DPO) 
 
REM constraints: 
ROA: is the return on assets ratio, which measures firm performance 
MarketSh: is the market-leader status in the industry, which is measured by a 
firm’s market share in its industry using the two-digits industry code 
Z-score: is the financial health status of a firm, which is measured by a modified 
Altman’s Z-score 
InsShare: is institutional ownership, which is the accumulated percentage of 
institutional shareholding 
BoardSz: is the number of directors on the board 
NED%: is the percentage of non-executive directors on the main board 
 
Control Variables: 
LnAssets: is the natural logarithm of total assets 
Mark2Book: is the market capitalization divided by the book value of 
shareholders’ equity 
Leverage: is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
PE Ratio: is the industry-adjusted price to earnings ratio ( = the difference 
between the target firm’s price-earnings ratio and the median industry price-
earnings ratio) 
DealVal: is the total cash paid to shareholders in buyout transactions; for MBOs, 
it is the deal value excluding the portion assumed to purchase shares owned 
by managers (=Deal Value * (1- CEO’s shareholding); for IBOs, it is the total 
deal value (unit: Million Pounds) 
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Tables 
Table 1.1  Distribution of leveraged buyouts firms with deal value 1997 to 2011 
Year leveraged buyouts 
Deal Value (GBP mil) 
Mean Total 
1997 8 57.3275 458.62 
1998 24 72.99708 1751.93 
1999 44 116.0811 5107.57 
2000 33 143.4227 4732.95 
2001 22 83.31 1832.82 
2002 22 203.0991 4468.18 
2003 22 172.9927 3805.84 
2004 9 301.4956 2713.46 
2005 15 295.738 4436.07 
2006 17 1267.119 21541.03 
2007 18 1056.364 19014.56 
2008 7 309.8114 2168.68 
2009 2 89.04 178.08 
2010 4 950.7275 3802.91 
2011 9 90.79111 817.12 
Total 256 300.1165 76829.82 
(Source: Thomson ONE database) 
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Table 2.7 Panel A  Endogeneity Tests Results 
Panel A. Audit Committee Characteristics Model 
 MBO 1 MBO 2 MBO 3 MBO 4 IBO 1 IBO 2 IBO 3 IBO 4 
VARIABLES AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo 
Ned%AudCom 0.001 -0.000 0.028 0.019 0.017 -0.042 -0.016 -0.091 
 (0.013) (-0.013) (0.540) (0.407) (0.273) (-0.537) (-0.265) (-1.176) 
FinancialExp 0.002 -0.006 0.007 -0.005 -0.023* -0.024* -0.027* -0.026* 
 (0.117) (-0.384) (0.311) (-0.281) (-1.758) (-1.677) (-1.938) (-1.750) 
AudShare -0.046  -0.067  0.229*  0.313***  
 (-0.840)  (-1.110)  (1.943)  (2.803)  
3%holdAudCom  0.024  0.024  0.040  0.050* 
  (1.058)  (0.999)  (1.550)  (1.734) 
AudComSz 0.015 0.010   0.004 0.001   
 (1.599) (1.328)   (0.658) (0.192)   
AuditSz2BoardSz   0.106* 0.069   -0.067 -0.079 
   (1.718) (1.409)   (-0.924) (-0.984) 
LNMarketVal 0.008* 0.008** 0.010** 0.010** 0.012** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (1.708) (1.977) (2.201) (2.218) (2.543) (2.423) (3.087) (2.778) 
InsShare -0.045 -0.028 -0.054 -0.032 0.068 0.071 0.085 0.085 
 (-1.372) (-1.077) (-1.443) (-1.115) (0.802) (0.786) (0.964) (0.902) 
LagROA -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.020 -0.008 -0.041 -0.024 
 (-1.445) (-1.461) (-1.171) (-1.315) (-0.576) (-0.204) (-1.125) (-0.573) 
SalesGrow 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.037** -0.035** -0.038** -0.034** 
 (4.224) (4.084) (4.671) (4.249) (-2.335) (-2.165) (-2.412) (-2.096) 
Leverage 0.021 0.034 0.033 0.045 -0.081 -0.089 -0.088 -0.098 
 (0.406) (0.690) (0.616) (0.849) (-1.324) (-1.450) (-1.374) (-1.488) 
FreeCashFlow 0.071 0.059 0.062 0.053 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.972) (0.847) (0.882) (0.775) (-3.565) (-3.424) (-3.396) (-3.538) 
Constant -0.120* -0.127* -0.181* -0.170* -0.162* -0.106 -0.109 -0.029 
 (-1.664) (-1.841) (-1.854) (-1.796) (-1.715) (-0.929) (-1.149) (-0.267) 
Observations 112 112 112 112 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.086 0.117 0.034 0.088 0.206 0.189 0.218 0.198 
chi2-test 35.64 28.25 37.22 29.25 76.41 68.16 80.25 67.88 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman test 
Chi2 
13.02 0.49 16.93 3.47 1.52 3.58 2.70 3.92 
Hausman test 
Prob > Chi2 
0.223 1.000 0.076 0.943 0.999 0.964 0.988 0.951 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note Endogenous variables in these models are: Ned%AudCom, FinancialExp, 
AudShare, 3%holdAudCom, AudComSz, AuditSz2BoardSz. The lagged values of the 
endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Table 2.7 Panel B  Endogeneity Tests Results 
Panel B. Audit Quality Model 
 MBO 1 MBO 2 MBO 3 IBO 1 IBO 2 IBO 3 
VARIABLES AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo AccruKo 
Big5 -0.027 -0.027 -0.033 -0.031 -0.036 -0.052 
 (-1.366) (-1.363) (-1.533) (-1.298) (-1.417) (-0.882) 
LNAudFees 0.008   0.022*   
 (0.918)   (1.808)   
AudFees/AssetsSqrt   -0.056   -0.034 
   (-1.302)   (-0.355) 
LNNonAudFees  0.006   0.016  
  (0.838)   (1.195)  
NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt   0.051   0.075 
   (1.341)   (0.494) 
NonAudFees/TotalFees 0.076   0.107   
 (1.529)   (0.841)   
NED% 0.129 0.127 0.085 0.058 0.025 0.133 
 (1.350) (1.328) (0.793) (0.590) (0.261) (0.410) 
BoardSz 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.749) (0.554) (1.031) (0.792) (0.483) (-0.231) 
Duality 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.038 0.036 0.027 
 (1.356) (1.315) (1.180) (1.112) (1.084) (0.626) 
LNMarketVal  0.006 0.008  0.007 0.019 
  (1.173) (1.492)  (1.436) (0.947) 
InsShare -0.049 -0.050 -0.049 0.082 0.081 0.077 
 (-1.537) (-1.566) (-1.416) (0.963) (0.969) (0.901) 
LagROA -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 0.035 0.011 0.047 
 (-1.048) (-0.921) (-0.775) (0.580) (0.213) (0.325) 
SalesGrow 0.003 0.004* 0.003 -0.034 -0.039* -0.054 
 (1.417) (1.653) (1.044) (-1.273) (-1.679) (-0.968) 
Leverage 0.035 0.034 0.030 -0.127** -0.129** -0.138 
 (0.608) (0.620) (0.516) (-2.094) (-2.047) (-1.303) 
FreeCashFlow 0.079 0.061  -0.008** -0.002  
 (1.252) (0.925)  (-2.500) (-0.656)  
Constant -0.145* -0.156** -0.146* -0.202 -0.167** -0.233 
 (-1.914) (-2.148) (-1.923) (-1.559) (-2.025) (-0.900) 
Observations 112 112 112 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.139 0.141 0.125 0.127 0.126  
chi2-test 20.63 21.52 51.17 48.86 56.21 8.452 
Prob > chi2 0.037 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.672 
Hausman test Chi2 6.13 5.65 2.68 5.68 4.35 3.80 
Hausman test Prob > Chi2 0.865 0.895 0.994 0.899 0.958 0.975 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Note: Endogenous variables in these models are: Big5, LNAudFees, 
AudFees/AssetsSqrt, LNNonAudFees, NonAudFees/AssetsSqrt, 
NonAudFees/TotalFees, NED%, BoardSz, Duality. The lagged values of the 
endogenous variables are used as instruments.  
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Table 3.5.1  Sensitive tests controlling undervaluation for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 
(Dependent Variable: RowCFO) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.020   -0.035  0.011   -0.007  
 (-0.389)   (-0.579)  (0.183)   (-0.125)  
Concentr3%  -0.020   -0.042  0.005   -0.017 
  (-0.287)   (-0.600)  (0.081)   (-0.283) 
Concentr5%   -0.037     -0.017   
   (-0.572)     (-0.315)   
Block10% 0.003 0.003  0.010  0.010 0.011  0.014  
 (0.068) (0.060)  (0.258)  (0.485) (0.473)  (0.656)  
Block20%   0.020  0.019   0.033  0.029 
   (0.609)  (0.556)   (1.258)  (1.192) 
CeoHd -0.117 -0.119 -0.112 -0.394 -0.368 -0.034 -0.036 -0.039 -0.320 -0.305 
 (-0.880) (-0.932) (-0.944) (-0.957) (-0.926) (-0.475) (-0.496) (-0.509) (-1.622) (-1.471) 
CeoHdSq    0.570 0.515    0.575* 0.537* 
    (0.840) (0.787)    (1.780) (1.685) 
NonExecHd 0.048 0.049 0.022 0.045 0.023 0.170 0.168 0.124 0.168 0.133 
 (0.739) (0.733) (0.288) (0.671) (0.264) (1.377) (1.375) (1.099) (1.351) (1.099) 
Ned% 0.116 0.113 0.111 0.118 0.111 -0.138 -0.136* -0.130* -0.129 -0.125 
 (0.938) (0.952) (0.929) (0.953) (0.943) (-1.638) (-1.735) (-1.764) (-1.504) (-1.617) 
Duality 0.043 0.043 0.038 0.046 0.041 -0.031 -0.031 -0.034 -0.026 -0.029 
 (1.139) (1.113) (0.998) (1.159) (1.017) (-1.166) (-1.174) (-1.205) (-0.998) (-1.020) 
BoardSz 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.782) (0.755) (0.734) (0.835) (0.774) (-1.245) (-1.270) (-1.319) (-1.284) (-1.340) 
LnAssets -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (-1.077) (-1.131) (-1.045) (-1.152) (-1.115) (0.093) (0.111) (0.095) (0.062) (0.009) 
SalesGrow -0.006** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.005** -0.038 -0.038 -0.039 -0.038 -0.040 
 (-2.475) (-2.483) (-2.652) (-2.172) (-2.214) (-1.484) (-1.460) (-1.552) (-1.524) (-1.563) 
Mark2Book 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (1.002) (0.996) (1.009) (0.822) (0.842) (-3.930) (-3.928) (-3.850) (-3.985) (-3.846) 
ROA 0.137 0.138 0.132 0.130 0.128 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.036 -0.037 
 (1.640) (1.628) (1.536) (1.614) (1.556) (-1.467) (-1.453) (-1.513) (-1.496) (-1.514) 
Leverage -0.040 -0.040 -0.039 -0.036 -0.039 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.016 
 (-0.494) (-0.497) (-0.471) (-0.441) (-0.461) (0.268) (0.268) (0.282) (0.210) (0.231) 
AssTurn 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.027 0.027 0.030 0.028 0.031 
 (0.254) (0.257) (0.376) (0.291) (0.391) (1.414) (1.414) (1.510) (1.488) (1.574) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.034) (1.143) (1.220) (1.035) (1.148) (1.473) (1.490) (1.406) (1.407) (1.337) 
PE Ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.135) (-0.150) (-0.140) (0.075) (0.056) (0.756) (0.754) (0.788) (0.707) (0.753) 
Constant 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.022 0.031 0.052 0.049 0.056 0.064 0.073 
 (0.050) (0.109) (0.044) (0.179) (0.250) (0.519) (0.512) (0.584) (0.644) (0.765) 
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Observations 115 115 115 115 115 114 114 114 114 114 
R-squared 0.113 0.113 0.116 0.124 0.125 0.252 0.252 0.259 0.266 0.272 
F-test 4.417 4.299 5.245 4.200 4.987 4.325 4.223 4.012 3.745 3.507 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6.1  Sensitive tests controlling undervaluation for IBOs Year T-1 and Year T-
2 (Dependent Variable: RowCFO) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.005   0.006  -0.046   -0.022  
 (0.079)   (0.096)  (-0.804)   (-0.412)  
Concentr3%  0.011   0.049  -0.070   0.010 
  (0.185)   (0.821)  (-1.353)   (0.215) 
Concentr5%   0.032     -0.014   
   (0.505)     (-0.293)   
Block10% -0.017 -0.017  -0.017  0.050** 0.055**  0.043*  
 (-0.679) (-0.735)  (-0.689)  (2.129) (2.451)  (1.964)  
Block20%   -0.059  -0.063*   -0.010  -0.009 
   (-1.642)  (-1.735)   (-0.495)  (-0.426) 
CeoHd 0.004 0.006 0.059 0.036 0.054 -0.058 -0.059 -0.092 0.322 0.348 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.354) (0.095) (0.161) (-0.352) (-0.356) (-0.542) (1.210) (1.159) 
CeoHdSq    -0.065 0.030    -0.838** -0.961** 
    (-0.116) (0.057)    (-2.003) (-2.003) 
NonExecHd 0.168 0.174 0.206 0.163 0.233 0.008 0.001 0.064 -0.057 -0.020 
 (0.709) (0.739) (1.142) (0.666) (1.124) (0.081) (0.014) (0.577) (-0.512) (-0.164) 
Ned% -0.153 -0.154 -0.112 -0.151 -0.110 -0.079 -0.077 -0.080 -0.036 -0.029 
 (-1.398) (-1.421) (-1.049) (-1.292) (-0.965) (-0.960) (-0.952) (-0.953) (-0.441) (-0.343) 
Duality -0.075* -0.075* -0.084** -0.076* -0.084** -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.019 -0.020 
 (-1.890) (-1.905) (-2.277) (-1.882) (-2.298) (-0.367) (-0.419) (-0.354) (-0.480) (-0.470) 
BoardSz -0.016** -0.016* -0.014* -0.016** -0.014* -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
 (-2.003) (-1.993) (-1.791) (-1.998) (-1.769) (-1.605) (-1.617) (-1.505) (-1.530) (-1.410) 
LnAssets 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.016 0.016 
 (1.233) (1.271) (1.529) (1.280) (1.645) (0.946) (0.853) (1.006) (1.263) (1.384) 
SalesGrow -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.019 0.021 
 (-0.378) (-0.378) (-0.652) (-0.378) (-0.667) (1.045) (1.119) (1.238) (0.989) (1.163) 
Mark2Book 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (2.256) (2.221) (2.068) (2.251) (1.894) (0.033) (0.071) (0.142) (0.167) (0.262) 
ROA -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.009 -0.014 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
 (-0.628) (-0.641) (-0.677) (-0.635) (-0.726) (-0.115) (-0.170) (-0.103) (-0.096) (-0.065) 
Leverage -0.140* -0.141* -0.147* -0.141* -0.154** -0.228** -0.219** -0.214** -0.258** -0.251** 
 (-1.790) (-1.817) (-1.978) (-1.837) (-2.111) (-2.314) (-2.279) (-2.352) (-2.423) (-2.444) 
AssTurn 0.044* 0.045* 0.041* 0.045* 0.041* 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.034 0.037* 
 (1.900) (1.925) (1.962) (1.914) (1.908) (1.005) (0.981) (1.068) (1.611) (1.765) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.807) (0.821) (0.565) (0.804) (0.566) (0.908) (0.900) (0.287) (0.822) (0.262) 
PE Ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (-0.713) (-0.717) (-0.975) (-0.708) (-0.994) (2.822) (2.697) (2.506) (2.718) (2.249) 
Constant 0.027 0.022 -0.046 0.023 -0.067 0.042 0.058 0.053 -0.043 -0.049 
 (0.235) (0.187) (-0.354) (0.184) (-0.505) (0.343) (0.477) (0.447) (-0.339) (-0.383) 
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Observations 85 85 85 85 85 78 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.357 0.358 0.380 0.357 0.383 0.400 0.408 0.357 0.423 0.388 
F-test 3.191 3.285 3.181 2.761 3.335 1.956 2.129 1.594 1.852 1.591 
Prob > F 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.034 0.020 0.102 0.044 0.099 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7.1  Sensitive analysis for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dep. Var.: Absolute 
RowCFO) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.007   0.030  -0.038   -0.029  
 (0.172)   (0.605)  (-0.701)   (-0.628)  
Concentr3%  0.014   0.065  -0.016   -0.012 
  (0.233)   (1.258)  (-0.276)   (-0.207) 
Concentr5%   0.059     -0.006   
   (1.231)     (-0.141)   
Block10% 0.005 0.004  -0.004  -0.022 -0.025  -0.024  
 (0.167) (0.110)  (-0.145)  (-1.185) (-1.254)  (-1.172)  
Block20%   -0.039*  -0.035   -0.030  -0.028 
   (-1.830)  (-1.660)   (-1.498)  (-1.474) 
CeoHd 0.017 0.020 0.005 0.439 0.414 -0.061 -0.053 -0.037 0.073 0.088 
 (0.145) (0.183) (0.053) (1.195) (1.182) (-1.031) (-0.904) (-0.529) (0.320) (0.369) 
CeoHdSq    -0.873 -0.826    -0.270 -0.257 
    (-1.513) (-1.491)    (-0.694) (-0.665) 
NonExecHd 0.048 0.052 0.115* 0.053 0.112* -0.009 -0.001 0.026 -0.008 0.019 
 (0.863) (0.887) (1.781) (0.956) (1.686) (-0.107) (-0.015) (0.346) (-0.098) (0.226) 
Ned% -0.134 -0.134 -0.133 -0.138 -0.134 0.174* 0.166 0.159* 0.168* 0.158 
 (-1.173) (-1.231) (-1.204) (-1.210) (-1.229) (1.669) (1.630) (1.670) (1.724) (1.650) 
Duality -0.026 -0.026 -0.018 -0.031 -0.022 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.028 
 (-0.768) (-0.740) (-0.510) (-0.855) (-0.611) (1.234) (1.284) (1.249) (1.233) (1.258) 
BoardSz -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (-1.506) (-1.470) (-1.412) (-1.571) (-1.471) (0.545) (0.550) (0.527) (0.546) (0.530) 
LnAssets 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.526) (0.546) (0.337) (0.707) (0.573) (-0.226) (-0.342) (-0.231) (-0.162) (-0.100) 
SalesGrow 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.006* 0.006* 0.035 0.035 0.037* 0.036 0.038 
 (2.024) (2.030) (2.478) (1.675) (1.949) (1.651) (1.598) (1.694) (1.655) (1.651) 
Mark2Book 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.733) (0.738) (0.756) (0.942) (0.873) (-1.370) (-1.304) (-1.739) (-1.307) (-1.768) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.008 0.016 0.036* 0.036 0.037* 0.036* 0.037* 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.203) (0.135) (0.257) (1.677) (1.657) (1.703) (1.695) (1.695) 
Leverage 0.119** 0.118** 0.114** 0.117** 0.117** 0.041 0.040 0.035 0.043 0.037 
 (2.348) (2.387) (2.028) (2.204) (2.023) (0.705) (0.668) (0.579) (0.763) (0.623) 
AssTurn -0.018* -0.018* -0.021** -0.019* -0.021** -0.022 -0.023 -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 
 (-1.881) (-1.895) (-2.167) (-1.937) (-2.149) (-1.324) (-1.325) (-1.410) (-1.325) (-1.414) 
DealVal -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 
 (-0.109) (-0.106) (0.020) (-0.094) (0.052) (-1.916) (-1.841) (-1.812) (-2.014) (-1.775) 
Constant 0.096 0.092 0.113 0.070 0.072 -0.007 0.001 -0.014 -0.014 -0.023 
 (0.860) (0.853) (0.973) (0.661) (0.711) (-0.107) (0.012) (-0.229) (-0.206) (-0.334) 
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 114 114 114 114 114 
R-squared 0.077 0.077 0.092 0.113 0.125 0.182 0.178 0.178 0.187 0.183 
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F-test 1.347 1.375 1.684 1.431 1.744 3.436 3.428 3.571 3.295 3.390 
Prob > F 0.194 0.179 0.0708 0.148 0.0543 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7.2  Sensitive analysis for MBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dep. Var.: Absolute 
GuySGA) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare -0.101   -0.077  -0.035   -0.044  
 (-1.480)   (-1.073)  (-0.436)   (-0.545)  
Concentr3%  -0.067   -0.077  -0.067   -0.158** 
  (-0.908)   (-1.057)  (-0.824)   (-2.116) 
Concentr5%   -0.129*     -0.172**   
   (-1.749)     (-2.108)   
Block10% -0.027 -0.032  -0.039  -0.068** -0.063*  -0.066**  
 (-0.661) (-0.780)  (-0.878)  (-2.135) (-1.987)  (-2.055)  
Block20%   -0.005  -0.011   0.041  0.030 
   (-0.203)  (-0.405)   (1.135)  (0.845) 
CeoHd -0.079 -0.075 -0.065 0.380 0.372 -0.092 -0.104 -0.043 -0.246 -0.217 
 (-0.789) (-0.733) (-0.716) (1.432) (1.509) (-0.792) (-0.898) (-0.413) (-1.121) (-0.937) 
CeoHdSq    -0.915* -0.850*    0.295 0.334 
    (-1.737) (-1.838)    (0.852) (0.941) 
NonExecHd 0.112 0.133 0.124 0.120 0.121 0.364*** 0.353*** 0.230* 0.365*** 0.234* 
 (0.991) (1.073) (1.139) (0.995) (0.900) (4.104) (3.752) (1.958) (3.915) (1.983) 
Ned% 0.163* 0.143 0.144* 0.155* 0.137 0.148 0.150 0.135 0.156 0.147 
 (1.849) (1.658) (1.729) (1.771) (1.574) (1.505) (1.575) (1.456) (1.592) (1.567) 
Duality 0.047 0.045 0.047 0.040 0.043 0.024 0.021 0.004 0.027 0.005 
 (1.452) (1.379) (1.404) (1.366) (1.304) (0.730) (0.619) (0.121) (0.841) (0.146) 
BoardSz 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.035) (-0.045) (-0.084) (-0.071) (-0.117) (-0.465) (-0.585) (-1.003) (-0.455) (-0.964) 
LnAssets 0.023* 0.021* 0.022* 0.026** 0.026* 0.013 0.014 0.020 0.012 0.019 
 (1.862) (1.681) (1.724) (2.021) (1.903) (0.984) (1.074) (1.534) (0.882) (1.387) 
SalesGrow 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.036 0.041 0.054* 0.036 0.057* 
 (0.174) (0.421) (0.321) (-0.182) (-0.227) (1.202) (1.346) (1.763) (1.201) (1.804) 
Mark2Book 0.022* 0.022 0.021 0.024* 0.024* -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005* 
 (1.674) (1.629) (1.610) (1.703) (1.728) (-1.344) (-1.362) (-1.636) (-1.356) (-1.835) 
ROA -0.108 -0.095 -0.109 -0.102 -0.102 0.034 0.038 0.046* 0.035 0.050* 
 (-1.369) (-1.214) (-1.381) (-1.366) (-1.314) (1.323) (1.447) (1.733) (1.342) (1.848) 
Leverage 0.065 0.058 0.074 0.061 0.075 0.036 0.036 0.015 0.034 0.012 
 (0.927) (0.822) (0.987) (0.856) (0.955) (0.563) (0.563) (0.233) (0.536) (0.184) 
AssTurn 0.065** 0.063** 0.065** 0.066** 0.065** 0.053* 0.055* 0.069** 0.053* 0.067** 
 (2.404) (2.334) (2.384) (2.480) (2.354) (1.854) (1.913) (2.369) (1.821) (2.247) 
DealVal -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-2.498) (-2.338) (-2.428) (-2.598) (-2.369) (-0.074) (-0.184) (-0.156) (-0.110) (-0.112) 
Constant -0.325** -0.289** -0.317** -0.359*** -0.378*** -0.141 -0.134 -0.201 -0.126 -0.182 
 (-2.496) (-2.291) (-2.403) (-2.814) (-2.694) (-0.863) (-0.870) (-1.303) (-0.752) (-1.094) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.316 0.307 0.317 0.346 0.328 0.382 0.386 0.364 0.385 0.362 
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F-test 1.898 1.751 1.847 1.869 1.586 12.15 11.32 10.35 11.97 9.558 
Prob > F 0.039 0.062 0.046 0.039 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8.1  Sensitive analysis for IBOs Year T-1 and T-2 (Dep. Var.: Absolute 
RowCFO) 
 Panel A:  Year T-1 Panel B:  Year T-2 
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
InsShare 0.003   -0.013  0.047   0.036  
 (0.053)   (-0.240)  (1.041)   (0.832)  
Concentr3%  -0.001   -0.037  0.068*   0.040 
  (-0.022)   (-0.712)  (1.839)   (1.150) 
Concentr5%   -0.028     0.045   
   (-0.509)     (1.182)   
Block10% 0.001 0.002  0.006  -0.019 -0.024  -0.016  
 (0.067) (0.103)  (0.305)  (-1.069) (-1.435)  (-0.951)  
Block20%   0.031  0.028   -0.011  -0.012 
   (0.936)  (0.846)   (-0.591)  (-0.691) 
CeoHd 0.371** 0.370** 0.340** -0.097 -0.110 0.095 0.095 0.107 -0.071 -0.086 
 (2.085) (2.059) (2.031) (-0.276) (-0.326) (0.659) (0.662) (0.756) (-0.299) (-0.331) 
CeoHdSq    0.953* 0.920*    0.367 0.431 
    (1.988) (1.879)    (0.984) (1.081) 
NonExecHd -0.203 -0.207 -0.241 -0.134 -0.170 -0.027 -0.019 -0.027 0.002 0.018 
 (-1.101) (-1.127) (-1.536) (-0.706) (-0.931) (-0.294) (-0.213) (-0.301) (0.023) (0.185) 
Ned% 0.091 0.091 0.074 0.058 0.039 -0.017 -0.019 -0.012 -0.036 -0.037 
 (0.943) (0.964) (0.795) (0.576) (0.403) (-0.291) (-0.322) (-0.211) (-0.642) (-0.651) 
Duality 0.028 0.028 0.032 0.045 0.049 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 (0.807) (0.808) (0.920) (1.448) (1.590) (0.123) (0.163) (0.126) (0.173) (0.157) 
BoardSz 0.016** 0.016** 0.015** 0.016** 0.015** 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (2.417) (2.411) (2.299) (2.512) (2.430) (1.412) (1.442) (1.384) (1.395) (1.425) 
LnAssets -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.017* -0.019* -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.019* -0.018* 
 (-1.369) (-1.393) (-1.477) (-1.799) (-1.952) (-1.658) (-1.600) (-1.667) (-1.787) (-1.809) 
SalesGrow -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.048) (-0.046) (0.143) (0.005) (0.149) (-0.540) (-0.580) (-0.465) (-0.501) (-0.518) 
Mark2Book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.428) (0.432) (0.615) (0.208) (0.468) (-0.644) (-0.681) (-0.756) (-0.689) (-0.777) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.048 0.054 0.049 0.048 0.048 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.045) (0.117) (0.163) (1.199) (1.388) (1.199) (1.166) (1.167) 
Leverage 0.090 0.090 0.093 0.110 0.117* 0.154* 0.146 0.144* 0.167* 0.159* 
 (1.364) (1.393) (1.452) (1.653) (1.789) (1.686) (1.657) (1.708) (1.730) (1.726) 
AssTurn -0.029 -0.029 -0.027 -0.041** -0.040** -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 -0.035* -0.035* 
 (-1.483) (-1.503) (-1.522) (-2.013) (-2.077) (-1.572) (-1.569) (-1.633) (-1.793) (-1.927) 
DealVal -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.158) (-1.175) (-0.973) (-1.259) (-1.069) (0.050) (0.018) (0.286) (0.100) (0.313) 
Constant 0.049 0.051 0.088 0.116 0.160 0.166 0.150 0.146 0.203* 0.183* 
 (0.486) (0.493) (0.749) (1.068) (1.393) (1.514) (1.433) (1.434) (1.824) (1.753) 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 78 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.313 0.313 0.323 0.340 0.349 0.307 0.319 0.303 0.314 0.314 
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F-test 1.047 1.057 1.254 5.012 5.202 0.880 0.967 0.894 0.844 0.902 
Prob > F 0.420 0.411 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.584 0.496 0.569 0.626 0.565 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.5 Panel A  OLS Regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruDe ProdCos AccruDe DisExp AccruDe Res&Dev AccruDe SGA AccruDe 
Sign (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (?) (-) (-) (-) 
Accruals 0.008  0.350  -0.211  0.020  -0.172  
 (0.054)  (1.429)  (-0.919)  (1.363)  (-1.521)  
CFO  -0.012         
  (-0.161)         
ProdCos    0.055       
    (1.498)       
DisExp      -0.038     
      (-1.541)     
Res&Dev        2.424   
        (1.414)   
SGA          -0.079 
          (-1.653) 
ROA 0.244**  -0.156  -0.535  -0.011  -0.409***  
 (2.540)  (-1.186)  (-1.447)  (-1.133)  (-3.831)  
MarketSh 1.198  -0.542  -12.068*  -0.079  -1.645  
 (0.679)  (-0.129)  (-1.957)  (-0.567)  (-0.750)  
Z-score -0.003  0.002  0.006  0.000  0.011***  
 (-1.370)  (0.555)  (0.606)  (0.784)  (4.270)  
InsShare -0.019  -0.064  0.213  -0.000  0.171***  
 (-0.442)  (-0.484)  (1.264)  (-0.065)  (2.880)  
PE Ratio -0.002*  -0.000  -0.003  0.000  -0.000  
 (-1.759)  (-0.314)  (-1.509)  (0.118)  (-0.026)  
BoardSz -0.002  -0.000  0.001  0.001  -0.013  
 (-0.302)  (-0.011)  (0.088)  (1.463)  (-1.171)  
NED% 0.098  -0.118  -0.388  -0.004  -0.076  
 (1.368)  (-0.736)  (-0.905)  (-0.842)  (-0.856)  
Big5  0.003  0.004  -0.003  0.007  -0.005 
  (0.160)  (0.216)  (-0.150)  (0.354)  (-0.240) 
LNAuditTn  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.007  -0.004 
  (-0.375)  (-0.315)  (-0.229)  (-0.511)  (-0.285) 
AudComSz  0.006  0.005  0.012  0.004  0.011 
  (0.682)  (0.572)  (1.130)  (0.535)  (1.099) 
AudShare  0.105  0.115  0.091  0.129  0.082 
  (0.902)  (0.968)  (0.728)  (1.060)  (0.672) 
OpeCycle  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.975)  (-1.042)  (-0.994)  (-1.041)  (-0.943) 
LnAssets -0.010 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.078 0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.010 0.000 
 (-0.735) (0.051) (-0.104) (0.143) (1.296) (0.274) (0.638) (-0.019) (-0.503) (0.011) 
Mark2Book 0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.004 0.012 0.010 -0.000 0.006 -0.003 0.008 
 (0.680) (0.721) (-0.364) (0.892) (0.353) (1.463) (-0.354) (1.215) (-0.124) (1.148) 
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Leverage -0.240* 0.054 0.045 0.056 -0.085 0.042 -0.004 0.068 -0.011 0.040 
 (-1.769) (0.653) (0.192) (0.729) (-0.383) (0.492) (-0.562) (0.962) (-0.097) (0.455) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.880) (0.626) (-1.281) (0.761) (4.061) (0.391) (0.042) (0.598) (1.406) (0.281) 
Constant 0.052 -0.041 0.175 -0.053 -0.836 -0.093 -0.007 -0.035 0.138 -0.053 
 (0.424) (-0.431) (0.707) (-0.572) (-1.560) (-0.865) (-0.701) (-0.374) (0.777) (-0.467) 
Observations 114 112 113 112 96 94 113 111 96 94 
R-squared 0.294 0.065 0.047 0.087 0.225 0.099 0.114 0.114 0.242 0.102 
F-test 2.211 1.031 2.898 1.183 8.664 1.444 0.604 1.429 3.721 1.731 
Prob > F 0.016 0.423 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.176 0.834 0.178 0.000 0.087 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.5 Panel B  OLS Regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx AccruDe CFO+DisEx AccruDe 
Accruals 0.458  0.216  
 (1.203)  (0.689)  
Prod+DisEx  0.038*   
  (1.855)   
CFO+DisEx    0.031 
    (1.191) 
ROA 0.144  0.310  
 (0.450)  (0.790)  
MarketSh 9.547  9.832  
 (1.152)  (1.503)  
Z-score 0.000  -0.003  
 (0.048)  (-0.335)  
InsShare -0.401  -0.186  
 (-1.626)  (-1.005)  
PE Ratio 0.003  0.006  
 (1.352)  (1.637)  
BoardSz 0.020  0.003  
 (0.689)  (0.176)  
NED% 0.324  0.331  
 (0.645)  (0.747)  
Big5  -0.002  -0.002 
  (-0.096)  (-0.104) 
LNAuditTn  -0.003  -0.003 
  (-0.209)  (-0.176) 
AudComSz  0.011  0.012 
  (1.068)  (1.142) 
AudShare  0.096  0.088 
  (0.759)  (0.698) 
OpeCycle  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-1.036)  (-0.980) 
LnAssets -0.075 0.003 -0.067 0.002 
 (-1.058) (0.273) (-1.077) (0.207) 
Mark2Book -0.016 0.010 -0.020 0.010 
 (-0.279) (1.522) (-0.516) (1.557) 
Leverage -0.107 0.052 0.249 0.040 
 (-0.286) (0.654) (0.886) (0.475) 
DealVal -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
 (-3.335) (0.549) (-3.778) (0.436) 
Constant 0.866 -0.096 0.743 -0.088 
 (1.351) (-0.879) (1.360) (-0.790) 
Observations 95 94 96 94 
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R-squared 0.156 0.114 0.236 0.098 
F-test 8.585 1.560 7.452 1.327 
Prob > F 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.230 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.6 Panel A  OLS Regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruDe ProdCos AccruDe DisExp AccruDe Res&Dev AccruDe SGA AccruDe 
Sign (-) (?) (+) (?) (-) (?) (?) (?) (-) (?) 
Accruals -0.274*  0.356  0.325  -0.002  -0.181  
 (-1.814)  (0.813)  (1.056)  (-0.198)  (-0.783)  
CFO  -0.119         
  (-1.397)         
ProdCos    0.030       
    (0.668)       
DisExp      0.039     
      (0.853)     
Res&Dev        -1.268   
        (-1.304)   
SGA          -0.094 
          (-1.100) 
ROA -0.183**  0.020  0.449**  0.002  0.117  
 (-2.604)  (0.104)  (2.342)  (0.386)  (1.091)  
MarketSh 0.534  -0.567  0.969*  0.007  0.534  
 (1.309)  (-0.777)  (1.862)  (0.449)  (1.622)  
Z-score 0.032***  0.002  -0.072***  -0.002**  -0.024*  
 (3.043)  (0.100)  (-2.984)  (-2.433)  (-1.824)  
InsShare 0.009  0.130  -0.006  -0.005  0.006  
 (0.206)  (0.811)  (-0.030)  (-0.978)  (0.073)  
PE Ratio 0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000*  
 (0.951)  (0.036)  (-1.049)  (0.943)  (-1.988)  
BoardSz -0.014**  0.027*  -0.020  -0.001*  -0.014*  
 (-2.196)  (1.710)  (-1.315)  (-1.816)  (-1.679)  
NED% -0.051  0.400**  -0.189  0.001  -0.188*  
 (-0.679)  (2.170)  (-1.137)  (0.181)  (-1.728)  
Big5  -0.013  -0.015  -0.018  -0.011  -0.020 
  (-0.643)  (-0.710)  (-0.812)  (-0.517)  (-0.920) 
LNAuditTn  0.009  0.012  -0.003  0.011  0.000 
  (0.883)  (1.292)  (-0.334)  (1.128)  (0.048) 
AudComSz  -0.006  -0.006  -0.009  -0.009  -0.007 
  (-0.950)  (-0.923)  (-1.209)  (-1.266)  (-1.018) 
AudShare  0.157  0.177  0.191*  0.174  0.146 
  (1.312)  (1.363)  (1.785)  (1.654)  (1.198) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.745)  (0.706)  (1.017)  (0.966)  (0.619) 
LnAssets 0.005 -0.010 -0.037 -0.010 0.030 -0.003 0.000 -0.009 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.364) (-1.141) (-1.158) (-1.136) (1.283) (-0.236) (0.417) (-1.064) (0.313) (-0.192) 
Mark2Book 0.002*** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (4.000) (-1.045) (0.668) (-1.349) (0.167) (0.290) (-0.311) (-1.368) (-1.241) (0.731) 
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Leverage -0.124 0.126 0.287 0.160* -0.111 0.098 -0.006 0.158* -0.046 0.092 
 (-1.118) (1.664) (0.972) (1.839) (-0.591) (1.124) (-1.337) (1.954) (-0.427) (1.076) 
DealVal 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.056) (1.891) (1.038) (1.728) (-0.831) (0.142) (-0.648) (1.558) (-0.847) (-0.015) 
Constant -0.010 0.088 0.014 0.089 -0.066 0.054 0.010 0.088 0.156 0.038 
 (-0.074) (1.133) (0.044) (1.057) (-0.215) (0.445) (1.028) (1.088) (0.913) (0.323) 
Observations 82 80 79 78 67 65 82 80 67 65 
R-squared 0.365 0.170 0.210 0.182 0.234 0.090 0.198 0.164 0.182 0.099 
F-test 6.739 1.622 1.753 1.511 12.01 1.305 1.556 1.464 2.572 1.583 
Prob > F 0.000 0.118 0.075 0.155 0.000 0.251 0.126 0.172 0.009 0.137 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3.6 Panel B.  OLS Regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx AccruDe CFO+DisEx AccruDe 
Accruals -0.287  -0.167  
 (-0.468)  (-0.492)  
Prod+DisEx  -0.017   
  (-0.645)   
CFO+DisEx    -0.028 
    (-0.632) 
ROA -0.677**  -0.383**  
 (-2.068)  (-2.069)  
MarketSh -1.882*  -1.577***  
 (-1.998)  (-2.770)  
Z-score 0.108***  0.048*  
 (2.902)  (1.918)  
InsShare 0.116  0.025  
 (0.279)  (0.111)  
PE Ratio 0.001  0.000  
 (0.923)  (0.806)  
BoardSz 0.040  0.027*  
 (1.390)  (1.685)  
NED% 0.556  0.246  
 (1.617)  (1.202)  
Big5  -0.017  -0.018 
  (-0.774)  (-0.814) 
LNAuditTn  -0.001  -0.003 
  (-0.080)  (-0.281) 
AudComSz  -0.009  -0.009 
  (-1.143)  (-1.161) 
AudShare  0.219*  0.188* 
  (1.968)  (1.716) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000 
  (1.040)  (1.029) 
LnAssets -0.032 -0.005 -0.010 -0.002 
 (-0.811) (-0.363) (-0.400) (-0.165) 
Mark2Book 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.020) (0.578) (-0.560) (0.316) 
Leverage 0.300 0.127 0.119 0.102 
 (0.885) (1.258) (0.574) (1.170) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.312) (0.161) (-0.238) (0.069) 
Constant -0.298 0.062 -0.167 0.042 
 (-0.562) (0.484) (-0.527) (0.362) 
Observations 64 63 67 65 
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R-squared 0.171 0.104 0.197 0.087 
F-test 2.910 1.441 18.59 1.269 
Prob > F 0.004 0.189 0.000 0.271 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4.1 Panel A  Robustness 3SLS regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruJo ProdCos AccruJo DisExp AccruJo Res&Dev AccruJo SGA AccruJo 
Sign (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (?) (-) (-) (-) 
AccruJo -1.152***  2.825***  1.579**  0.117***  -0.286  
 (-4.408)  (4.858)  (2.349)  (7.695)  (-0.776)  
CFO  -0.274***         
  (-3.601)         
ProdCos    0.199***       
    (6.561)       
DisExp      0.055     
      (1.296)     
Res&Dev        8.203***   
        (8.959)   
SGA          -0.063 
          (-1.011) 
ROA 0.167*  -0.012  -0.085  -0.001  -0.371**  
 (1.858)  (-0.063)  (-0.320)  (-0.330)  (-2.564)  
MarketSh 0.251  1.370  -10.759  0.003  -1.766  
 (0.109)  (0.278)  (-1.620)  (0.032)  (-0.490)  
Z-score -0.003  0.002  -0.004  0.000  0.010**  
 (-0.927)  (0.296)  (-0.431)  (0.296)  (2.175)  
InsShare -0.038  0.002  0.208  0.000  0.164**  
 (-0.745)  (0.018)  (1.369)  (0.224)  (1.993)  
PE Ratio -0.002***  -0.000  -0.003***  -0.000  -0.000  
 (-4.205)  (-0.291)  (-2.683)  (-0.030)  (-0.011)  
BoardSz 0.003  -0.009  -0.016  0.000  -0.014  
 (0.413)  (-0.521)  (-0.768)  (0.161)  (-1.248)  
NED% 0.099  -0.086  -0.427**  -0.001  -0.087  
 (1.270)  (-0.509)  (-1.992)  (-0.212)  (-0.750)  
Big5  0.002  0.005  0.004  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.147)  (0.408)  (0.225)  (0.251)  (-0.033) 
LNAuditTn  -0.009  -0.007  -0.012  -0.002  -0.013 
  (-1.126)  (-0.911)  (-1.159)  (-0.537)  (-1.257) 
AudComSz  0.002  0.001  0.008  -0.000  0.007 
  (0.427)  (0.120)  (1.024)  (-0.164)  (0.910) 
AudShare  0.000  0.031  0.038  0.015  0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.504)  (0.472)  (0.435)  (0.061) 
OpeCycle  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000** 
  (-1.373)  (-1.589)  (-1.795)  (-0.187)  (-2.098) 
LnAssets -0.004 0.003 -0.020 0.006 0.079** 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 
 (-0.275) (0.491) (-0.685) (0.871) (2.281) (0.201) (0.202) (-0.178) (-0.323) (0.488) 
Mark2Book 0.011 0.006 -0.018 0.004 -0.007 0.008 -0.001* 0.007* -0.001 0.007 
 (1.601) (1.340) (-1.149) (1.125) (-0.285) (1.496) (-1.703) (1.807) (-0.102) (1.224) 
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Leverage -0.150 -0.016 -0.034 0.023 -0.149 0.005 -0.006 0.050 -0.036 0.007 
 (-1.462) (-0.258) (-0.148) (0.375) (-0.562) (0.078) (-0.745) (0.775) (-0.260) (0.105) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.522) (0.339) (-0.664) (0.496) (1.470) (-0.126) (-0.296) (0.306) (0.529) (-0.089) 
Constant -0.066 -0.054 0.418 -0.089 -0.696** -0.036 0.002 -0.015 0.105 -0.059 
 (-0.506) (-0.770) (1.420) (-1.302) (-2.059) (-0.441) (0.194) (-0.222) (0.587) (-0.754) 
Observations 111 111 110 110 93 93 109 109 93 93 
R-squared -0.076 -0.092 -0.353 -0.101 -0.022 0.015 -0.337 -0.310 0.193 0.123 
Wald chi2 54.90 20.11 33.43 47.91 27.08 14.41 82.48 96.58 21.74 12.24 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.028 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.269 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4.1 Panel B  Robustness 3SLS regressions for MBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx AccruJo CFO+DisEx AccruJo 
AccruJo 1.671  -0.143  
 (1.568)  (-0.181)  
Prod+DisEx  0.060***   
  (2.607)   
CFO+DisEx    0.023 
    (0.686) 
ROA 0.213  -0.075  
 (0.515)  (-0.242)  
MarketSh 9.837  9.179  
 (0.976)  (1.190)  
Z-score 0.000  0.006  
 (0.017)  (0.658)  
InsShare -0.370  -0.153  
 (-1.560)  (-0.868)  
PE Ratio 0.003  0.006***  
 (1.636)  (4.309)  
BoardSz 0.013  0.014  
 (0.432)  (0.575)  
NED% 0.321  0.349  
 (0.980)  (1.407)  
Big5  0.002  0.002 
  (0.114)  (0.135) 
LNAuditTn  -0.012  -0.013 
  (-1.159)  (-1.192) 
AudComSz  0.007  0.008 
  (0.861)  (1.002) 
AudShare  0.006  0.015 
  (0.072)  (0.180) 
OpeCycle  -0.000**  -0.000** 
  (-2.262)  (-2.202) 
LnAssets -0.086 0.008 -0.075* 0.006 
 (-1.634) (1.045) (-1.923) (0.697) 
Mark2Book -0.028 0.008 -0.018 0.008 
 (-0.787) (1.499) (-0.654) (1.554) 
Leverage -0.088 0.028 0.231 0.008 
 (-0.227) (0.416) (0.782) (0.115) 
DealVal -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.328) (0.103) (-1.344) (-0.028) 
Constant 1.048** -0.122 0.774** -0.087 
 (1.993) (-1.539) (2.019) (-1.072) 
Observations 92 92 93 93 
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R-squared 0.151 0.141 0.235 0.126 
Wald chi2 19.38 17.28 29.56 12.16 
Prob > chi2 0.080 0.069 0.003 0.275 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4.2 Panel A  Robustness 3SLS regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(1) AEM(1) REM(2) AEM(2) REM(3) AEM(3) REM(4) AEM(4) REM(5) AEM(5) 
Depend.Var CFO AccruJo ProdCos AccruJo DisExp AccruJo Res&Dev AccruJo SGA AccruJo 
Sign (-) (?) (+) (?) (-) (?) (?) (?) (-) (?) 
AccruJo -2.050**  4.260**  2.362*  0.068  -1.506  
 (-2.193)  (1.982)  (1.716)  (1.127)  (-1.374)  
CFO  -0.311***         
  (-3.452)         
ProdCos    0.147***       
    (3.408)       
DisExp      0.178***     
      (3.349)     
Res&Dev        0.353   
        (0.191)   
SGA          -0.382*** 
          (-4.963) 
ROA -0.134  0.038  0.394  0.004  0.034  
 (-1.122)  (0.132)  (1.513)  (0.384)  (0.226)  
MarketSh 0.337  -0.223  0.737  0.005  0.090  
 (0.487)  (-0.138)  (0.559)  (0.089)  (0.127)  
Z-score 0.025  -0.019  -0.064*  -0.002*  -0.010  
 (1.455)  (-0.387)  (-1.838)  (-1.750)  (-0.454)  
InsShare 0.044  0.002  -0.040  -0.008  -0.003  
 (0.483)  (0.009)  (-0.198)  (-1.117)  (-0.021)  
PE Ratio 0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  
 (0.737)  (-0.246)  (-0.828)  (0.537)  (-0.401)  
BoardSz -0.008  0.020  -0.014  -0.001**  -0.011  
 (-1.044)  (1.023)  (-0.873)  (-2.229)  (-0.991)  
NED% -0.042  0.228  -0.154  0.002  -0.078  
 (-0.454)  (1.030)  (-0.778)  (0.223)  (-0.657)  
Big5  -0.002  -0.000  -0.013  -0.002  -0.011 
  (-0.095)  (-0.010)  (-0.526)  (-0.089)  (-0.493) 
LNAuditTn  -0.002  0.001  -0.004  0.012  -0.002 
  (-0.171)  (0.117)  (-0.277)  (0.847)  (-0.165) 
AudComSz  -0.003  -0.005  -0.001  -0.007  -0.008 
  (-0.461)  (-0.698)  (-0.141)  (-0.725)  (-0.834) 
AudShare  0.068  0.080  0.116  0.184  0.080 
  (0.661)  (0.790)  (0.905)  (1.491)  (0.661) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.513)  (0.422)  (1.057)  (1.122)  (0.436) 
LnAssets -0.027 -0.015** 0.026 -0.010 0.058* -0.014 0.002 -0.016** -0.004 -0.004 
 (-1.356) (-1.974) (0.577) (-1.310) (1.878) (-1.376) (1.244) (-2.033) (-0.170) (-0.397) 
Mark2Book 0.005** 0.002*** -0.006 0.002** -0.004 0.001 -0.000 0.002** 0.003 0.002** 
 (2.147) (2.648) (-1.081) (1.972) (-0.997) (1.616) (-0.915) (2.067) (0.957) (2.083) 
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Leverage 0.099 0.082 -0.327 0.099* -0.379 0.129* -0.018 0.192*** 0.088 0.088 
 (0.536) (1.388) (-0.706) (1.711) (-1.626) (1.928) (-1.410) (3.438) (0.519) (1.271) 
DealVal 0.000* 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.790) (1.650) (-0.745) (1.050) (-0.615) (0.300) (-0.831) (1.294) (-0.485) (-0.251) 
Constant 0.260 0.145* -0.368 0.091 -0.402 0.165 -0.001 0.141* 0.145 0.058 
 (1.340) (1.858) (-0.827) (1.131) (-1.189) (1.481) (-0.091) (1.758) (0.651) (0.530) 
Observations 76 76 75 75 62 62 74 74 60 60 
R-squared -1.353 0.157 -1.454 0.091 -0.434 0.041 -0.234 0.219 -0.698 -0.009 
Wald chi2 19.53 31.41 18.89 35.57 14.52 21.53 11.98 22.71 23.30 40.54 
Prob > chi2 0.077 0.001 0.091 0.000 0.269 0.018 0.447 0.012 0.025 0.000 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4.2 Panel B  Robustness 3SLS regressions for IBOs 
Models REM(6) AEM(6) REM(7) AEM(7) 
Depend.Var Prod+DisEx AccruJo CFO+DisEx AccruJo 
AccruJo -1.702  -1.975  
 (-0.710)  (-1.495)  
Prod+DisEx  -0.043   
  (-1.338)   
CFO+DisEx    -0.193*** 
    (-3.397) 
ROA -0.755  -0.312  
 (-1.470)  (-1.211)  
MarketSh -1.872  -1.166  
 (-0.759)  (-0.883)  
Z-score 0.125  0.044  
 (1.471)  (1.322)  
InsShare 0.211  0.028  
 (0.511)  (0.140)  
PE Ratio 0.001  0.000  
 (0.812)  (0.654)  
BoardSz 0.038  0.018  
 (1.251)  (1.086)  
NED% 0.491  0.215  
 (1.296)  (1.092)  
Big5  -0.017  -0.013 
  (-0.599)  (-0.508) 
LNAuditTn  -0.002  -0.004 
  (-0.139)  (-0.270) 
AudComSz  -0.006  -0.002 
  (-0.513)  (-0.221) 
AudShare  0.177  0.131 
  (1.271)  (0.990) 
OpeCycle  0.000  0.000 
  (1.210)  (1.189) 
LnAssets -0.043 -0.007 -0.032 -0.010 
 (-0.866) (-0.684) (-1.065) (-0.984) 
Mark2Book 0.006 0.002** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.888) (2.019) (0.588) (1.319) 
Leverage 0.437 0.129* 0.414* 0.156** 
 (1.014) (1.864) (1.817) (2.269) 
DealVal 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.335) (0.135) (-0.186) (-0.109) 
Constant -0.206 0.089 0.131 0.126 
 (-0.356) (0.787) (0.394) (1.149) 
Observations 61 61 62 62 
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R-squared 0.082 0.155 -0.312 -0.001 
Wald chi2 10.30 12.60 14.18 21.75 
Prob > chi2 0.590 0.247 0.289 0.016 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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